Northern Star (NST) — Stock Analysis 2026 [3.6]

Analysis as of 2 September 2026. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Northern Star’s FY2026 results (released 20 August 2026) and FY2025 Annual Report, the June 2026 quarterly activities report (29 July 2026) and the annual Resources and Reserves update for the 12 months to 31 March 2026 (3 June 2026). Market data is as of 2 September 2026. Rating: ★★★½, Solid — Modestly undervalued (wide band) → a re-rating candidate; the edge is the catalyst. Price deck: base gold US$4,000/oz — the representative trailing average on the fixed US$3,000–5,000 grid — with every grid price run as a scenario (deep bear US$3,000 to deep bull US$5,000); the 2027 consensus deck (~US$3,900/oz) as a 0%-weight cross-check, no spot deck. At A$1 = US$0.7133, the US$4,000 base is A$5,608/oz; NAV/share is published in Australian dollars, the trading currency, with the gold grid on its US$ axis. 5% real post-tax discount rate, the precious-metals convention. Figures are Australian dollars unless marked US$. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Northern Star is Australia’s largest gold miner, it owns the biggest gold mine in the country, and it has just spent three years and A$1.6 billion rebuilding that mine’s processing plant while missing its own guidance seven times. The thesis in one line: a genuinely tier-one, tier-one-jurisdiction reserve base of 28.4 million ounces is attached to an operating and capital-allocation record poor enough to have drawn an activist with a billion dollars and a demand for a strategic review. Why look now: the KCGM mill expansion is tying in, the chief executive has just left early with a Glencore hire arriving in October, and the market has marked the shares down ~38% from their 52-week high — to about two-thirds of net asset value on a conservative gold deck — while gold sits near a record. To screen Northern Star against every listed gold producer on production, reserves, grade and cost, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Northern Star Resources Ltd (ASX: NST) is a senior gold producer headquartered in Subiaco, Western Australia, with about 3,383 employees and three operating production centres — Kalgoorlie and Yandal in Western Australia and Pogo in Alaska — comprising six mining operations, plus one development project, Hemi in the Pilbara, acquired with De Grey Mining in May 2025. By archetype it is a producer/operator carrying a large funded development project, which means the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). (AISC = all-in sustaining cost, the industry’s per-ounce measure of cash costs plus royalties, corporate overhead and sustaining capital, but not growth capital; AIC = all-in cost, which adds growth capital and exploration; koz = thousand ounces, Moz = million ounces; 2P = proven and probable ore reserves.)

Figure 1. Northern Star in numbers

Figure data: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (production, AISC, cash, share count), FY2026 results, 20 August 2026 and Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 (reserves, resources); market data per stockanalysis.com as of 2 Sep 2026. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.

Table 1. Northern Star in numbers

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for FY2026 operating, cost, hedging and balance-sheet figures; Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 for reserves and resources; Northern Star 2025 Annual Report and the FY2026 results, 20 August 2026 for the dividend; market data per stockanalysis.com , 2 Sep 2026. Cash margin = (realised price − AISC) ÷ realised price. Enterprise value = market capitalisation less net cash; net cash = cash and bullion of A$1,235 m less the US$600 m senior guaranteed notes converted at the 30 June 2026 rate of A$1 = US$0.6980. Corporate bank facilities of A$1,750 m were undrawn at 30 June 2026. Listed: Public (ASX: NST).

Thesis in brief. Bull: this is 28.4 Moz of reserves and 88.9 Moz of resources — both up more than a quarter year-on-year, at a discovery cost under A$23/oz — entirely inside Western Australia and Alaska, throwing off a A$2,227/oz cash margin, and the two things that have been consuming cash are about to stop: the KCGM mill expansion is commissioning now, and Hemi’s 530 koz a year arrives early next decade. Bear: the company has missed production or cost guidance seven times in four financial years, abandoned its 2 Moz FY2026 target, watched AISC rise 25% in a single year (with FY2027 guidance pointing higher still, A$3,050–3,450/oz in a stated transition year), issued about a quarter of its capital to buy an asset that will not pour gold before 2031, and has just seen its chief executive depart early (28 August 2026) and its chief financial officer resign under pressure from an activist holding more than A$1 billion of stock. What tips it: whether the expanded 27 Mtpa mill at KCGM actually delivers the ounces the reserve says it should. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Northern Star sells into the strongest gold market on record. Spot gold sat near US$4,350/oz on 1 September 2026 — roughly A$6,100/oz — yet the company realised A$4,925/oz across FY2026, because a legacy hedge book is still delivering ounces at A$3,397. That gap is worth holding in mind through everything below: this is a business earning enormous margins that are nonetheless smaller than the spot price implies. For how gold is priced, who mines it and why miners are geared to the metal, see the Gold — A Complete Market Guide . This section spends its words on the company.

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

The portfolio is unusually clean for a senior producer: six operations in two countries, both top-tier jurisdictions, organised into three production centres, plus one development project.

Table 2. Asset base

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , Tables 2 and 6–11, for FY2026 gold sold and AISC by operation; Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 for reserves and resources effective 31 March 2026, prepared under the JORC Code (2012). Mineral resources are inclusive of ore reserves and are not ore reserves. Reserves are estimated at an assumed gold price of A$2,900/oz for Australian assets and US$1,900/oz for Pogo; resources at A$3,700/oz and US$2,600/oz respectively — both conservative against a spot price near A$6,100/oz. Carosue Dam’s reserve is derived as the Kalgoorlie centre residual and is approximate. Kalgoorlie Operations combines Kanowna Belle and South Kalgoorlie. Pogo AISC is stated in US dollars, its functional currency; the FY2026 average rate was A$1 = US$0.68. Listed: Public (ASX: NST).

Concentration cuts two ways. KCGM alone is 53% of group ore reserves, 47% of mineral resources and 30% of production — this is, in practice, a KCGM company with four other mines attached. But no single operation is more than a third of output, all six sit in jurisdictions with no expropriation risk, and the reserve base behind them is 18 years deep.

2.2 Where the ounces and the value sit

Northern Star produces one metal. By-product credits were A$33 million against A$7,602 million of gold revenue in FY2026 — four-tenths of one percent — so the by-metal revenue split a polymetallic miner publishes here would be a single slice, and gold sold by operation is the revenue split by asset.

Figure 2. FY2026 gold sold by operation

Figure data: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , Tables 6–11. Gold revenue by operation follows the same ranking, since all six operations sell into one gold price; group gold revenue was A$7,602 m in FY2026.

Figure 3. Risked net asset value by asset

Figure data: the Section 7 net-asset-value build (Table 13, base case: US$4,000/oz (A$5,608/oz) gold, 5% real post-tax discount rate, Hemi risked at 0.70). Shares are of gross asset value before net cash and the hedge book — the bridge to equity is Figure 6. The Hemi risk factor is the author’s estimate, not a disclosed figure.

Read together, the two figures show why the KCGM story dominates the equity: the Kalgoorlie centre is 55% of production but 60% of value, because it holds the long reserve life and the mill that is about to double in capacity. Pogo is the opposite — 17% of production and 12% of value from a mine with nine years of reserves, but it generated A$609 million of net mine cash flow in FY2026, more than Kalgoorlie and Yandal combined, because it carries no expansion bill.

2.3 KCGM — the Super Pit and the new mill

KCGM, the Kalgoorlie Consolidated Gold Mines complex, is the Fimiston open pit — the Super Pit — plus the Mt Charlotte underground and the Fimiston underground development, and it is Australia’s largest gold mine. Northern Star acquired full ownership in stages to 2019–2020 and has since doubled its mineral resource, adding 19.8 Moz to reach 42.2 Moz, and lifted ore reserves 50% to 15.0 Moz.

FY2026 sold 468 koz at an AISC of A$2,495/oz — the group’s lowest-cost Australian operation — from 10.3 Mt milled at 1.8 g/t and 83% recovery. The June quarter was the best of the year at 136 koz and A$2,411/oz, with open-pit material movement at an annualised 88 Mtpa and underground at 3.2 Mtpa, both records under Northern Star ownership. That followed a bruising FY2025 in which delayed access to the high-grade Golden Pike North area, while a 4.5-year East Wall remediation was completed, was a principal cause of the group missing original guidance.

The transformation under way is the KCGM Mill Expansion Project, which replaces about 85% of the 13 Mtpa Fimiston processing plant and lifts capacity to 27 Mtpa. Stage I entered commissioning in July 2026 on schedule after more than three years of construction, with tie-in planned for September; Stage II consolidates the separate Gidji facility into a single Fimiston hub by late 1H FY2027, eliminating concentrate haulage and adding a forecast 1–2% recovery uplift. Total project spend from the first quarter of FY2024 stands at A$1,605 million, of which A$713 million fell in FY2026, alongside a further A$322 million of “operational readiness” capital for tailings facilities, a thermal power station, transmission, camp and stores.

The key asset-level risk is stated plainly by the company itself: management declined to give FY2027 group guidance with the June quarterly, deferring it to 20 August so that ore commissioning in August can “identify and address latent constraints that could affect throughput, recovery and plant availability”, and said it does not expect to give FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance in calendar 2026 at all. Ramp-up to a 27 Mtpa run-rate is expected to take roughly two years, reaching steady state in FY2029. Everything good about this analysis rests on that ramp.

2.4 Pogo — the quiet cash machine

Pogo, near Delta Junction in interior Alaska, is a narrow-vein underground mine and the group’s highest-grade asset by a wide margin: 9.3 Moz of mineral resources at 7.6 g/t and 2.4 Moz of reserves at 6.8 g/t, against a group average of 1.7 g/t and 1.4 g/t. FY2026 sold 265 koz at an AISC of US$1,534/oz (A$2,259), and the June quarter was its strongest — 82 koz at US$1,384/oz — driven by higher-grade stoping from newly established areas in East Deeps and Liese 3, with stoping ore reaching 72% of mill feed and development advancing at 1,560 metres a month.

Two things make Pogo matter more than its 17% share of production suggests. It delivered a fifth consecutive annual record net mine cash flow, A$609 million, on just US$19 million of growth capital in the June quarter — it is the only production centre currently returning materially more cash than it consumes. And its resource grew 3.1 Moz in the year, including a maiden 0.3 Moz Star resource 1.3 km from the mine and extensions at East Deeps and South Pogo, with a lower cut-off grade (4.1 g/t to 3.4 g/t) unlocking tonnes at the higher gold price.

The asset-level risk is logistical and structural rather than geological: Pogo is a remote, narrow-vein underground operation with a cost base above the Australian mines when expressed in common currency, and a major planned shutdown of the processing plant and underground ore bin falls in the September 2026 quarter.

2.5 Hemi — the growth asset

Hemi, in the Pilbara, arrived with the A$5 billion all-scrip takeover of De Grey Mining completed in May 2025 and is expected to become Northern Star’s fourth production centre. The 2026 statement booked it for the first time under Northern Star’s own standards at 13.2 Moz of mineral resources and 5.5 Moz of ore reserves — the single largest addition in the company’s history, and 19% of group reserves.

The published economics are still De Grey’s. Northern Star has not restated them, and a final investment decision is targeted for late FY2027.

Table 3. Hemi — De Grey definitive feasibility study, September 2023

Source: De Grey Mining’s Hemi Definitive Feasibility Study, announced September 2023, as summarised by Australian Mining and MINING.COM . These are study estimates prepared by the prior owner at a A$2,700/oz gold price, not achieved results and not Northern Star’s own guidance. Northern Star’s 31 March 2026 ore reserve for Hemi is 5.5 Moz, restated under its own standards; the DFS contemplated 5.7 Moz of recovered ounces. Capital cost is stated in 2023 dollars and has not been re-based.

The honest read: the study’s A$2,700/oz gold price is roughly half today’s spot, so Hemi’s real economics at current prices are far better than the table shows — but its A$1.3 billion capital estimate is three years old, and this is a company whose most recent major build has absorbed A$1.6 billion and counting. FY2026 spending on Hemi was A$104 million of development capital against guidance of A$165–175 million, plus A$39 million of exploration. Permitting is partial, itemised in the Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 : the State EPA approval under the EP Act has been received; still outstanding are the Federal EPBC approval, the Traditional Owner mining agreement, the State EPA secondary approvals for on-ground works, the Mine Development and Closure Proposal, miscellaneous licences and the water licence — for which Managed Aquifer Recharge trials begin in the September 2026 quarter following agreement with Traditional Owners. The asset-level risk is simply that FID slips again — it has already moved from FY2026 to late FY2027.

2.6 Yandal — Jundee and Thunderbox

The Yandal centre is the group’s problem child. It sold 434 koz at an AISC of A$3,198/oz in FY2026 — A$700 an ounce above the Kalgoorlie centre and the highest cost in the portfolio — split between Jundee (202 koz at A$3,212/oz, underground only) and Thunderbox & Bronzewing (232 koz at A$3,187/oz, open pit and underground).

Both improved through the year. Thunderbox delivered a record quarter in June, 67 koz, on better mill throughput, higher-grade Orelia ore and an increasing contribution from the Bannockburn open pit replacing low-grade stockpile feed. Jundee sold 57 koz in the June quarter, up 24%, and the company began an operational review during the quarter whose early outcomes are informing an updated medium-term mine plan.

The structural problem is reserve life. Yandal carries 2.6 Moz of ore reserves against 434 koz a year — about six years — and reserves fell 0.4 Moz over the year at Thunderbox on depletion and smaller open-pit shells. Jundee, to its credit, replaced depletion and held reserves at 1.0 Moz. Behind them sits 10.7 Moz of mineral resources, so the ounces exist; the question is whether they convert at a cost that works. The valuation in Section 7 assumes eight years of Yandal production, two more than reserves currently support, and says so.

2.7 Carosue Dam and Kalgoorlie Operations

The two smaller Kalgoorlie-centre mines together sold 377 koz, about a quarter of group output. Carosue Dam sold 217 koz at an AISC of A$2,732/oz from 3.8 Mt milled; Wallbrook open-pit mining was completed as planned in the June quarter, marking the transition to underground mining supplemented by lower-grade stockpiles — which is why its unit cost rose through the year to A$3,082/oz in the final quarter. Kalgoorlie Operations — the Kanowna Belle and South Kalgoorlie underground mines — sold 160 koz at A$2,617/oz at a head grade of 3.1 g/t, the highest of the Australian assets. Between them they hold about 3.0 Moz of reserves and 13.5 Moz of resources, including a maiden 0.9 Moz Hercules resource and a 0.25 Moz probable reserve defined in FY2025.

2.8 Group production, reserves & costs

Table 4. FY2026 performance by production centre

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , Table 2, 12 months ending 30 June 2026. Pogo figures are converted to Australian dollars at the FY2026 average rate of A$1 = US$0.68. Growth capital excludes Hemi development capital (A$104 m), Hemi exploration (A$39 m) and corporate growth capital (A$7 m). Net mine cash flow = mine operating cash flow less growth capital; mine operating cash flow = revenue less cash operating costs (excluding inventory movements) and sustaining capital.

The cost story is the FY2026 story — and the FY2027 story. Group AISC rose from A$2,163/oz in FY2025 to A$2,698/oz — up 25% in one year, driven by higher gold-price-linked royalties, Pogo tariff assumptions, general inflation and the shift at Carosue Dam and Yandal to lower-grade feed. Gold sold fell from 1,634 koz to 1,543 koz. Worse, FY2027 guidance (20 August 2026) is A$3,050–3,450/oz on 1,500–1,650 koz — a further step-up the company frames as a transition-year peak before KCGM reaches scale. Against a peer set whose 2026 AISC guidance clusters around US$1,400–1,700/oz, Northern Star’s A$2,698 (≈US$1,835 at the FY2026 average rate) already sits at or slightly above the top of that band, and the FY2027 figure is higher again. The margin remains enormous — A$2,227/oz — but it comes from the gold price, not from a cost-curve advantage. For how cost-curve position decides who survives a downturn across commodities, see the macro regime guide .

Reserves and replacement are the other side of the ledger, and here the record is excellent. Group ore reserves rose 27% to 28.4 Moz and mineral resources 26% to 88.9 Moz in the 12 months to 31 March 2026, after mining depletion — 5.5 Moz and 13.2 Moz of that from Hemi, but also +0.7 Moz of reserves and +3.6 Moz of resources organically at Kalgoorlie and +0.3 Moz and +3.1 Moz at Pogo, at an average discovery cost below A$23/oz. Reserve life at FY2026 rates is roughly 18 years, and the reserves are struck at A$2,900/oz against a ~A$6,100/oz spot price, which is a conservative basis with real conversion upside embedded in it.

Figure 4. Group gold sold, FY2024–FY2026

Figure data: Table 6. Group AISC (A$2,163/oz in FY2025 rising to A$2,698/oz in FY2026, up 25% in one year) is read from Table 6 rather than overlaid as a second series; FY2025 and FY2026 quarterly splits by production centre are in the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report.

2.9 Peer positioning

The peer set used throughout this analysis — for every scorecard star in Section 9 and the relative valuation in Section 7 — is five listed senior and mid-tier gold producers with primary gold revenue and tier-one-jurisdiction asset bases: the global seniors Northern Star is measured against on cost and scale, and its closest Australian comparator.

Table 5. Peer positioning — quality metrics

Source: Newmont and Agnico Eagle 2026 production and cost guidance as reported in each company’s 2026 outlook disclosures; Northern Star per its June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report and Resources and Reserves Update . Barrick, Gold Fields and Evolution Mining rows are qualitative — their current-year guidance was not verified to a primary filing for this analysis and no figures are stated for them; they are included because the scorecard and the valuation reference them as a jurisdictional and cost comparison, not because a number is being asserted. AISC bases differ between issuers and Northern Star’s Australian-dollar figure converts at the FY2026 average rate of A$1 = US$0.68. These are quality comparators for the scorecard only; the Section 7 valuation is standalone and carries no peer multiples. Screen the full gold peer set on production, reserves, grade and cost at Metal Pilot.

Northern Star’s position in that set is specific and a little uncomfortable. It is the purest tier-one-jurisdiction portfolio of the group — no African, Latin American or Central Asian exposure at all, rare at this scale and a durable advantage — and its reserve life is at the long end. But it is roughly a third of Agnico’s size, its unit costs sit at or above the peer band rather than below it, and neither Agnico nor Newmont has spent four years missing guidance. Best-in-class ground, middling execution: that is the whole investment debate.

3. Financials & balance sheet

Table 6. Five-year financial summary (A$M unless stated, fiscal years ended 30 June)

Source: Northern Star 2025 Annual Report — the Operating & Financial Review’s FY2025-vs-FY2024 table for all FY2024 and FY2025 lines, and the five-year charts in the Remuneration Report for FY2022 and FY2023 realised price, cash earnings, underlying NPAT and the dividend history; June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for FY2026 gold sold, realised price, AISC and cash and bullion, and the FY2026 results released 20 August 2026 for statutory revenue (A$7,623.1 m), underlying EBITDA (A$4.3 bn, +22%) and net profit after tax (A$1,664.3 m). Cash earnings and basic EPS are approximate pending the full statutory accounts; remaining FY2026 lines marked “—” were not isolated in the sources gathered here. FY2022 and FY2023 lines not published in the FY2025 report’s comparative tables are also marked “—” rather than sourced from a different basis. FY2024 gold sold of 1,621 koz is derived by summing the FY2024 comparatives disclosed per operation in the FY2025 Annual Report. Cash margin = (realised price − AISC) ÷ realised price. Net cash at 30 June 2026 is the author’s calculation: cash and bullion of A$1,235 m less the US$600 m notes converted at A$1 = US$0.6980.

The five-year shape is a company whose earnings have quadrupled on the gold price while its operations went sideways: realised price up 102% from FY2022 to FY2026, gold sold down 5% from FY2024, and AISC up 25% in the last year alone. The FY2026 results (20 August 2026) confirmed it: statutory revenue A$7,623 million and net profit after tax A$1,664 million, with underlying EBITDA of A$4.3 billion up 22% — but cash earnings near A$2.9 billion, essentially flat on FY2025’s A$2,873 million, which is the clearest single statement of the problem. A 26% higher gold price bought little earnings growth at the cash line, because volume fell and unit costs rose to absorb it — and FY2027 guidance points to a further cost step-up (AISC A$3,050–3,450/oz).

Balance sheet and liquidity. The balance sheet is genuinely strong and did the heavy lifting through a record capital year. At 30 June 2026 Northern Star held A$1,235 million of cash and bullion, no drawn corporate bank debt, and A$1,750 million of undrawn corporate facilities maturing March 2030 and March 2031 across two equal tranches. The only debt is US$600 million of senior guaranteed notes at 6.125%, due April 2033, guaranteed by certain wholly-owned subsidiaries. Net cash of roughly A$375 million is down from A$1,013 million a year earlier — the cost of funding A$2,146 million of growth capital, A$657 million of sustaining capital and A$217 million of exploration out of operating cash flow rather than the market.

The hedge book is a real, quantifiable drag and deserves its own table.

Table 7. Gold hedging commitments at 30 June 2026

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , Table 5. Northern Star has added no hedge commitments since August 2024 and is winding the book down; 165 koz were delivered at A$3,195/oz during the June 2026 quarter. Against a spot price of ~A$6,100/oz (US$4,350) these commitments represent roughly A$2.1 bn of foregone revenue on a pre-tax, undiscounted basis; against the ~A$5,608/oz (US$4,000) base-case deck used in Section 7, roughly A$1.7 bn pre-tax, or A$1.2 bn after 30% tax — A$1,161 m once discounted at 5% over the ~1-year average time to delivery, which is the figure carried in the Section 7 NAV bridge.

Northern Star’s policy is now effectively to be unhedged: no new commitments in nearly two years, and the book runs off by mid-2028. That is the right call at these prices and the wrong call retrospectively — the existing 787,500 ounces are the single largest identifiable value transfer away from shareholders on the balance sheet, and they are why realised prices lag spot by roughly A$900/oz.

Capital returns. Northern Star pays a real dividend and has raised it every year of the last five: 21.5c in FY2022 to 55.0c in FY2025, and 60.0c total for FY2026 (a 30.0c interim plus a 30.0c final declared with the 20 August 2026 results), fully franked. On top of that, an on-market buy-back of up to A$500 million was announced on 2 April 2026, of which A$129 million had been executed by 30 June at an average price of A$20.39. The trailing yield is about 3.1%. For a company in the last year of a A$2 billion capital programme, that is a defensible capital-returns record — the criticism in Section 9 is about what the growth capital bought, not about what was returned.

4. Management, strategy & corporate structure

4.1 Management & governance

Northern Star is in the middle of the most complete leadership turnover in its history, and it is not happening voluntarily.

Stuart Tonkin, Managing Director since July 2021 and Chief Executive since November 2016 — a mining engineer with more than 25 years underground and Northern Star’s Chief Operating Officer from 2013 — announced on 21 May 2026 that he would step down, and in the event departed early, on 28 August 2026, days after the FY2026 results and amid the activist pressure below. Suresh Vadnagra, named on 2 July, commences as Managing Director and CEO on 5 October 2026 — a mining executive with more than 25 years across strategy, operations, major projects and transactions in large multi-commodity portfolios, most recently at Glencore. Ryan Gurner, Chief Financial Officer since December 2021, was appointed Deputy CEO and is serving as interim CEO through the gap — but on 31 August the company disclosed that Gurner will himself leave on 30 November 2026 after more than eleven years, with Phillip Coetzer acting as Chief Financial Officer from 29 August 2026. On 2 July, Michael Ashforth — Deputy Chairman since July 2024 — was named to succeed Michael Chaney AO as Chairman from the conclusion of the 2026 Annual General Meeting, and on 9 July Jeffrey Quartermaine joined as an independent Non-Executive Director. A chief executive, a chief financial officer and a chairman are all changing inside six months, at the start of the most important ramp-up in the company’s history.

The board that presided over the period runs to eight: Chaney (Chairman since July 2021, concurrently Chairman of Wesfarmers and formerly Chairman of Woodside and National Australia Bank), Ashforth, Tonkin, John Fitzgerald (director since November 2012, chartered accountant, 35 years in resource financing at NM Rothschild, Investec and HSBC Precious Metals), Nick Cernotta (July 2019, mining engineer, former Director of Operations at Fortescue and at Barrick Australia Pacific), Sally Langer (February 2021, chartered accountant), Sharon Warburton (September 2021, chartered accountant, formerly Co-Deputy Chair of Fortescue) and Marnie Finlayson (October 2022); John Richards resigned effective 31 July 2024. The executive bench beyond Gurner includes Simon Jessop (Chief Operating Officer since 2021, previously COO at Saracen), Steven McClare (Chief Technical Officer since 2015) and Hilary Macdonald (Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary, with ESG, environment and heritage in her remit).

The reason for the turnover is the record. Elliott Investment Management, holding well over A$1 billion of stock, published a presentation titled Northern Star Rising in mid-2026 calling for a formal strategic review and explicitly raising a possible sale of the company. Its central factual charge is that Northern Star missed production or cost guidance seven times across four financial years, including four separate downward revisions in the first three months of 2026 alone — a charge the company’s own disclosure substantiates: FY2025 missed original production and cost guidance and met only revised guidance; FY2026 production guidance was revised on 13 March and again on 22 April 2026, and cost guidance on 20 January 2026. The 2 Moz group target set in 2021 for FY2026 was abandoned. Elliott’s framing — world-class assets, sub-standard execution — is uncomfortable precisely because the operating data supports it.

4.2 Strategy & capital allocation

The stated purpose is “to generate superior returns for our shareholders … through operational effectiveness, exploration and active portfolio management”, and the strategy has three legs: expand KCGM, develop Hemi, and keep replacing reserves organically.

On exploration, the record is the best thing about the company: A$217 million spent in FY2026, resources up 26% and reserves up 27% after depletion, at a discovery cost below A$23 per ounce. KCGM’s resource has doubled and its reserve grown 50% since acquisition. On capital projects, the picture is heavier: A$1,605 million into the KCGM mill so far, A$322 million of operational readiness capital, and a further A$104 million into Hemi in FY2026, against total FY2026 growth capital of A$2,146 million — a year in which the company spent more on growth than it earned in cash earnings less sustaining capital. On portfolio management, Northern Star sold its 50% interest in the Central Tanami Project joint venture and Tanami exploration tenements to MGX Resources on 6 February 2026, removing 1.3 Moz of resources, and withdrew from the Egina earn-in with Novo in May 2026.

The named forward targets are thinner than usual by design. FY2027 guidance, given with the 20 August 2026 results, is 1,500–1,650 koz at an AISC of A$3,050–3,450/oz — flat-to-lower volume and materially higher unit cost than FY2026, framed as a transition year of continued heavy investment before the KCGM step-change. Beyond it: KCGM steady-state 27 Mtpa in FY2029, Hemi FID late FY2027, and no FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance at all in calendar 2026. A company that has missed guidance seven times declining to give more of it is defensible; it also means the next twelve months offer the market very little to hold management to, and the FY2027 cost step-up is itself an argument the activist will use.

4.3 Ownership & corporate structure

The structural event of the period is the acquisition of De Grey Mining Ltd, agreed 2 December 2024 and completed by scheme of arrangement in May 2025 for approximately A$5 billion in Northern Star scrip, bringing the Hemi Project and its Pilbara land position. It was funded entirely in shares, taking the count to 1,424,805,062 and diluting existing holders by roughly a quarter — the specific decision Elliott’s campaign attacks hardest, because the asset acquired will not produce until the next decade.

Table 8. Capital structure and ownership

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for issued capital, buy-back, facilities and notes; Elliott’s holding as characterised in its own Northern Star Rising presentation and reported by TipRanks . Gold Fields agreed to sell an approximately A$1.1 bn holding in Northern Star acquired through its takeover of Gold Road Resources, which had held De Grey scrip. There are no warrants, convertible notes or strategic cornerstone holders; Northern Star has no joint-venture partner at any of its six operating mines.

The structural simplicity is worth stating plainly, because it is unusual at this scale: Northern Star owns 100% of every operating mine and the Hemi development project outright. There are no minority partners, no streams or royalties encumbering the assets beyond statutory state royalties, and no off-take obligations. What complexity exists is in the share register and the boardroom, not in the asset ownership.

5. ESG & sustainability

Table 9. ESG snapshot

Source: Northern Star 2025 Annual Report , FY2025 Highlights and sustainability sections, for all FY2025 figures, targets and programmes; June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , Table 3, for FY2026 safety rates (12-month moving average). Industry comparators are the latest published WorkSafe WA Mineral Industry Safety Performance Report 2022–23 (metalliferous total): SLTIFR 2.0, SIFR 5.5. The full FY2025 Environment & Social Responsibility reporting suite is published separately.

This is a strong ESG profile by producer standards, and it is specific rather than boilerplate. Safety is the standout — an SLTIFR of 0.5 against an industry 2.0, held flat through a year in which mining volumes hit records at KCGM, and a serious-injury rate that recovered from a FY2025 deterioration to 1.9. The climate work is concrete: real wind and solar plant commissioned at named sites, an absolute 35% reduction target against a stated baseline year, not an intensity fudge. The honest caveats are that Scope 3 is not addressed in the headline commitments, that a 2050 net-zero date is late relative to some peers, and that the FY2026 safety figures come from a quarterly report rather than the audited sustainability suite, which lands with the annual report in August.

6. Risks

Table 10. Risk register

Source: risk categories drawn from the Northern Star 2025 Annual Report risk management section and the operational disclosures in the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report ; the guidance-miss record and activist position per Elliott’s Northern Star Rising presentation as reported by TipRanks . Likelihood and impact ratings are the author’s assessment on a 1–5 scale, not disclosed figures.

Figure 5. Risk matrix — likelihood against impact

Figure data: Table 10. Each point prints its likelihood × impact score; the shaded region is the high-likelihood, high-impact quadrant (likelihood ≥ 3.5 and impact ≥ 3.5). Ratings are the author’s assessment, not disclosed figures.

The register has an unusual shape for a senior producer: the commodity risk is small and the execution risk is large. A company with 18 years of reserves in Western Australia and Alaska, no debt to speak of and a 45% cash margin is not fragile to gold. What it is fragile to is its own delivery — and the two highest-scoring risks, the KCGM ramp and a further guidance miss, are the same risk seen from two angles. If the expanded mill hits 27 Mtpa on schedule, most of the rest of this register stops mattering.

7. Valuation

Valuation as of 2 September 2026, in Australian dollars (FX A$1 = US$0.7133 as of 2 Sep 2026). Horizon: spot fair value. Price deck: base gold US$4,000/oz — the representative trailing average snapped to the fixed US$3,000–5,000 grid: the 3-, 6- and 12-month trailing averages to 31 August 2026 are US$4,271, US$4,523 and US$4,435 (Goldify monthly archive of the London PM spot series, monthly averages June–August 2026 US$4,271 / 4,111 / 4,431); the 3-month window is the representative one because the 6- and 12-month figures are lifted by the January–March spike to US$5,594, and it sits mid-step with the early-June leg down from US$4,546 and the July trough at US$4,019 inside it, so it is snapped to the lower grid price, US$4,000 — A$5,608/oz at the FX above — with every grid price run as a scenario (deep bear US$3,000 / bear US$3,500 / base US$4,000 / bull US$4,500 / deep bull US$5,000); the 2027 consensus deck (~US$3,900/oz) carried as a 0%-weight cross-check, no spot deck. Discount rate 5% real, post-tax — the precious-metals convention — sensitised 4–7%. Share price A$22.58 (2 Sep 2026 close), 1,424.8 m shares outstanding, 1,435.1 m fully diluted, balance sheet as of 30 June 2026.

Northern Star is a producer/operator with a material funded development project, so it is valued sum-of-the-parts: a life-of-mine DCF on each of the three production centres, a risked share of Hemi, a resource-conversion tier for the M&I ounces outside the mine plan, an explicit deduction for the hedge book and the rehabilitation provision, bridged to equity. The method behind the numbers is the The Commodity Investor, Part 11: How to Value Commodity Stocks guide’s; this section applies it to Northern Star. The headline is a deck-to-value map: the blended fair value is A$27.55/share at the US$4,000/oz base price, A$20.16 at US$3,500 and A$34.08 at US$4,500, and each US$500/oz of gold is worth about A$6.5 of blended fair value and A$6.8 of net asset value per share — the deck sensitivity in Table 15 lets a reader run the model at any gold price they hold. The tiers frame the structure: the three producing centres plus the bridge are worth A$21.08/share, risked Hemi A$4.29 and the M&I resource pathway A$3.49, against total net asset value of A$28.86. The gold grid is quoted on its US$ axis so every Metal Pilot gold analysis reads on one comparable scale; net asset value per share is published in Australian dollars, the trading currency, converted once at the equity bridge. The section sets the current A$22.58 price against that map only in §7.6, where the rating and the flip prices are published.

7.1 Method selection

Northern Star is a producer, so the blend is the producer default — NAV/DCF 50%, EV/EBITDA 30%, FCF-yield support 20% — carried in full. The third method is built as FCF-yield support from disclosed lines, because operating-cash-flow-per-share cannot be struck without an author-invented cash-tax and depreciation schedule: a forward FCF (EBITDA less sustaining capital less cash tax) capitalised at the archetype yield anchor, rather than a P/CF on an invented cash-flow-per-share. Every input is a filed figure — the guidance-year EBITDA build, the FY2025 sustaining-capital and D&A lines — so the third read stays independent instead of the blend collapsing to two. The three methods split across two input families — intrinsic (NAV) 50%, cash-flow (EV/EBITDA + FCF-yield) 50% — the latter exactly at the collinear ceiling, so no deviation from the default is needed or made.

Table 11. Valuation method selection

Source: method-to-archetype mapping and the default weight set per The Commodity Investor, Part 11: How to Value Commodity Stocks , “The archetype is the unit of analysis” and “The valuation toolkit”; the producer default run in full. Archetype per Section 1. Input families: intrinsic 50% (one method), cash-flow 50% (two methods, at the collinear ceiling) — both inside the family caps. P/NAV is the conversion factor on the NAV, not a second weighted line. Target multiples derived in §7.3 from the archetype anchors, not from a peer set.

7.2 Net asset value

Vehicle map. All four assets are 100%-owned by Northern Star with no JV partner, listed subsidiary or minority: the Kalgoorlie centre (including KCGM, consolidated to 100% via the 2021 Saracen merger), Yandal and Carosue Dam in Western Australia; Pogo in Alaska; and Hemi in the Pilbara, acquired with De Grey Mining by scheme of arrangement in May 2025. There is no third-party operator and no stream or royalty over any asset beyond the statutory WA royalty carried in unit costs; the Central Tanami JV interest was sold to MGX in February 2026 and is out of the model. Nothing inside one line reappears as another. Three bridge items are not assets: the hedge book — charged once, at mark-to-market against the deck, with the assets modelled unhedged; the rehabilitation provision, bridged in full from the financial statements rather than assumed away inside AISC; and net working capital with the current tax liability, taken from the balance sheet at its last audited date. Lease liabilities have one home and it is the rows: the FY2025 balance sheet carries A$448.5 m of lease liabilities (A$119.6 m current + A$328.9 m non-current, note 9(b)), and the FY2026 outlook states that fleet lease payments sit inside sustaining capital — so they are charged through every centre’s AISC and are excluded from the net-cash line, never both.

Tax basis and the shield. The three WA centres and Hemi carry Australian corporate tax at 30% on the cash margin with no depreciation shield credited in the row; Pogo at 27%. This is the conservative side: Northern Star’s FY2025 accounts disclose deferred tax liabilities of A$1,595.3 m, unused tax losses (including the De Grey acquisition step-up, ~50% of the depreciable value amortising within five years) and FY2025 cash tax paid of only A$129.5 m against ~A$4.3 bn of EBITDA — so the true near-term cash-tax rate is well below 30% while the pools run off. Holding the no-shield basis therefore understates NAV; the direction and rough size are stated rather than modelled, because the year-by-year pool schedule is not disclosed granularly enough to place in each row — the shield would add of order A$0.3–0.5/share if scheduled, an upside the model declines. The rehabilitation provision is bridged from the statements: A$834.5 m at carrying value (current A$10.9 m + non-current A$823.6 m, FY2025 provisions note), so AISC carries only the provision’s annual accretion, not the liability.

Stage risk is charged once, in Hemi’s row weight. Hemi is a tranche inside a producer’s SOTP, so its stage risk sits in the row risk weight: the 2023 De Grey DFS production profile risked at 0.70×, read off the de-risking ladder’s band for an FS-complete, permitted project with the funding decision still open (0.55–0.75×). The primary State EPA approval under the EP Act has been received, while the Federal EPBC approval, the Traditional Owner mining agreement, the water licence and the State secondary approvals remain outstanding and FID is targeted for 2H FY27; 0.70× sits in the band’s upper half because the build is self-fundable from group cash flow and no approval has been refused, while the case for the band’s middle is that FID has already slipped once and three approvals are still open. Had the primary approval not been granted, the applicable band would be the unpermitted 0.45–0.65× and the factor 0.65×, worth about A$0.30/share less. The target P/NAV and the discount rate carry no second charge; the three producing centres carry risk weight 1.00.

The per-asset NPV build. Every NPV the model carries is built here first, one banded block per asset, so the arithmetic arrives before the answer. Kalgoorlie is modelled on its ramp, not at steady state: FY2026 delivered 844 koz and the company’s own path to 27 Mtpa reaches steady state in FY2029, so its block carries a three-step schedule with the higher unit costs the ramp years actually carry, and only then the 1,000 koz/yr steady state. Pogo and Yandal are flat life-of-mine DCFs. Every row’s AISC is the centre’s FY2026 all-in sustaining cost plus a A$95/oz corporate allocation (A$147 m of FY2026 corporate cost ÷ 1,543 koz sold), so corporate overhead is charged once, inside the rows, and the bridge carries no separate G&A line.

Table 12. Per-asset NPV build — base case (US$4,000/oz = A$5,608/oz gold, 5% real)

Notes to Table 12

1. AISC escalates ~2.5% of the gold price above base for the WA royalty (the cost lag in the deck sensitivity). Each steady-state AISC is the centre’s FY2026 figure plus the A$95/oz corporate allocation: Kalgoorlie A$2,579 + 95 = A$2,674 ≈ A$2,675; Pogo A$2,259 + 95 = A$2,354; Yandal A$3,198 + 95 = A$3,293; Hemi A$1,250 DFS + 95 = A$1,345. Kalgoorlie’s two ramp-year AISCs (A$3,300, A$2,975) are author estimates set so the first modelled year reconciles to FY2027 group guidance and step down to the steady state.
2. Hemi’s stage risk is charged here, in the row factor, and nowhere else; the un-risked NPV of A$8,790 m (A$10,107 m operating PV less A$1,317 m capital PV) times 0.70 gives A$6,152 m.
3. Resource conversion: 24.77 Moz exclusive M&I at an effective A$202.3/oz (A$1,348.8 in-plan value per reserve oz × 0.15×) = A$5,011 m. The 0.15× is a departure below the M&I band (0.25–0.50×), treated as off-ladder in the assumptions box: the bulk of the 24.77 Moz sits in regional and deep material on Northern Star’s 20–30-year growth pathway, outside the near-term mine footprint, so it is valued nearer market M&I gold-resource comps (~A$150–300/oz) than near-mine M&I, the upper half supported by the Group’s sub-A$23/oz discovery cost. All 35.68 Moz of inferred resource is carried at 0.0, as optionality (§7.5).

Source: author’s model; reserve, production and cost inputs per Tables 2, 4 and 6, the Hemi profile per Table 3; exclusive M&I from the 3 June 2026 Resources and Reserves Update . The value column is headed Value rather than A$m because the blocks multiply heterogeneous terms; only the = rows are the asset’s own currency. Every = row recomputes on a calculator from the rows above it.

Calibration check against FY2027 guidance. The four operating rows sum to 1,549 koz at a weighted AISC of A$3,136/oz in the first modelled year, against company guidance of 1,500–1,650 koz at A$3,050–3,450/oz issued 20 August 2026 — inside both ranges, with volume 3% above the guidance midpoint and cost 3% below it. The model is therefore calibrated to the guided transition year rather than to a steady state it has not reached.

Table 13. Per-asset model — base case (US$4,000/oz = A$5,608/oz gold, 5% real)

Source: author’s model; every NPV in the last column reproduces from its block in Table 12. Reserve, cost and capital inputs per Tables 2, 4 and 6; Hemi per Table 3. The M&I factor 0.15× is off-ladder (below the 0.25–0.50× M&I band), reasoned in the notes to Table 12.

Table 14. Net asset value build-up and equity bridge (base case — US$4,000/oz, 5% real)

Source: author’s model (Table 12); balance sheet and hedge book per the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report ; the rehabilitation provision, lease liabilities, working capital and tax pools per the FY2025 Annual Report (balance sheet and notes 8(a), 8(e), 9(b), 9(e)). Bridge lines in order, each printed even where empty. The tiers sum to the published NAV/share: 21.08 + 4.29 + 3.49 = A$28.86, and the producing tier alone sits ~7% below the A$22.58 price — the market pays for the producing base and roughly a third of the risked Hemi value, and nothing for the resource pathway. The rehabilitation provision is charged in the bridge, not AISC: AISC carries only accretion and sustaining reclamation, not the A$834.5 m liability. Values computed on unrounded inputs.

Figure 6. Net asset value build-up

Figure data: Table 14. Equity net asset value of A$41,416 m equates to A$28.86 per fully diluted share; the producing centres and bridge alone are A$21.08. “Net cash & WC” nets the A$375 m net-cash line against the A$307 m working-capital and current-tax line.

Figure 7. NAV per share sensitivity — gold price × discount rate

		Gold price (US$/oz; A$/oz at FX 0.7133)
		$3,000A$4,206	$3,500A$4,907	$4,000A$5,608	$4,500A$6,309	$5,000A$7,010
Discount rate	4%	A$16.62	A$23.94	A$31.26	A$38.58	A$45.90
	5% (base)	A$15.29	A$22.07	A$28.86	A$35.64	A$42.43
	7%	A$13.02	A$18.90	A$24.77	A$30.65	A$36.53

Notes to Figure 7

1. Checksum — the bear column (US$3,500) at the 5% base rate: Kalgoorlie A$17,639 m + Hemi A$5,018 m + Pogo A$3,535 m + Yandal A$3,204 m + resource A$3,843 m = A$33,239 m gross + net cash A$375 m − hedge A$793 m − rehab A$835 m − working capital A$307 m = A$31,679 m ÷ 1,435.1 m = A$22.07 (the resource tier scales with the operating assets’ value, so it steps down with them).
2. Rate rows — every asset is an author-built DCF, so all rows re-discount together with the rate axis; no study NPV is held at a fixed rate. Hemi’s risk weight is held at 0.70 throughout the grid; it moves only in the scenarios (§7.6).
3. Cost — a +10% unit-cost shock takes NAV/share to A$26.17 (−9%) at the base price, and a +10% gold move with the cost deck’s own lag applied (the WA royalty adds ~A$14/oz per A$561/oz of gold) takes it to A$34.29 (+19%).
4. FX — a 10% stronger A$ (FX 0.7846) lowers the A$ gold price and takes NAV/share to A$23.92 (−17%), a 10% weaker A$ (FX 0.6420) to A$34.89 (+21%); the company’s own FY2025 financial-risk note shows a smaller ±A$43–53 m post-tax swing on financial instruments only.
5. Stage risk — Hemi at 0.55× (its band floor) gives A$27.82 (−A$1.04); Hemi is 14% of gross asset value, below the 25% trigger, so this is informative rather than required.
6. Schedule slip — Hemi’s first gold and remaining capital one year later gives A$28.63 (−0.8%), small because Hemi is 14% of gross asset value and already 4.5 years out; the milestone whose slip would do it is the 2H FY27 FID.

Figure data: this analysis’ NAV model (Tables 12–14), every cell recomputed from the per-asset rows at that column’s gold price (converted A$ = US$ ÷ 0.7133) and that row’s discount rate, never scaled from the base cell. Price columns are the fixed gold grid, grid version 2026-09 (US$3,000–5,000); base case US$4,000/oz (A$5,608) at 5%. A one-step (US$500) gold move shifts NAV/share by roughly ±A$6.8, or ±23%; the deck sensitivity is tabulated in Table 15.

Deck sensitivity. The grid holds the recomputed values; this table names the slope between grid prices so a reader can move the valuation to their own gold view. Every centre’s margin is close to linear in the deck (the WA royalty cost lag makes it mildly concave), so each line is one slope over the grid.

Table 15. Deck sensitivity — value per US$500/oz step of gold (A$/share unless stated; base rate 5%, target multiples held)

Source: this analysis, Tables 12–14, 18 and 19. % of base is each line’s per-step move divided by its own base-price value — a leverage read. Linear over is the gold range on which the slope holds: ¹ guidance-year FCF/share crosses zero at ~US$3,060/oz, just above the bottom of the grid. Every step is the difference between two recomputed grid prices of Figure 7, never a scaled figure. How to use it: start from the base-price values (NAV/share A$28.86, blended fair value A$27.55) and add or subtract the per-step figure for every US$500/oz away from US$4,000 — a US$4,200/oz flat deck gives a NAV/share of ~A$31.6 and a held-multiple blend of ~A$30.2; for a reading that also moves the discount rate, use the scenario columns of Table 21.

P/NAV ladder (unweighted). The NAV restated as a price map, straight off Figure 7’s base-rate row: for each of the producer archetype’s five fixed P/NAV levels, the share price it implies at every grid price of gold — NAV/share at the deck (base 5% rate, Hemi’s 0.70× held) × the level. No current-price column and no target row: Northern Star’s 1.03× target (derived in §7.3) is named beneath, and where the A$22.58 price sits on the map is said by the market-implied deck in §7.5 (~US$3,620/oz at the blend).

Table 16. P/NAV ladder — share price implied by each P/NAV level at each grid price (A$/share)

Source: this analysis, solved on Tables 12–14: each cell is the Figure 7 base-rate NAV/share at that column’s gold price (15.29 / 22.07 / 28.86 / 35.64 / 42.43) × the row’s P/NAV. The levels are the archetype’s fixed set (producers 0.50× to 1.50× in quarter steps), so two producers read column-for-column; Northern Star’s 1.03× target reads A$29.72 at the base price, just above the 1.00× parity level. Unweighted: it translates a multiple and a deck into a share price without today’s quote — parity at the base price is A$28.86, and the A$22.58 price sits just above the 0.75× level at the base deck, the 0.78× P/NAV read another way.

7.3 Relative valuation

At A$22.58 and 1,435.1 million diluted shares, market capitalisation is ~A$32.4 billion and enterprise value ~A$32.0 billion (net cash of A$375 m, leases excluded as §7.2 states). This section values Northern Star standalone: each target multiple is the archetype’s fixed anchor for the producer, moved by the signed drivers the Section 9 scorecard has already scored. No peer multiples are tabulated here — reading Northern Star against named peers on observed multiples is the sector comparison ’s job, on one shared deck. The cycle test is printed, not asserted: gold’s five-year average is ~US$2,650/oz (September 2021–August 2026, built from Macrotrends ’ annual averages — 2021 US$1,793, 2022 US$1,799, 2023 US$1,954, 2024 US$2,405, 2025 US$3,473, 2026 year-to-date US$4,545 — weighted by the months each contributes to the window), so the US$4,000 base sits ~51% above it, far outside the ±25% band that marks mid-cycle. The cycle is therefore normalised on the deck side: every anchor is held at its mid-cycle value in every scenario and only the deck flexes.

Deriving the targets from the archetype anchors. One signed driver set, each term tied to a Section 9 scorecard dimension and capped at about ±10%, applied as one product to every anchor:

× (1 + 0.08 reserves & life [Dim 3, ★★★★★] + 0.05 jurisdiction [Dim 8, ★★★★★] + 0.03 balance sheet [Dim 5, ★★★★] − 0.05 cost position [Dim 2, ★★★] − 0.08 capital allocation [Dim 6, ★★]) = × 1.03

Target P/NAV = 1.00× anchor (parity) × 1.03 = 1.030× → 1.03× · Target EV/EBITDA = 7.0× anchor × 1.03 = 7.21× → 7.2×

The same 1.03 product moves every anchor; the rounded figures are the ones every table below uses.

The premium for best-in-class ground and jurisdiction is very nearly cancelled by the discount for cost and the guidance record — the scorecard’s own verdict expressed as a multiple: a 3% premium to parity.

Table 17. Forward EBITDA build — FY2027 guidance year at the base deck (A$m)

Source: this analysis; unit costs, sustaining capital and corporate cost per the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report and FY2026 results; the first-year volumes are the per-asset rows of Table 13. “Forward” is the next twelve months = FY2027, the guidance year; the volume ties to guidance with nothing added above it. Cost-basis reconciliation: the NAV rows run on AISC (sustaining capital and the corporate allocation inside), the multiple on the cash operating cost with sustaining capital below EBITDA and corporate cost deducted once — the gap between the two margins is a definition, not an error. This is deliberately the guided transition year, not a normalised one — FY2027 is the trough as KCGM ties in — so the normalised FY2029 figure is carried beneath Table 18 as an unweighted memo.

Table 18. Relative valuation — implied value per share

Source: this analysis; anchor per the valuation guide linked in §7, “The valuation toolkit” (producer EV/EBITDA 7.0×), moved by the driver product (×1.03); the FY2027 EBITDA numerator is built line by line in Table 17. The implied EV crosses the same bridge lines as the NAV (net cash, hedge, rehabilitation provision, working capital), so the two methods differ only in what they see, not in how they reach equity. This is deliberately the guided transition year, not a normalised one — FY2027 is the trough as KCGM ties in — so a mid-cycle multiple is applied to Northern Star’s worst modelled year, the conservative side, stated: the same 7.2× on the FY2029 steady state gives A$26.44, carried as an unweighted memo above.

The relative read lands at A$21.18/share, below the A$29.72 the NAV method carries at its 1.03× target (§7.6) — the gap is Hemi, the post-ramp KCGM and the resource tier, none of which a FY2027 multiple can see. On the current run rate Northern Star trades at ~7.1× FY2027 EV/EBITDA, in line with the target: the market pays the mid-cycle multiple on the trough year and nothing for what follows it.

7.4 FCF-yield support

The producer default’s third method is a cash-flow yield read, built from disclosed lines because operating-cash-flow-per-share cannot be struck without an author-invented cash-tax and depreciation schedule.

Table 19. FCF-yield support build — FY2027 at the base deck

Source: this analysis; guidance and the FY2025 cash-flow statement per the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report and FY2025 Annual Report. The cash-tax line prints its own arithmetic and is the same figure the free-cash-flow memo carries. Growth capital is excluded from the FCF-yield capitalisation by construction — the method reads the producing business’s cash generation, and Hemi’s value is what the NAV leg carries.

This is the highest of the three methods and is carried at the 20% floor for two stated reasons. First, a yield capitalisation is a perpetuity read, and applied to FY2027 free cash flow struck at US$4,000 gold it prices US$4,000 gold in perpetuity — the peak-times-perpetuity trap, and precisely the assumption the market-implied read (§7.5) shows the market rejects. Second, the durability a perpetuity yield rewards is Northern Star’s reserve-replacement record, which the resource-conversion tier in the NAV already values as an asset — so weighting FCF-yield any higher would count the same replacement twice. It is kept in the blend because it is a genuine, independently-built third read; its high value is disclosed, not hidden, and the NAV anchors the conclusion.

7.5 Cross-checks (unweighted)

Seven diagnostics locate the blend; none carries weight.

Table 20. Cross-checks — reported, reconciled, never weighted

Source: this analysis; the market-implied deck and the flip prices solved on the Tables 12–19 model; reserve movements per the 3 June 2026 Resources and Reserves Update ; the De Grey consideration per the scheme announcement cited in Section 4; own-multiple history and consensus per stockanalysis.com , read 4 September 2026.

7.6 Scenarios & fair value

Every weighted method is re-run in every column of the gold grid; the price columns are the same five grid prices as the sensitivity figure. The 5% real precious-metals rate is already at the convention floor, so the upside columns hold it there and the downside columns step it out (6%, 7%). The target P/NAV and target EV/EBITDA hold at 1.03× and 7.2× in every column: the anchors are mid-cycle conventions and the base deck already sits ~51% above gold’s five-year average (§7.3), so the deck is the side that flexes and the multiples are held.

Table 21. Scenarios & fair value — inputs, value per method and the blend by grid price (A$/share)

Source: this analysis; weights per §7.1 (the producer default, no deviation); scenario names by offset from the base price. Base blend on a calculator: 0.50 × 29.722 + 0.30 × 21.177 + 0.20 × 31.682 = 14.861 + 6.353 + 6.336 = A$27.55 (on unrounded per-method values, 27.550). Inputs behind the rows, by column: the targets held at 1.03×, 7.2× and 6.8% in every column; forward EBITDA A$2,371 m / 3,430 m / 4,489 m / 5,547 m / 6,606 m; forward FCF before growth A$1,610 m / 2,351 m / 3,092 m / 3,833 m / 4,574 m; the hedge book moving with the deck (A$−425 m / −793 m / −1,161 m / −1,529 m / −1,897 m); the rehabilitation provision and working-capital lines held. The held-multiple memo row differs from the blend only in the deep-bear and bear columns, where the discount rate steps out; the base, bull and deep-bull columns hold the 5% rate anyway. The FCF/share memo row re-runs Table 19’s guidance-year bridge at each grid price (cash tax recomputed, the other lines held). Adding the ~2.7% forward yield, the implied one-year total return at the base is ~+25% — reported, not rated. Illustrative scenarios, not forecasts.

Figure 8. Value per share by method and scenario

		Scenario (gold deck)
		Deep Bear$3,000	Bear$3,500	Base$4,000	Bull$4,500	Deep Bull$5,000
Method	NAV × 1.03 (50%)	A$13.41(−55%)	A$21.01(−29%)	A$29.72(base)	A$36.71(+24%)	A$43.70(+47%)
	EV/EBITDA (30%)	A$11.07(−48%)	A$16.12(−24%)	A$21.18(base)	A$26.23(+24%)	A$31.29(+48%)
	FCF-yield (20%)	A$16.49(−48%)	A$24.09(−24%)	A$31.68(base)	A$39.28(+24%)	A$46.87(+48%)
	Blended fair value	A$13.32(−52%)	A$20.16(−27%)	A$27.55(base)	A$34.08(+24%)	A$40.61(+47%)

Source: Table 21; each cell recomputed at its column’s deck and discount rate; data-level ranked 0–9 across the whole grid. The FCF-yield read carries the steepest leverage (a perpetuity on the trough build year), the NAV the next, the multiple the least — which is why the NAV anchors the blend and the yield read is capped. Current share price A$22.58 (2 Sep 2026); market-implied deck ~US$3,620/oz. The bracketed figure under each value is its change against the same row’s base-case value.

Conclusion. The blended base-case fair value is A$27.55, inside a A$13.32 (Deep Bear, US$3,000) – A$40.61 (Deep Bull, US$5,000) range, against a A$22.58 price — an implied +22.0% → Modestly undervalued, published "(wide band)" because the Deep Bear blend sits ~41% below the price. Rating-flip prices: with the multiples held, the base blend crosses up into Undervalued above ~US$4,140/oz gold (+3.5% from the base price) and down into Fairly valued below ~US$3,790/oz (−5%) — a narrow corridor either side of the base, so the read is a conviction about the deck more than about the company; Modestly overvalued needs ~US$3,450/oz (−14%). The one assumption that drives the downside is gold reverting to US$3,000/oz while the KCGM ramp underdelivers — a world in which the producing centres alone barely cover the price. The three methods span A$21.18 to A$31.68 at the base deck; the spread is legible rather than averaged away — the NAV sees Hemi, a post-ramp KCGM and the resource tier, the EV/EBITDA multiple sees only the guided FY2027 trough, and the FCF-yield capitalises trough-year cash flow to perpetuity (§7.4). What separates A$14 from A$41 is not the mine plan; it is what gold price you capitalise and whether KCGM delivers 1,000 koz a year — one variable nobody controls, one on which the company has three years of mixed evidence. The tiered NAV is the honest frame: the producing centres and bridge alone are worth A$21.08 — ~7% below the price — so a buyer at A$22.58 pays for the operating business plus about a third of the risked Hemi value, and receives the rest of Hemi, the resource pathway and the gold-price optionality for nothing. The guidance-year free cash flow of A$1,392 m, a ~4.3% yield even in the trough build year, is the point the trough-year multiple cannot show. That is why the quality axis stays Solid rather than higher, and the value read carries the wide-band flag.

Assumptions box: valuation date 2 September 2026; balance-sheet as-of 30 June 2026 (with the rehabilitation provision and tax pools carried from the FY2025 accounts — see data gaps); horizon spot fair value. Trading currency A$; the gold grid is quoted in US$/oz and converted at A$1 = US$0.7133 (2 Sep 2026) once, at the equity bridge; share price A$22.58, the 2 September 2026 close; FY2026 operating figures convert at the company’s A$1 = US$0.68 average. Price decks: base US$4,000/oz (A$5,608) — the 3-month trailing average to 31 August 2026 (US$4,271; 6-month US$4,523, 12-month US$4,435, Goldify monthly archive of the London PM series) snapped to the lower grid price because the window carries the June–July leg down and the longer windows carry the Q1 spike — run across the US$3,000–5,000/oz grid; the 2027 consensus deck (~US$3,900/oz) as a 0%-weight cross-check; no spot deck. Decks and rates real, after-tax. Discount rate 5% real post-tax throughout, sensitised 4–7%. Share basis 1,435.1 m fully diluted (1,424.8 m outstanding + 10.2 m performance rights + director rights; treasury method); basic and if-converted differ by 0.7%, one count published. Values published to two decimals, computed on unrounded inputs; multiples to two significant figures. Cycle normalised on the deck side (base ~51% above gold’s five-year average of ~US$2,650, Sep 2021–Aug 2026, Macrotrends annual averages weighted by month — §7.3), so every anchor is held at mid-cycle in every scenario; the EV/EBITDA method is additionally struck on the guided FY2027 trough year rather than a normalised one, stated in §7.3 as the conservative side. Anchors producer P/NAV 1.00×, EV/EBITDA 7.0×, FCF yield 7.0%, no anchor re-sourced, each moved by one driver product ×1.03; metric basis forward — FY2027 — on underlying EBITDA and reported net cash (lease liabilities excluded: charged in AISC, one home); the relative-method bridge crosses the same lines as the NAV bridge; P/NAV form equity (market cap ÷ equity NAV). No peer multiples enter this section. Method weights NAV/DCF 50%, EV/EBITDA 30%, FCF-yield 20% — the producer default run in full, cash-flow family at the 50% collinear ceiling. NAV provenance: author-built sum-of-the-parts from the 31 March 2026 JORC reserves and FY2026 unit costs, calibrated to FY2027 guidance in §7.2; Hemi from De Grey’s September 2023 DFS with capital re-based to A$1.6 bn by the author and spread over FY2029–31; the resource tier a conversion of exclusive M&I. Primary value yardstick: P/NAV (equity form). Stage-risk placement: charged in Hemi’s 0.70× row risk weight (FS-complete, permitted, funding-open band 0.55–0.75×), not the discount rate or the target P/NAV; the three producing centres carry risk weight 1.00. The resource-conversion factor 0.15× is off-ladder (below the M&I band), reasoned in the notes to Table 12. Rehabilitation provision A$834.5 m charged in the bridge, not AISC; net working capital and the current tax liability (−A$307.3 m, 30 Jun 2025) in the bridge; lease liabilities (A$448.5 m, 30 Jun 2025) in the rows through AISC. Australian corporate tax 30%, Pogo 27%, no depreciation shield credited (biasing NAV down, bound ~A$0.3–0.5/share); WA royalty ~2.5% of the gold price in AISC; corporate overhead charged at A$95/oz inside every row and in rows in the bridge. Hedge book marked against the deck, taxed at 30% and discounted at 5% over the ~1-year average time to delivery, charged once in the bridge with the assets modelled unhedged. Known data gaps: (1) the rehabilitation provision, working capital, lease liabilities and tax pools are the FY2025 figures (30 June 2025); the FY2026 audited financial statements are not in the source set, so a FY2026 provision (likely modestly higher with the KCGM and Hemi build) would lower NAV slightly and the working-capital line may have moved either way (bound ±A$0.2/share) — closed by the FY2026 Annual Report; (2) the tax-pool run-off schedule is not disclosed year-by-year, so the depreciation shield is declined rather than modelled — an understatement of order A$0.3–0.5/share; (3) FY2026 D&A is n/d for the same reason, so the FCF-yield cash-tax line uses FY2025’s A$1,365 m — a higher FY2026 charge would raise the shield and the read (direction: FCF-yield understated). None changes the rating. To rank Northern Star against every listed gold producer on the same metrics, screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Table 22. Near-term catalysts

Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for all project, guidance, leadership and hedging timing. All timing is company guidance, not a guarantee, and Northern Star has explicitly declined to give FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance during calendar 2026. The growth-capital and free-cash-flow inference is the author’s.

The sequence matters more than any single item: FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance are now out (20 August), the mill tie-in is under way, the September-quarter numbers land in early October, and a new chief executive arrives on 5 October. The next three months will show whether the last three years were worth it.

9. Rating & verdict

Northern Star is scored on the same nine dimensions every Metal Pilot company analysis uses, against the peer set declared in Section 2.9. As a producer/operator it takes the reference weighting: asset quality, cost position, reserves and life, balance sheet and capital allocation carry 15% each; growth, management, jurisdiction and ESG carry 6.25% each. No dimension is marked not-applicable.

Table 23. Scorecard rationale

Source: each row cites its evidence in this analysis; peer references are the set declared in Section 2.9.

Weighted average: 0.75 + 0.60 + 0.60 + 0.45 + 0.30 + 0.3125 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.125 = 3.64/5 → ★★★½, Solid.

The two-axis verdict. Composite quality ★★★½ (Solid); value read Modestly undervalued (wide band) as of 2 September 2026; verdict: Re-rating candidate — cheap; name the catalyst. Northern Star owns some of the best gold ground on earth in the best jurisdictions on earth, and has run it about as well as an average operator would. On the value axis, the blended base-case fair value of ~A$27.6/share (a conservative US$4,000/oz deck) implies +22% upside, but the deep-bear scenario sits ~41% below today’s price — hence the (wide band) qualifier. Beside that read, the market is pricing ~US$3,620/oz gold in perpetuity against the US$4,000 base deck. The target P/NAV carries a premium for reserves/life (Dim 3), jurisdiction (Dim 8) and the balance sheet (Dim 5), very nearly offset by a discount for cost position (Dim 2) and the capital-allocation record (Dim 6), landing at a 1.03× target against the parity anchor for a producer — the scorecard’s own verdict that best-in-class ground meets middling execution.

The bull case is that the two things which have made the last three years painful — the KCGM capital programme and the guidance credibility gap — are turning: growth capital of A$2.1 billion rolls off, the mill doubles, a new (ex-Glencore) chief executive takes over on 5 October, the hedge book runs to zero by mid-2028, and behind it all sits an 18-year reserve life bought at under A$23 an ounce. The bear case is that this is a company with a demonstrated pattern of over-promising, valued at ~0.78× net asset value for a reason, in a stock that sits ~29% below its high while gold made records — and that the activist is right that the discount is deserved rather than temporary.

The specific thing that tips it is now the delivery, not the guidance. FY2027 guidance is out — 1,500–1,650 koz at an AISC of A$3,050–3,450/oz, a transition-year step down in volume and up in cost from the 1.7–1.8 Moz sub-A$2,700 outcome the bull case wanted. So the argument no longer turns on what management promises but on whether the September-quarter tie-in and the FY2029 27 Mtpa ramp actually convert three years of capital into the ounces the reserve says are there. Deliver, and the base case is validated and the wide-band discount closes; miss again, and the eighth miss in five years settles the argument about whether these assets are worth more in someone else’s hands — which is precisely what Elliott is asking.

To rank Northern Star against every listed gold producer on the same nine dimensions — reserves, grade, AISC, reserve life and P/NAV — screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Company filings. Northern Star 2025 Annual Report (year ended 30 June 2025) — the spine of this analysis, source of the FY2025 financials, the operations review, the board and executive biographies, the strategy scorecard and the ESG programmes. June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (29 July 2026) — FY2026 production, costs, cash flow by production centre and operation, the hedge book, issued capital, the KCGM and Hemi updates and the leadership changes. Resources and Reserves Update (3 June 2026) — mineral resources and ore reserves as at 31 March 2026, prepared under the JORC Code (2012). Guidance revisions of 4 January, 20 January, 13 March, 2 April and 22 April 2026, and the Production Updates of 2 April and 2 July 2026, are referenced through the quarterly report.

Technical reports. De Grey Mining’s Hemi Definitive Feasibility Study, September 2023, as reported by Australian Mining and MINING.COM ; the Northern Star–De Grey scheme announcement of 2 December 2024.

Exchange and market data. stockanalysis.com for share price (A$22.58, the 2 September 2026 close, per its price history), market capitalisation, share count, P/E, dividend yield, 52-week range and employee count as of 2 September 2026; the ~16-analyst consensus target of ~A$24.82 (targets ranging A$19.80–A$34.45) per stockanalysis.com and Morningstar.

Gold prices. Spot gold of ~US$4,350/oz at 1 September 2026 per Trading Economics , converted at A$1 = US$0.7133; the base deck US$4,000/oz is gold’s US$4,271/oz three-month trailing average to 31 August 2026 (6-month US$4,523, 12-month US$4,435; monthly averages per the Goldify archive of the London PM spot series) snapped to the lower grid price; the five-year average (~US$2,650/oz, Sep 2021–Aug 2026) from Macrotrends ’ annual averages; the own-multiple history from stockanalysis.com ; long-run context in the Gold — A Complete Market Guide .

Activist and peer material. Elliott Investment Management’s Northern Star Rising presentation and its demands, as reported by TipRanks and Morningstar ; Newmont and Agnico Eagle 2026 guidance from their own outlook disclosures; the Metal Pilot gold dataset for the peer-screening basis.

Methodology. Durable structure (reserves, resources, grade, mine life, ownership, jurisdiction) is kept separate from the dated market layer (share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples, valuation) throughout. The data-as-of date is 2 September 2026; market data is as of 1–2 September 2026; reserves and resources are effective 31 March 2026; operating figures are effective 30 June 2026; statutory FY2026 results (revenue, EBITDA, NPAT) are the 20 August 2026 release, and FY2027 guidance the same. Scorecard weights follow the producer/operator reference case, sum to 100%, and no dimension is not-applicable. The valuation follows the How to Value Commodity Stocks guide’s producer archetype: a sum-of-the-parts NAV/DCF at a 1.03× target P/NAV (50%), EV/EBITDA at 7.2× (30%) and a FCF-yield support built from disclosed lines (20%) — the producer default run in full — with the targets the guide’s archetype anchors moved by signed, scorecard-tied drivers; the section carries no peer multiples (peer reads belong to a sector-comparison post). The NAV bridges the FY2025 rehabilitation provision, folds a resource-conversion tier for the M&I ounces beyond reserves, and publishes a tiered NAV/share (producing / development / resource). The model runs across the fixed gold grid (US$3,000–5,000/oz, US$4,000 base) with the sensitivity grid and every scenario recomputed from the per-asset model (Tables 12–19 and the assumptions box), and the first modelled year is calibrated to FY2027 guidance. The Hemi risk factor, the Kalgoorlie ramp schedule, the Yandal life extension and the re-based Hemi capital cost are author estimates, not company figures. The primary value yardstick is P/NAV (equity form). Three peer rows in Table 5 are deliberately qualitative because their current-year guidance was not verified to a primary filing; they serve the scorecard only. Re-run log: 2 September 2026 — Section 7 rebuilt to the current valuation standard: a per-asset NPV build table, a deck-sensitivity table and a P/NAV ladder were added, the five-year FCF profile was replaced by a guidance-year free-cash-flow bridge with free cash flow per share by grid price, the spot memo was removed, and the scenario and fair-value tables were merged into one; the base-case blend was A$28.17 (+43%, Undervalued, wide band) on the prior run’s inputs, and Kalgoorlie remains modelled on its FY2027–29 ramp and calibrated to FY2027 guidance. 5 September 2026 — corrections to Section 7 after a playbook audit: the share price is the actual 2 September 2026 close (A$22.58, previously carried at A$19.67); the FCF-yield build now deducts FY2026 sustaining capital (A$657 m), the same line the EBITDA build strips; the EV/EBITDA leg crosses the same bridge lines as the NAV (rehabilitation provision and working capital added); net working capital and the current tax liability (−A$307 m, 30 June 2025) are bridged and the lease-liability treatment is stated (charged in AISC, excluded from net cash); the own-multiple history, EV/production, reserve-replacement value and a De Grey transaction comparable were added to the cross-checks; the five-year gold average is printed with its window and source. Net effect: NAV/share A$28.86 (from A$29.07), base blend A$27.55 (from A$28.17), value read Modestly undervalued (wide band) at +22% (from Undervalued at +43%, of which the price correction accounts for most). 5 September 2026 — playbook audit corrections to Section 7: the 3-, 6- and 12-month trailing gold averages are now printed with their source and end date in the opening block and the assumptions box (the base deck was previously stated as “the representative trailing average” with no figure), and the FY2027 EBITDA numerator is built line by line in a new Table 17 (later tables renumbered). No model input changed; NAV/share, the blend and the value read are unchanged. Open data gap: the FY2026 audited financial statements (balance sheet, provisions, lease and income-tax notes) are not yet in the source set — the FY2025 figures are carried, as the assumptions box states. Update cadence: refreshed on each annual report and on material events. Figures: every figure is an inline HTML/CSS component; the asset-footprint map is omitted (a proportional-symbol map of the six operations plus Hemi and Pogo would not render legibly at this scale), so Table 2 and the §2 prose carry the footprint, and the gold-sold-and-AISC chart is a single series of annual group gold sold with the AISC line moved to Table 6.

Provenance: Northern Star Resources Ltd — Annual Report — 2025.

10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 2 September 2026: the share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples and valuation read all move, and the FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance (released 20 August 2026) are reflected here. Reserve, resource, study and forecast figures are estimates, prepared on the codes and bases stated beside each table, and study economics are not achieved results. The Quality × Value verdict is an analytical read, never an instruction to the reader. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from primary filings and reviewed, but readers should verify every number against the original documents before acting on it. The author holds no position in Northern Star Resources Ltd or in any company named here. Please do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser.