Northern Star (NST) — Stock Analysis 2026 [3.6]
Analysis as of 2 September 2026. Northern Star stock analysis. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Northern Star’s FY2026 results (released 20 August 2026) and FY2025 Annual Report, the June 2026 quarterly activities report (29 July 2026) and the annual Resources and Reserves update for the 12 months to 31 March 2026 (3 June 2026). Market data is as of 2 September 2026. Rating: ★★★½, Solid — Modestly undervalued (wide band) → a re-rating candidate; the edge is the catalyst. Price deck: base gold US$4,000/oz — the representative trailing average on the fixed US$3,000–5,000 grid — with every grid price run as a scenario (deep bear US$3,000 to deep bull US$5,000); the 2027 consensus deck (~US$3,900/oz) as a 0%-weight cross-check, no spot deck. At A$1 = US$0.7133, the US$4,000 base is A$5,608/oz; NAV/share is published in Australian dollars, the trading currency, with the gold grid on its US$ axis. 5% real post-tax discount rate, the precious-metals convention. Figures are Australian dollars unless marked US$. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.
Northern Star is Australia’s largest gold miner, it owns the biggest gold mine in the country, and it has just spent three years and A$1.6 billion rebuilding that mine’s processing plant while missing its own guidance seven times. The thesis in one line: a genuinely tier-one, tier-one-jurisdiction reserve base of 28.4 million ounces is attached to an operating and capital-allocation record poor enough to have drawn an activist with a billion dollars and a demand for a strategic review. Why look now: the KCGM mill expansion is tying in, the chief executive has just left early with a Glencore hire arriving in October, and the market has marked the shares down ~38% from their 52-week high — to about two-thirds of net asset value on a conservative gold deck — while gold sits near a record. To screen Northern Star against every listed gold producer on production, reserves, grade and cost, go to Metal Pilot’s gold mining stock screener.
1. Snapshot & thesis
Northern Star Resources Ltd (ASX: NST) is a senior gold producer headquartered in Subiaco, Western Australia, with about 3,383 employees and three operating production centres — Kalgoorlie and Yandal in Western Australia and Pogo in Alaska — comprising six mining operations, plus one development project, Hemi in the Pilbara, acquired with De Grey Mining in May 2025. By archetype it is a producer/operator carrying a large funded development project, which means the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). (AISC = all-in sustaining cost, the industry’s per-ounce measure of cash costs plus royalties, corporate overhead and sustaining capital, but not growth capital; AIC = all-in cost, which adds growth capital and exploration; koz = thousand ounces, Moz = million ounces; 2P = proven and probable ore reserves.)
Figure 1. Northern Star in numbers
Figure data: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (production, AISC, cash, share count), FY2026 results, 20 August 2026 and Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 (reserves, resources); market data per stockanalysis.com as of 2 Sep 2026. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.
Table 1. Northern Star in numbers
| Metric | Value | As of |
|---|---|---|
| Share price / market capitalisation | A$22.58 / A$32.4 bn | 2 Sep 2026 |
| Enterprise value | ~A$32.0 bn | 2 Sep 2026 |
| Shares outstanding / fully diluted | 1,424.8 m / 1,435.1 m | 29 Jul 2026 |
| 52-week range | A$15.30 – A$31.96 | 2 Sep 2026 |
| Gold sold | 1,543 koz | FY2026 |
| Average realised price | A$4,925/oz | FY2026 |
| All-in sustaining cost | A$2,698/oz | FY2026 |
| Cash margin over AISC | A$2,227/oz (45.2%) | FY2026 |
| All-in cost (incl. growth capital) | A$4,200/oz | FY2026 |
| Ore reserves (2P) | 28.4 Moz @ 1.4 g/t (627 Mt) | 31 Mar 2026 |
| Mineral resources | 88.9 Moz @ 1.7 g/t (1,617 Mt) | 31 Mar 2026 |
| Reserve life at FY2026 rates | ~18 years | 31 Mar 2026 |
| Cash and bullion / debt | A$1,235 m / A$860 m (US$600 m notes) | 30 Jun 2026 |
| Net cash | ~A$375 m | 30 Jun 2026 |
| Gold hedged | 787.5 koz @ A$3,397/oz to Jun 2028 | 30 Jun 2026 |
| Dividend per share | 60.0c (FY2026 total); 55.0c (FY2025) | FY2026 |
| Quality rating / valuation read | 3.6/5 (Solid) / Modestly undervalued (wide band) | 2 Sep 2026 |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for FY2026 operating, cost, hedging and balance-sheet figures; Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 for reserves and resources; Northern Star 2025 Annual Report and the FY2026 results, 20 August 2026 for the dividend; market data per stockanalysis.com, 2 Sep 2026. Cash margin = (realised price − AISC) ÷ realised price. Enterprise value = market capitalisation less net cash; net cash = cash and bullion of A$1,235 m less the US$600 m senior guaranteed notes converted at the 30 June 2026 rate of A$1 = US$0.6980. Corporate bank facilities of A$1,750 m were undrawn at 30 June 2026. Listed: Public (ASX: NST).
Thesis in brief. Bull: this is 28.4 Moz of reserves and 88.9 Moz of resources — both up more than a quarter year-on-year, at a discovery cost under A$23/oz — entirely inside Western Australia and Alaska, throwing off a A$2,227/oz cash margin, and the two things that have been consuming cash are about to stop: the KCGM mill expansion is commissioning now, and Hemi’s 530 koz a year arrives early next decade. Bear: the company has missed production or cost guidance seven times in four financial years, abandoned its 2 Moz FY2026 target, watched AISC rise 25% in a single year (with FY2027 guidance pointing higher still, A$3,050–3,450/oz in a stated transition year), issued about a quarter of its capital to buy an asset that will not pour gold before 2031, and has just seen its chief executive depart early (28 August 2026) and its chief financial officer resign under pressure from an activist holding more than A$1 billion of stock. What tips it: whether the expanded 27 Mtpa mill at KCGM actually delivers the ounces the reserve says it should. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.
How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).
2. Assets & operations
Northern Star sells into the strongest gold market on record. Spot gold sat near US$4,350/oz on 1 September 2026 — roughly A$6,100/oz — yet the company realised A$4,925/oz across FY2026, because a legacy hedge book is still delivering ounces at A$3,397. That gap is worth holding in mind through everything below: this is a business earning enormous margins that are nonetheless smaller than the spot price implies. For how gold is priced, who mines it and why miners are geared to the metal, see the Gold — A Complete Market Guide. This section spends its words on the company.
2.1 Portfolio overview & map
The portfolio is unusually clean for a senior producer: six operations in two countries, both top-tier jurisdictions, organised into three production centres, plus one development project.
Table 2. Asset base
| Asset | Production centre | Location | Stage | FY2026 gold sold | FY2026 AISC | Ore reserves | Mineral resources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KCGM | Kalgoorlie | Western Australia | Producing (open pit + UG) | 468 koz | A$2,495/oz | 15.0 Moz @ 1.2 g/t | 42.2 Moz @ 1.4 g/t |
| Pogo | Pogo | Alaska, USA | Producing (underground) | 265 koz | US$1,534/oz | 2.4 Moz @ 6.8 g/t | 9.3 Moz @ 7.6 g/t |
| Thunderbox & Bronzewing | Yandal | Western Australia | Producing (open pit + UG) | 232 koz | A$3,187/oz | 1.6 Moz @ 1.7 g/t | 4.3 Moz @ 1.6 g/t |
| Carosue Dam | Kalgoorlie | Western Australia | Producing (UG + open pit) | 217 koz | A$2,732/oz | ~0.7 Moz | 3.9 Moz @ 1.9 g/t |
| Jundee | Yandal | Western Australia | Producing (underground) | 202 koz | A$3,212/oz | 1.0 Moz @ 3.2 g/t | 6.4 Moz @ 2.5 g/t |
| Kalgoorlie Operations (Kanowna Belle, South Kalgoorlie) | Kalgoorlie | Western Australia | Producing (underground) | 160 koz | A$2,617/oz | 2.3 Moz | 9.6 Moz |
| Hemi | Pilbara | Western Australia | Development (FID late FY27) | — | — | 5.5 Moz | 13.2 Moz @ 1.4 g/t |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, Tables 2 and 6–11, for FY2026 gold sold and AISC by operation; Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 for reserves and resources effective 31 March 2026, prepared under the JORC Code (2012). Mineral resources are inclusive of ore reserves and are not ore reserves. Reserves are estimated at an assumed gold price of A$2,900/oz for Australian assets and US$1,900/oz for Pogo; resources at A$3,700/oz and US$2,600/oz respectively — both conservative against a spot price near A$6,100/oz. Carosue Dam’s reserve is derived as the Kalgoorlie centre residual and is approximate. Kalgoorlie Operations combines Kanowna Belle and South Kalgoorlie. Pogo AISC is stated in US dollars, its functional currency; the FY2026 average rate was A$1 = US$0.68. Listed: Public (ASX: NST).
Concentration cuts two ways. KCGM alone is 53% of group ore reserves, 47% of mineral resources and 30% of production — this is, in practice, a KCGM company with four other mines attached. But no single operation is more than a third of output, all six sit in jurisdictions with no expropriation risk, and the reserve base behind them is 18 years deep.
2.2 Where the ounces and the value sit
Northern Star produces one metal. By-product credits were A$33 million against A$7,602 million of gold revenue in FY2026 — four-tenths of one percent — so the by-metal revenue split a polymetallic miner publishes here would be a single slice, and gold sold by operation is the revenue split by asset.
Figure 2. FY2026 gold sold by operation
Figure data: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, Tables 6–11. Gold revenue by operation follows the same ranking, since all six operations sell into one gold price; group gold revenue was A$7,602 m in FY2026.
Figure 3. Risked net asset value by asset
Figure data: the Section 7 net-asset-value build (Table 14, base case: US$4,000/oz (A$5,608/oz) gold, 5% real post-tax discount rate, Hemi risked at 0.70). Shares are of gross asset value before net cash and the hedge book — the bridge to equity is Figure 7. The Hemi risk factor is the author’s estimate, not a disclosed figure.
Read together, the two figures show why the KCGM story dominates the equity: the Kalgoorlie centre is 55% of production but 60% of value, because it holds the long reserve life and the mill that is about to double in capacity. Pogo is the opposite — 17% of production and 12% of value from a mine with nine years of reserves, but it generated A$609 million of net mine cash flow in FY2026, more than Kalgoorlie and Yandal combined, because it carries no expansion bill.
2.3 KCGM — the Super Pit and the new mill
KCGM, the Kalgoorlie Consolidated Gold Mines complex, is the Fimiston open pit — the Super Pit — plus the Mt Charlotte underground and the Fimiston underground development, and it is Australia’s largest gold mine. Northern Star acquired full ownership in stages to 2019–2020 and has since doubled its mineral resource, adding 19.8 Moz to reach 42.2 Moz, and lifted ore reserves 50% to 15.0 Moz.
FY2026 sold 468 koz at an AISC of A$2,495/oz — the group’s lowest-cost Australian operation — from 10.3 Mt milled at 1.8 g/t and 83% recovery. The June quarter was the best of the year at 136 koz and A$2,411/oz, with open-pit material movement at an annualised 88 Mtpa and underground at 3.2 Mtpa, both records under Northern Star ownership. That followed a bruising FY2025 in which delayed access to the high-grade Golden Pike North area, while a 4.5-year East Wall remediation was completed, was a principal cause of the group missing original guidance.
The transformation under way is the KCGM Mill Expansion Project, which replaces about 85% of the 13 Mtpa Fimiston processing plant and lifts capacity to 27 Mtpa. Stage I entered commissioning in July 2026 on schedule after more than three years of construction, with tie-in planned for September; Stage II consolidates the separate Gidji facility into a single Fimiston hub by late 1H FY2027, eliminating concentrate haulage and adding a forecast 1–2% recovery uplift. Total project spend from the first quarter of FY2024 stands at A$1,605 million, of which A$713 million fell in FY2026, alongside a further A$322 million of “operational readiness” capital for tailings facilities, a thermal power station, transmission, camp and stores.
The key asset-level risk is stated plainly by the company itself: management declined to give FY2027 group guidance with the June quarterly, deferring it to 20 August so that ore commissioning in August can “identify and address latent constraints that could affect throughput, recovery and plant availability”, and said it does not expect to give FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance in calendar 2026 at all. Ramp-up to a 27 Mtpa run-rate is expected to take roughly two years, reaching steady state in FY2029. Everything good about this analysis rests on that ramp.
2.4 Pogo — the quiet cash machine
Pogo, near Delta Junction in interior Alaska, is a narrow-vein underground mine and the group’s highest-grade asset by a wide margin: 9.3 Moz of mineral resources at 7.6 g/t and 2.4 Moz of reserves at 6.8 g/t, against a group average of 1.7 g/t and 1.4 g/t. FY2026 sold 265 koz at an AISC of US$1,534/oz (A$2,259), and the June quarter was its strongest — 82 koz at US$1,384/oz — driven by higher-grade stoping from newly established areas in East Deeps and Liese 3, with stoping ore reaching 72% of mill feed and development advancing at 1,560 metres a month.
Two things make Pogo matter more than its 17% share of production suggests. It delivered a fifth consecutive annual record net mine cash flow, A$609 million, on just US$19 million of growth capital in the June quarter — it is the only production centre currently returning materially more cash than it consumes. And its resource grew 3.1 Moz in the year, including a maiden 0.3 Moz Star resource 1.3 km from the mine and extensions at East Deeps and South Pogo, with a lower cut-off grade (4.1 g/t to 3.4 g/t) unlocking tonnes at the higher gold price.
The asset-level risk is logistical and structural rather than geological: Pogo is a remote, narrow-vein underground operation with a cost base above the Australian mines when expressed in common currency, and a major planned shutdown of the processing plant and underground ore bin falls in the September 2026 quarter.
2.5 Hemi — the growth asset
Hemi, in the Pilbara, arrived with the A$5 billion all-scrip takeover of De Grey Mining completed in May 2025 and is expected to become Northern Star’s fourth production centre. The 2026 statement booked it for the first time under Northern Star’s own standards at 13.2 Moz of mineral resources and 5.5 Moz of ore reserves — the single largest addition in the company’s history, and 19% of group reserves.
The published economics are still De Grey’s. Northern Star has not restated them, and a final investment decision is targeted for late FY2027.
Table 3. Hemi — De Grey definitive feasibility study, September 2023
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Average annual production, first 10 years | 530 koz |
| Average annual production, first 5 years | 553 koz |
| Mine life | ~12 years |
| Pre-production capital cost | A$1.3 bn |
| All-in sustaining cost | A$1,200–1,300/oz |
| Post-tax net present value | A$2.9 bn |
| Post-tax internal rate of return | 36% |
| Gold price assumption | A$2,700/oz |
Source: De Grey Mining’s Hemi Definitive Feasibility Study, announced September 2023, as summarised by Australian Mining and MINING.COM. These are study estimates prepared by the prior owner at a A$2,700/oz gold price, not achieved results and not Northern Star’s own guidance. Northern Star’s 31 March 2026 ore reserve for Hemi is 5.5 Moz, restated under its own standards; the DFS contemplated 5.7 Moz of recovered ounces. Capital cost is stated in 2023 dollars and has not been re-based.
The honest read: the study’s A$2,700/oz gold price is roughly half today’s spot, so Hemi’s real economics at current prices are far better than the table shows — but its A$1.3 billion capital estimate is three years old, and this is a company whose most recent major build has absorbed A$1.6 billion and counting. FY2026 spending on Hemi was A$104 million of development capital against guidance of A$165–175 million, plus A$39 million of exploration. Permitting is partial, itemised in the Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026: the State EPA approval under the EP Act has been received; still outstanding are the Federal EPBC approval, the Traditional Owner mining agreement, the State EPA secondary approvals for on-ground works, the Mine Development and Closure Proposal, miscellaneous licences and the water licence — for which Managed Aquifer Recharge trials begin in the September 2026 quarter following agreement with Traditional Owners. The asset-level risk is simply that FID slips again — it has already moved from FY2026 to late FY2027.
2.6 Yandal — Jundee and Thunderbox
The Yandal centre is the group’s problem child. It sold 434 koz at an AISC of A$3,198/oz in FY2026 — A$700 an ounce above the Kalgoorlie centre and the highest cost in the portfolio — split between Jundee (202 koz at A$3,212/oz, underground only) and Thunderbox & Bronzewing (232 koz at A$3,187/oz, open pit and underground).
Both improved through the year. Thunderbox delivered a record quarter in June, 67 koz, on better mill throughput, higher-grade Orelia ore and an increasing contribution from the Bannockburn open pit replacing low-grade stockpile feed. Jundee sold 57 koz in the June quarter, up 24%, and the company began an operational review during the quarter whose early outcomes are informing an updated medium-term mine plan.
The structural problem is reserve life. Yandal carries 2.6 Moz of ore reserves against 434 koz a year — about six years — and reserves fell 0.4 Moz over the year at Thunderbox on depletion and smaller open-pit shells. Jundee, to its credit, replaced depletion and held reserves at 1.0 Moz. Behind them sits 10.7 Moz of mineral resources, so the ounces exist; the question is whether they convert at a cost that works. The valuation in Section 7 assumes eight years of Yandal production, two more than reserves currently support, and says so.
2.7 Carosue Dam and Kalgoorlie Operations
The two smaller Kalgoorlie-centre mines together sold 377 koz, about a quarter of group output. Carosue Dam sold 217 koz at an AISC of A$2,732/oz from 3.8 Mt milled; Wallbrook open-pit mining was completed as planned in the June quarter, marking the transition to underground mining supplemented by lower-grade stockpiles — which is why its unit cost rose through the year to A$3,082/oz in the final quarter. Kalgoorlie Operations — the Kanowna Belle and South Kalgoorlie underground mines — sold 160 koz at A$2,617/oz at a head grade of 3.1 g/t, the highest of the Australian assets. Between them they hold about 3.0 Moz of reserves and 13.5 Moz of resources, including a maiden 0.9 Moz Hercules resource and a 0.25 Moz probable reserve defined in FY2025.
2.8 Group production, reserves & costs
Table 4. FY2026 performance by production centre
| Metric | Kalgoorlie | Yandal | Pogo | Group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold sold (koz) | 844 | 434 | 265 | 1,543 |
| Milled tonnes (Mt) | 15.8 | 9.1 | 1.4 | 26.4 |
| Head grade (g/t) | 1.9 | 1.7 | 6.7 | 2.1 |
| Recovery (%) | 85 | 87 | 87 | 86 |
| Gold revenue (A$M) | 4,214 | 2,101 | 1,287 | 7,602 |
| Cash operating cost (A$/oz) | 1,992 | 2,575 | 1,956 | 2,150 |
| All-in sustaining cost (A$/oz) | 2,579 | 3,198 | 2,259 | 2,698 |
| All-in cost (A$/oz) | 4,685 | 4,111 | 2,806 | 4,200 |
| Sustaining capital (A$M) | 382 | 212 | 63 | 657 |
| Growth capital (A$M) | 1,700 | 352 | 94 | 2,146 |
| Mine operating cash flow (A$M) | 1,932 | 690 | 703 | 3,325 |
| Net mine cash flow (A$M) | 232 | 338 | 609 | 1,179 |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, Table 2, 12 months ending 30 June 2026. Pogo figures are converted to Australian dollars at the FY2026 average rate of A$1 = US$0.68. Growth capital excludes Hemi development capital (A$104 m), Hemi exploration (A$39 m) and corporate growth capital (A$7 m). Net mine cash flow = mine operating cash flow less growth capital; mine operating cash flow = revenue less cash operating costs (excluding inventory movements) and sustaining capital.
The cost story is the FY2026 story — and the FY2027 story. Group AISC rose from A$2,163/oz in FY2025 to A$2,698/oz — up 25% in one year, driven by higher gold-price-linked royalties, Pogo tariff assumptions, general inflation and the shift at Carosue Dam and Yandal to lower-grade feed. Gold sold fell from 1,634 koz to 1,543 koz. Worse, FY2027 guidance (20 August 2026) is A$3,050–3,450/oz on 1,500–1,650 koz — a further step-up the company frames as a transition-year peak before KCGM reaches scale. Against a peer set whose 2026 AISC guidance clusters around US$1,400–1,700/oz, Northern Star’s A$2,698 (≈US$1,835 at the FY2026 average rate) already sits at or slightly above the top of that band, and the FY2027 figure is higher again. The margin remains enormous — A$2,227/oz — but it comes from the gold price, not from a cost-curve advantage. For how cost-curve position decides who survives a downturn across commodities, see the macro regime guide.
Reserves and replacement are the other side of the ledger, and here the record is excellent. Group ore reserves rose 27% to 28.4 Moz and mineral resources 26% to 88.9 Moz in the 12 months to 31 March 2026, after mining depletion — 5.5 Moz and 13.2 Moz of that from Hemi, but also +0.7 Moz of reserves and +3.6 Moz of resources organically at Kalgoorlie and +0.3 Moz and +3.1 Moz at Pogo, at an average discovery cost below A$23/oz. Reserve life at FY2026 rates is roughly 18 years, and the reserves are struck at A$2,900/oz against a ~A$6,100/oz spot price, which is a conservative basis with real conversion upside embedded in it.
Figure 4. Group gold sold, FY2024–FY2026
Figure data: Table 6. Group AISC (A$2,163/oz in FY2025 rising to A$2,698/oz in FY2026, up 25% in one year) is read from Table 6 rather than overlaid as a second series; FY2025 and FY2026 quarterly splits by production centre are in the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report.
Figure 5. Reserves and resources by operation, 31 March 2026
Figure data: 3 June 2026 Resources and Reserves Update, the Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve tables by production centre — attributable ore reserves (as in Table 2) and measured plus indicated resources at each operation’s sub-total, JORC 2012, effective 31 March 2026; reserves at A$2,900/oz (Pogo US$1,900/oz) and resources at A$3,700/oz (Pogo US$2,600/oz). Northern Star reports resources inclusive of ore reserves, and Table 2’s resource column adds inferred; the second bar is measured plus indicated only, and the printed addition is derived as M&I less the reserve. Kalgoorlie Operations sums the Kanowna and South Kalgoorlie sub-totals; Thunderbox includes Bronzewing. Jundee’s indicated is the summary table’s 4,522 koz, which reconciles to its 6,405 koz total (the detail table prints 4,181). Not drawn: Hemi (5.5 Moz of reserve, development); the six sum to 22.91 Moz of reserves and 45.25 Moz of M&I against the group’s 28.4 Moz and 53.2 Moz. Inferred resources are not drawn.
By operation (Figure 5), KCGM holds two-thirds of the producing reserve and 23.8 Moz of M&I, the base the mill expansion is built on. The underground operations are thin on reserve and long on resource: Jundee holds 4.6 Moz of M&I against a 1.0 Moz reserve and Carosue Dam 2.7 Moz against 0.7 Moz — the conversion behind the reserve growth the section opens with.
2.9 Peer positioning
The peer set used throughout this analysis — for every scorecard star in Section 9 and the relative valuation in Section 7 — is five listed senior and mid-tier gold producers with primary gold revenue and tier-one-jurisdiction asset bases: the global seniors Northern Star is measured against on cost and scale, and its closest Australian comparator.
Table 5. Peer positioning — quality metrics
| Company | Listing | Annual gold production | AISC | Reserve base | Jurisdictions | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Newmont | Public (NYSE: NEM) | ~5.3 Moz (2026 guidance) | ~US$1,680/oz | Largest in sector | Global, mixed tiers | Portfolio rationalisation |
| Agnico Eagle | Public (NYSE: AEM; TSX: AEM) | 3.3–3.5 Moz (2026 guidance) | US$1,400–1,550/oz | Deep, Canada-weighted | Canada, Finland, Mexico, Australia | Detour, Odyssey, Hope Bay |
| Northern Star | Public (ASX: NST) | 1.54 Moz (FY2026) | A$2,698/oz (≈US$1,835) | 28.4 Moz, ~18 yr life | Australia, USA — tier-1 only | KCGM 27 Mtpa; Hemi 530 koz/yr |
| Barrick | Public (NYSE: B; TSX: ABX) | Senior scale | Sector-average | Very deep | Global, incl. higher-risk | Reko Diq, Lumwana |
| Gold Fields | Public (NYSE: GFI; JSE: GFI) | Mid-senior scale | Sector-average | Moderate life | South Africa, Australia, Ghana, Peru | Salares Norte, Gold Road |
| Evolution Mining | Public (ASX: EVN) | Mid-tier | Low, copper by-product credits | Moderate | Australia, Canada | Northparkes, Ernest Henry |
Source: Newmont and Agnico Eagle 2026 production and cost guidance as reported in each company’s 2026 outlook disclosures; Northern Star per its June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report and Resources and Reserves Update. Barrick, Gold Fields and Evolution Mining rows are qualitative — their current-year guidance was not verified to a primary filing for this analysis and no figures are stated for them; they are included because the scorecard and the valuation reference them as a jurisdictional and cost comparison, not because a number is being asserted. AISC bases differ between issuers and Northern Star’s Australian-dollar figure converts at the FY2026 average rate of A$1 = US$0.68. These are quality comparators for the scorecard only; the Section 7 valuation is standalone and carries no peer multiples. Screen the full gold peer set on production, reserves, grade and cost at Metal Pilot’s gold mining stock screener.
Northern Star’s position in that set is specific and a little uncomfortable. It is the purest tier-one-jurisdiction portfolio of the group — no African, Latin American or Central Asian exposure at all, rare at this scale and a durable advantage — and its reserve life is at the long end. But it is roughly a third of Agnico’s size, its unit costs sit at or above the peer band rather than below it, and neither Agnico nor Newmont has spent four years missing guidance. Best-in-class ground, middling execution: that is the whole investment debate.
3. Financials & balance sheet
Table 6. Five-year financial summary (A$M unless stated, fiscal years ended 30 June)
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gold sold (koz) | — | — | 1,621 | 1,634 | 1,543 |
| Average realised price (A$/oz) | 2,433 | 2,639 | 3,031 | 3,922 | 4,925 |
| Revenue | — | — | 4,921.2 | 6,414.9 | 7,623.1 |
| Revenue YoY % | — | — | — | +30% | +19% |
| AISC (A$/oz) | — | — | — | 2,163 | 2,698 |
| Cash margin over AISC (%) | — | — | — | 44.9 | 45.2 |
| Underlying EBITDA | — | — | 2,192.3 | 3,501.5 | 4,300 |
| Cash earnings | 1,054 | 1,223 | 1,805.1 | 2,873.2 | ~2,900 |
| Net profit after tax | — | — | 638.5 | 1,339.7 | 1,664.3 |
| Underlying net profit after tax | 295 | 301 | 689.4 | 1,415.4 | — |
| Basic EPS (cents) | — | — | 55.6 | 112.6 | ~117 |
| Operating cash flow | — | — | 2,070.4 | 2,953.5 | — |
| Underlying free cash flow | — | — | 462.4 | 535.9 | — |
| Cash, bullion and deposits | — | — | 1,247.5 | 1,914.4 | 1,235 |
| Net cash | — | — | 358.2 | 1,013.0 | ~375 |
| Net debt / EBITDA | — | — | net cash | net cash | net cash |
| Dividend per share (cents) | 21.5 | 26.5 | 40.0 | 55.0 | 30.0 interim |
Source: Northern Star 2025 Annual Report — the Operating & Financial Review’s FY2025-vs-FY2024 table for all FY2024 and FY2025 lines, and the five-year charts in the Remuneration Report for FY2022 and FY2023 realised price, cash earnings, underlying NPAT and the dividend history; June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for FY2026 gold sold, realised price, AISC and cash and bullion, and the FY2026 results released 20 August 2026 for statutory revenue (A$7,623.1 m), underlying EBITDA (A$4.3 bn, +22%) and net profit after tax (A$1,664.3 m). Cash earnings and basic EPS are approximate pending the full statutory accounts; remaining FY2026 lines marked “—” were not isolated in the sources gathered here. FY2022 and FY2023 lines not published in the FY2025 report’s comparative tables are also marked “—” rather than sourced from a different basis. FY2024 gold sold of 1,621 koz is derived by summing the FY2024 comparatives disclosed per operation in the FY2025 Annual Report. Cash margin = (realised price − AISC) ÷ realised price. Net cash at 30 June 2026 is the author’s calculation: cash and bullion of A$1,235 m less the US$600 m notes converted at A$1 = US$0.6980.
The five-year shape is a company whose earnings have quadrupled on the gold price while its operations went sideways: realised price up 102% from FY2022 to FY2026, gold sold down 5% from FY2024, and AISC up 25% in the last year alone. The FY2026 results (20 August 2026) confirmed it: statutory revenue A$7,623 million and net profit after tax A$1,664 million, with underlying EBITDA of A$4.3 billion up 22% — but cash earnings near A$2.9 billion, essentially flat on FY2025’s A$2,873 million, which is the clearest single statement of the problem. A 26% higher gold price bought little earnings growth at the cash line, because volume fell and unit costs rose to absorb it — and FY2027 guidance points to a further cost step-up (AISC A$3,050–3,450/oz).
Balance sheet and liquidity. The balance sheet is genuinely strong and did the heavy lifting through a record capital year. At 30 June 2026 Northern Star held A$1,235 million of cash and bullion, no drawn corporate bank debt, and A$1,750 million of undrawn corporate facilities maturing March 2030 and March 2031 across two equal tranches. The only debt is US$600 million of senior guaranteed notes at 6.125%, due April 2033, guaranteed by certain wholly-owned subsidiaries. Net cash of roughly A$375 million is down from A$1,013 million a year earlier — the cost of funding A$2,146 million of growth capital, A$657 million of sustaining capital and A$217 million of exploration out of operating cash flow rather than the market.
The hedge book is a real, quantifiable drag and deserves its own table.
Table 7. Gold hedging commitments at 30 June 2026
| Delivery period | Ounces | Contracted price (A$/oz) |
|---|---|---|
| Dec half 2026 | 280,000 | 3,292 |
| Jun half 2027 | 237,500 | 3,340 |
| Dec half 2027 | 180,000 | 3,532 |
| Jun half 2028 | 90,000 | 3,603 |
| Total | 787,500 | 3,397 |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, Table 5. Northern Star has added no hedge commitments since August 2024 and is winding the book down; 165 koz were delivered at A$3,195/oz during the June 2026 quarter. Against a spot price of ~A$6,100/oz (US$4,350) these commitments represent roughly A$2.1 bn of foregone revenue on a pre-tax, undiscounted basis; against the ~A$5,608/oz (US$4,000) base-case deck used in Section 7, roughly A$1.7 bn pre-tax, or A$1.2 bn after 30% tax — A$1,161 m once discounted at 5% over the ~1-year average time to delivery, which is the figure carried in the Section 7 NAV bridge.
Northern Star’s policy is now effectively to be unhedged: no new commitments in nearly two years, and the book runs off by mid-2028. That is the right call at these prices and the wrong call retrospectively — the existing 787,500 ounces are the single largest identifiable value transfer away from shareholders on the balance sheet, and they are why realised prices lag spot by roughly A$900/oz.
Capital returns. Northern Star pays a real dividend and has raised it every year of the last five: 21.5c in FY2022 to 55.0c in FY2025, and 60.0c total for FY2026 (a 30.0c interim plus a 30.0c final declared with the 20 August 2026 results), fully franked. On top of that, an on-market buy-back of up to A$500 million was announced on 2 April 2026, of which A$129 million had been executed by 30 June at an average price of A$20.39. The trailing yield is about 3.1%. For a company in the last year of a A$2 billion capital programme, that is a defensible capital-returns record — the criticism in Section 9 is about what the growth capital bought, not about what was returned.
4. Management, strategy & corporate structure
4.1 Management & governance
Northern Star is in the middle of the most complete leadership turnover in its history, and it is not happening voluntarily.
Stuart Tonkin, Managing Director since July 2021 and Chief Executive since November 2016 — a mining engineer with more than 25 years underground and Northern Star’s Chief Operating Officer from 2013 — announced on 21 May 2026 that he would step down, and in the event departed early, on 28 August 2026, days after the FY2026 results and amid the activist pressure below. Suresh Vadnagra, named on 2 July, commences as Managing Director and CEO on 5 October 2026 — a mining executive with more than 25 years across strategy, operations, major projects and transactions in large multi-commodity portfolios, most recently at Glencore. Ryan Gurner, Chief Financial Officer since December 2021, was appointed Deputy CEO and is serving as interim CEO through the gap — but on 31 August the company disclosed that Gurner will himself leave on 30 November 2026 after more than eleven years, with Phillip Coetzer acting as Chief Financial Officer from 29 August 2026. On 2 July, Michael Ashforth — Deputy Chairman since July 2024 — was named to succeed Michael Chaney AO as Chairman from the conclusion of the 2026 Annual General Meeting, and on 9 July Jeffrey Quartermaine joined as an independent Non-Executive Director. A chief executive, a chief financial officer and a chairman are all changing inside six months, at the start of the most important ramp-up in the company’s history.
The board that presided over the period runs to eight: Chaney (Chairman since July 2021, concurrently Chairman of Wesfarmers and formerly Chairman of Woodside and National Australia Bank), Ashforth, Tonkin, John Fitzgerald (director since November 2012, chartered accountant, 35 years in resource financing at NM Rothschild, Investec and HSBC Precious Metals), Nick Cernotta (July 2019, mining engineer, former Director of Operations at Fortescue and at Barrick Australia Pacific), Sally Langer (February 2021, chartered accountant), Sharon Warburton (September 2021, chartered accountant, formerly Co-Deputy Chair of Fortescue) and Marnie Finlayson (October 2022); John Richards resigned effective 31 July 2024. The executive bench beyond Gurner includes Simon Jessop (Chief Operating Officer since 2021, previously COO at Saracen), Steven McClare (Chief Technical Officer since 2015) and Hilary Macdonald (Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary, with ESG, environment and heritage in her remit).
The reason for the turnover is the record. Elliott Investment Management, holding well over A$1 billion of stock, published a presentation titled Northern Star Rising in mid-2026 calling for a formal strategic review and explicitly raising a possible sale of the company. Its central factual charge is that Northern Star missed production or cost guidance seven times across four financial years, including four separate downward revisions in the first three months of 2026 alone — a charge the company’s own disclosure substantiates: FY2025 missed original production and cost guidance and met only revised guidance; FY2026 production guidance was revised on 13 March and again on 22 April 2026, and cost guidance on 20 January 2026. The 2 Moz group target set in 2021 for FY2026 was abandoned. Elliott’s framing — world-class assets, sub-standard execution — is uncomfortable precisely because the operating data supports it.
4.2 Strategy & capital allocation
The stated purpose is “to generate superior returns for our shareholders … through operational effectiveness, exploration and active portfolio management”, and the strategy has three legs: expand KCGM, develop Hemi, and keep replacing reserves organically.
On exploration, the record is the best thing about the company: A$217 million spent in FY2026, resources up 26% and reserves up 27% after depletion, at a discovery cost below A$23 per ounce. KCGM’s resource has doubled and its reserve grown 50% since acquisition. On capital projects, the picture is heavier: A$1,605 million into the KCGM mill so far, A$322 million of operational readiness capital, and a further A$104 million into Hemi in FY2026, against total FY2026 growth capital of A$2,146 million — a year in which the company spent more on growth than it earned in cash earnings less sustaining capital. On portfolio management, Northern Star sold its 50% interest in the Central Tanami Project joint venture and Tanami exploration tenements to MGX Resources on 6 February 2026, removing 1.3 Moz of resources, and withdrew from the Egina earn-in with Novo in May 2026.
The named forward targets are thinner than usual by design. FY2027 guidance, given with the 20 August 2026 results, is 1,500–1,650 koz at an AISC of A$3,050–3,450/oz — flat-to-lower volume and materially higher unit cost than FY2026, framed as a transition year of continued heavy investment before the KCGM step-change. Beyond it: KCGM steady-state 27 Mtpa in FY2029, Hemi FID late FY2027, and no FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance at all in calendar 2026. A company that has missed guidance seven times declining to give more of it is defensible; it also means the next twelve months offer the market very little to hold management to, and the FY2027 cost step-up is itself an argument the activist will use.
4.3 Ownership & corporate structure
The structural event of the period is the acquisition of De Grey Mining Ltd, agreed 2 December 2024 and completed by scheme of arrangement in May 2025 for approximately A$5 billion in Northern Star scrip, bringing the Hemi Project and its Pilbara land position. It was funded entirely in shares, taking the count to 1,424,805,062 and diluting existing holders by roughly a quarter — the specific decision Elliott’s campaign attacks hardest, because the asset acquired will not produce until the next decade.
Table 8. Capital structure and ownership
| Item | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Ordinary fully paid shares (NST) | 1,424,805,062 | At 29 July 2026 |
| Performance and conditional retention rights (NSTAA) | 10,243,792 | Unvested |
| Non-executive director share rights (NSTAC) | 8,488 | Unvested |
| Fully diluted shares | ~1,435,057,342 | Used in Section 7 |
| On-market buy-back | Up to A$500 m; A$129 m executed | Announced 2 Apr 2026; average A$20.39 |
| Elliott Investment Management | “Well over A$1 bn” | Activist; strategic review demanded |
| Corporate bank facilities | A$1,750 m, undrawn | Maturing Mar 2030 and Mar 2031 |
| Senior guaranteed notes | US$600 m at 6.125% | Due April 2033 |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for issued capital, buy-back, facilities and notes; Elliott’s holding as characterised in its own Northern Star Rising presentation and reported by TipRanks. Gold Fields agreed to sell an approximately A$1.1 bn holding in Northern Star acquired through its takeover of Gold Road Resources, which had held De Grey scrip. There are no warrants, convertible notes or strategic cornerstone holders; Northern Star has no joint-venture partner at any of its six operating mines.
The structural simplicity is worth stating plainly, because it is unusual at this scale: Northern Star owns 100% of every operating mine and the Hemi development project outright. There are no minority partners, no streams or royalties encumbering the assets beyond statutory state royalties, and no off-take obligations. What complexity exists is in the share register and the boardroom, not in the asset ownership.
5. ESG & sustainability
Table 9. ESG snapshot
| Pillar | Named programme or target | Measurable attribute | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safety | Serious Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate | 0.7 (FY2024) → 0.5 (FY2025) → 0.5 (FY2026) | 4× better than industry |
| Safety | Serious Injury Frequency Rate | 2.1 (FY2024) → 2.9 (FY2025) → 1.9 (FY2026) | Recovered; 65% below industry |
| Climate | Net Zero Scope 1 & 2 ambition | By 2050, against a 931 kt CO₂-e FY2020 baseline | Committed |
| Climate | Interim emissions target | 35% absolute Scope 1 & 2 reduction by 2030 | On track per FY2025 report |
| Climate | Renewable generation | Jundee wind project commissioned FY2025; Carosue Dam 8 MW Stage 3 solar commissioned FY2025; KCGM renewables in build | Delivered / in progress |
| Social | Local procurement | 100% of the group’s local procurement spend ambition achieved | Complete |
| Social | Gender pay equity | 1% variance between female and male average base salary in like-for-like roles | March 2025 review |
| Social | Traditional Owner engagement | 17 named Traditional Owner groups acknowledged across the Australian portfolio; Athabascan people at Pogo | Ongoing |
Source: Northern Star 2025 Annual Report, FY2025 Highlights and sustainability sections, for all FY2025 figures, targets and programmes; June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, Table 3, for FY2026 safety rates (12-month moving average). Industry comparators are the latest published WorkSafe WA Mineral Industry Safety Performance Report 2022–23 (metalliferous total): SLTIFR 2.0, SIFR 5.5. The full FY2025 Environment & Social Responsibility reporting suite is published separately.
This is a strong ESG profile by producer standards, and it is specific rather than boilerplate. Safety is the standout — an SLTIFR of 0.5 against an industry 2.0, held flat through a year in which mining volumes hit records at KCGM, and a serious-injury rate that recovered from a FY2025 deterioration to 1.9. The climate work is concrete: real wind and solar plant commissioned at named sites, an absolute 35% reduction target against a stated baseline year, not an intensity fudge. The honest caveats are that Scope 3 is not addressed in the headline commitments, that a 2050 net-zero date is late relative to some peers, and that the FY2026 safety figures come from a quarterly report rather than the audited sustainability suite, which lands with the annual report in August.
6. Risks
Table 10. Risk register
| Risk | Type | Likelihood / impact | Who or what is exposed | Mitigant |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KCGM mill ramp-up falls short of 27 Mtpa | Operational | High / Very high | 60% of gross asset value; the whole re-rating case | Two-year measured ramp to FY2029; Stage I commissioned on schedule; low-grade feed used first |
| Further guidance misses and cost inflation | Operational | High / High | Credibility, and the market’s willingness to pay for FY2029 | New CEO and chairman; FY2027 guidance now set (1,500–1,650 koz, AISC A$3,050–3,450/oz) — a higher bar to clear, but a number to hold management to |
| Leadership transition execution | Governance | Medium / High | Continuity through the most important ramp in company history | CEO left early (28 Aug), CFO also departing (30 Nov); interim CEO and acting CFO bridging to the incoming Glencore hire (5 Oct) — a fuller turnover than planned |
| Gold price falls below ~A$4,200/oz (US$3,000) | Commodity | Low-medium / Very high | Every asset; the deep-bear case in Section 7 | 45% cash margin over AISC; net cash; 18-year reserve life at conservative price assumptions |
| Hemi capital escalation or FID slip | Development | Medium / Medium | 16% of gross asset value; the post-2030 growth profile | FID targeted late FY27; EPA secondary approval progressing; company can self-fund |
| Yandal reserve-life depletion | Operational | High / Low-medium | 13% of net asset value; six years of reserves | 10.7 Moz of resources behind 2.6 Moz of reserves; Jundee operational review under way |
| Hedge book delivery to June 2028 | Commodity / treasury | Very high / Low-medium | ~A$2.1 bn of foregone revenue vs spot | Runs off by mid-2028; no new hedges since August 2024 |
| Activist-driven break-up or forced sale | Corporate | Low-medium / Medium | Control of the timing and terms of any strategic outcome | Board refreshed; buy-back under way; assets are individually saleable |
Source: risk categories drawn from the Northern Star 2025 Annual Report risk management section and the operational disclosures in the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report; the guidance-miss record and activist position per Elliott’s Northern Star Rising presentation as reported by TipRanks. Likelihood and impact ratings are the author’s assessment on a 1–5 scale, not disclosed figures.
Figure 6. Risk matrix — likelihood against impact
Rare
Likely
Figure data: Table 10. Each point prints its likelihood × impact score; the shaded region is the high-likelihood, high-impact quadrant (likelihood ≥ 3.5 and impact ≥ 3.5). Ratings are the author’s assessment, not disclosed figures.
The register has an unusual shape for a senior producer: the commodity risk is small and the execution risk is large. A company with 18 years of reserves in Western Australia and Alaska, no debt to speak of and a 45% cash margin is not fragile to gold. What it is fragile to is its own delivery — and the two highest-scoring risks, the KCGM ramp and a further guidance miss, are the same risk seen from two angles. If the expanded mill hits 27 Mtpa on schedule, most of the rest of this register stops mattering.
7. Valuation
Valuation as of 2 September 2026, in Australian dollars (FX A$1 = US$0.7133 as of 2 Sep 2026). Horizon: spot fair value. Price deck: base gold US$4,000/oz — the representative trailing average snapped to the fixed US$3,000–5,000 grid: the 3-, 6- and 12-month trailing averages to 31 August 2026 are US$4,271, US$4,523 and US$4,435 (Goldify monthly archive of the London PM spot series, monthly averages June–August 2026 US$4,271 / 4,111 / 4,431); the 3-month window is the representative one because the 6- and 12-month figures are lifted by the January–March spike to US$5,594, and it sits mid-step with the early-June leg down from US$4,546 and the July trough at US$4,019 inside it, so it is snapped to the lower grid price, US$4,000 — A$5,608/oz at the FX above — with every grid price run as a scenario (deep bear US$3,000 / bear US$3,500 / base US$4,000 / bull US$4,500 / deep bull US$5,000); the 2027 consensus deck (~US$3,900/oz) carried as a 0%-weight cross-check, no spot deck. Discount rate 5% real, post-tax — the precious-metals convention — sensitised 4–7%. Share price A$22.58 (2 Sep 2026 close), 1,424.8 m shares outstanding, 1,435.1 m fully diluted, balance sheet as of 30 June 2026.
Northern Star is a producer/operator with a material funded development project, so it is valued sum-of-the-parts: a life-of-mine DCF on each of the three production centres, a risked share of Hemi, a resource-conversion tier for the M&I ounces outside the mine plan, an explicit deduction for the hedge book and the rehabilitation provision, bridged to equity. The method behind the numbers is the The Commodity Investor, Part 11: How to Value Commodity Stocks guide’s; this section applies it to Northern Star. The headline is a deck-to-value map: the blended fair value is A$27.55/share at the US$4,000/oz base price, A$20.16 at US$3,500 and A$34.08 at US$4,500, and each US$500/oz of gold is worth about A$6.5 of blended fair value and A$6.8 of net asset value per share — the deck sensitivity in Table 16 lets a reader run the model at any gold price they hold. The tiers frame the structure: the three producing centres plus the bridge are worth A$21.08/share, risked Hemi A$4.29 and the M&I resource pathway A$3.49, against total net asset value of A$28.86. The gold grid is quoted on its US$ axis so every Metal Pilot gold analysis reads on one comparable scale; net asset value per share is published in Australian dollars, the trading currency, converted once at the equity bridge. The section sets the current A$22.58 price against that map only in §7.6, where the rating and the flip prices are published.
What §7 starts from. The figures below set the per-centre margins, the Hemi block, the two claims in the bridge and the currency the answer is published in — move any one of them and the answer moves. Everything else the section takes from a filing is in the full register at §10.1 (Table 25).
Table 11. Load-bearing inputs — the filed figures the valuation moves on
| Input | Value | Where §7 uses it | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Group ore reserves | 28,419 koz (28.4 Moz @ 1.4 g/t) · 31 Mar 2026 | Table 14 — the life basis of every centre, and the in-plan value per reserve ounce | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | “Group Ore Reserves increase to 28.4Moz” |
| Measured and indicated resources | 53,189 koz (measured 5,629 + indicated 47,560), less the reserve = 24.77 Moz exclusive · 31 Mar 2026 | Table 13 — the resource-conversion tier at 0.15× the in-plan value | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | “NORTHERN STAR TOTAL”, MEASURED and INDICATED columns |
| Gold sold and AISC, by production centre | Kalgoorlie 844 koz at A$2,579/oz; Yandal 434 koz at A$3,198/oz; Pogo 265 koz at A$2,259/oz · FY2026 | Table 13 — the volume and cost every row’s margin is built from | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | “Gold sold”, “All-in sustaining cost” |
| Corporate cost | A$147 m on 1,543 koz sold · FY2026 | Table 13 — the A$95/oz allocation charged inside every row, so the bridge carries no G&A line | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | “Gold sold” and the corporate cost line |
| Sustaining capital | A$657 m (A$426/oz) · FY2026 | Table 18 — stripped out of AISC for EBITDA; deducted again in Table 20 | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | “Sustaining capital” |
| Hemi study profile | 530 koz/yr over ~12 years at A$1,200–1,300/oz AISC; A$1.3 bn pre-production capital · Sep 2023 | Table 13 — the Hemi block, before the 0.70× risk weight | Filed | Hemi DFS Sep 2023 | “Average annual production, first 10 years” (Table 3), via the reports listed in §10.1 |
| FY2027 production and cost guidance | 1,500–1,650 koz at A$3,050–3,450/oz · 20 Aug 2026 | the calibration check beneath Table 13; Table 18’s forward year | Filed | FY2026 results | 20 Aug 2026 |
| Net cash | A$375 m — cash and bullion A$1,235 m less the US$600 m notes · 30 Jun 2026 | Table 15 — the bridge’s first line | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | “Cash and bullion” |
| Gold hedging commitments | 787,500 oz at A$3,397/oz to Jun 2028 · 30 Jun 2026 | Table 15 — the A$1,161 m mark, the largest deduction in the bridge | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 5 | “Gold hedging commitments” |
| Rehabilitation provision | A$834.5 m (A$10.9 m current + A$823.6 m non-current) · 30 Jun 2025 | Table 15 — bridged in full; AISC carries only the accretion | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Note 9(g) | “Rehabilitation” |
| Exchange rate | A$1 = US$0.7133 · 2 Sep 2026 | converts the US$4,000/oz deck to A$5,608/oz in every row, and the NAV into A$/share | Market | A$/US$ | 2 Sep 2026 — the post states the rate and its date but names no provider |
| Fully diluted shares | 1,435.1 m (1,424.8 m outstanding) · 29 Jul 2026 | every per-share figure in §7 | Market | stockanalysis.com | “Shares Outstanding” | 2 Sep 2026 |
Source: the Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026; the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (29 July 2026); the FY2026 results (20 August 2026); the Northern Star 2025 Annual Report; the De Grey Hemi definitive feasibility study of September 2023 as reported in the sources listed in §10.1; market data per stockanalysis.com. Reserves and resources are effective 31 March 2026, operating figures 30 June 2026 and the balance-sheet provisions 30 June 2025 — the section’s three vintages, each printed with its row. The share price the section is read against (A$22.58, 2 September 2026) is in the opening block, not here: it moves the rating, not the valuation. The full register — every figure §7 takes from outside this analysis, with the notes on those that are sums or estimates rather than printed lines — is Table 25 in §10.1.
8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)
Table 23. Near-term catalysts
| Catalyst | Expected timing | Why it benefits Northern Star |
|---|---|---|
| September 2026 quarter production update | Early Oct 2026 | First hard number on post-tie-in output (guided ~350 koz for the quarter) against the FY2027 1,500–1,650 koz guide |
| KCGM Stage I tie-in to the 27 Mtpa plant | September 2026 | Converts three years and A$1.6 bn of capital into throughput; the single largest value event available |
| KCGM Stage II single-hub consolidation | Late 1H FY2027 | Eliminates concentrate haulage to Gidji and adds a forecast 1–2% recovery uplift |
| Suresh Vadnagra commences as MD & CEO | 5 October 2026 | New (ex-Glencore) leadership through the ramp, after the interim CEO period; Michael Ashforth becomes Chairman at the 2026 AGM |
| Growth capital rolls off | FY2027–FY2028 | A$2.1 bn of FY2026 growth capital was the peak; free cash flow converts as it falls away |
| Hedge book runs off | To June 2028 | 787.5 koz at A$3,397/oz stop diluting realised prices; realised converges on spot |
| Hemi final investment decision | Late FY2027 | Unlocks 530 koz/yr from ~2031 and removes the largest single risk factor in the Section 7 NAV |
| KCGM at steady-state 27 Mtpa | FY2029 | The production and unit-cost step-change the whole equity is priced against |
Source: Northern Star June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report for all project, guidance, leadership and hedging timing. All timing is company guidance, not a guarantee, and Northern Star has explicitly declined to give FY2028–FY2029 medium-term guidance during calendar 2026. The growth-capital and free-cash-flow inference is the author’s.
The sequence matters more than any single item: FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance are now out (20 August), the mill tie-in is under way, the September-quarter numbers land in early October, and a new chief executive arrives on 5 October. The next three months will show whether the last three years were worth it.
9. Rating & verdict
Northern Star is scored on the same nine dimensions every Metal Pilot company analysis uses, against the peer set declared in Section 2.9. As a producer/operator it takes the reference weighting: asset quality, cost position, reserves and life, balance sheet and capital allocation carry 15% each; growth, management, jurisdiction and ESG carry 6.25% each. No dimension is marked not-applicable.
Figure 10. Scorecard by dimension, 2 September 2026
Figure data: Table 24. Each spoke prints its stars and weight; the dashed ring is the weighted composite, 3.64/5.
Table 24. Scorecard rationale
| Dimension | Weight | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3. Reserves, life & replacement | 15% | ★★★★★ | Ore reserves +27% to 28.4 Moz and resources +26% to 88.9 Moz after depletion, at a discovery cost below A$23/oz; ~18-year reserve life; KCGM’s resource doubled and its reserve rose 50% since acquisition. Top-decile against any peer in the set (Section 2.8) |
| 1. Asset quality & scale | 15% | ★★★★☆ | 1.54 Moz/yr places it among the world’s larger producers; KCGM is a genuine tier-1 asset at 42.2 Moz, Pogo grades 7.6 g/t and Hemi is a tier-1 undeveloped deposit. Against: group head grade of 2.1 g/t and KCGM at 1.8 g/t are low, and it is a third of Agnico’s size (Tables 2, 5) |
| 5. Balance sheet & liquidity | 15% | ★★★★☆ | A$1,235 m cash and bullion, A$1,750 m undrawn facilities, only US$600 m of 2033 notes, net cash ~A$375 m — and it self-funded A$2.1 bn of growth capital without issuing equity. Against: net cash fell 63% in the year and the hedge book is a ~A$1.7 bn pre-tax (A$1.2 bn after-tax) drag at the base deck (Tables 6, 7) |
| 2. Cost position & margins | 15% | ★★★☆☆ | FY2026 AISC of A$2,698/oz (≈US$1,835) sits at or above a peer band clustering around US$1,400–1,700/oz, rose 25% in one year, and FY2027 guidance points higher again (A$3,050–3,450/oz); Yandal at A$3,198/oz is poor and all-in cost reached A$4,200/oz. The 45% cash margin is real but comes from the gold price, not the cost curve (Tables 4, 5) |
| 6. Capital allocation & returns | 15% | ★★☆☆☆ | Seven guidance misses across four financial years, four downward revisions in Q1 2026 alone, the 2 Moz FY2026 target abandoned, and ~A$5 bn of scrip issued for an asset that will not produce before ~2031. Against that: dividends raised every year to 60.0c in FY2026, a A$500 m buy-back under way, and genuinely excellent exploration capital efficiency (Sections 4.1, 4.2; Table 6) |
| 8. Jurisdiction & geopolitics | 6.25% | ★★★★★ | Every ounce of production and every ounce of reserve sits in Western Australia or Alaska — the purest tier-1 jurisdictional profile in the peer set, with no African, Latin American or Central Asian exposure and no expropriation risk (Tables 2, 5) |
| 4. Growth & optionality | 6.25% | ★★★★☆ | KCGM from 13 to 27 Mtpa commissioning now with steady state in FY2029, Hemi at 530 koz/yr from ~2031, and 88.9 Moz of resources behind 28.4 Moz of reserves struck at a conservative A$2,900/oz. Funded from cash flow (Sections 2.3, 2.5; Table 23) |
| 9. ESG & licence to operate | 6.25% | ★★★★☆ | SLTIFR of 0.5 against a 2.0 industry benchmark and SIFR of 1.9 against 5.5; named renewable projects commissioned at Jundee and Carosue Dam; a 35% absolute Scope 1 & 2 reduction target by 2030 off a stated baseline; 1% gender pay variance. Against: 2050 net zero is late and Scope 3 is unaddressed (Table 9) |
| 7. Management & governance | 6.25% | ★★☆☆☆ | The chief executive, the chairman and the board composition are all changing at once under activist pressure, at the start of the most important ramp-up in company history. The incoming CEO and the credentialled board are mitigants; the record that forced the change is the evidence (Section 4.1) |
| Composite | 100% | ★★★½ | Solid |
Source: each row cites its evidence in this analysis; peer references are the set declared in Section 2.9.
Weighted average: 0.75 + 0.60 + 0.60 + 0.45 + 0.30 + 0.3125 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.125 = 3.64/5 → ★★★½, Solid.
The two-axis verdict. Composite quality ★★★½ (Solid); value read Modestly undervalued (wide band) as of 2 September 2026; verdict: Re-rating candidate — cheap; name the catalyst. Northern Star owns some of the best gold ground on earth in the best jurisdictions on earth, and has run it about as well as an average operator would. On the value axis, the blended base-case fair value of ~A$27.6/share (a conservative US$4,000/oz deck) implies +22% upside, but the deep-bear scenario sits ~41% below today’s price — hence the (wide band) qualifier. Beside that read, the market is pricing ~US$3,620/oz gold in perpetuity against the US$4,000 base deck. The target P/NAV carries a premium for reserves/life (Dim 3), jurisdiction (Dim 8) and the balance sheet (Dim 5), very nearly offset by a discount for cost position (Dim 2) and the capital-allocation record (Dim 6), landing at a 1.03× target against the parity anchor for a producer — the scorecard’s own verdict that best-in-class ground meets middling execution.
The bull case is that the two things which have made the last three years painful — the KCGM capital programme and the guidance credibility gap — are turning: growth capital of A$2.1 billion rolls off, the mill doubles, a new (ex-Glencore) chief executive takes over on 5 October, the hedge book runs to zero by mid-2028, and behind it all sits an 18-year reserve life bought at under A$23 an ounce. The bear case is that this is a company with a demonstrated pattern of over-promising, valued at ~0.78× net asset value for a reason, in a stock that sits ~29% below its high while gold made records — and that the activist is right that the discount is deserved rather than temporary.
The specific thing that tips it is now the delivery, not the guidance. FY2027 guidance is out — 1,500–1,650 koz at an AISC of A$3,050–3,450/oz, a transition-year step down in volume and up in cost from the 1.7–1.8 Moz sub-A$2,700 outcome the bull case wanted. So the argument no longer turns on what management promises but on whether the September-quarter tie-in and the FY2029 27 Mtpa ramp actually convert three years of capital into the ounces the reserve says are there. Deliver, and the base case is validated and the wide-band discount closes; miss again, and the eighth miss in five years settles the argument about whether these assets are worth more in someone else’s hands — which is precisely what Elliott is asking.
To rank Northern Star against every listed gold producer on the same nine dimensions — reserves, grade, AISC, reserve life and P/NAV — screen the sector on Metal Pilot’s gold mining stock screener.
10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer
10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage
Company filings. Northern Star 2025 Annual Report (year ended 30 June 2025) — the spine of this analysis, source of the FY2025 financials, the operations review, the board and executive biographies, the strategy scorecard and the ESG programmes. June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (29 July 2026) — FY2026 production, costs, cash flow by production centre and operation, the hedge book, issued capital, the KCGM and Hemi updates and the leadership changes. Resources and Reserves Update (3 June 2026) — mineral resources and ore reserves as at 31 March 2026, prepared under the JORC Code (2012). Guidance revisions of 4 January, 20 January, 13 March, 2 April and 22 April 2026, and the Production Updates of 2 April and 2 July 2026, are referenced through the quarterly report.
Technical reports. De Grey Mining’s Hemi Definitive Feasibility Study, September 2023, as reported by Australian Mining and MINING.COM; the Northern Star–De Grey scheme announcement of 2 December 2024.
Exchange and market data. stockanalysis.com for share price (A$22.58, the 2 September 2026 close, per its price history), market capitalisation, share count, P/E, dividend yield, 52-week range and employee count as of 2 September 2026; the ~16-analyst consensus target of ~A$24.82 (targets ranging A$19.80–A$34.45) per stockanalysis.com and Morningstar.
Gold prices. Spot gold of ~US$4,350/oz at 1 September 2026 per Trading Economics, converted at A$1 = US$0.7133; the base deck US$4,000/oz is gold’s US$4,271/oz three-month trailing average to 31 August 2026 (6-month US$4,523, 12-month US$4,435; monthly averages per the Goldify archive of the London PM spot series) snapped to the lower grid price; the five-year average (~US$2,650/oz, Sep 2021–Aug 2026) from Macrotrends’ annual averages; the own-multiple history from stockanalysis.com; long-run context in the Gold — A Complete Market Guide.
Activist and peer material. Elliott Investment Management’s Northern Star Rising presentation and its demands, as reported by TipRanks and Morningstar; Newmont and Agnico Eagle 2026 guidance from their own outlook disclosures; the Metal Pilot gold dataset for the peer-screening basis.
The full input register. Every figure Section 7 takes from a filing or a market series is listed once below, in document order, with its date, the row that uses it and the address in the document it came from — the long form of the load-bearing inputs published as Table 11 at the top of that section. Nothing in the register is this analysis’ own work: the arithmetic, the parameters and the judgements live in Tables 13–15 and are marked there as Derived, Input or Estimate.
Table 25. Full source register — every figure §7 takes from a filing or a market series
| Input | Value | As of | Where §7 uses it | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026 — effective 31 March 2026, JORC Code (2012) | ||||
| Group ore reserves | 28,419 koz — proved 4,280 + probable 24,139; 627 Mt @ 1.4 g/t | 31 Mar 2026 | Table 14 — the life basis of every centre; the in-plan value per reserve ounce | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "Group Ore Reserves increase to 28.4Moz"; "NORTHERN STAR TOTAL", PROVED and PROBABLE columns |
| Measured and indicated resources | 53,189 koz — measured 5,629 + indicated 47,560 | 31 Mar 2026 | Table 13 — the 24.77 Moz exclusive of reserves behind the resource tier | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "NORTHERN STAR TOTAL", MEASURED and INDICATED columns 1 |
| Inferred resources | 35,683 koz | 31 Mar 2026 | Table 21 — optionality, carried at 0.0 and never blended | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "NORTHERN STAR TOTAL", INFERRED column |
| Group mineral resources | 88,872 koz (1,617 Mt @ 1.7 g/t) | 31 Mar 2026 | §7.5 — the resource base behind the optionality read | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "Group Mineral Resources increase to 88.9Moz" |
| Reserve growth after depletion, and discovery cost | +6,100 koz (+27%); under A$23/oz | 31 Mar 2026 | Table 21 — reserve replacement and the replacement-value read | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "up 6.1Moz (+27%), after mining depletion"; "average discovery cost" |
| Hemi reserves and resources | 5.5 Moz reserve; 13.2 Moz resource | 31 Mar 2026 | Table 21 — the De Grey transaction comparable, per reserve ounce | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | "Hemi Project Mineral Resources of 13.2Moz and Ore Reserves of 5.5Moz" |
| Hemi permitting status | State EPA approval received; EPBC, Traditional Owner agreement, water licence and secondary approvals outstanding | 3 Jun 2026 | §7.2 — the 0.55–0.75× band, and the 0.70× point inside it | Filed | R&R update 3 Jun 2026 | the Hemi approvals section |
| June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, 29 July 2026 — twelve months ended 30 June 2026 2 | ||||
| Gold sold, group | 1,543 koz | FY2026 | the A$95/oz corporate allocation and the A$426/oz sustaining rate | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | "Gold sold" |
| Gold sold, by production centre | Kalgoorlie 844 koz; Yandal 434 koz; Pogo 265 koz | FY2026 | Table 13 — the ramp's first step and the two flat rows | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | "Gold sold" |
| All-in sustaining cost, group and by centre | group A$2,698/oz; Kalgoorlie A$2,579; Yandal A$3,198; Pogo A$2,259 | FY2026 | Table 13 — each row's steady-state AISC, before the A$95/oz corporate allocation | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | "All-in sustaining cost" |
| Corporate cost | A$147 m | FY2026 | Table 13 — charged at A$95/oz inside every row; no bridge G&A line | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | the corporate cost line |
| Sustaining capital | A$657 m (A$426/oz) | FY2026 | Table 18 — stripped out of AISC for EBITDA; deducted again in Table 20 | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | "Sustaining capital" |
| Average realised price | A$4,925/oz | FY2026 | §7.5 — the hedge drag against spot | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 2 | "Average realised price" |
| Cash and bullion, and debt | A$1,235 m; US$600 m senior guaranteed notes — net cash ~A$375 m | 30 Jun 2026 | Table 15 — the bridge's net-cash line | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | "Cash and bullion" |
| Gold hedging commitments | 787,500 oz at A$3,397/oz, to Jun 2028 | 30 Jun 2026 | Table 15 — the A$1,161 m mark, re-struck against each column's deck | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | Table 5 | "Gold hedging commitments" |
| Hemi spend | A$104 m development capital; A$39 m exploration | FY2026 | §7.2 — the funding test behind the 0.70× weight | Filed | June 2026 Quarterly | the Hemi update |
| FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance, 20 August 2026 2 | ||||
| FY2027 production and cost guidance | 1,500–1,650 koz at A$3,050–3,450/oz | 20 Aug 2026 | the calibration check beneath Table 13; Table 18's forward year | Filed | FY2026 results 20 Aug 2026 | the FY2027 guidance table |
| FY2027 growth capital guidance | A$1,700 m | 20 Aug 2026 | Table 20 — the free-cash-flow memo after all capital | Filed | FY2026 results 20 Aug 2026 | the FY2027 guidance table |
| Northern Star 2025 Annual Report — year ended 30 June 2025 | ||||
| Depreciation and amortisation | A$1,365.3 m | FY2025 | Table 20 — the cash-tax build | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | "Depreciation & Amortisation" |
| Rehabilitation provision | A$834.5 m — A$10.9 m current + A$823.6 m non-current | 30 Jun 2025 | Table 15 — bridged in full; AISC carries only the accretion | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Note 9(g) | "Rehabilitation" |
| Lease liabilities | A$448.5 m — A$119.6 m current + A$328.9 m non-current | 30 Jun 2025 | Table 15 — excluded from net cash because the payments sit inside sustaining capital, and so inside every row's AISC | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Note 9(b) | "Lease liabilities" |
| Working-capital lines | receivables A$602.8 m; payables A$576.6 m; current tax liabilities A$333.5 m | 30 Jun 2025 | Table 15 — the −A$307 m working-capital line | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Notes 8(a), 8(e), 9(e) | "Receivables and other assets", "Trade and other payables", "Current tax liabilities" |
| Deferred tax liabilities | A$1,595.3 m | 30 Jun 2025 | §7.2 — the shield the rows decline, direction stated | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Note 9(e) | "Deferred tax liabilities" |
| Income tax paid | A$129.5 m | FY2025 | §7.2 — the evidence that the 30% no-shield basis is the conservative one | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | "Income tax paid" |
| Financial assets | A$19.5 m | 30 Jun 2025 | Table 15 — the investments line, immaterial and carried at 0.0 | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | Note 8(d) | "Financial assets" |
| De Grey scheme consideration | A$5,485.2 m of scrip; control obtained 5 May 2025 | FY2025 | Table 21 — the transaction comparable, per reserve ounce | Filed | FY2025 Annual Report | "The fair value of consideration was $5,485.2 million" |
| Hemi — De Grey definitive feasibility study, September 2023 | ||||
| Production profile and mine life | 530 koz/yr first 10 years (553 koz first 5); ~12 years | Sep 2023 | Table 13 — the Hemi block's volume line | Filed | Hemi DFS Sep 2023 | "Average annual production, first 10 years" (Table 3) 3 |
| All-in sustaining cost and capital | A$1,200–1,300/oz; A$1.3 bn pre-production capital, 2023 dollars | Sep 2023 | Table 13 — A$1,345/oz after the corporate allocation; the capital re-based in the block's own Estimate row | Filed | Hemi DFS Sep 2023 | "All-in sustaining cost", "Pre-production capital cost" (Table 3) 3 |
| Market and price series | ||||
| Share price | A$22.58 | 2 Sep 2026 close | §7.3 enterprise value; §7.6 the implied return and the flip prices | Market | stockanalysis.com | "Stock Price History" | 2 Sep 2026 |
| Shares outstanding and fully diluted | 1,424.8 m / 1,435.1 m | 29 Jul 2026 | every per-share figure in §7 | Market | stockanalysis.com | "Shares Outstanding" | 2 Sep 2026 |
| Exchange rate | A$1 = US$0.7133 | 2 Sep 2026 | converts the US$4,000/oz deck to A$5,608/oz in every row, and the NAV into A$/share | Market | A$/US$ | 2 Sep 2026 4 |
| Gold trailing averages | 3-month US$4,271; 6-month US$4,523; 12-month US$4,435 | to 31 Aug 2026 | the base deck, snapped to the lower grid price at US$4,000 | Market | Goldify | London PM spot, monthly averages | Aug 2026 |
| Gold five-year average | ~US$2,650/oz | Sep 2021 – Aug 2026 | §7.3 cycle position; Table 21's market-implied read | Market | Macrotrends | annual averages | 2026 |
| Consensus gold deck, 2027 | ~US$3,900/oz | 2026 | the 0%-weight forecast deck | Market | consensus as cited in §10.1 | 2026 |
| Own EV/EBITDA history | 5.5× / 7.5× / 7.3× / 8.0× / 6.7×; median 7.3× | FY2022–FY2026 | Table 21 — the own-multiple cross-check against the 7.2× target | Market | stockanalysis.com | "Ratios", June year-ends | 4 Sep 2026 |
| Analyst consensus | ~A$24.82 across 16 analysts, Buy (range A$19.80–A$34.45) | late Jul 2026 | Table 21 — reported for direction, never weighted | Market | stockanalysis.com and Morningstar | "Price Target" | Jul 2026 |
Notes to Table 25
- Measured and indicated is the sum of the update’s two printed columns (5,629 koz + 47,560 koz); the figure the resource tier uses is that sum less the 28,419 koz reserve, or 24.77 Moz exclusive of reserves.
- The June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report and the 20 August 2026 FY2026 results are not in the verification source set held for this post; their figures and labels are carried from the filings as cited in Tables 1, 4 and 7 and were not re-read against a source copy for this register.
- The Hemi study is cited through the secondary reports listed in §10.1 rather than a De Grey filing, and its figures are the prior owner’s estimates at a A$2,700/oz gold price. Its A$1.3 bn 2023 capital estimate is re-based to A$1.6 bn over FY2029–31 inside Table 13’s Hemi block, which is an author estimate and is marked there as one.
- The rate and its date are stated in §7’s opening block and in §10.1, but no FX provider is named. It converts every row, so the gap is registered here: a 1% move in the rate is worth roughly A$0.3/share of net asset value, direction with the rate.
Source: the Resources and Reserves Update, 3 June 2026; the June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report (29 July 2026); the FY2026 results (20 August 2026); the Northern Star 2025 Annual Report; the De Grey Hemi definitive feasibility study of September 2023 as reported in the sources listed above; market and price series per stockanalysis.com, Goldify and Macrotrends. Figures are in Australian dollars unless the row says otherwise; Pogo’s are converted at the FY2026 average rate of A$1 = US$0.68 in the filing itself. The register is Section 7’s input side in full — Table 11 carries the inputs the answer actually moves on: the arithmetic and the judgements built on them carry their own Derived, Input and Estimate cells in Tables 13–15, and figures used only in Sections 1–6 are not repeated here.
Methodology. Durable structure (reserves, resources, grade, mine life, ownership, jurisdiction) is kept separate from the dated market layer (share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples, valuation) throughout. The data-as-of date is 2 September 2026; market data is as of 1–2 September 2026; reserves and resources are effective 31 March 2026; operating figures are effective 30 June 2026; statutory FY2026 results (revenue, EBITDA, NPAT) are the 20 August 2026 release, and FY2027 guidance the same. Scorecard weights follow the producer/operator reference case, sum to 100%, and no dimension is not-applicable. The valuation follows the How to Value Commodity Stocks guide’s producer archetype: a sum-of-the-parts NAV/DCF at a 1.03× target P/NAV (50%), EV/EBITDA at 7.2× (30%) and a FCF-yield support built from disclosed lines (20%) — the producer default run in full — with the targets the guide’s archetype anchors moved by signed, scorecard-tied drivers; the section carries no peer multiples (peer reads belong to a sector-comparison post). The NAV bridges the FY2025 rehabilitation provision, folds a resource-conversion tier for the M&I ounces beyond reserves, and publishes a tiered NAV/share (producing / development / resource). The model runs across the fixed gold grid (US$3,000–5,000/oz, US$4,000 base) with the sensitivity grid and every scenario recomputed from the per-asset model (Tables 13–20 and the assumptions box), and the first modelled year is calibrated to FY2027 guidance. The Hemi risk factor, the Kalgoorlie ramp schedule, the Yandal life extension and the re-based Hemi capital cost are author estimates, not company figures. The primary value yardstick is P/NAV (equity form). Three peer rows in Table 5 are deliberately qualitative because their current-year guidance was not verified to a primary filing; they serve the scorecard only. Re-run log: 2 September 2026 — Section 7 rebuilt to the current valuation standard: a per-asset NPV build table, a deck-sensitivity table and a P/NAV ladder were added, the five-year FCF profile was replaced by a guidance-year free-cash-flow bridge with free cash flow per share by grid price, the spot memo was removed, and the scenario and fair-value tables were merged into one; the base-case blend was A$28.17 (+43%, Undervalued, wide band) on the prior run’s inputs, and Kalgoorlie remains modelled on its FY2027–29 ramp and calibrated to FY2027 guidance. 5 September 2026 — corrections to Section 7 after a playbook audit: the share price is the actual 2 September 2026 close (A$22.58, previously carried at A$19.67); the FCF-yield build now deducts FY2026 sustaining capital (A$657 m), the same line the EBITDA build strips; the EV/EBITDA leg crosses the same bridge lines as the NAV (rehabilitation provision and working capital added); net working capital and the current tax liability (−A$307 m, 30 June 2025) are bridged and the lease-liability treatment is stated (charged in AISC, excluded from net cash); the own-multiple history, EV/production, reserve-replacement value and a De Grey transaction comparable were added to the cross-checks; the five-year gold average is printed with its window and source. Net effect: NAV/share A$28.86 (from A$29.07), base blend A$27.55 (from A$28.17), value read Modestly undervalued (wide band) at +22% (from Undervalued at +43%, of which the price correction accounts for most). 5 September 2026 — playbook audit corrections to Section 7: the 3-, 6- and 12-month trailing gold averages are now printed with their source and end date in the opening block and the assumptions box (the base deck was previously stated as “the representative trailing average” with no figure), and the FY2027 EBITDA numerator is built line by line in a new Table 18 (later tables renumbered). No model input changed; NAV/share, the blend and the value read are unchanged. Open data gap: the FY2026 audited financial statements (balance sheet, provisions, lease and income-tax notes) are not yet in the source set — the FY2025 figures are carried, as the assumptions box states. Update cadence: refreshed on each annual report and on material events. Figures: every figure is an inline HTML/CSS component; the asset-footprint map is omitted (a proportional-symbol map of the six operations plus Hemi and Pogo would not render legibly at this scale), so Table 2 and the §2 prose carry the footprint, and the gold-sold-and-AISC chart is a single series of annual group gold sold with the AISC line moved to Table 6.
Provenance: Northern Star Resources Ltd — Annual Report — 2025.
10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure
This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 2 September 2026: the share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples and valuation read all move, and the FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance (released 20 August 2026) are reflected here. Reserve, resource, study and forecast figures are estimates, prepared on the codes and bases stated beside each table, and study economics are not achieved results. The Quality × Value verdict is an analytical read, never an instruction to the reader. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from primary filings and reviewed, but readers should verify every number against the original documents before acting on it. The author holds no position in Northern Star Resources Ltd or in any company named here. Please do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser.