Barrick Mining (ABX) — Stock Analysis 2026 [3.7]

Analysis as of 8 August 2026. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Barrick Mining’s 2025 Annual Information Form (year ended 31 December 2025, dated 27 February 2026) and its Q1 2026 results released 11 May 2026 — this analysis predates the Q2 2026 release scheduled for 10 August 2026. Market data is as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026 ($41.37). Rating: ★★★½, Solid — Modestly undervalued (wide band) → re-rating candidate: cheap, and the catalyst is a corporate breakup. Price deck (rule V26): base gold US$4,000/oz (the three-month trailing average ~US$4,210, rounded down on the US$500 grid and held below the recent spike); bear US$3,000/oz (the long-term/incentive reversion); bull US$4,500/oz; against spot ~US$4,350/oz, carried as a cross-check. Copper base US$5.00/lb, bear US$4.00/lb, bull US$6.66/lb (spot). 5% real post-tax discount rate. All figures are US dollars unless marked C$. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Barrick Mining is the world’s third-largest gold producer and, increasingly, a serious copper company — 85 million ounces of gold reserves and roughly 40 billion pounds of copper, spread from Nevada to Mali to Pakistan. It trades at about 10.6× forward earnings and 0.77× net asset value (on a $4,000 through-cycle deck) while the market’s favourite senior, Agnico Eagle, trades at 1.11× — a discount that reflects real jurisdiction risk but that management is now actively trying to close. The thesis in one line: a cheap, sprawling major that spent 2025 in a Malian crisis and is spending 2026 breaking itself apart — a planned North American spin-off, a possible London listing for its African mines, a $3 billion buyback — so the sum-of-the-parts is about to be tested in the open market. Why look now: Loulo-Gounkoto is back under Barrick’s control and ramping, copper is at a record $6.66/lb, and the stock is a quarter below its high while both metals trade near records. To screen Barrick against every listed gold producer on grade, cost, reserve life and stage, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Barrick Mining Corporation (TSX: ABX; NYSE: B) — renamed from Barrick Gold Corporation in May 2025 — is a senior gold-and-copper producer headquartered in Toronto with about 17,500 employees and operations on four continents: Nevada Gold Mines (61.5%) and the Fourmile development in the United States, Pueblo Viejo (60%) in the Dominican Republic, Loulo-Gounkoto (80%) in Mali, Kibali (45%) in the DRC, North Mara and Bulyanhulu in Tanzania, Veladero (50%) in Argentina, Porgera (24.5%) in PNG, and the Lumwana copper mine in Zambia plus the giant Reko Diq (50%) copper-gold project in Pakistan. By archetype it is a diversified senior producer/operator spanning gold and copper, so the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). (AISC = all-in sustaining cost; koz = thousand ounces, Moz = million ounces; kt/Mt = thousand/million tonnes; 2P = proven and probable reserves; g/t = grams per tonne; NGM = Nevada Gold Mines.)

Figure 1. Barrick Mining in numbers

Figure data: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form (reserves, production, guidance) and Q1 2026 results , 11 May 2026; market data per stockanalysis.com as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.

Table 1. Barrick Mining in numbers

Source: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form for reserves, resources, production and guidance, prepared under NI 43-101 and S-K 1300 / CIM definitions; market data, share count, 52-week range and consensus per stockanalysis.com , 6 Aug 2026; five-year financials per the financials overview (Fiscal.ai). All production and reserve figures are attributable to Barrick (net of joint-venture partners’ interests). Barrick reports measured and indicated resources exclusive of reserves; a further 43 Moz of inferred gold sits outside both. Cash margin uses an approximate 2025 realised gold price of ~$3,120/oz against group gold AISC of $1,637/oz. Reserves were estimated at conservative long-term price assumptions. Listed: Public (TSX: ABX / NYSE: B).

Thesis in brief. Bull: the cheapest senior in the sector — 0.77× net asset value and ~10.6× forward earnings against Agnico’s 1.11× and ~13× — sitting on the largest reserve base in gold (85 Moz) plus ~40 Blb of copper into a record copper market; a genuine catalyst in the planned North American spin-off (Nevada, Fourmile, Pueblo Viejo) that would separate tier-1 assets from the discount; Loulo-Gounkoto back under control and ramping; and a $3 billion buyback shrinking the count into the re-rating. Bear: the discount is earned — a group AISC of $1,637/oz that guides higher to $1,760–1,950 in 2026 (among the worst of the seniors), a production base that has fallen from 4.4 Moz in 2021 to 3.26 Moz in 2025, a portfolio still weighted to Mali, the DRC, Tanzania, Pakistan and Argentina, and a management team largely rebuilt in the last year. What tips it: whether the breakup actually completes and the market pays tier-1 multiples for the Nevada core. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Barrick sells into two markets at once, and in August 2026 both are near records — spot gold ~$4,350/oz and spot copper ~$6.66/lb, the latter up roughly 47% in a year on AI-datacentre and electrification demand against tight inventories. Barrick does not hedge its gold, so the metal flows through unhedged. For how gold is priced and why miners are a geared expression of the metal, see the Gold — A Complete Market Guide . This section spends its words on the company.

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

Nineteen material properties across four continents, held at working interests from 24.5% to 100% — the structure a sum-of-the-parts valuation exists for.

Table 2. Asset base (attributable)

Source: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form , production and Mineral Reserve tables effective 31 December 2025, prepared under NI 43-101 / S-K 1300 and CIM definitions; all figures attributable to Barrick. Nevada Gold Mines is a joint venture operated by Barrick with Newmont holding 38.5%; Pueblo Viejo is 60% Barrick / 40% Newmont; other interests as shown. Loulo-Gounkoto produced only 29 koz in 2025 because of a temporary suspension from 14 January 2025 during the Mali dispute (Section 2.5); its normal run-rate is several hundred koz. Mineral resources are not mineral reserves and do not have demonstrated economic viability. Per-asset reserve splits are approximate. Listed: Public (TSX: ABX / NYSE: B).

Two facts about that table matter more than the rest. The Nevada Gold Mines and Pueblo Viejo interests — the two assets Barrick plans to spin off — produced about 2.06 Moz in 2025, roughly 63% of group gold, and are the tier-1 core of the company. And Loulo-Gounkoto, historically one of Barrick’s largest and highest-grade mines, contributed just 29 koz in 2025 — a hole of over 500 koz that is the single biggest swing factor in the 2026 recovery.

Geographic concentration. Barrick’s footprint is genuinely global and genuinely uneven: North America is the value, but Africa (Mali, DRC, Tanzania), Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic), the Middle East (Saudi) and Asia-Pacific (Pakistan, PNG) all carry material production and much of the jurisdiction risk the scorecard penalises in Section 9. A proportional-symbol asset map is not rendered here — this analysis publishes no drawn geometry, and a symbol map is one of the graphics the component library does not express (see Section 10.1); the portfolio table and the value-by-region read below carry what it would have shown.

2.2 Where the revenue and the value sit

Unlike a pure gold miner, Barrick earns roughly a tenth of its revenue from copper — and after the Lumwana expansion and Reko Diq, that share is set to grow. The value picture, though, is dominated by one region: North America.

Figure 2. Revenue by metal, 2025

Figure data: Barrick Mining financials (Fiscal.ai segment data) — gold sales $15,147 m and copper sales $1,475 m of $16,956 m total 2025 revenue. Copper’s share rises materially once the Lumwana Super Pit and Reko Diq reach production (Sections 2.7, 2.8).

Figure 3. Net asset value by region, base case

Figure data: the Section 7 net-asset-value build (Table 9, base case: $4,000/oz gold, $5.00/lb copper, 5% real post-tax discount rate). Shares are of gross asset value before net cash and the reclamation bridge. Regional groupings and the development and jurisdiction risk factors are the author’s estimates, not disclosed figures.

The two figures frame the whole thesis. North America is 48% of value but sits inside a company the market prices at a discount to its African and Latin American peers’ risk — which is precisely why Barrick wants to separate it. And copper plus the development pipeline are already 23% of value, so calling Barrick a “gold miner” understates what a re-rating of the copper book could do.

2.3 Nevada Gold Mines — the crown jewel

Nevada Gold Mines is the largest gold-producing complex in the world and the reason Barrick’s breakup makes sense. It is a joint venture, 61.5% Barrick (operator) and 38.5% Newmont, combining Carlin, Cortez, Turquoise Ridge, Phoenix and the ramping Goldrush mine across the Carlin and Cortez trends. On an attributable basis it produced roughly 1.68 Moz in 2025 — over half of group gold — from tier-1 orebodies with multi-decade lives in the best mining jurisdiction on earth.

The individual assets show the range: Carlin produced 775 koz (at a high $1,906/oz AISC, reflecting its maturity and complex ores), Cortez 454 koz at $1,513/oz, Turquoise Ridge 341 koz at $1,358/oz, and Phoenix 109 koz of gold plus copper by-product. Goldrush, adjacent to Cortez, is ramping toward ~130 koz a year and is the near-term growth within the complex. Costs here are not low — Nevada’s ores are refractory and deep — but the durability, scale and jurisdiction are what a spin-off buyer pays a premium for.

The asset-level point is strategic rather than operational: Nevada is the anchor of the planned North American company (Section 4.2), and its value is currently trapped inside a group the market discounts for Mali and the DRC. The single most important thing Barrick can do for its share price is prove that Nevada is worth a tier-1 multiple on its own.

2.4 Pueblo Viejo — the Caribbean cash engine

Pueblo Viejo in the Dominican Republic (60% Barrick, 40% Newmont) produced 379 koz attributable in 2025 at a $1,412/oz AISC — a large, long-life mine whose plant expansion lifted throughput and extended the mine life well into the 2040s. It is the second pillar of the planned North American spin-off, and the only one outside the United States, included because it shares the Newmont partnership and the tier-1, long-life character of the Nevada assets.

The asset-level risk is a special-lease-agreement and tax regime that the Dominican government has periodically revisited, and a tailings-storage expansion that has drawn local scrutiny — but neither has interrupted a mine that has been one of Barrick’s most reliable cash generators for a decade.

2.5 Loulo-Gounkoto — the Mali crisis and recovery

No asset better captures Barrick’s risk-and-reward than Loulo-Gounkoto in western Mali (80% Barrick, 20% State of Mali). Historically one of the group’s largest and highest-grade complexes, it produced just 29 koz in 2025 after operations were suspended from 14 January 2025 in a dispute with Mali’s military government over the country’s 2023 mining code, back taxes and revenue sharing. Over 2025 the government detained employees, blocked gold exports, placed the complex under provisional administration, and physically removed stored gold.

The crisis was resolved in November 2025: Barrick and the Government of Mali signed a settlement ending all disputes. Under it, the four detained employees were released, the Somilo mining convention was renewed, Barrick withdrew its ICSID arbitration claims, and — critically — operational control of Loulo-Gounkoto was handed back to Barrick, with gold produced during the administration period returned on 18 December 2025. Barrick recorded an $823 million charge, largely the settlement payment. For 2026 the company guides Loulo-Gounkoto to 260–290 koz as it ramps back up, and the mine’s full recovery toward its historical run-rate is the single largest source of production growth in the plan.

The asset-level lesson is the whole Barrick jurisdiction question in miniature: a world-class orebody, in a country where the state can — and did — seize control of it. The settlement is a genuine de-risking, but it is a reminder, not an all-clear.

2.6 The African & Latin American portfolio

Beyond Loulo-Gounkoto, five more producing mines carry the group’s higher-risk output and roughly a fifth of its value.

In Africa: Kibali in the DRC (45% Barrick, operated with AngloGold and the DRC state) produced 303 koz at $1,337/oz — a large, well-run mine whose main issue is repatriating cash from the DRC; and North Mara (249 koz) and Bulyanhulu (153 koz) in Tanzania, both 84%-held under a 50/50 economic partnership with the Tanzanian government following the resolution of an earlier export ban, with North Mara carrying a long history of community and tailings tension. In Latin America: Veladero in Argentina (50%, with Shandong Gold) produced 230 koz, a high-altitude heap-leach with a history of cyanide-solution incidents; and Porgera in Papua New Guinea (24.5% after the 2023 reopening agreement handed majority economics to PNG interests) contributed 92 koz.

None is individually thesis-defining, but together they are why Barrick is exploring a possible separate listing for its African business (Section 4.2) — the market simply will not pay a full multiple for ounces in Mali, the DRC and Tanzania while they sit beside Nevada.

2.7 Copper — Lumwana and the growth into a second metal

Barrick is quietly becoming a major copper producer. In 2025 it produced 220 kt of copper at a $3.20/lb AISC against a spot price now near $6.66/lb — a margin that, per pound, rivals its gold economics. The core asset is Lumwana in Zambia (100%), which produced 151 kt and is now being expanded: the Lumwana Super Pit, under construction since 2025, is designed to roughly double output to a top-tier ~240 kt a year and extend the mine life into the 2050s. Two 50%-owned mines — Zaldívar in Chile and Jabal Sayid in Saudi Arabia — add the balance.

With 18 Mt (~40 Blb) of attributable copper reserves and 24 Mt of M&I resource behind them, copper is no longer a by-product line for Barrick — it is a second commodity leg, and the reason the company dropped “Gold” from its name in 2025. For the copper market backdrop, this analysis does not re-teach the metal; the point here is that a record copper price is a live, under-appreciated part of the earnings mix.

2.8 The development pipeline

Barrick’s pipeline is anchored by two projects that are, in different ways, world-class.

Reko Diq in Balochistan, Pakistan (50% Barrick, with the Government of Pakistan and Balochistan holding the rest) is one of the largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits on the planet. The phased development targets first production around 2028 and, at plateau, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of copper plus significant gold — a genuinely transformational asset that is also the single riskiest thing Barrick owns, given Balochistan’s security environment and the project’s scale and capital intensity. Fourmile in Nevada (100% Barrick) is the opposite kind of asset: a very high-grade gold discovery next to Goldrush and Cortez, grading roughly double the Goldrush reserve, that Barrick intends to fold into the North American company and that new CEO Mark Hill helped initiate. Behind them sit Norte Abierto (50%, Chile) and the suspended Pascua-Lama on the Chile–Argentina border, both large but long-dated and unlikely to move soon.

The pipeline is the paradox of Barrick in one place: the best growth asset (Fourmile) is going into the low-risk spin-off, while the biggest (Reko Diq) sits in one of the highest-risk jurisdictions it operates in.

2.9 Group production, reserves & costs

Figure 4. Group attributable gold production, 2021–2026

Figure data: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form and full-year results. The multi-year decline is real — depletion, divestments and the 2025 Mali suspension — and reversing it is the growth thesis: Loulo-Gounkoto’s ramp, Goldrush and, later, Fourmile, Reko Diq and the Lumwana copper expansion. 2026 is a forward estimate, not an achieved figure.

Costs. Group gold AISC of $1,637/oz in 2025, guiding higher to $1,760–1,950/oz in 2026, is among the highest of the senior producers — well above Agnico’s $1,400–1,550 and Kinross’s $1,380–1,480, and comparable to Newmont’s ~$1,680. This is the clearest quantitative weakness in the company and the main reason the cost dimension scores where it does in Section 9. For how cost-curve position decides who survives a downturn, see the macro regime guide .

Reserves and replacement. Barrick holds the largest reserve base in the gold sector — 85 Moz of attributable gold at 0.98 g/t, plus 18 Mt of copper and 150 Moz of silver, and behind them 156 Moz of M&I gold and 43 Moz of inferred. At 2026 guidance the gold reserve life is roughly 26 years. The reserves are lower-grade than Agnico’s, but there are far more of them, and they are struck at conservative long-term prices, so a higher gold price both extends lives and pulls resource into reserve.

2.10 Peer positioning

The peer set used throughout this analysis — for every scorecard star in Section 9 and the relative valuation in Section 7 — is the senior gold producers Barrick competes with for capital, with the note that Barrick’s copper book has no clean comparator in the group.

Table 3. Peer positioning — quality metrics

Source: each company’s latest 2026 guidance as published — Newmont , Kinross 2026 outlooks; Agnico per the Metal Pilot Agnico Eagle analysis ; Northern Star per its FY2026 quarterly reporting ; Barrick per the 2025 Annual Information Form . AISC definitions and reporting bases differ between issuers, so the comparison is indicative. Screen the full gold peer set on grade, cost, reserve life and stage at Metal Pilot.

Barrick’s position in that set is the whole investment case: it is the second-largest producer and holds the largest reserve base, but sits at the high end on cost and the low end on jurisdiction quality — Newmont and Barrick are the only two with material Africa/PNG exposure, and Barrick adds Pakistan and Argentina on top. It also owns something none of the pure-gold peers do: a record-margin copper business heading into a structural bull market. The market resolves this by pricing Barrick at a discount to Agnico and Kinross on almost every multiple; the bet in Section 7 is that the breakup narrows the gap.

3. Financials & balance sheet

Table 4. Five-year financial summary (US$m unless stated, years ended 31 December)

Source: revenue, net income, EPS and dividends per stockanalysis.com drawing on Barrick’s audited IFRS statements (net income and EPS attributable to shareholders, i.e. after non-controlling interests); cash-flow and balance-sheet lines standardized on the same source. Trailing twelve months to 31 March 2026: revenue $19,044 m, net income $6,121 m, operating cash flow $9,031 m, free cash flow $5,068 m, cash $7,131 m, net cash ~$2,405 m. A performance dividend on top of the $0.125/quarter base took the trailing rate to ~$0.92. 2026 figures are not shown because the year is incomplete, and the Q2 2026 results (10 August 2026) postdate this analysis.

Figure 5. Free cash flow, 2021–2025

Figure data: stockanalysis.com from Fiscal.ai. The step-up in 2025 — and a further surge to $5.1 bn on a trailing basis to March 2026 — reflects the gold and copper price rally; Q1 2026 free cash flow alone rose ~195% year-on-year.

The five-year record has two stories running against each other. On the operating side, falling gold production (4.4 Moz to 3.26 Moz) held revenue roughly flat until the price rally rescued it in 2024–25. On the cash side, free cash flow exploded — from $432 m in 2022 to $3.9 bn in 2025 and a $5.1 bn trailing run-rate — because a record gold price and a rising copper price hit a cost base that grew far more slowly. The result is the strongest balance sheet Barrick has carried in years.

Balance sheet and capital returns. At 31 March 2026 Barrick held $7.1 billion of cash against ~$4.7 billion of debt — net cash of ~$2.4 billion, investment-grade rated, with debt maturities well spread. It is deploying that strength aggressively at shareholders: a $3 billion share buyback launched in May 2026 (on top of $1.5 billion repurchased in 2025), the base-plus-performance dividend, and $1 billion received in 2025 from selling its Donlin (Alaska) stake to Paulson and NOVAGOLD. The capital-returns pivot is deliberate — Chairman John Thornton has framed it as part of a strategic reset to close the valuation discount (Section 4.2).

Hedging. Barrick does not hedge its gold or, materially, its copper — both flow through at spot, so the record 2026 prices are fully captured on the way up and fully exposed on the way down.

4. Management, strategy & corporate structure

4.1 Management & governance

Barrick’s leadership was largely rebuilt in the space of a year, which is both the biggest governance question and part of the reset. Mark Bristow, who had run the company for nearly seven years since joining through the 2019 Randgold merger, departed on 29 September 2025. Mark Hill — a 30-year mining executive who joined Barrick in 2006, previously led its Latin America and Asia-Pacific regions, and helped initiate the Fourmile discovery — was appointed Group COO and interim CEO on Bristow’s departure and confirmed as President and Chief Executive Officer on 4 February 2026. Helen Cai, a Barrick director since 2021 with an equity-research and corporate-finance background, became Chief Financial Officer effective 1 March 2026, succeeding Graham Shuttleworth. New legal, compliance and global-affairs officers were appointed in early 2026 as well.

John Thornton remains Chairman and is the continuity — and the driving force behind the strategic reset. The board runs to ten directors overseeing an Audit & Risk Committee and the usual governance, compensation and sustainability committees, with a management-level Environmental and Social Oversight Committee chaired by the CEO. Directors and officers as a group own about 0.25% of the shares. The honest read on governance is mixed: a value-focused reset and a cleaner capital-returns policy on one hand; an almost wholesale management turnover, the loss of a high-profile builder-CEO, and Thornton’s long-contested influence on the other.

4.2 Strategy & capital allocation

The strategy in 2026 is, unusually, to take the company apart. Three moves define it:

First, a North American spin-off / IPO: Barrick plans to list a new company holding its Nevada Gold Mines interest, the Fourmile project and Pueblo Viejo, targeted for completion by the end of 2026, to let the market value its tier-1 assets on a tier-1 multiple rather than at the group’s discount. Second, a possible London listing or sale of the African business — Reuters reported in mid-2026 that Barrick was weighing a London vehicle, with a potential all-share transaction involving UK-listed Endeavour Mining under consideration — to separate the Mali/DRC/Tanzania mines from the core. Third, an aggressive capital-returns program: the $3 billion buyback, the performance dividend, and the $1 billion Donlin divestment.

The logic is a conglomerate-discount trade: a sprawling four-continent major trades below the sum of its parts, so management is crystallising the parts. The counter-evidence is the track record: the 2019 Randgold merger, years of write-downs, the production decline and the Mali misstep are why the discount exists in the first place, and a breakup is easier to announce than to complete on good terms.

4.3 Ownership & corporate structure

Table 5. Capital structure and corporate events

Source: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form for the joint ventures, divestment, settlement and buyback; share count and net cash per stockanalysis.com , 31 Mar 2026; the North American spin-off and possible African listing per Barrick’s Q1 2026 disclosures and Reuters reporting , June 2026. Most assets are held through joint ventures with partners (Newmont, AngloGold, Shandong Gold) and host-state interests (Mali 20%, Tanzania 16%, PNG, Pakistan/Balochistan), which is why the group carries $9.4 bn of non-controlling interest and why all figures in this analysis are stated on an attributable basis.

The structural point is that Barrick is not a clean 100%-owned portfolio like Agnico: it is a web of joint ventures and state partnerships, with large minority interests, that the company is now trying to simplify. The spin-off is the first real test of whether the parts are worth more separated than combined.

5. ESG & sustainability

Table 6. ESG snapshot

Source: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form and the 2025 Sustainability Report (12 June 2026). Quantified injury-frequency rates are not reproduced here — a gap noted in Section 10.1.

Barrick’s ESG record is genuinely two-sided and should be read that way. On the positive side, it publishes detailed sustainability data, has a 30%-by-2030 emissions target and a net-zero ambition, and has restructured host-country relationships into economic partnerships (the Tanzanian 50/50 model, the Mali settlement, the PNG reopening). On the other side, the same footprint that creates jurisdiction risk creates ESG risk: North Mara has a long history of community conflict and tailings issues, Veladero has had repeated cyanide-solution incidents, and the Mali episode showed how quickly a licence to operate can be withdrawn. The dimension is scored in Section 9 as adequate rather than strong — neither a leader nor a laggard, but carrying real, named liabilities.

6. Risks

Table 7. Risk register

Source: risk categories drawn from the Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form risk factors and the disclosures in the Q1 2026 results . Likelihood and impact ratings are the author’s assessment on a 1–5 scale, not disclosed figures.

Figure 6. Risk matrix — likelihood against impact

Figure data: Table 7. Each point prints its likelihood × impact score; the shaded region is the high-likelihood, high-impact quadrant. Ratings are the author’s assessment, not disclosed figures.

The register’s shape is the opposite of Agnico’s: where the low-risk major’s dominant exposure is price and multiple, Barrick’s single largest risk is jurisdiction — the recurring possibility that a host government does what Mali just did. The 2025 Mali episode is not an abstraction here; it is the base rate. The whole breakup is, in part, an attempt to quarantine that risk in a separate vehicle so the tier-1 assets can be valued without it.

7. Valuation

Valuation as of 8 August 2026, in US dollars. Horizon: spot fair value. Deck (rule V26): base gold $4,000/oz (the three-month trailing average ~$4,210, rounded down on the $500 grid and held below the recent spike); bear $3,000/oz (the long-term/incentive reversion); bull $4,500/oz; against spot ~$4,350/oz, carried as a 0% cross-check. Copper base $5.00/lb, bear $4.00/lb, bull $6.66/lb (spot). Discount rate 5% real, post-tax, sensitised at 4% and 7%. Share price $41.37, ~1.68 bn shares. All asset values are attributable (net of joint-venture and state interests).

Barrick is a diversified senior producer/operator spanning gold and copper, so it is valued sum-of-the-parts — and, conveniently, the company is about to run that valuation itself through the North American spin-off. The build discounts each region’s attributable cash flow with a jurisdiction risk factor (North America at 1.0, Africa risked to ~0.65, Latin America and PNG lower), values copper separately, risks the development pipeline by stage, and bridges to equity. The conclusion: a base-case net asset value of $53.78 per share and a blended base-case fair value of ~$51 against a $41.37 share price — a P/NAV of 0.77× on the $4,000 deck — with a value read of Modestly undervalued (wide band), on a scenario range from ~$30 (bear) to ~$65 (bull). The market is capitalising Barrick’s gold at roughly $3,330/oz, far below the $4,350 spot and the $4,000 base deck; a spot-deck valuation is far higher.

7.1 Method selection

Table 8. Valuation method selection

Source: method-to-archetype mapping per the Metal Pilot valuation framework; the archetype classification is stated in Section 1 and the peer set in Section 2.10. Typical P/NAV and EV/EBITDA bands are conventions from sell-side mining primers, not current peer observations.

7.2 Net asset value

Each region is modelled on attributable production and reserve life, an estimated all-in cost, a $90/oz corporate overhead, tax at a blended 30% (Barrick’s jurisdictions are high-tax and high-royalty), a 5% real discount rate, and a jurisdiction risk factor that captures what a discounted cash flow alone cannot. Copper is valued at $5.00/lb base against a $3.20/lb AISC. The development pipeline is risk-weighted by stage; the resource-conversion credit values ~50 Moz of gold outside reserves at a risked in-situ multiple.

Table 9. Net asset value build-up, base case (US$m, attributable)

Source: author’s model. Reserve and production inputs per Table 2; balance sheet per stockanalysis.com , 31 Mar 2026. Blended tax 30%; 5% real post-tax discount rate; $90/oz corporate overhead; jurisdiction risk factors as stated. The regional production rates, the jurisdiction risk factors, the development risk factors, the copper and resource-conversion assumptions and the reclamation bridge are the author’s estimates, not company figures. This is a model output, not a disclosed value.

Figure 7. Net asset value build-up

Figure data: Table 9; the Latin America & PNG and resource-conversion lines are combined into the “Other & resources” bar for readability. Equity net asset value of $90,135 m equates to $53.78 per share.

Figure 8. NAV per share sensitivity — gold price × discount rate

Figure data: this analysis’ net-asset-value model, Table 9, holding copper at $5.00/lb and all operating and risk assumptions constant. Price columns: the fixed gold grid ($3,000–$5,000 by $500; Table 3b of the valuation playbook). Base case: $4,000/oz gold, 5% real post-tax discount rate ($53.78/share). A one-rung ($500/oz) gold move shifts NAV/share by roughly ±$9.30. The $41.37 share price sits below every cell at the base deck and far below every cell at spot-level gold — mapping to only ~$3,330/oz gold at the 5% base rate, so the market is not paying even the $4,000 base deck, let alone the copper upside.

7.3 Relative valuation

Table 10. Relative valuation cross-checks

Source: author’s calculations. Market capitalisation, enterprise value and net cash per Table 1; reserves per Table 2; P/E, book value and yield per stockanalysis.com , 6 Aug 2026. 2026 base-deck EBITDA is estimated from guidance production at $4,000/oz gold and $5.00/lb copper — an estimate, not guidance. Typical multiple ranges are conventions, not current peer observations.

Every cross-check tells the same story, and it is the opposite of Agnico’s: Barrick is cheap on everything. A 0.77× P/NAV, ~10.6× forward earnings, $787 per gold-reserve ounce with a copper book thrown in for free, and a 2.66× price-to-book — these are discount multiples. The EV-per-reserve-ounce line is the sharpest: Barrick’s enterprise value is about $787 for each ounce of gold reserve, roughly half what the market pays Agnico, and Barrick’s 85 Moz comes with ~40 Blb of copper the metric ignores entirely. The discount is real, it is earned by the risk, and it is what a successful breakup would close.

7.4 Optionality not in the base case

Three exclusions favour the upside. The breakup itself is the largest: if a North American company is valued on a tier-1 multiple, the implied uplift to the sum-of-the-parts is well beyond the 0.77× the whole trades at today — the base case gives no re-rating credit. Copper at spot ($6.66/lb vs the $5.00 base) adds materially to the copper and Reko Diq values. And the resource base — 156 Moz of M&I gold and 24 Mt of copper outside reserves — is only lightly credited here. None belongs in a base case; all three are real, and all three point the same way.

7.5 Scenario analysis

Table 11. Scenario valuation (blended fair value per share, US$)

Source: author’s model. Each weighted method is recomputed in each scenario (rule V14): the sum-of-the-parts NAV (55%), a warranted P/NAV × NAV (25%), and an EV/EBITDA value (20%). Warranted P/NAV runs 0.85× (bear) / 0.95× (base) / 0.95× (bull) and EV/EBITDA 6.5× / 7.0× / 7.5×; because the base NAV is struck near a cycle-high deck, the bull flexes the deck rather than the multiple and the target P/NAV is held at mid-cycle (rule V17) — the breakup re-rating is carried as un-modelled optionality (Section 7.4). These are illustrative scenarios, not forecasts. The bear case is the one Section 6’s register describes: metals mean-revert while another jurisdiction dispute erupts and the breakup disappoints.

7.6 Valuation conclusion

The blended fair value runs from ~$30 in the bear case to ~$65 in the bull, with a base case of ~$51 — and the $41.37 share price sits well below the base blend, at 0.77× base-case net asset value on the $4,000 deck. The value read is Modestly undervalued (wide band) — the base blend implies ~+24%, while the bear case sits ~27% below today’s price. This is a genuinely different setup from a tier-1 major: Barrick is not expensive on any measure, so the question is not whether the quality is in the price but whether the discount is too large for the risk. On the $4,000/oz through-cycle deck (the three-month trailing average, rounded down per rule V26) the stock is ~24% below the base blend; at spot metals it is worth nearly double; and unlike most cheap stocks, it has a dated, management-driven catalyst — the North American spin-off targeted for end-2026 — designed to close the gap. Sell-side consensus sits at $52.87 with a Buy rating across 24 analysts (a 0% cross-check, rule V12), about 28% above the current price and near this model’s base blend, implying the street already expects some of the re-rating to land.

The honest caveat is that the discount is not irrational. A group AISC guiding to $1,760–1,950/oz, a production base that has fallen for four years, a portfolio still anchored in Mali, the DRC, Tanzania and Pakistan, and a management team rebuilt in a year are exactly the things that keep a name cheap. The re-rating requires execution, not just a rising gold price.

Assumptions box. Valuation date 8 August 2026; all figures in US dollars; balance sheet as of 31 March 2026; horizon spot fair value. Deck (rule V26): base gold $4,000/oz (the three-month trailing average ~$4,210, rounded down on the $500 grid and held below the recent spike), bear $3,000/oz (the long-term/incentive reversion), bull $4,500/oz; spot ~$4,350/oz and the $52.87 analyst consensus carried as 0% cross-checks (V12). Copper base $5.00/lb, bear $4.00/lb, bull $6.66/lb (spot). Discount rate 5% real post-tax, sensitised at 4% and 7% (V21: a real deck against a real rate). Share basis ~1,676 million. Method weights 55/25/20 (one intrinsic, one P/NAV, one cash-flow) — the diversified-producer default. Because the base NAV is struck on a near-cycle-high deck, the bull flexes the deck rather than the multiple and target P/NAV is held at mid-cycle (rule V17). All cash flows attributable (net of JV and state interests). Blended tax 30%; corporate overhead $90/oz. Jurisdiction risk factors: North America 1.0, Latin America ~0.85, Africa ~0.65, PNG ~0.55; development risked 0.6–1.0 by stage; ~50 Moz of gold outside reserves credited at a risked in-situ multiple. Intrinsic anchor: an author-built after-tax SOTP DCF; net cash $2,405 m and reclamation provisions $2,000 m bridged separately. Primary yardstick: P/NAV. The value read is anchored on the base-case blend per the module convention, with the breakup as un-modelled upside.

8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Table 12. Near-term catalysts

Source: Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form and Q1 2026 results for project timing and the corporate plans; the African-listing report per Reuters , June 2026. All timing is company guidance or reported intention, not a guarantee. The re-rating inferences are the author’s.

Barrick’s catalysts are unusually corporate for a miner: the biggest single event over the next 18 months is not a mine ramping but a company being created — the North American spin-off. That is what makes this a re-rating story rather than a simple leverage-to-gold story. The operational catalysts (Loulo’s recovery, the copper builds) are real and dated, but the swing factor is whether the breakup delivers the multiple the parts deserve.

9. Rating & verdict

Barrick is scored on the same nine dimensions every Metal Pilot company analysis uses, against the peer set declared in Section 2.10. As a producer/operator it takes the reference weighting: asset quality, cost position, reserves and life, balance sheet and capital allocation carry 15% each; growth, management, jurisdiction and ESG carry 6.25% each. No dimension is marked not-applicable.

Table 13. Scorecard rationale

Source: each row cites its evidence in this analysis; peer references are the set declared in Section 2.10.

Weighted average: (0.15 × 4) + (0.15 × 3) + (0.15 × 5) + (0.15 × 4) + (0.15 × 3) + (0.0625 × 5) + (0.0625 × 3) + (0.0625 × 2) + (0.0625 × 3) = 0.60 + 0.45 + 0.75 + 0.60 + 0.45 + 0.3125 + 0.1875 + 0.125 + 0.1875 = 3.66/5 → ★★★½, Solid.

The two-axis verdict. Composite quality ★★★½ (Solid, 3.7/5); value read Modestly undervalued (wide band) as of 8 August 2026; verdict: Re-rating candidate — cheap, and the catalyst is a corporate breakup. Barrick is a bigger, cheaper, riskier company than the tier-1 majors, and it is trying to fix the “riskier” and “cheaper” at once by taking itself apart.

The bull case is a value-and-catalyst story: the largest reserve base in gold plus a record-margin copper book, at 0.77× net asset value and ~10.6× forward earnings, with a dated management-driven event — the North American spin-off — designed to close the very discount that makes it cheap. The bear case is that the discount is earned and durable: the highest costs of the seniors, a four-year production decline, a portfolio the market rightly fears could see another Mali, and a management team so new it has not yet been tested through a cycle.

The specific thing that tips it is the breakup. If the North American company lists on a tier-1 multiple and the African business is separated or sold, the sum-of-the-parts this analysis models gets validated in the open market and the 0.77× P/NAV has no reason to persist. If the breakup stalls, is done on poor terms, or another jurisdiction dispute erupts before it completes, then Barrick stays exactly what its multiple says it is — a cheap major that is cheap for reasons. Unlike Agnico, where the entry point is a gold-price call, here the entry point is a bet on execution and corporate action.

To rank Barrick against every listed gold producer on the same nine dimensions — grade, AISC, reserve life, growth stage and P/NAV — screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Company filings. Barrick Mining 2025 Annual Information Form (year ended 31 December 2025, dated 27 February 2026) — the spine of this analysis: mineral reserves and resources at 31 December 2025, the property descriptions, 2026 production and cost guidance, the Loulo-Gounkoto settlement, leadership transitions, corporate transactions and sustainability disclosures. Barrick Reports First Quarter 2026 Results (11 May 2026) — Q1 operating and financial results, the $3 billion buyback and the North American spin-off plan. The 2025 Sustainability Report (12 June 2026). The Q2 2026 results (10 August 2026) postdate this analysis and are not reflected.

Technical reports. The NI 43-101 and S-K 1300 technical reports underlying the reserve and resource estimates for each mine and development project, as summarised in the 2025 Annual Information Form and available on SEDAR+ .

Exchange and market data. stockanalysis.com for share price, market capitalisation, share count, P/E, book value, dividend, 52-week range, beta, employee count and the 24-analyst consensus target of $52.87, as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026; the financials overview , cash-flow statement and balance sheet (Fiscal.ai) for the five-year history.

Commodity prices. Spot gold ~$4,350/oz and spot copper ~$6.66/lb in early August 2026 per Trading Economics and daily price reporting; long-run gold context in the Gold — A Complete Market Guide .

Peer and corporate material. 2026 guidance from Newmont and Kinross ; the Metal Pilot Agnico Eagle analysis for the tier-1 comparator; the possible African listing per Reuters ; the Metal Pilot gold dataset for the peer-screening basis.

Methodology. Durable structure (reserves, resources, grade, mine life, ownership, jurisdiction) is kept separate from the dated market layer (share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples, valuation) throughout. The data-as-of date is 8 August 2026; market data is as of the NYSE close on 6 August 2026; reserves and resources are effective 31 December 2025; operating and balance-sheet figures are effective 31 March 2026. Barrick reports on a calendar fiscal year in US dollars under IFRS, reports resources exclusive of reserves, and carries large non-controlling interests, so every production, reserve and cash-flow figure here is stated on an attributable basis and net income/EPS are after minorities. Scorecard weights follow the producer/operator reference case, sum to 100%, and no dimension is not-applicable. The valuation is a sum-of-the-parts build reproducible from Table 9 and the assumptions box; the regional production rates, jurisdiction and development risk factors, copper and resource-conversion assumptions, corporate-overhead charge and reclamation bridge are author estimates, not company figures. Two figures from the standard set are not drawn: the asset map (drawn geometry the component library does not express — Section 2.1), and per-asset reserve splits are approximate rather than exact. One disclosure gap is noted rather than filled: injury-frequency rates are not reproduced here. Update cadence: refreshed on each annual report and on material events — the next scheduled refresh is the Q2 2026 results (10 August 2026) and any confirmation of the North American spin-off.

Provenance: Barrick Mining Corporation — Annual Information Form — 2025.

10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 8 August 2026: the share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples and valuation read all move, and gold-and-copper mining equities are especially volatile. Reserve, resource, study and forecast figures are estimates, prepared on the codes and bases stated beside each table, and study economics and the proposed corporate transactions are not achieved results. The Quality × Value verdict is an analytical read, never an instruction to the reader. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from primary filings and reviewed, but readers should verify every number against the original documents before acting on it. The author holds no position in Barrick Mining Corporation or in any company named here. Please do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser.