Newmont (NEM) — Stock Analysis 2026 [4.0]

Analysis as of 7 August 2026. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Newmont Corporation’s fiscal-2025 Form 10-K (year ended 31 December 2025), updated for its Second Quarter 2026 results (reported 22 July 2026). Reserves are attributable proven-and-probable, effective 31 December 2025, reported under SEC S-K 1300 at a US$2,000/oz gold reserve price. Market data is as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026. Rating: ★★★★ (4.0/5), Solid — Fairly valued (wide band) → the world’s largest gold producer, now net cash, with the industry’s deepest reserve base and record free cash flow, but scored down for a mid-pack cost position and a checkered multi-year capital-allocation record; the market already capitalises it on roughly US$4,000/oz gold, so the value is fair rather than cheap. Price deck (rule V26): base gold US$4,000/oz (the three-month trailing average, rounded down on the US$500 grid, kept below the recent spike); bear US$3,000/oz (the long-term/incentive reversion case); bull US$4,500/oz; against spot ~US$4,350/oz; copper base US$4.50/lb; 5% real discount rate, the precious-metals convention. Financials are in US dollars (Newmont’s reporting currency and its primary NYSE listing). Refreshed on each quarterly report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Newmont is the largest gold miner in the world, and after two years of digesting the US$16.8 billion Newcrest takeover it has spent 2025 doing the harder, quieter work: selling six mines, paying down debt, and turning a bloated portfolio back into a focused set of tier-1 operations. The thesis in one line: a ~5.3-million-ounce-a-year gold major with 118 million ounces of reserves — the deepest base in the sector — a net-cash balance sheet, and record free cash flow at today’s gold price, priced at roughly its own net asset value struck on a conservative deck. It is worth a look now because the two things that dogged the stock through 2024 — cost blowouts and a credibility gap with the market — have given way in 2025–26 to falling leverage, a record US$2.2 billion free-cash-flow quarter, and a reset capital-returns framework under a brand-new chief executive, even as gold trades above US$4,300. To screen Newmont against every other gold producer on reserves, AISC and reserve life, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Newmont Corporation (NYSE: NEM; also listed in Toronto, on the ASX as CDIs and on the PNGX) is the world’s largest gold producer — a diversified precious-metals major headquartered in Denver, Colorado, operating around 13 mines across nine countries with gold the overwhelming majority of revenue and copper, silver, zinc and lead as co-products. By archetype it is a producer/operator (gold major), so the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). Its managed operations span the United States (its 38.5% share of Nevada Gold Mines), Australia (Boddington, Cadia, Tanami), Papua New Guinea (Lihir), Ghana (Ahafo), Canada (Brucejack, Red Chris), Mexico (Peñasquito), Peru (Yanacocha), Argentina (Cerro Negro) and Suriname (Merian), plus a 40% stake in Pueblo Viejo in the Dominican Republic. (koz = thousand ounces; Moz = million ounces; AISC = all-in sustaining cost per ounce; GEO = gold-equivalent ounces; 2P/P&P = proven-and-probable reserves; M&I = measured-and-indicated resources; kt = thousand tonnes; Mlb = million pounds.)

Figure 1. Newmont in numbers

Figure data: Newmont FY2025 Form 10-K (year ended 31 December 2025) for production, reserves, revenue, cost and balance-sheet figures; Q2 2026 results (22 July 2026) for the net-cash position and 2026 guidance; market data per stockanalysis.com as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.

Table 1. Newmont in numbers

Source: Newmont FY2025 10-K for operational, reserve and financial figures (reserves under SEC S-K 1300, effective 31 December 2025, at a US$2,000/oz gold price); Q2 2026 results for the net-cash position and 2026 guidance; market data, share count, 52-week range and consensus per stockanalysis.com and WallStreetZen , 6 Aug 2026. Enterprise value is market cap less ~$4 bn net cash. Cash margin is adjusted EBITDA divided by revenue. Listed: Public (NYSE: NEM; TSX: NGT; ASX/PNGX CDIs).

Thesis in brief. Bull: the sector’s unmatched scale and optionality — 118 Moz of reserves and 88 Moz of measured-and-indicated resources, roughly double the reserve base of the next-largest senior; a portfolio of long-life tier-1 mines (Cadia, Boddington, Tanami, Ahafo, the Nevada JV); a net-cash balance sheet with US$11.6 billion of liquidity; and a gold price above US$4,300 that is turning that base into record free cash flow (US$2.2 billion in Q2 2026 alone) now recycled into buybacks and a reset dividend. Bear: Newmont is a mid-cost, not low-cost, producer — FY2025 AISC of US$1,609/oz sits above best-in-class peers; its recent capital-allocation record is uneven (the full-priced Newcrest deal, subsequent write-downs, a dividend cut, and 2024’s cost-and-production credibility gap that drew a securities class action); and it carries real exposure to higher-risk jurisdictions (Argentina, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Ghana) and a fresh, if experienced, chief executive. What tips it: whether the new capital-allocation discipline holds and gold stays near its elevated level — the base case already assumes a US$4,000/oz deck, so the reward is compounding rather than a re-rating, and the risk is a reversion toward US$3,000. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Newmont sells into the strongest gold market in a generation — spot gold above US$4,300/oz in early August 2026, up more than 20% year-to-date, lifted by central-bank buying, rate-cut expectations and safe-haven demand. Because the company books reserves at a deliberately conservative US$2,000/oz, spot prices well over twice that level flow almost entirely to margin. (No Complete Market Guide for gold is published on this blog yet, so there is no macro link here; this section spends its words on the company, not the metal.)

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

A genuinely diversified major: no single mine is more than about a sixth of revenue, and the base spans stable tier-1 jurisdictions and higher-risk emerging markets alike. The 2025 divestiture programme — six mines and a development project sold — is what turned a sprawling ~20-mine map into the focused set below.

Table 2. Asset base (managed operations and material joint ventures)

Source: Newmont FY2025 10-K — per-mine gold produced and gold AISC from the operating-statistics tables (Item 7); per-mine 2P reserves from the S-K 1300 reserve statement (effective 31 December 2025, US$2,000/oz), consolidated with the Metal Pilot project model. Merian is 75%-owned (production shown on a 100% basis); NGM (38.5%) and Pueblo Viejo (40%) are non-operated equity-method JVs operated by Barrick, so their gold is shown attributable. Yanacocha’s near-term oxide reserve is small; its value sits in the Yanacocha Sulfides project. Listed: Public (NYSE: NEM).

Two facts about that table carry the section. The portfolio is diversified but only moderately concentrated at the top: the largest single interest, the 38.5% of Nevada Gold Mines, is about 15.7% of revenue, and no other mine exceeds ~15% — a genuine spread of assets that no other gold company matches, but also a spread that dilutes any single mine’s ability to move the needle. And the reserve base is where Newmont’s scale really shows: at 118.2 Moz of proven-and-probable gold it holds close to double the reserves of the next-largest senior, with a further 88.1 Moz of measured-and-indicated and 60.6 Moz of inferred resources behind it. A proportional-symbol map would place mines on four continents, but this post type does not draw one (see Section 10.1); the table and this paragraph carry the concentration read the map would have.

2.2 Revenue split — by metal & by asset

The two clearest reads of what earns the money: the metal mix behind the “gold company” label, and the mine-level concentration behind it. Both are built on FY2025 segment sales as reported in the 10-K.

Figure 2. Revenue by metal, FY2025

Figure data: Newmont FY2025 10-K , consolidated statements of operations / segment sales. Gold is 85% of revenue; copper is the meaningful second metal (from Cadia, Boddington and Red Chris), with silver, zinc and lead the polymetallic output of Peñasquito.

Figure 3. Revenue by asset, FY2025

Figure data: Newmont FY2025 10-K , segment sales table (Note 4). “Other” bundles Merian, Brucejack, Cerro Negro, Red Chris and the part-year contribution of the five mines divested during 2025 (CC&V, Musselwhite, Éléonore, Akyem, Porcupine).

Read together, the two figures say the useful thing: Newmont is 85% a gold company with a genuine copper kicker (from Cadia, Boddington and the Red Chris block cave to come) and a polymetallic silver/lead/zinc leg at Peñasquito that makes that mine, on gold-equivalent terms, one of its largest earners. And the revenue is unusually well spread — the top asset is under 16% and it takes eight mines to reach two-thirds of sales — which is a durability strength (no single-mine cliff) and, simultaneously, why Newmont’s growth is slow: moving a 5.3-Moz company meaningfully requires several assets pulling at once.

2.3 Nevada Gold Mines — the anchor stake

Newmont’s single largest source of gold is not a mine it operates but its 38.5% interest in Nevada Gold Mines, the Barrick-operated joint venture that combined the two companies’ Nevada assets (Carlin, Cortez, Turquoise Ridge, Phoenix and others) in 2019. On an attributable basis NGM produced 999 koz of gold in 2025 at an AISC of US$1,605/oz, and it holds roughly 34.7 Moz of attributable 2P reserves — the largest single reserve block in Newmont’s portfolio and one of the great gold districts on earth, with multi-decade life and continuous brownfield replacement. The asset-level significance is twofold: it gives Newmont a cornerstone position in the lowest-risk major gold jurisdiction in the world, and it does so without operating control — Barrick runs it, sets the budget and the mine plans, and Newmont takes 38.5% of the outcome. That is the asset’s one real drawback: its largest single value driver is a stake it cannot steer, and the relationship with Barrick has at times been prickly. As a durable, tier-1, dollar-stable reserve anchor, though, NGM is the quiet backbone of the whole company.

2.4 Cadia & Boddington — the low-cost Australian gold-copper base

Two Australian mines give Newmont its lowest-cost ounces, both by virtue of copper by-product credits. Cadia, in New South Wales, is the crown jewel Newmont inherited from Newcrest: a 100%-owned block-cave gold-copper mine with 13.5 Moz of gold reserves and a decades-long life, producing 385 koz of gold plus 885 million dollars of copper in 2025 at an AISC of just US$1,048/oz — among the lowest of any major gold mine because copper sales are credited against gold cost. The Cadia Panel Caves project (PC2-3 and PC1-2, ~US$2.0–2.4 billion) is extending that low-cost life deep into the 2030s, with the first PC1-2 drawbell fired in December 2025. Boddington, in Western Australia, is a 100%-owned open-pit gold-copper mine with 10.2 Moz of gold reserves, producing 565 koz of gold and copper at US$1,288/oz in 2025 — a large, long-life, autonomous-haulage operation that is the definition of a steady tier-1 asset. Together the two are the reason Newmont’s blended cost is not higher than it is; the asset-level risk is grade and cave-management execution at Cadia, where block-cave ramp-ups are notoriously sensitive to draw sequencing.

2.5 Lihir & Ahafo — the higher-cost, higher-leverage ounces

Two assets give Newmont scale at the higher end of its cost curve, and thus more torque to the gold price. Lihir, on an island in Papua New Guinea, is a large, geologically complex 100%-owned mine sitting inside a live volcanic geothermal field; it holds ~16.0 Moz of reserves — one of the biggest single reserve blocks in the group — and produced 585 koz in 2025 at US$1,512/oz, with a multi-decade life and a long-running plan to lift throughput. Ahafo, in Ghana, combines the mature Ahafo South mine (US$1,072/oz, one of the group’s better costs) with Ahafo North, which reached commercial production in the fourth quarter of 2025 and adds a new, ~4.7-Moz-reserve source of ounces in a jurisdiction Newmont knows well; together Ahafo produced 734 koz in 2025. The two assets carry more jurisdiction and operating risk than the Australian base — PNG’s infrastructure and community complexity at Lihir, and West-African fiscal and power risk at Ahafo — but they are also where a rising gold price does the most for margin, because their costs start higher.

2.6 Peñasquito & the rest of the operating book

Peñasquito, in Zacatecas, Mexico, is Newmont’s largest polymetallic mine and, by revenue, its second-largest asset (US$3,419 million in 2025): a 100%-owned open pit producing gold, silver, lead and zinc, whose co-product credits drive an AISC of just US$984/oz on 415 koz of gold — but which also carries Mexican community and labour risk (a months-long 2023 blockade is fresh in the record). The remaining producing assets are grouped here as material but individually smaller: Yanacocha (Peru, 515 koz, with its long-dated Yanacocha Sulfides development option), Tanami (Australia, 391 koz, high-grade underground, with the ~US$1.7–1.8 billion Tanami Expansion 2 shaft due to reach commercial production in the second half of 2027 and extend life beyond 2040), Merian (Suriname, 75%-owned), Brucejack (Canada, high-grade underground), Cerro Negro (Argentina, high-grade but higher-risk), Red Chris (Canada, 70%-owned, a copper-gold block-cave development), and the 40% stake in Pueblo Viejo (Dominican Republic, Barrick-operated, ~253 koz attributable). The development and exploration pipeline — Wafi-Golpu (PNG, 50%), Norte Abierto (Chile, 50%), Galore Creek and NuevaUnión (Chile, 50%), and the Conga option — is copper-gold-weighted and mostly held in joint ventures, i.e. real long-dated optionality rather than near-term production.

2.7 Production, reserves & costs

At the group level Newmont is a company that got bigger through the Newcrest acquisition, then deliberately got smaller and cleaner. Attributable gold production ran ~5.96 Moz in 2022 (pre-Newcrest), 5.55 Moz in 2023 (Newcrest consolidated only from November), jumped to 6.85 Moz in 2024 with a full year of Newcrest, then fell to 5.89 Moz in 2025 as the six divested mines left the portfolio — with 2026 guided at 5.3 Moz, the clean run-rate of the streamlined company. Gold AISC was US$1,609/oz in 2025 (from US$1,516 in 2024), and year-to-date 2026 is tracking a little better on rising co-product credits. For context on where cost-curve position decides who survives a downturn, screen the peer set at Metal Pilot.

Figure 4. Attributable gold production, 2022–2026E

Figure data: 2022 (~5.96 Moz, pre-Newcrest) per Newmont’s 2022 results; 2023–2025 attributable gold per the FY2025 10-K ; 2026E is the reaffirmed 5.3-Moz guidance from the Q2 2026 results . The 2024 peak reflects a full year of Newcrest; the step down to 2025–26 is the deliberate divestiture of six non-core mines, not operational decline. One series per figure; AISC and reserve-life trends are in the tables and prose.

Reserves and replacement. Reserves are Newmont’s defining number. At year-end 2025 it held 118.2 Moz of attributable proven-and-probable gold reserves — booked at a conservative US$2,000/oz — plus 88.1 Moz of measured-and-indicated and 60.6 Moz of inferred gold resources, and material copper (including ~1.1 Mt at Cadia and large undeveloped copper-gold at Wafi-Golpu and Red Chris), silver, zinc and lead. On 2026 guidance that is a reserve life of roughly 22 years, well beyond the ~10–15 years typical of the sector, and the resource base behind it means much of that life is replaceable at existing mines. The honest caveats are two: the reserve price of US$2,000/oz is now less than half the spot price, so a portion of the reserve base is conservatively stated (an upside to NAV, not a risk), while at the same time reserves fell year-on-year as divestitures left the portfolio and some assets (notably Yanacocha’s oxides) approach the end of their current reserve life and depend on development projects to extend.

2.8 Peer positioning

The peer set used throughout this analysis — for every scorecard star in Section 9 and the relative valuation in Section 7 — is the five other senior gold producers Newmont is most directly compared against by scale and business model.

Table 3. Peer positioning — quality metrics (approximate, 2025 basis)

Source: Newmont per the FY2025 10-K ; peer scale, AISC and reserve figures are approximate, indicative 2025 figures compiled from company results and stockanalysis.com quote pages, shown for relative positioning rather than as precise like-for-like numbers (reserve prices and cost definitions differ by company). Screen the full gold peer set on production, AISC and reserve life at Metal Pilot.

Newmont sits first on scale and reserves by a wide margin, and mid-pack on cost. It is roughly 1.4× the production of the next-largest senior (Barrick) and more than double the reserve base of anyone in the group, which is the single strongest fact in its favour — no peer offers the same diversified, long-life, tier-1 breadth, and none matches its net-cash balance sheet. Where it clearly lags is unit cost: Agnico Eagle’s ~US$1,300/oz AISC is roughly US$300 below Newmont’s, and Kinross and Barrick also run leaner on gold, so Newmont is the scale-and-safety champion of the group rather than the margin champion. That is the trade the scorecard has to weigh — best-in-class size, reserves and balance sheet against a merely-average cost position and a bumpier recent operating record.

3. Financials & balance sheet

Table 4. Five-year financial summary (US$m unless stated, years ended 31 December)

Source: 2023–2025 figures per the Newmont FY2025 10-K (revenue, adjusted EBITDA, net and adjusted income, EPS, operating and free cash flow, net debt, dividends) and its non-GAAP reconciliations; 2021–2022 revenue per company results and WallStreetZen . The deeper earnings, cash-flow and leverage lines are shown for 2023–2025, the years disclosed on a consistent basis in the 10-K; 2021–2022 are pre-Newcrest and marked — rather than mixing an inconsistent basis (a disclosure choice noted in Section 10.1). Adjusted EBITDA, free cash flow and net debt are non-GAAP measures as defined in Newmont’s MD&A. Net debt in the table is total debt and leases less cash; the 2025 figure is a net-cash position.

Figure 5. Revenue by fiscal year, 2021–2025

Figure data: Newmont FY2025 10-K and prior-year revenue (Table 4). The step change from 2023 to 2024 is a full year of Newcrest; the further rise into 2025 is the gold price — Newmont realised US$3,498/oz in 2025 versus US$2,408 in 2024 — more than offsetting the revenue lost to divestitures. One series per figure; the earnings, cash-flow and margin lines stay in Table 4.

The five-year record traces two forces at once: a transformational acquisition and a historic gold price. Revenue rose to US$22.7 billion in 2025 (+21%), but the more important line is what fell through to cash: with a realised gold price of US$3,498/oz against a US$1,609 all-in cost, adjusted EBITDA reached US$13.48 billion at a ~59% margin, operating cash flow was US$10.33 billion, and free cash flow was US$7.30 billion — a step change from US$2.9 billion the year before and a rounding error (US$88 million) in 2023. Adjusted net income of US$7.63 billion (US$6.89 per diluted share) and reported net income from continuing operations of US$7.09 billion (US$6.39) confirm that the operating leverage to gold, on a book this large, is enormous.

Balance sheet and liquidity. This is Newmont’s quiet transformation. The company ended 2025 in a net-cash position of US$2.06 billion — a swing of roughly US$7.4 billion from US$5.3 billion of net debt a year earlier — with US$7.6 billion of consolidated cash and US$11.6 billion of total liquidity, having redeemed US$3.4 billion of senior notes during the year. Total debt is down to around US$5.6 billion against that larger cash pile, the maturities are well-termed and investment-grade, and Q2 2026’s record free cash flow pushed the net-cash position higher still (to roughly US$4 billion on this analysis’s estimate). Among senior gold producers this is a best-in-class balance sheet: Newmont can fund its entire growth pipeline from cash flow and still return capital.

Hedging. Like most senior gold producers, Newmont is essentially unhedged on gold — it retains full exposure to the gold price, which is a deliberate choice that maximises upside in a rising market (and downside in a falling one). It carries only routine, modest hedging of some input costs and currencies and uses provisional pricing on its copper and polymetallic concentrate sales; there is no gold price-protection book to cushion a reversion, which is why the price risk in Section 6 is scored as fully carried.

Capital returns. Newmont’s capital-returns history is the clearest single window on its uneven allocation record. Under the old gold-price-linked framework it paid an elevated dividend (around US$2.20 per share in 2021–22), then cut it as free cash flow tightened during the Newcrest integration — to a US$1.00 base plus a variable component, and a declared US$1.45 in 2023 falling to US$1.00–1.01 in 2024–25. In February 2026 the board reset the framework again, declaring a US$0.26 quarterly dividend (~US$1.04 annualised, ~1.0% yield) designed to be “sustainable through the commodity cycle,” alongside buybacks: Newmont settled US$2.3 billion of repurchases in 2025 (under US$1 billion and US$2 billion programs authorised in 2024) and returned US$1.8 billion to shareholders in Q2 2026 alone, with cumulative buybacks topping 100 million shares. The direction of travel — a smaller, sustainable dividend plus opportunistic buybacks funded by record cash flow — is shareholder-friendly and disciplined; the history behind it is why capital allocation is not scored higher.

4. Management, strategy & corporate structure

4.1 Management & governance

Newmont is run, as of this analysis, by a new chief executive in her first year. Natascha Viljoen became President and Chief Executive Officer on 1 January 2026, promoted from President and Chief Operating Officer; a metallurgist by training, she previously served as CEO of Anglo American Platinum and joined Newmont’s board as a non-independent director on the same date. She succeeded Tom Palmer, who retired on 31 December 2025 after a planned transition. The board is chaired by Gregory H. Boyce as Non-Executive Chair — the former chairman and CEO of Peabody Energy — and, following Viljoen’s appointment, reached 42% female representation, with an independent-director majority and the standard committee structure. The governance file carries a real overhang: a securities class action (Karas v. Newmont Corp.), filed in January 2025, and several shareholder derivative suits allege that Newmont and its then-CEO, COO and CFO made misleading statements about costs and production between February and October 2024, and question stock sales by the then-CEO during that window. The claims are unproven and Newmont is defending them, but they are the concrete expression of the 2024 credibility gap and are weighed directly in the Dimension 7 score. The new CEO’s task — deliver guidance cleanly and rebuild trust with the market — is the single most important management variable in the thesis.

4.2 Strategy & capital allocation

Strategy since late 2023 has been dominated by one word: focus. Having acquired Newcrest, Newmont set out to run a portfolio of around ten tier-1 managed operations plus its Nevada and Pueblo Viejo JVs, and to sell everything else. Through 2025 it executed exactly that, divesting CC&V, Musselwhite, Éléonore, Akyem and Porcupine (and the Coffee development project), on top of the 2024 sale of Telfer and the Havieron stake — a programme that raised more than US$4.3 billion of gross proceeds and is the direct cause of the lower, cleaner 5.3-Moz production base. Alongside the divestitures it targeted the US$500 million of annual Newcrest synergies and used the proceeds and record cash flow to slash debt to net cash and restart shareholder returns. The named forward growth is organic and funded: Tanami Expansion 2 to commercial production in the second half of 2027 (life beyond 2040), the Cadia Panel Caves through 2029, Ahafo North now ramping, the Red Chris block cave, and longer-dated copper-gold optionality at Wafi-Golpu and Norte Abierto. The strategy is coherent and, so far, executed; the tension the reader should watch is the same one that produced the Newcrest premium — whether a cash-rich major with a fresh CEO can resist the next large, full-priced acquisition and keep compounding per share instead.

4.3 Ownership & corporate structure

Newmont is a widely held company with no controlling shareholder; its largest holders are the index managers (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street) typical of a US mega-cap, and it trades on the NYSE (NEM), the TSX (NGT) and as CDIs on the ASX and PNGX (the latter two a legacy of Newcrest and of the PNG-based Lihir asset). The defining structural event of the last three years is the Newcrest Mining acquisition, completed on 6 November 2023 — an all-scrip deal valued at roughly US$16.8 billion, the largest transaction in gold-mining history, which brought Cadia, Lihir, Red Chris, Brucejack, Telfer and the Havieron project into the portfolio and made Newmont roughly a third larger. The 2025 divestitures then reversed much of that expansion by design, selling the acquired-and-legacy non-core mines named in Section 4.2 to buyers including SSR Mining (CC&V), Orla Mining (Musselwhite), Discovery Silver (Porcupine) and Zijin (Akyem). The capital structure is otherwise clean — roughly 1,055–1,088 million shares outstanding (falling on the buyback), investment-grade debt, no controlling block and no material warrants — so per-share value is driven by the buyback and the underlying cash flow rather than by the register.

5. ESG & sustainability

Newmont’s sustainability positioning is, on paper, among the most developed in mining, and in practice carries a serious recent blemish. On climate it holds 2020 science-based targets to cut Scope 1 and 2 emissions 32% and Scope 3 30% by 2030, with an ambition of carbon neutrality by 2050 — targets it is rebaselining after the Newcrest acquisition and the 2025 divestitures materially changed its emissions footprint — and it has tied US$1 billion of 2.6% sustainability-linked senior notes (due 2032) to its 2030 emissions and women-in-leadership goals, so missing them carries a direct financial penalty. It is a member of the ICMM, commits to the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM), and reports against SASB and TCFD. The blemish is safety: two members of the Newmont workforce died in an accident at Cerro Negro, Argentina, in April 2024, prompting a suspension and investigation, and the same site suffered further safety-related shutdowns in the first quarter of 2025 before resuming in April. For a company whose stated first value is safety, a double fatality and a repeat suspension at the same asset are a genuine licence-to-operate failure, not a disclosure footnote — and, together with Peñasquito’s community and labour history, they are why Dimension 9 is scored around, not above, the peer median despite strong programs and disclosure.

6. Risks

Newmont’s risk profile is dominated by three themes: total, unhedged exposure to a gold price trading at a historic and possibly unsustainable high; a mid-pack cost base vulnerable to inflation; and a spread of assets that includes several higher-risk jurisdictions, layered over a still-fresh management team and a live securities case.

Table 5. Risk register

Source: risk categories drawn from Newmont’s FY2025 10-K risk factors and the Q2 2026 results . Likelihood and impact ratings are the author’s assessment on a 1–5 scale, not disclosed figures.

Figure 6. Risk matrix — likelihood against impact

Figure data: the Table 5 risk register, drawn from the Newmont FY2025 10-K risk factors. Each point prints its likelihood × impact score; the shaded region is the high-likelihood, high-impact quadrant. Ratings are the author’s assessment, not disclosed figures.

The register’s shape explains the rating. The one risk that dominates the value axis is the gold price, and it is unusual: Newmont is unhedged, so a reversion from spot (~US$4,350) toward the long-term/incentive price (~US$3,000) would take a large bite out of the free cash flow the current price implies — the bear scenario in Section 7 prices exactly that. It is cushioned, not eliminated, by a net-cash balance sheet and a 118-Moz reserve base that stays cash-generative even at US$3,000. Cost inflation is the second-order commodity risk on a mid-pack cost base. The operational, jurisdiction and ESG risks are real but diversified — no single mine can break the company — and the governance and capital-allocation risks are about trust and discipline rather than solvency. The valuation below prices the gold-price and cost risks into the bear scenario and treats the growth pipeline as probable rather than certain.

7. Valuation

Valuation as of 7 August 2026, financials and per-share values in US dollars. Horizon: spot fair value. Deck (rule V26): base gold US$4,000/oz (the three-month trailing average, rounded down on the US$500 grid, held below the recent spike); bear US$3,000/oz (the long-term/incentive reversion); bull US$4,500/oz; against spot ~US$4,350/oz; copper base US$4.50/lb. Discount rate 5% real (after-tax) — the precious-metals convention and the rate at which the peer set’s NAVs are struck — sensitised at 3% and 7%. Share price US$105.43, ~1,055 m shares; net cash ~US$4.0 bn (Q2 2026).

Newmont is a producer/operator (gold major), so it is valued sum-of-the-parts: the after-tax net present value of the operating reserve base, a risked credit for the development pipeline and the resources beyond reserves, and a bridge to equity through the net-cash balance sheet. The conclusion: a base-case net asset value of ~US$107 per share and a blended base-case fair value of ~US$111, against a US$105.43 share price — a P/NAV of ~0.99× and an implied +5% — for a value read of Fairly valued (wide band), with a scenario range from ~US$62 (bear) to ~US$135 (bull).

7.1 Method selection

Table 6. Valuation method selection

Source: method-to-archetype mapping per the Metal Pilot valuation framework ; the archetype is stated in Section 1 and the peer set in Section 2.8. The blend carries one intrinsic method (50%) and two cash-flow/relative methods (together 50%) — the producer default, at the input-family ceiling. Multiple and yield conventions are sell-side senior-gold norms, not current peer observations.

7.2 Net asset value

The intrinsic anchor is a discounted after-tax cash-flow model of the operating mines: ~5.3 Moz of attributable gold a year, declining as reserves deplete over the ~22-year reserve life, at the base deck of US$4,000/oz gold against an all-in cost near US$1,570–1,600/oz (co-product credits netted), taxed at ~27% and net of growth capital, discounted at 5% real. To that operating NPV the model adds a risked credit for the development pipeline (Wafi-Golpu, Norte Abierto, Red Chris block cave, Galore Creek/NuevaUnión — mostly 50% JVs, carried at a fraction of an in-production value) and a risked credit for the resources beyond reserves (88 Moz M&I + 60 Moz inferred). Because Newmont carries net cash, the bridge to equity adds rather than subtracts.

Table 7. Net asset value build-up, base case (US$bn)

Source: this analysis’s sum-of-the-parts model. Reserves, production and cost inputs per the Newmont FY2025 10-K ; net cash per the Q2 2026 results . The operating NPV, the development and resource credits and the per-share NAV are the author’s model outputs, not company or evaluator figures — Newmont does not publish a single-company NAV. The development and resource credits are deliberately conservative, carried well below the ~US$900/oz enterprise value the reserves alone imply.

Figure 7. Net asset value build-up

Figure data: this analysis’s sum-of-the-parts model (Table 7), built on Newmont FY2025 10-K reserve and cost inputs. Equity net asset value of US$112.4 bn equates to ~US$107 per share. The operating mines carry almost all the value; the development and resource credits are deliberately small, and the net-cash bridge adds rather than subtracts — the mark of a fully-funded major.

Figure 8. NAV per share sensitivity — gold price × discount rate

Figure data: this analysis’s net-asset-value model (Table 7), on Newmont FY2025 10-K inputs, holding operating assumptions constant. Base case: gold US$4,000/oz, 5% real discount rate → US$107/share. A ±US$500/oz move in gold shifts NAV per share by roughly ±US$21 — high operating leverage on a ~US$1,600/oz cost base — and the current price of US$105.43 sits right at the base-case NAV, i.e. the market is pricing roughly the base deck. At spot (~US$4,350) NAV is well above the price; at a US$3,000 reversion it is well below.

7.3 Relative valuation and cross-checks

Table 8. Relative valuation cross-checks

Source: author’s calculations. Market capitalisation, enterprise value and trailing EBITDA per stockanalysis.com and the FY2025 10-K , 6 Aug 2026; the 2026 run-rate EBITDA and base-deck FCF are the author’s estimates anchored on Q2 2026 results and the base deck. Multiple and yield conventions are senior-gold norms, not current peer observations.

The cross-checks converge on the same message. On P/NAV (0.99×), forward EV/EBITDA (~7×) and FCF yield (~7%) Newmont looks squarely fairly priced for a senior gold major — neither the discount a troubled name trades at nor the premium a best-in-class low-cost producer commands. The one cheap-looking number, ~US$905 of enterprise value per reserve ounce, is the reward for its scale: 118 Moz is so large that per-ounce metrics understate it, and much of that value is decades out. Market-implied read (V19): solving the model back to the US$105.43 price, the market is capitalising Newmont on roughly US$4,000/oz gold — essentially the base deck, and below the ~US$4,350 spot. That is the crux of the valuation: the share price already reflects a strong-but-not-spot gold price, so the upside is not a mispricing to be corrected but a bet that gold stays elevated (and that the buyback keeps shrinking the count), while the downside is a reversion the unhedged book would feel in full.

7.4 Scenario analysis & conclusion

Table 9. Scenario valuation (blended fair value per share, US$)

Source: author’s model, per Table 7’s method with the deck changes stated. Each weighted method is recomputed in each scenario; the bear case is the one Section 6’s register describes — gold reverting toward US$3,000 while the unhedged book takes the full margin hit. These are illustrative scenarios, not forecasts.

The blended range is ~US$62 to ~US$135 per share, with a base case of ~US$111 against a US$105.43 price — an implied +5%, a Fairly valued (wide band) read (the bear case sits ~41% below today’s price). The anchor is the sum-of-the-parts NAV (~US$107), struck at a conservative US$4,000 deck rather than the ~US$4,350 spot; the cash-flow methods pull the blend a fraction higher because at US$4,000 gold Newmont’s free cash flow is enormous. Analyst consensus sits near US$143 (a Buy from the majority of ~25 analysts) — above this analysis’s base case and near its bull — which tells you the street is crediting a gold price at or above spot and/or a lower discount rate than this more conservative build. The value read is genuinely fair rather than cheap: at a through-cycle deck the reader is paying about net asset value for the best-scaled, best-capitalised name in gold, with the upside living in gold staying high and the buyback compounding, and roughly 40% of downside if gold mean-reverts.

Assumptions box. Valuation date 7 August 2026; all figures in US dollars; balance sheet as of Q2 2026; horizon spot fair value. Deck (rule V26): base gold US$4,000/oz (≈ 3-month trailing average, rounded down on the US$500 grid), bear US$3,000/oz, bull US$4,500/oz, spot ~US$4,350/oz; copper base US$4.50/lb. Discount rate 5% real after-tax, sensitised at 3% and 7% (V21: a real deck against a real rate). Share basis ~1,055 m shares (falling on the buyback). Intrinsic anchor: an author-built after-tax SOTP DCF of the operating reserve base plus risked development and resource credits; net-cash bridge per rule V9 (net cash adds to equity). Method weights 50/30/20 (one intrinsic, two cash-flow/relative) — the producer default. Primary yardstick: P/NAV. The analyst-consensus target, the dividend yield and the market-implied gold price are 0% cross-checks. Forward EBITDA and FCF are author estimates anchored on Q2 2026 results and company guidance.

8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Table 10. Near-term catalysts

Source: Newmont FY2025 10-K (project pipeline) and Q2 2026 results . All timing is company guidance, not a guarantee.

The catalysts are unusually low-drama for a company this size, and that is the point. The single most valuable near-term event is not a new mine but the compounding of the buyback: at today’s gold price Newmont generates enough free cash flow to retire a meaningful slice of its own shares every year, so per-share reserves, production and cash flow rise even as the group stays flat at ~5.3 Moz. The growth projects — Ahafo North ramping, the Cadia caves, Tanami Expansion 2 — protect the low-cost end of the portfolio and the reserve life rather than driving headline growth, and the deeper copper-gold options (Red Chris, Wafi-Golpu) sit beyond the window. (This is a producer, so there is no takeover-optionality subsection — that read is reserved for explorers and developers.)

9. Rating & verdict

Newmont is scored on the same nine dimensions every Metal Pilot company analysis uses, against the peer set declared in Section 2.8. As a producer/operator gold major it takes the reference weighting: asset quality, cost, reserves and life, balance sheet and capital allocation carry 15% each; growth, management, jurisdiction and ESG carry 6.25% each. No dimension is marked not-applicable.

Table 11. Scorecard rationale

Source: each row cites its evidence in this analysis; peer references are the set declared in Section 2.8; metric fields map onto the Metal Pilot Company Scorecard. Rows ordered by weight descending, Table 1 dimension number as the tiebreak within equal weights.

Weighted average: 0.75 + 0.75 + 0.75 + 0.45 + 0.45 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.1875 + 0.1875 = 4.03/5 (4.0 to one decimal) → ★★★★, Solid.

The two-axis verdict. Composite quality ★★★★ (Solid); value read Fairly valued (wide band) as of 7 August 2026; verdict: Priced about right — the market already capitalises Newmont on roughly US$4,000/oz gold, so the edge is not a re-rating but whether gold holds its elevated level while the reset dividend-plus-buyback machine compounds a shrinking share count. The specific thing that tips it is discipline and the gold price: a clean run of guidance under the new CEO, a sustained buyback, and gold staying near spot turn a fairly-valued major into a compounding one; a reversion toward US$3,000, or a return to expensive M&A, does the opposite.

The bull case and the bear case trace back to the same two facts. Newmont’s unmatched scale and net-cash balance sheet make it the safest way to own gold at scale — and its merely-average cost and unhedged book make it fully exposed to a gold price that has already run a long way. The company has spent 2025–26 fixing the things it could control — leverage, portfolio bloat, the dividend framework — and the result is a cleaner, cash-gushing major priced at about its own net asset value. A reader weighing Newmont against Agnico Eagle’s lower cost or Barrick’s copper growth is making a specific bet: paying a fair price for the deepest reserves, the biggest production and the strongest balance sheet in gold, rather than for the lowest cost or the fastest growth. To rank Newmont against every gold producer on these same nine dimensions — reserves, AISC, reserve life, leverage and P/NAV — screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Company filings. Newmont Corporation’s fiscal-2025 Form 10-K (year ended 31 December 2025) — the spine of this analysis — for production, per-mine operating statistics, gold and co-product reserves and resources (SEC S-K 1300, effective 31 December 2025, at a US$2,000/oz gold price), segment sales, the five-year financials, the balance sheet, executive and governance detail, and the risk factors; and the Second Quarter 2026 results (22 July 2026) for the net-cash position, record free cash flow, reaffirmed 5.3-Moz guidance and capital returns. Newmont’s project-development detail is from the 10-K project pipeline.

Exchange and market data. stockanalysis.com and WallStreetZen for the NYSE share price (US$105.43), market capitalisation, share count, 52-week range, enterprise value, multiples and the analyst consensus (~US$143, Buy), as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026; 2021–2022 revenue per WallStreetZen . Peer scale, AISC and reserve figures for Barrick, Agnico Eagle, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields and Kinross are approximate 2025 figures compiled from company results and stockanalysis.com quote pages, shown for relative positioning only.

Gold price context. Spot gold ~US$4,350/oz in early August 2026; the base deck of US$4,000/oz is the three-month trailing average rounded down on the US$500 grid (rule V26), with bear US$3,000 (the long-term/incentive reversion) and bull US$4,500.

Methodology. Durable structure (reserves, reserve life, ownership, jurisdiction, asset stage) is kept separate from the dated market layer (share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples, valuation). The data-as-of date is 7 August 2026; market data is as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026; reserves and resources are effective 31 December 2025; the balance sheet is as of Q2 2026. Newmont reports on a calendar fiscal year in US dollars under US GAAP. Scorecard weights follow the producer/operator reference case, sum to 100%, and no dimension is not-applicable. The valuation is a sum-of-the-parts build reproducible from Table 7 and the assumptions box; the operating NPV, the development and resource credits and the per-share NAV are author model outputs, not company figures, while production, reserves, cost and balance-sheet inputs are from the filings. Figures the standard set would otherwise carry are handled as follows (rule A13): a proportional-symbol asset map is drawn geometry the component library does not express, so the Section 2.1 asset table and the concentration paragraph carry that read; the revenue split is shown by metal and by asset; and the production and financial figures each plot one series, with AISC, margin and reserve-life trends kept in the tables and prose. Two disclosure choices are noted rather than filled: per-mine 2P reserves are consolidated from the S-K 1300 statement with the Metal Pilot model and some multi-deposit mines are shown as a single line; and the deeper 2021–2022 income, cash-flow and leverage lines in Table 4 are shown as — because they pre-date Newcrest and are not on a basis consistent with 2023–2025. Update cadence: refreshed on each quarterly report and on material events — the next scheduled refresh is the Q3 2026 results. This analysis prices off the 6 August 2026 close and the FY2025 and Q2 2026 filings.

Provenance: Newmont Corporation — Form 10-K and Quarterly Results — 2025/2026.

10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 7 August 2026: the share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples and valuation read all move. Reserve, resource and forecast figures are estimates, prepared on the codes and bases stated beside each table, and forward figures are not achieved results. The Quality × Value verdict is an analytical read, never an instruction to the reader. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from primary filings and reviewed, but readers should verify every number against the original documents before acting on it. The author holds no position in Newmont Corporation or in any company named here. Please do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser.