Occidental Petroleum (OXY) — Stock Analysis 2026 [3.7]

Analysis as of 7 September 2026. This is a point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Operating fundamentals, reserves and the standardized measure are from Occidental’s fiscal-2025 Form 10-K (year ended 31 December 2025); the balance sheet, production and guidance are from the second-quarter 2026 results, reported 5 August 2026. Market data — share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value and analyst targets — is as of the 4 September 2026 close. All figures are US dollars. Rating: ★★★★ (3.7/5), Solid — Overvalued (wide band) → the deleveraging worked and the shares re-rated past it; at US$60.04 the price implies a flat WTI of about US$100/bbl held forever. Price deck used in the valuation: base WTI US$70/bbl — the twelve-month trailing average of US$75.87 leaned to the lower price of the fixed US$60–100 grid, because the window carries the March–May 2026 Hormuz spike — with every grid price run as a scenario (bear US$60 / base US$70 / bull US$80 / deep bull US$90 / extreme bull US$100); Henry Hub US$3.00/MMBtu; 10% discount rate; no spot deck is carried. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Occidental spent 2025 and the first half of 2026 doing the one thing the market had waited six years to see: cutting the Anadarko-era debt down to size. The US$9.7 billion sale of OxyChem to Berkshire Hathaway (closed 2 January 2026) plus a record cash-flow quarter took principal debt to US$11.8 billion — the lowest since the second quarter of 2019 — against US$4.2 billion of cash, and reframed Oxy from a sprawling oil-and-chemicals conglomerate into a focused, Permian-led producer with a Gulf of America deepwater business, a Middle-Eastern cash engine and the industry’s most credible carbon-management arm. The thesis in one line: a ~1.43-million-barrel-a-day, oil-weighted producer whose equity value compounds as debt and an 8% Berkshire preferred are retired — but whose shares, up ~30% in a year, now price a barrel of oil the audited reserve book does not contain. To screen Occidental against every US upstream name on production, cost, reserve life and free-cash-flow yield, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Occidental Petroleum Corporation (NYSE: OXY) is an international energy company headquartered in Houston, Texas, built around three businesses: oil & gas — the Permian Basin (Midland and Delaware, enlarged by the 2024 CrownRock deal), the Rockies/DJ Basin, the Gulf of America (deepwater), and international operations in Oman, the UAE, Algeria and Qatar; midstream & marketing, including an equity interest in Western Midstream (WES); and OxyLow-Carbon Ventures, whose 1PointFive subsidiary is building the world’s largest direct-air-capture plant. It is an E&P producer by archetype — valued sum-of-the-parts, because the midstream business earns a margin the reserve book does not contain — and an energy producer by sector. Following the US$9.7 billion sale of OxyChem to Berkshire Hathaway (closed 2 January 2026), the chemicals segment is gone and the balance sheet is the story. In FY2025 Occidental sold 1,434 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (~523.4 mmboe/yr) and held 4,603 million boe of proved reserves, 72% of them developed. (boe = barrel of oil equivalent, gas converted to oil at 6:1 by energy content; following the standard oil-field convention, mmboe = million boe, Mboe/d = thousand boe per day.)

Figure 1. Occidental in numbers

Figure data: production, reserves, unit costs and revenue per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K ; debt, cash and the dividend per the Q2 2026 results release , 5 August 2026; market data and free cash flow per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026 on the 4 September close. Rating per Section 9.

Table 1. Occidental in numbers

Source: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K for production, reserves, unit costs and revenue; the Q2 2026 results release for debt, cash, guidance and the dividend; market data and free cash flow per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026. Enterprise value is market capitalisation plus net principal debt on the company’s own definition (principal debt US$11.8 bn less unrestricted cash US$4.2 bn); the balance sheet carries US$14.6 bn of debt including US$1.8 bn of lease liabilities, so a lease-inclusive enterprise value reads ~US$70.5 bn. The US$8.5 bn preferred is a separate senior claim (§4.3), charged in the valuation.

Thesis in brief. Bull: a large, oil-weighted, Permian-anchored producer whose equity value grows mechanically as principal debt falls toward the US$10 billion target and interest drops — annualised interest is already down about US$630 million on 2025 — throwing off a mid-single-digit free-cash-flow yield, backed by Berkshire’s 26.9% common stake, with a first-mover carbon-capture option in Stratos and a midstream franchise the reserve book cannot see. Bear: a price-taker on oil carrying the most complex capital structure among the large-caps — ~US$11.8 billion of principal debt plus US$8.5 billion of 8% preferred that cannot be voluntarily redeemed before August 2029 plus 83.9 million Berkshire warrants — an allocation record still shadowed by Anadarko, international exposure its US peers avoid, and a first-year CEO; and after a ~30% one-year re-rating the shares discount a flat WTI price far above anything in the audited reserve report. What tips it: whether the market is right that the midstream business, the unbooked drilling inventory and the carbon option are worth the US$34 a share the model does not carry. The full rating is in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Occidental is a leveraged play on oil, so the backdrop matters: after a soft 2025 in which WTI averaged US$64.81/bbl, crude spiked on a Middle-East risk premium through the spring of 2026 — the second quarter’s WTI marker averaged US$92.79/bbl and Occidental’s own realised crude reached US$96.78/bbl — before easing back over the summer. Domestic gas went the other way: Permian takeaway constraints pushed Occidental’s domestic realised gas price to minus US$1.48/Mcf in the second quarter. For the full picture of how crude is priced, who produces it and how it behaves across cycles, see the Oil — A Complete Market Guide ; the gas and NGL side is covered in the Natural Gas guide . This section spends its words on the company.

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

Unlike a single-basin pure-play, Occidental runs a genuinely diversified E&P footprint plus two adjacent businesses: Midstream & Marketing and OxyLow-Carbon Ventures / 1PointFive. The chemicals business (OxyChem) that long defined the “diversified” label was sold to Berkshire Hathaway for US$9.7 billion on 2 January 2026 to accelerate deleveraging, booking an estimated US$3.2 billion after-tax gain — so the portfolio today is a focused producer with a carbon-management option, not a conglomerate.

Table 2. Asset base at a glance, FY2025

Source: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K , Items 1 and 2 and the supplemental oil and gas information. WI = working interest; PSC = production-sharing contract. Sales volumes per day, FY2025. All interests are held through the publicly listed parent (NYSE: OXY).

The centre of gravity is US onshore — 1,202 Mboe/d, 84% of group volumes — with the Gulf of America adding high-margin barrels and the international book adding contract-based cash flow that also carries the portfolio’s only meaningful jurisdiction risk (Section 6).

2.2 Revenue split — by product & by segment

Two cuts of the same base tell the concentration story. By product, Occidental is decisively an “oil company”: at FY2025 realised prices of US$64.60/bbl for crude, US$20.60/bbl for NGLs and US$1.65/Mcf for gas, crude made up roughly 82% of upstream revenue against just 6% for natural gas — so cash flow tracks the oil price, not the volume mix, which is only 51% oil. By segment, revenue is dominated by the oil & gas business, with Midstream & Marketing a modest contributor and Low-Carbon Ventures still pre-revenue.

Figure 2. FY2025 upstream revenue by product

Figure data: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K , average realised prices and sales volumes by product. Shares are computed as 265.7 mmbbl of oil at US$64.60, 119.0 mmbbl of NGL at US$20.60 and 831.5 Bcf of gas at US$1.65/Mcf, summing to US$20,987 m against the US$20,902 m of oil and gas segment sales the filing reports — a 0.4% difference.

Figure 3. Production by segment, FY2025

Figure data: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K , sales volumes per day by business unit: Permian 786, Rockies and other domestic 284, international 232 and Gulf of America 132 Mboe/d.

Read together: Occidental’s cash flow lives and dies on the oil price, and it is concentrated in the Permian but on a more diversified geographic base than the pure-play Permian names.

2.3 The Permian — the core (post-CrownRock)

The Permian is the thesis. Occidental is one of the basin’s largest operators across both the Midland and Delaware sub-basins, a position deepened by the ~US$12 billion CrownRock acquisition (closed August 2024), and it holds 1.5 million net acres producing from roughly 6,300 gross wells. In 2025 the Permian produced 786 Mboe/d — 18% more than 2024 — on US$3.4 billion of development capital, and added 390 mmboe of proved reserves through infill development and extensions of proved areas, the single largest source of the group’s reserve replacement. It is the low-cost, high-return heart of the company; the key asset-level risks are the oil price and, increasingly, Permian gas takeaway, which drove domestic realised gas to a negative price in the second quarter of 2026.

2.4 Gulf of America — the deepwater leg

The Gulf of America (formerly Gulf of Mexico) is Occidental’s high-margin offshore business: 132 Mboe/d in 2025 from just 96 gross wells, long-life and oil-weighted, with major-equipment uptime above 99%. In 2025 it added 44 mmboe of proved reserves through improved recovery, the portfolio’s largest such addition, and it beat guidance again in the second quarter of 2026. It is a genuine second engine that diversifies the company away from short-cycle shale decline; its asset-level risks are the deepwater ones — well integrity, hurricane exposure and federal permitting — offset by high per-barrel margins.

2.5 International — the MENA cash engine

Occidental’s international operations produced 232 Mboe/d in 2025, 16% of the group. Oman is the largest piece at 71 Mboe/d, where Occidental operates Blocks 9, 27, 53 (Mukhaizna), 62 and 65 across 6.0 million gross acres with 10,000 potential well locations, and where a 2025 contract extension added 61 mmbbl to proved oil reserves. Al Hosn Gas in the UAE (40%) contributed 90 Mboe/d from sour-gas facilities designed to process 1.45 Bcf/d; the Dolphin project in Qatar and the UAE (24.5%) added 40 Mboe/d and Algeria 31 Mboe/d. These barrels are self-funded and diversify the portfolio geographically. The trade-off, and the portfolio’s most distinctive risk versus the US pure-plays, is contract and geopolitical exposure: production-sharing terms mean Occidental’s entitlement falls as prices rise, and fiscal terms, renewal and regional stability sit outside its control (Section 6).

2.6 Low-Carbon Ventures & the OxyChem exit

Occidental’s most differentiated asset is not a barrel — it is 1PointFive, its low-carbon subsidiary building Stratos, designed as the world’s largest direct-air-capture (DAC) facility, in Ector County, Texas. It is being built through a joint venture with BlackRock, which had invested US$500 million of a US$550 million commitment by the end of 2025; the venture’s assets were US$1.2 billion of construction in progress at 31 December 2025. Distributions from the venture go preferentially to BlackRock up to a return threshold and then to Occidental, and Occidental may call BlackRock’s interest on 30 June 2035 or earlier if the plant fails to reach commercial operations. Combined with decades of CO₂ enhanced-oil-recovery know-how, Stratos gives Occidental a first-mover platform to monetise the 45Q tax credit and carbon-removal sales — a genuine, if unproven, growth option most producers cannot replicate. The counter-development is the US$9.7 billion sale of OxyChem to Berkshire (January 2026): a high-quality, cash-generative chemicals business sold to speed deleveraging, on terms under which Occidental retained the legacy environmental liabilities and indemnified the buyer for pre-closing ones — a deliberate simplification that trades diversified earnings for a cleaner balance sheet, but not for a clean liability register.

2.7 Other assets & the development pipeline

Beyond the producing regions, Occidental runs Midstream & Marketing — gathering, processing, transportation and marketing, a 24.5% interest in the Dolphin pipeline (capacity 3.2 Bcf/d, currently moving about 2.0 Bcf/d), and an equity interest in Western Midstream (WES), of which an Occidental subsidiary is the general partner. The segment earned US$252 million in 2025 on US$1,279 million of sales, and it is genuinely volatile: its results turn on Midland-to-Gulf-Coast oil spreads (US$0.30/bbl in 2025) and Waha-to-Gulf-Coast gas spreads (US$2.21/MMBtu, up from US$1.49), and in the second quarter of 2026 alone it delivered US$1.3 billion of pre-tax income. The “pipeline” for a producer of this maturity is its drilling inventory — Permian running room extended by CrownRock, carried at US$14.4 billion of gross capitalised unproved property — plus the Stratos hub and Gulf of America projects: self-funded running room, with the carbon business the one genuinely optional piece.

2.8 Production, reserves & costs (consolidated)

At group level Occidental sold 1,434 Mboe/d in FY2025 (~523.4 mmboe/yr), 8% more than 2024, and guides to 1,423–1,453 Mboe/d for 2026 on an 8%-lower capital budget of US$5.5–5.9 billion; the second quarter delivered 1,433 Mboe/d, above the high end of guidance, and the third quarter is guided to 1,400–1,440 Mboe/d. Proved reserves stood at 4,603 mmboe at year-end 2025 — 2,162 mmbbl of oil, 1,150 mmbbl of NGL and 7,745 Bcf of gas — of which 72% were developed, a proved reserve life of roughly 8.8 years at the FY2025 rate. Reserve replacement was 107% organic and 98% all-in: 340 mmboe of extensions, 60 mmboe of improved recovery and 161 mmboe of revisions against 523 mmboe produced, 10 mmboe purchased and 57 mmboe sold. The 1,309 mmboe of proved undeveloped reserves carry a five-year development plan — US$2.2 billion spent converting them in 2025, about US$8.4 billion planned over five years on the Permian’s share alone. The cost structure is competitive — worldwide lease operating cost of US$8.94/boe, US$8.35 domestic — though the all-in corporate breakeven still carries interest and the 8% preferred dividend (Section 3).

Figure 4. Average production by fiscal year, FY2021–FY2025

Chart source: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K , sales volumes per day (1,222 / 1,328 / 1,434 Mboe/d for 2023–25) annualised, and prior-year filings for 2021–22. Realised crude fell from US$76.85/bbl in 2023 to US$64.60 in 2025 before the 2026 spike — that second series is carried in the prose rather than overlaid.

2.9 Peer positioning

Occidental’s natural peer set is the large-cap US oil-weighted independents: ConocoPhillips (COP), EOG Resources (EOG), Diamondback Energy (FANG) and Devon Energy (DVN). Every “vs. peers” claim in this analysis — each scorecard star and the cost read — uses that set. (Integrated majors ExxonMobil and Chevron are a scale reference, not direct comparables.)

Table 3. Quality-metric peer positioning (approximate, mid-2026)

Source: Occidental’s figures per the FY2025 Form 10-K and the Q2 2026 results release ; Devon’s per the Devon Energy analysis ; the remaining peer figures are approximate mid-2026 company disclosures and are flagged as such. Occidental’s US$8.5 bn 8% preferred is an additional senior claim on top of the net-debt/EBITDA shown. No peer multiples appear here or in Section 7.

Where Occidental sits: second on scale behind ConocoPhillips, the most oil-weighted of the group, competitive on operating cost, and uniquely optioned on carbon — but carrying the most complex capital structure in it (debt plus an 8% preferred plus the Berkshire warrants), and with international exposure the others lack. That single fact — elite assets and a differentiated carbon platform, weighed against a heavy capital structure — is the crux of the scorecard.

3. Financials & balance sheet

FY2025 was a study in why the balance sheet, not the income statement, is Occidental’s swing factor. Revenue was US$22,075 million (roughly flat on 2024 as CrownRock volumes offset a soft price tape), income from continuing operations US$2,107 million, and free cash flow US$3,825 million — the weakest of the five years, on a US$64.81 WTI average. The momentum since has been dramatic: the second quarter of 2026 delivered US$5.1 billion of operating cash flow, US$3.0 billion of free cash flow before working capital — the highest since the third quarter of 2022 — and adjusted EPS of US$2.40, funding a US$1.9 billion debt paydown in the quarter alone.

Table 4. Five-year financial summary

Source: revenue, free cash flow, total debt and dividends per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026; income from continuing operations and diluted EPS for FY2023–25 per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K and for FY2021–22 per prior filings. FY2023–25 are on a continuing-operations basis reflecting the OxyChem divestiture (closed January 2026), so the pre-2023 columns include the chemicals business and are not perfectly comparable across the boundary. Total debt includes lease liabilities. FY2022 was an exceptional high-price year.

The balance sheet is the watch item and the opportunity in one. Total debt fell from US$26.9 billion at the end of 2024 to US$14.6 billion at 30 June 2026 (including US$1.8 billion of lease liabilities), funded by the US$9.7 billion OxyChem sale and strong free cash flow. On the company’s own measure, principal debt is US$11.8 billion — the lowest since the second quarter of 2019 — against US$4.2 billion of unrestricted cash, for net principal debt of US$7.6 billion, with a stated milestone of US$10 billion of principal debt still ahead. Annualised interest is already about US$630 million lower than 2025.

Sitting above the common equity is the more expensive layer: 84,897 shares of 8% cumulative perpetual preferred stock held by Berkshire, US$8.5 billion at face, which cost US$679 million in dividends in 2025. Its terms matter more than the headline suggests. Occidental cannot voluntarily redeem the preferred before August 2029, and thereafter only at a 5% premium; before then, redemption is mandatory at a 10% premium, dollar for dollar, only for distributions to common shareholders above US$4.00 per share on a trailing twelve-month basis. At a US$1.12 dividend, that trigger is far away — the preferred comes down only if Occidental returns capital at a scale it is not yet returning. Beyond it sit 83.9 million Berkshire warrants at US$59.59 and 30.4 million common stock warrants at US$22.00 (expiring 3 August 2027), of which about 12.5 million appear to have been exercised in the first half of 2026. Liquidity is ample. On capital returns, the quarterly dividend was raised 8% to US$0.28 in August 2026 (US$1.12 annualised, ~1.9%) — deliberately modest, because the priority is debt.

Hedge & treasury posture. Occidental runs an unhedged production book by policy: the derivatives note shows no instruments designated as hedges, only short-duration marketing derivatives (net short 59 mmbbl of oil and 189 Bcf of gas at 31 December 2025, a net US$36 million fair value) used to fix margins on stored volumes. The income statement is therefore a direct read on crude, and the balance-sheet repair — not a hedge book — is the downside cushion. The retained legacy liabilities are the other half of the picture: US$1,870 million of environmental remediation provisions across 152 sites, US$1,674 million of it relating to the divested chemical business, plus US$4,553 million of asset-retirement obligations.

Figure 5. Free cash flow by fiscal year, FY2021–FY2025

Chart source: stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026 (operating cash flow less capital expenditure). Revenue and the debt trajectory are read from Table 4 and the prose rather than overlaid as additional series. The trailing twelve months to 30 June 2026 stand at US$4,527 m, already above the FY2025 figure.

4. Management, strategy & corporate structure

4.1 Management & governance

Occidental is led by President & CEO Richard Jackson, who stepped up from Chief Operating Officer on 1 June 2026 and joined the board, framing his priorities as execution, advanced recovery and cost efficiency with a stated goal of significant free-cash-flow growth by 2030. He succeeds Vicki Hollub, who retired after 10 years as CEO and 45 years at the company — the architect of the 2019 Anadarko acquisition, the Berkshire relationship and the pivot to low-carbon — in an orderly internal succession, so the strategy is continuous rather than a reset. The governance backdrop a reader must weigh is unusually specific: Berkshire Hathaway owned 26.9% of the common stock at 31 March 2026, holds US$8.5 billion of 8% preferred and warrants over 83.9 million shares at US$59.59, and is now also the owner of OxyChem and the beneficiary of Occidental’s indemnity for its legacy liabilities. That is a supportive, long-term anchor shareholder which is simultaneously a concentration of influence, a counterparty and a dilution overhang. The twin watch items are a first-year CEO and the Berkshire dependence baked into the capital structure.

4.2 Strategy & capital allocation

The strategy is now sharply focused: be a low-cost, oil-weighted producer, deleverage aggressively, and build an optional carbon-management business on top. The capital-allocation stack is explicit and debt-first — fund a US$5.5–5.9 billion programme (down 8% on 2025) to hold production roughly flat, drive principal debt to US$10 billion, and only then lean into buybacks and faster dividend growth; management names advanced recovery, “value-based development” and lower base decline as the operating levers. The M&A methodology has swung from expansion (Anadarko 2019, CrownRock 2024) to simplification, the OxyChem sale being the defining recent move. The honest caveat is that per-share value creation has lagged: the share count rose 1.8% over the past year on warrant exercises, and buybacks remain paused.

4.3 Ownership & corporate structure

The defining structural feature is the Berkshire Hathaway relationship, which runs through the whole capital structure. It began in 2019 with Berkshire’s US$10 billion investment in 8% cumulative perpetual preferred (100,000 shares at US$100,000 face, with a US$105,000 liquidation preference) plus warrants over 83.9 million shares at US$59.59, to help fund the ~US$55 billion Anadarko Petroleum acquisition. Berkshire then built a 26.9% common stake — the largest holder — and in January 2026 acquired OxyChem for US$9.7 billion; 84,897 preferred shares remain outstanding, US$8.5 billion at face, on the redemption mechanics set out in Section 3. The Berkshire warrants sit essentially at the money and are a dilution overhang; the separate 30.4 million common stock warrants at US$22.00 expire on 3 August 2027 and are deep in the money. The structural items the valuation must net out are therefore the preferred at face and the warrant dilution, both of which sit ahead of or alongside the common in the equity bridge (Section 7).

5. ESG & sustainability

For an oil and gas producer, Occidental positions itself as the carbon-management leader among E&Ps, and the claim has substance. The Stratos direct-air-capture plant and the CO₂ enhanced-oil-recovery expertise behind it (§2.6) convert an operating skill into a platform for permanent carbon removal, 45Q monetisation and carbon-removal sales to corporate buyers; few producers can credibly claim a net-carbon-removal business line. Occidental also reports US$874 million of environmental expenditures in 2025, up from US$663 million, of which US$472 million was recurring operating cost. The honest limitations are three: this remains a hydrocarbon producer whose product is burned, so Scope 3 and transition risk cap the ceiling; the DAC economics are unproven at scale, and Stratos must demonstrate cost and throughput before the option is worth a hard number; and Occidental carries a legacy remediation estate of 152 sites and US$1,870 million of provisions, retained rather than transferred when OxyChem was sold. Presented even-handedly, the ESG profile is a real strength on ambition and capability, tempered by execution risk on the very projects that differentiate it and by a liability tail the sale did not remove.

6. Risks

Table 5. Risk register

Source: Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K risk factors, Notes 11–13, and the Q2 2026 results release ; this analysis. Likelihood/impact are the author’s assessment.

The through-line: Occidental has elite assets and a differentiated carbon platform, but it cannot engineer away price risk, and it carries the group’s heaviest capital structure. Its biggest single vulnerability is a sustained drop in oil; its most Occidental-specific exposure is the preferred-plus-warrants stack, which is simultaneously the risk and the opportunity, since retiring it transfers value to the common — except that the redemption trigger requires a scale of shareholder distribution the company is not yet making. Its distinctive exposures — PSC entitlements that shrink as prices rise, negative Permian gas realisations, and a retained remediation estate — are ones the pure-play Permian names simply do not have. Presented even-handedly, the mitigants are real and improving: a low-cost core, principal debt at a seven-year low, and an anchor shareholder aligned for the long term.

Figure 6. Risk heat-map

Figure data: this analysis; risks per the register above.

7. Valuation

Valuation as of 7 September 2026, in US dollars. Horizon: spot fair value. Price deck: base WTI US$70/bbl — the representative trailing average snapped to the fixed US$60–100 grid (3-month US$83.06, 6-month US$90.50, 12-month US$75.87, all to end-August 2026 on the U.S. EIA Cushing monthly spot series; the twelve-month window is the representative one because the three- and six-month windows sit inside the March–May 2026 Hormuz spike, and the average is leaned to the lower grid price) — with every grid price run as a scenario (bear US$60 / base US$70 / bull US$80 / deep bull US$90 / extreme bull US$100); the EIA’s August 2026 outlook, which puts Brent at US$69/bbl in 2027 as the disruption unwinds, is carried as a 0%-weight cross-check; no spot deck is carried, so the section does not age with the daily quote. Realisations are the company’s own disclosed percentages of the benchmark, so every stream moves with its deck: oil at 100% of WTI, NGLs at 32% of WTI and domestic gas at 45% of NYMEX — at the base deck, oil US$70.00/Bbl, NGL US$22.40/Bbl and domestic gas US$1.35/Mcf, with international gas held at its contractual US$1.89/Mcf. The production book is unhedged by policy, so no realisation carries a cash settlement. Discount rate 10%, the E&P convention for a high-decline shale-weighted base with a sub-ten-year proved life — sensitised 8–12%. Share price US$60.04 (4 September 2026 close), 999.7 m shares outstanding and 1,011.6 m fully diluted, balance sheet as of 30 June 2026.

Occidental is valued on the E&P producer archetype, run as a sum-of-the-parts over three claims — the proved developed reserve base, the proved undeveloped tranche the reserve report funds, and the midstream and marketing business, whose margin the reserve book does not contain. The method behind the numbers is set out in the How to Value Commodity Stocks guide; this section applies it. The headline is a deck-to-value map, not a single number: the blended fair value is US$31.33/share at the US$70 base price, US$18.04 at US$60 and US$46.09 at US$80, and each US$10/bbl of WTI is worth about US$9.73 of net asset value per share — the deck sensitivity in Table 11 lets a reader run the model at any oil price they hold. The tiers frame the structure: the producing reserve base plus the midstream business and the whole bridge is worth US$23.62/share, the booked undeveloped tranche another US$4.33, and the resource tier nothing at all, because the unbooked inventory cannot be built from disclosure. The section sets the current US$60.04 price against that map only in §7.6, where the rating and the flip price are published.

7.1 Method selection

Occidental is a producer, so the blend is the E&P-producer default set out in the valuation guide linked above — NAV/DCF 45% / EV/EBITDA 30% / a reserve read 25% — carried without deviation. The third slice takes the guide’s reserve anchor on proved (1P) reserves, the only category an SEC filer publishes; the anchor is written for 2P, so the denominator is narrower than the convention and the method reads low. Trailing earnings are deliberately not an anchor: reported twelve-month EPS of US$6.51 is inflated by the US$3.2 billion after-tax gain on the OxyChem sale and by a quarter in which WTI averaged US$92.79. The single feature that shapes every method is the Berkshire preferred: US$8.5 billion at face is a senior claim subtracted in each equity bridge, which is why Occidental’s common is worth less per unit of EBITDA or per booked barrel than a peer with the same assets and no preferred.

Table 6. Valuation method selection

Source: method-to-archetype mapping, anchors and the default weight set per The Commodity Investor, Part 11: How to Value Commodity Stocks , “The archetype is the unit of analysis” and “The valuation toolkit”. Deviation, stated: the E&P-producer default weights the sum-of-the-parts NAV, EV/EBITDA and EV-per-proved-boe legs; here the EV-per-proved-boe leg is dropped to a 0% cross-check because a 1P read at a 2P anchor inherits the unbooked-inventory omission the NAV already carries, and its weight is redistributed to a price-to-cash-flow leg at the archetype’s own P/CF anchor and to the NAV (the load-bearing-gap re-weight; the inventory row stays n/d, bounded in §7.5). Archetype in Section 1; target multiples derived in §7.3 from the archetype anchors, not from the Section 2.9 peer set, which stays a quality comparator. Input families: intrinsic 50% (single method, at the cap), cash-flow 50% (EV/EBITDA + P/CF, at the collinear-pair cap), transaction 0% — all inside the family caps.

7.2 Net asset value

Vehicle map. Occidental holds its producing assets directly or through wholly-owned subsidiaries, its international positions under production-sharing and concession contracts, and its midstream interests partly through equity-method investees. There is one consolidated joint venture with a third-party interest ahead of the common equity — the Stratos direct-air-capture venture with BlackRock — and it is mapped as a claim rather than as a percentage, because its distributions run through a waterfall.

Table 7. Vehicle map

Source: this analysis; reserves, the standardized measure, the segment results, the joint-venture terms and the preferred stock per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K ; debt, cash and guidance per the Q2 2026 results release , 5 August 2026; the 30 June 2026 balance-sheet lines per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026.

Tax basis and asset-retirement obligations. The reserve base is carried at the SEC after-tax standardized measure, so tax is inside the figure by construction (the disclosure’s own schedule, US$10,223 m against US$70,223 m of pre-tax future net revenue, an effective 14.6%), and the US$5,671 m of deferred tax liabilities sit behind it — neither charged nor credited again. An incremental dollar of oil price is taxed at 27.7%, the filing’s own blended statutory rate on oil and gas activities (US$1,679 m against US$6,066 m of pre-tax income), and that is the rate the deck adjustment uses. Future dismantlement and abandonment are already inside the reserve report’s development costs, so the bridge’s reclamation line prints in rows and names the US$4,553 m obligation it corresponds to; the relative legs in §7.3 and §7.4 still deduct it, because neither EBITDA nor a reserve multiple carries it. The retained environmental remediation estate is a separate line and is charged at the statements’ own provision of US$1,870 m, because it sits outside the reserve report entirely.

Stage risk (n/a) and the Stratos venture. No asset the model values is pre-production. The proved undeveloped tranche is a booked SEC category that must be developed within five years and whose share of the US$25,085 m of future development costs is already charged inside the standardized measure, so it takes a 1.00 risk weight; the midstream business is producing, so it takes 1.00 too. Neither the target P/NAV nor the discount rate carries a second charge. The Stratos direct-air-capture venture is deliberately not in the model — it is pre-revenue with no disclosed offtake economics — and the omission is a stated understatement, bounded below by the US$1.2 bn of construction in progress the venture had capitalised at year-end 2025.

The per-asset NPV build. Every NPV the model carries is built here first, one block per tranche, so the arithmetic arrives before the answer. The two reserve blocks are the company’s own disclosed standardized measure apportioned on its filed volumes and a price set built from the 10-K’s own realisation percentages, then moved to the deck; the midstream block is a segment EBITDA at a multiple, not a discounted stream.

Table 8. Per-asset NPV build — base case (US$70/bbl WTI, 10%)

Notes to Table 8

1. The 10-K publishes the standardized measure by geography, not by reserve category, so each of its lines is apportioned on a filed quantity: future cash inflows on revenue-weighted volumes, production costs on the boe share, income tax on pre-tax net revenue. The apportionment is exact by construction: 33,573 + 3,054 = US$36,627 m. The price set is itself checked: the FY2025 realised prices applied to the filed reserve volumes — oil US$64.60/Bbl, NGL US$20.60/Bbl, domestic gas US$1.53/Mcf (45% of the reserve report’s US$3.39 Henry Hub) and international gas US$1.89/Mcf — rebuild US$175,864 m of future cash inflows against the filed US$172,535 m, a 1.9% difference, the residue being field-level differentials and production-sharing entitlements the disclosure nets but does not itemise.
2. The 10-K footnotes that ARO costs are included in future development costs but does not size them, so the balance sheet’s US$4,553 m asset-retirement obligation stands in for the component, split on boe volumes; the remaining US$20,532 m of drilling capital is charged wholly to the undeveloped tranche, which is what it funds. The company’s own five-year plan — about US$8.4 bn on the Permian’s undeveloped reserves alone, and US$2.2 bn spent converting in 2025 — is consistent with that placement.
3. One discount ratio, both tranches. The disclosure gives a single US$23,373 m discount against US$60,000 m of undiscounted after-tax cash flow, and no split by category, so both tranches carry it. The developed base produces earlier and the undeveloped later, so the split understates the developed tranche and overstates the undeveloped one; the total is exact, and the same ratio implies a flat-equivalent life of 10.16 years — the annuity that reproduces 0.61045 at 10% — which is the profile the rate rows of Figure 8 move both blocks on.
4. The deck term. Crude-linked barrels are oil plus the 32% of NGL volume that prices off WTI: developed 1,798 mmbbl, undeveloped 732 mmbbl. Each is taken less the 4.93% severance and property-tax rate (US$1,030 m against US$20,902 m of FY2025 oil and gas sales), less the 27.7% blended statutory tax, and multiplied by the 0.6105 discount ratio. The result is then calibrated to the company’s own published sensitivity: the 10-K states that a US$1/bbl change in WTI moves 2026 budgeted pre-tax cash by about US$240 m and a US$1 change in Brent by about US$25 m, US$265 m in total, against US$286 m on the raw volume arithmetic — so a 0.9266 factor carries the production-sharing entitlement effect, under which Occidental’s international share falls as prices rise.
5. Corporate property is 0.9% of gross property, plant and equipment, so essentially the whole non-upstream depreciation charge belongs to the midstream and marketing segment. Segment results exclude unallocated corporate expense by definition, which is why the bridge capitalises it separately.
6. The segment earns marketing spreads rather than contracted fees — its 2025 result turned on Midland-to-Gulf-Coast oil and Waha-to-Gulf-Coast gas differentials — so it is struck on the group’s own cash-flow target rather than on a contracted-infrastructure convention. What that costs is quantified in Table 17.
7. Occidental publishes no US undrilled-location count, type curve or inventory life, so the row that would price the rest of the inventory cannot be built from disclosure and is printed n/d rather than proxied. It is bounded, and the bound is large: unproved properties are carried at US$14,444 m gross, US$10,211 m net of the US$4,233 m valuation allowance — US$10.09/share — and the Stratos venture had US$1.2 bn of construction in progress. Direction: net asset value understated. The company’s investor presentation, with a location count and a type curve, is the document that would let the row be built.

Source: the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K — the supplemental oil and gas information for the standardized measure, reserve volumes, unit results and the reserves pricing table; the segment table and Notes 7, 10 and 13 for the segment results, derivatives, asset-retirement obligations and the preferred. Filed marks a figure printed in the filing, Derived the arithmetic of rows above it, Input a parameter of this section. The value column is headed Value rather than US$m because a build that multiplies heterogeneous terms cannot hold one unit; the unit sits in the line item, and only the = rows are US$m. The one relationship the table cannot express is the parametric form the sensitivity grid runs across the deck and the rate: proved(WTI, r) = [36,627 + 983.9 × (WTI − 65.34)] × AF(r, 10.16) ÷ AF(10%, 10.16).

Table 9. Per-asset model — base case (US$70/bbl WTI, 10%)

Source: this analysis, from the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K and the Q2 2026 results release . Every NPV in the last column reproduces from its block in Table 8; this table adds the reserve, cost, capital, tax and discounting inputs behind those figures. One discount-rate treatment: the two reserve blocks and the capitalised overhead re-discount on the reserve report’s own implied timing, the midstream multiple is held, and the grid’s notes say so.

Table 10. NAV build-up and equity bridge (base case — US$70/bbl WTI, 10%)

Source: this analysis; reserve and provision lines per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K ; debt, cash and the dividend per the Q2 2026 results release of 5 August 2026; the 30 June 2026 balance-sheet and share-count lines per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026. Bridge lines in the standard order, each printed even where empty on one of the five value-column states, with two added lines — the Berkshire preferred and the retained environmental remediation provision — because both are senior claims the standard list does not name and neither sits inside the reserve report. The tiers sum to the published NAV/share: producing US$23.62 + development US$4.33 + resource US$0.00 = US$27.95 — and the producing tier alone sits 61% below the US$60.04 price, before the booked undeveloped tranche is counted. The remaining count of US$22.00 warrants is derived (30.4 m at 31 Dec 2025 less the 91.65% warrant share of the 13.7 m shares issued in the first half of 2026) and is the section’s one estimated share-count input. Values computed on unrounded inputs, printed to whole US$m and two decimals per share.

Figure 7. Sum-of-the-parts NAV build-up

Figure data: Table 10. Equity net asset value of US$28,271 m equates to US$27.95 per share; the producing tier alone is US$23.62. “Environ. & wkg cap.” groups the retained environmental provision (−1,870) and net working capital (−348). The Berkshire preferred is the second-largest deduction in the bridge, larger than net debt.

Figure 8. NAV/share sensitivity — WTI price × discount rate

Notes to Figure 8

1. Checksum — the bear column (US$60) at the 10% base rate: proved developed = 33,573 + 699.4 × (60 − 65.34) = US$29,838 m; proved undeveloped = 3,054 + 284.5 × (−5.34) = US$1,535 m; plus the US$8,198 m midstream value = US$39,571 m of enterprise NAV, less net debt 7,600, the environmental provision 1,870, capitalised G&A 2,831, the preferred 8,490 and working capital 348 = US$18,432 m ÷ 1,011.6 m = US$18.22.
2. Rate rows — they move the two reserve blocks and the capitalised overhead, on the 10.16-year flat-equivalent profile the standardized measure’s own discount ratio implies (×1.0932 at 8%, ×0.9187 at 12%; the capitalised G&A runs US$3,095 m / US$2,831 m / US$2,601 m). The midstream value is a multiple on a segment EBITDA, and net debt, the preferred, the environmental provision and working capital are balance-sheet claims, so all are held down each column.
3. Cost — a +10% shock to the reserve report’s future production costs (US$77,227 m gross, after tax and discounted) takes NAV/share to US$24.58 (−12.1%); a +10% WTI move to US$77.00 lifts it to US$34.75 (+24.4%), and with a 5% cost lag applied to that price move, US$33.07 (+18.3%). The cost line bites less here than at a gassier peer, because 82% of upstream revenue is crude.
4. FX — n/a, Occidental reports and trades in US dollars.
5. Stage risk — n/a, no asset the model values is pre-production; the proved undeveloped tranche is a booked SEC category and the midstream business is operating, both at 1.00, so there is no risked tranche to step down a band. The Stratos venture is n/d, not risked.
6. Schedule slip — n/a for the reserve rows, whose capital sits inside the standardized measure’s own five-year schedule. Stratos is the one development asset that could slip, and it is n/d in the model, so a slip moves nothing in it — the direction is already logged as an understatement.

Figure data: this analysis’ model (Tables 8–10), every cell recomputed at that column’s WTI price and that row’s rate, never scaled from the base cell. Price columns are the fixed crude-oil grid, grid version 2026-09 (US$60–100); base case US$70 at 10%. A one-step (US$10/bbl) WTI move shifts NAV/share by US$9.73, or ~35%; the deck sensitivity is tabulated in Table 11.

Deck sensitivity — what one US$10/bbl step of WTI is worth. The grid above holds the recomputed values at each grid price; this table names the slope between them, so a reader who holds a different oil view can move the valuation themselves. Both reserve rows enter on the disclosure’s own linear price term and the midstream value is held, so the net-asset-value line is one slope across the whole grid; the reserve multiple is flat by construction, because a fixed booked volume at a fixed dollar per barrel does not care what the barrel sells for.

Table 11. Deck sensitivity — value per US$10/bbl step of WTI (US$/share unless stated; base rate, target multiples held)

Source: this analysis, Tables 8–10 and 18. % of base is each line’s per-step move divided by its own base-price value — a leverage read, and the reason free cash flow is the most oil-sensitive line on the page: at US$5.7 bn of annual capital and US$0.7 bn of preferred dividends against US$12.6 bn of EBITDA, the residual is what moves. Linear over is the WTI range on which the slope holds: ² FCF/share crosses zero at ~US$48.21/bbl, below the grid; ³ the scenario blend steps 13.29 → 14.76 → 16.52 → 18.47 because the three target multiples move with the column. Every step is the difference between two recomputed grid prices of Figure 8, never a scaled figure. Forward EBITDA moves US$2,860 m per step. How to use it: start from the base-price values (NAV/share US$27.95, blended fair value US$31.33) and add or subtract the per-step figure for every US$10/bbl of WTI away from US$70 — a US$85 flat deck gives a NAV/share of ~US$32.8 and a held-multiple blend of ~US$46.0; for a reading that also lets the multiples move with the cycle, use the scenario columns of Table 18.

P/NAV ladder (unweighted). The net asset value restated as a price map, straight off Figure 8’s base-rate row: for each of the five fixed P/NAV levels this series uses for producers and E&Ps, the share price it implies at every grid price — NAV/share at the deck × level, the base rate held. Read down a column for the deck you hold, across a row for the multiple you would pay; where today’s quote sits on the map is said once, by the market-implied deck in §7.5.

Table 12. P/NAV ladder — share price implied by each P/NAV level at each grid price (US$/share)

Source: this analysis, solved on Tables 8–10: each cell is the Figure 8 base-rate NAV/share at that column’s WTI price (18.22 / 27.95 / 37.67 / 47.40 / 57.12) × the row’s P/NAV level. The levels are fixed for the series (0.50× to 1.50× in quarter steps), so two producers can be read column-for-column; Occidental’s 0.78× target, derived in §7.3, reads US$21.80 at the base price, US$14.21 at US$60 and US$29.38 at US$80, between the 0.75× and 1.00× levels. Unweighted: it translates a multiple and a deck into a share price without reference to today’s quote, so the map stays readable as both move — parity at the base price is US$27.95, and the top of the map, 1.50× at US$100 oil, is US$85.68.

7.3 Relative valuation

At US$60.04 and 999.7 million shares outstanding, Occidental’s market capitalisation is ~US$60.0 billion and enterprise value ~US$67.6 billion on the company’s own net-principal-debt measure. This section values Occidental standalone: each target multiple is the fixed anchor for the E&P-producer archetype moved by the signed drivers this post’s own scorecard has already scored. No peer multiples are tabulated here — reading Occidental against the Section 2.9 peer set on observed multiples is the job of the sector comparison , on one shared basis. Forward metrics are struck on the next twelve months at the Q3 2026 guidance run-rate of 1,420 Mboe/d — the most recent guided period, and a better proxy for the forward year than the FY2026 guidance year, which is three-quarters elapsed. The US$70 base sits 11.5% below WTI’s five-year average of US$79.08 (September 2021–August 2026) — inside the ±25% band that marks a cycle extreme — so the subject is treated as near mid-cycle, and the scenarios in §7.6 flex the deck and the multiples together.

Table 13. Target-multiple driver line (one line, applied to every multiple)

Source: this analysis; each term is tied to one scored dimension, capped at ±10%, and no fact is charged under two labels. The driver set is the standard one — asset quality, cost position, reserves and replacement, balance sheet and capital allocation, jurisdiction; growth, management and ESG (Dims 4, 7 and 9) sit outside it and are scored in Section 9, which is why the preferred stock appears once, under the balance sheet, and not again. The one line is applied, unchanged, to every anchor:

Target P/NAV = 0.80× anchor × 0.98 = 0.784 → 0.78× · Target EV/EBITDA = 5.0× anchor × 0.98 = 4.900 → 4.9× · Target P/CF = 4.5× anchor × 0.98 = 4.410 → 4.4×. Rounded figures are the ones used in every table below. (The set-aside EV-per-proved-boe cross-check, §7.4, is struck at US$10.00 anchor × 0.98 = US$9.80 on the same line.)

Table 14. Forward EBITDA build — the next twelve months at the Q3 2026 guidance run-rate and the base deck

Source: this analysis; volumes and capital per the Q2 2026 results release of 5 August 2026; realisation percentages, unit costs, cost lines and the tax rate per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K . “Forward” is the next twelve months, struck on the Q3 2026 guidance run-rate rather than on the FY2026 guidance year, which is three-quarters elapsed; every trailing line sits on FY2025, the latest full reported year. Reconciliation: run at FY2025’s own net sales and cost lines, this build gives US$11,255 m, against US$11,255 m read from the income statement as pre-tax income plus depreciation, interest, impairments and acquisition costs, less interest and dividend income and asset-sale gains — an exact match, so the EBITDA definition is the same on both sides. Cost-basis note: the NAV rows use the reserve report’s own production costs with gathering and severance netted inside its price line, while this build states each cost line separately — a definition, not a gap.

Table 15. Relative valuation — implied value per share (base case)

Source: this analysis; archetype anchors (E&P: P/NAV 0.80×, EV/EBITDA 5.0×) per the valuation guide linked in §7, “The valuation toolkit”. The implied EV crosses the same claims as the NAV bridge — plus the US$4,553 m asset-retirement obligation, which the reserve report carries inside its development costs but EBITDA does not — and omits only the capitalised corporate overhead, which is already deducted inside the EBITDA build, and the equity-method investments, whose income is inside it too. The hedge line is zero on both sides, because the production book is unhedged. Values computed on unrounded inputs. To run the same reserve and cash-flow multiples across every North American upstream name, screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

The three reads do not agree, and the gap is the valuation: the two cash-flow legs land at US$38.52 (EV/EBITDA) and US$44.39 (P/CF) against the net asset value’s US$21.80 — a factor of about 1.8 to 2.0. It is the difference between capitalising one year of cash flow and discounting a finite, audited reserve book. The multiples see US$12.6 billion of EBITDA and US$10.2 billion of cash flow to common and apply mid-cycle anchors; the net asset value sees 4,603 mmboe that run 8.8 years at the guided rate, charges the US$25.1 billion of future development capital the reserve report schedules, and stops. Occidental spends US$5.7 billion a year — 45% of that EBITDA — to hold production flat, and the multiples charge none of it. That is the standard trap in valuing a high-decline shale-weighted producer on cash-flow multiples, and it is why the net asset value anchors the blend at 50% — while the price-to-cash-flow leg, which unlike the reserve read is not blind to the earnings the unbooked inventory throws off, does the work the dropped EV-per-proved-boe leg used to.

7.4 Set-aside cross-check — EV per proved boe (0% weight)

This read prices the booked reserve base at the archetype’s reserve anchor moved by the same driver line, and bridges it on the same claims. It is built but not weighted: the anchor is a 2P convention read on Occidental’s SEC-proved (1P) book, and — like the net asset value — it carries only the booked barrels, so weighting it would charge the unbooked-inventory omission (the n/d row in Table 8) a second time. It is dropped to a 0% cross-check per the load-bearing-gap rule and its weight moved to the price-to-cash-flow leg, which does see the cash that inventory generates. It is shown here because the number frames the disagreement with the market.

Table 16. EV per proved boe build — base case

Source: this analysis; reserves per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K supplemental oil and gas information; the bridge lines as Table 10. Basis note: the archetype’s reserve anchor is written for 2P reserves and this denominator is SEC proved (1P), the only category the filer publishes — so the method reads low by whatever the probable tranche is worth, and the unbooked inventory it cannot see is n/d in Table 8.

The read lands at US$19.19, well below the US$31.33 blend. It most sharply frames the disagreement with the market: at US$60.04 the shares carry US$14.69 per proved boe against that US$9.80 target — a 50% premium, and a reminder that on the booked barrels alone Occidental is not cheap. The reserve read is flat across the deck by construction: a fixed booked volume at a fixed dollar per barrel does not move, and with no hedge book there is nothing inside its bridge that does either — which, together with the double-counted inventory omission, is the second reason it stays a diagnostic rather than a weighted leg.

7.5 Cross-checks (unweighted)

Ten diagnostics locate the blend; none carries weight.

Table 17. Cross-checks — reported, reconciled, never weighted

Source: this analysis; the market-implied and flip prices solved on the Tables 8–16 model; reserve, cost and roll-forward figures per the Occidental FY2025 Form 10-K ; production guidance per the Q2 2026 results release ; WTI history per the U.S. EIA Cushing monthly series, five-year window September 2021–August 2026; the 2027 Brent forecast per the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook , August 2026; the trailing-multiple and dividend-yield series, consensus and analyst count per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026 on the 4 September close.

7.6 Scenarios & fair value

Every weighted method is re-run in every column of the WTI grid — the same five grid prices as Figure 8 and Table 11, so the whole section reads on one price axis. Each column is its own world, and Table 18 lists what changes in it above the values it produces: the deck moves one step at a time; because the base sits inside 25% of crude’s five-year average (§7.3) the subject is near mid-cycle, so the three target multiples step ×0.90 / — / ×1.10 / ×1.20 / ×1.30 with the deck; the discount rate steps out to 12% on the downside and holds at the 10% convention on the upside — a rate below the industry’s own floor would price an 8.8-year book as safer than the industry treats it at any price. The last memo row but one is the same blend with the multiples held at their targets, which is the linear version a reader can reproduce from Table 11.

Table 18. Scenarios & fair value — inputs, value per method and the blend by grid price (US$/share)

Source: this analysis; weights per §7.1, scenario names by offset from the base price — the base sits on the grid’s second column, so the scenario names read Bear through Extreme Bull. Base blend on a calculator: 0.50 × 21.7974 + 0.30 × 38.5156 + 0.20 × 44.3908 = 10.8987 + 11.5547 + 8.8782 = US$31.33. The unrounded method values are printed here because the blend is computed on them; the two-decimal figures in the rows above give the same US$31.33. Inputs behind the rows, by column: the flexed targets (P/NAV · EV/EBITDA · P/CF) 0.71× · 4.4× · 4.0× / 0.78× · 4.9× · 4.4× / 0.86× · 5.4× · 4.9× / 0.94× · 5.9× · 5.3× / 1.02× · 6.4× · 5.7× (the set-aside EV-per-boe target runs US$8.82 / 9.80 / 10.78 / 11.76 / 12.74); forward EBITDA US$9,757 m / 12,617 m / 15,477 m / 18,337 m / 21,198 m; cash tax US$491 m / 1,283 m / 2,075 m / 2,867 m / 3,659 m; capitalised corporate G&A US$2,601 m in the bear column and US$2,831 m elsewhere. The hedge mark is US$0.0 m in every column — not a held balance-sheet figure but a found zero, because the derivatives note shows no production hedges at all. Risk weights are 1.00 in every column: nothing the model values is pre-production. Illustrative scenarios, not forecasts.

Figure 9. Value per share by method and scenario

Source: Table 18; each cell recomputed at its column’s deck, rate and multiple flex, never scaled; data-level ranked 0–9 across the whole grid. The three weighted methods fan rather than cluster, and the fan is the finding: the EV/EBITDA read carries the steepest deck leverage because nothing stands between EBITDA and the equity except fixed claims; the net asset value sits lowest, because it alone charges the development capital and terminates at the end of the 8.8-year book; and the price-to-cash-flow read sits between them, because it capitalises the cash the whole business throws off this year — booked and unbooked alike — at a below-market multiple. Current share price US$60.04 (4 Sep 2026); market-implied deck ~US$99.45/bbl WTI. The bracketed figure under each value is its change against the same row’s base-case value.

Conclusion. The blended base-case fair value is US$31.33, inside a US$18.04 (Bear, US$60) – US$81.08 (Extreme Bull, US$100) range, against a US$60.04 price — an implied −47.8%, Overvalued, published as Overvalued “(wide band)” because the bear-column blend sits 70% below the price. Rating-flip price: the base blend crosses up into Modestly overvalued at a flat ~US$80.97/bbl WTI, +16% above the base deck and near crude’s five-year average; there is no band below Overvalued, so no downward flip price is printed. At the base price the forward-year free cash flow of US$4,506 m attributable to the common — after all capital and the preferred coupon — is a 7.4% yield on the US$60.0 bn market capitalisation, which is the strongest single number on the page and the reason the price-to-cash-flow leg is the highest of the three.

The three weighted methods do not cluster, and the spread is explained rather than averaged away: the two cash-flow legs (EV/EBITDA US$38.52 and P/CF US$44.39) run 1.8–2.0× the net asset value (US$21.80) because they capitalise one guided run-rate and charge neither the US$25.1 billion of scheduled development capital nor the fact that the booked base runs 8.8 years. The net asset value anchors the blend at 50% for that reason; the price-to-cash-flow leg replaces the old EV-per-proved-boe leg, which is set aside to a 0% cross-check (§7.4) because a 1P read at a 2P anchor would charge the unbooked-inventory omission the net asset value already carries a second time.

The framing that matters is not that Occidental is a poor business — the deleveraging genuinely improved it. Principal debt is at a seven-year low, annualised interest is down about US$630 million, the second quarter produced US$3.0 billion of free cash flow and beat guidance on volumes, reserve replacement was 107% organic and the recycle ratio 2.11×. It is what the price requires: the producing reserve base plus the midstream business and the whole bridge is worth US$23.62/share, the booked undeveloped tranche another US$4.33 — and a buyer at US$60.04 is paying a US$32 premium to both for WTI at ~US$100 held flat in perpetuity, at a moment when the EIA expects Brent back at US$69 in 2027.

Three things could close much of that gap honestly, and all three are named rather than modelled because none is a disclosed line this section can price: the drilling inventory beyond proved reserves, carried at US$10,211 million net of its valuation allowance (US$10.09/share); the midstream and marketing franchise, worth US$7.61/share more at an infrastructure convention than at the producer multiple used here; and the Stratos direct-air-capture venture, which the model carries at nothing against US$1.2 billion of construction in progress. Add all three in full and the read moves roughly one band, not four. Berkshire’s own 26.9% position and the Street’s US$67.08 target underwrite far more than that. Occidental is a materially better company than it was two years ago; on this model it is not a materially cheaper share. This is an analytical read of price against value, not a recommendation.

Assumptions box: valuation date 7 September 2026; balance sheet as of 30 June 2026 for net debt, working capital and shares, 31 December 2025 for the reserves, the standardized measure, the provisions and the segment lines; horizon spot fair value. USD throughout — trading currency = model currency, no FX. Price decks: base WTI US$70/bbl (the 12-month trailing average of US$75.87 to end-August 2026, leaned to the lower price of the fixed grid because the window carries the March–May 2026 Hormuz spike; 3-month US$83.06, 6-month US$90.50), run across the US$60–100 grid, version 2026-09, with the base on the grid’s second column; the EIA’s US$69/bbl Brent forecast for 2027 as a 0% cross-check — no spot deck is carried. Realisations are the company’s own disclosed percentages — oil 100% of WTI, NGLs 32% of WTI, domestic gas 45% of NYMEX at a US$3.00/MMBtu base, international gas held at its contractual US$1.89/Mcf — so oil and NGLs move with the grid and gas is held; constant-price, unescalated deck and costs, matching the SEC reserve convention, so the 10% rate is real. Discount rate 10% — the E&P convention for a high-decline shale-weighted base with an 8.8-year proved life — sensitised 8–12% on the reserve rows and the capitalised overhead; no jurisdiction premium (Dim 8 ★★★★, 84% United States, so the band is +0%; the international contract risk is charged in the driver line’s Dim 8 term instead, never twice). Share basis 1,011.6 m fully diluted on the treasury-stock method (999.7 m basic, 1.19% apart); values per share to two decimals, multiples to two significant figures, on unrounded inputs. Cycle: base 11.5% below the five-year average of US$79.08 (Sep 2021–Aug 2026), inside ±25%, so deck and multiples flex together across the scenario columns; anchors E&P P/NAV 0.80×, EV/EBITDA 5.0×, P/CF 4.5× (set-aside EV per reserve boe US$10.00) per the valuation guide linked in §7, one driver line (×0.98); metric basis forward on the Q3 2026 guidance run-rate of 1,420 Mboe/d, the twelve-month window Q4 2026–Q3 2027 — the next twelve months rather than the three-quarters-elapsed FY2026 guidance year; EBITDA before all capital and after selling, general and administrative expense; P/CF numerator forward operating cash flow to common (EBITDA less cash interest, cash tax and the preferred coupon); net debt on the company’s own principal measure, leases excluded and charged in costs; P/NAV form equity (market cap ÷ equity NAV); no peer multiples enter this section. Method weights NAV 50% / EV/EBITDA 30% / P/CF 20%, with EV per proved boe set aside to a 0% cross-check — a stated deviation from the E&P default, because a 1P reserve read at a 2P anchor inherits the unbooked-inventory omission the NAV already carries, so its weight moves to a price-to-cash-flow leg that does see the inventory’s earnings (the load-bearing-gap re-weight). Input families: intrinsic 50% (at the single-method cap), cash-flow 50% (EV/EBITDA + P/CF, at the collinear-pair cap). NAV provenance: the FY2025 after-tax standardized measure apportioned on its own filed volumes and a price set built from the disclosed realisation percentages that rebuilds the filed future cash inflows to 1.9%, moved to the deck on a term calibrated to the company’s own published US$1/bbl pre-tax cash sensitivity; the midstream segment at its filed result plus derived segment depreciation, at the group target multiple; tax basis the SEC schedule (basis 3) with a 27.7% blended statutory rate on the increment; abandonment inside the reserve report, the environmental estate from the statements’ own provision. Primary value yardstick P/NAV (equity form). Stage-risk placement n/a — no pre-production asset the model values; every row at 1.00. Known data gaps: (1) drilling inventory beyond proved reserves n/d — Occidental publishes no US location count, type curve or inventory life, so the row cannot be built; net asset value understated, bounded at US$10,211 m (US$10.09/share) by net unproved property, and closed by the company’s investor presentation. This is a load-bearing gap — the bound is 36% of NAV/share, well above the 15% threshold — so the run does not ship the net asset value at its default weight: the EV-per-proved-boe leg, which reads the booked base only and inherits the same omission, is dropped to a 0% cross-check and its weight redistributed to a price-to-cash-flow leg that does see the cash the inventory generates (the load-bearing-gap re-weight); the inventory row itself stays n/d, bounded here, pending the presentation; (2) the Stratos venture’s offtake economics and capital to complete are n/d, so the low-carbon tranche is carried at nothing against US$1.2 bn of construction in progress — net asset value understated, closed by a 1PointFive project economics disclosure; (3) the abandonment component of the reserve report’s US$25,085 m of future development costs is not footnoted, so the balance sheet’s US$4,553 m obligation stands in for it and is split on boe volumes — direction indeterminate, bounded by the provision itself; (4) the remaining count of US$22.00 common stock warrants at 30 June 2026 is not in the source set and is derived from the 31 December 2025 count less the warrant share of first-half issuance — a ±5 m error moves NAV/share by about US$0.09, closed by the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q; (5) the three-year finding-and-development series behind the recycle ratio is not in the source set, so that cross-check is struck on FY2025 alone; (6) NGLs are a co-product at 11.9% of forward hydrocarbon revenue (US$2,639 m of US$22,270 m) but are moved at a fixed 32% of WTI rather than on their own Mont Belvieu deck with a co-product deck-sensitivity row on its own deck, because no NGL price series is in the source set — direction indeterminate, bounded by the spread between the 32% ratio and a trailing Mont Belvieu average, closed by an NGL price series; (7) the 30 June 2026 balance-sheet-face and share-count lines are cited to an aggregator (stockanalysis.com) — the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q is the primary source for those lines and closes both this and gap (4). Gaps (1) and (2) both point the same way — the model is conservative — and together they are the largest single reason the market-implied deck sits where it does. To run the same net asset value and multiples across every North American upstream name, screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Occidental’s forward upside over the next two to three years is mostly already in motion — the job is to finish the balance-sheet repair and prove the carbon business, not to chase volume. The most material positives are structural, not speculative.

Table 19. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Source: Occidental Q2 2026 results release of 5 August 2026 and the FY2025 Form 10-K ; timing reflects company guidance and is not guaranteed.

The common thread is balance-sheet-driven catalysts: Occidental does not need higher oil to deleverage or to start Stratos — a firm tape simply accelerates both and brings forward buybacks. The one catalyst a reader should discount, though, is the preferred, which is not on a near-term glide path: Occidental cannot voluntarily redeem it before August 2029, and the mandatory trigger requires common distributions above US$4.00 per share on a trailing twelve-month basis against a current US$1.12 dividend. The swing factor is execution and the oil price, not access to capital.

9. Rating & verdict

Occidental is scored on the Metal Pilot Company Scorecard — the same nine dimensions, on the same ★1–5 scale, that every US upstream name in the series is scored on, so the peers are directly comparable. Each star is relative to the large-cap US oil-weighted E&P peer set declared in Section 2.9 and substantiated below.

Table 20. The Occidental scorecard

Source: the Metal Pilot Company Scorecard; evidence in Sections 2–7. Peer basis: large-cap US oil-weighted independent E&Ps (COP, EOG, FANG, DVN), declared in Section 2.9. Rows are ordered by weight, descending.

Weighted average = 0.15 × (4 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 3) + 0.0625 × (4 + 4 + 4 + 4) = 2.70 + 1.00 = 3.70/5 → the published ★★★★ (3.7), Solid.

The two-axis verdict. Quality Solid (★★★★, 3.7/5) × Value Overvalued (wide band) → full: the market already sees it, and then some. The quality axis is genuinely high on the assets and the carbon platform — a large, oil-weighted Permian core, a high-margin Gulf of America leg, a differentiated DAC option no peer can match, and a balance sheet transformed in eighteen months — but it is held out of the high-quality band by the two ★★★ dimensions that define Occidental’s story: the heaviest capital structure among the large-caps, where US$8.5 billion of 8% preferred cannot be voluntarily retired before August 2029, and a capital-allocation record still shadowed by Anadarko. The value axis is where the analysis parts company with the market: at US$60.04 the shares trade at 2.15× the model’s net asset value, an implied −47.8% against the US$31.33 base-case blend, and discount a flat WTI price of roughly US$100 a barrel — 26% above crude’s own five-year average. That gap is not all mispricing; US$10.09 a share of unbooked inventory, US$7.61 of midstream re-rating and an unpriced direct-air-capture option are real things the model does not carry, and together they would move the read about one band. They would not close it. The thing that tips the verdict is therefore not the assets — those are settled and improving — but whether a reader is willing to underwrite an oil deck the audited reserve report does not contain. This is an analytical read, not a recommendation.

For how Occidental compares head-to-head with the other largest US upstream oil producers on one shared construction, see US Large-Cap Upstream Oil Producers Compared (2026) .

To go from this single-name view to the whole peer group — screening every US upstream E&P on production, cost, reserve life, net debt and free-cash-flow yield — explore Metal Pilot.

10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Company fundamentals, structure, reserves, the standardized measure, per-unit results, segment results and the derivatives, provisions and preferred-stock notes are from Occidental Petroleum Corporation — Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025, filed 18 February 2026. Post-year-end movement — production, principal debt, cash, the dividend, interest reduction and 2026 guidance — is from the second-quarter 2026 results release of 5 August 2026. Berkshire Hathaway’s 26.9% common holding is from Berkshire’s own Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 March 2026. Market data (US$60.04, 999.7 million shares, ~US$60.0 billion market capitalisation), the five-year financial and ratio series and analyst figures (25-analyst consensus target US$67.08, Buy) are as of the 4 September 2026 close per stockanalysis.com , read 7 September 2026. WTI history and the trailing averages are the U.S. EIA Cushing monthly spot series to end-August 2026; the 2027 Brent forecast is the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook of August 2026.

The valuation blends three value-per-share methods — a sum-of-the-parts net asset value (50%), EV/EBITDA (30%) and price to cash flow (20%), each charging the US$8.5 billion Berkshire preferred (the enterprise bridges at face, the cash-flow leg at the coupon), with EV per proved boe set aside to a 0% cross-check because a 1P read at a 2P anchor inherits the unbooked-inventory omission the net asset value already carries — and is reproducible from Tables 6–18. It is struck in US dollars on a base deck of WTI US$70/bbl and Henry Hub US$3.00/MMBtu, run across the fixed US$60–100 crude grid (version 2026-09) at a 10% discount rate, and returns Overvalued (wide band) on a base-case blend of US$31.33 against the US$60.04 price. The audited FY2025 statements and their notes are in hand, so the run is on a single vintage; the second-quarter 2026 balance-sheet detail comes from a standardized data provider rather than the Form 10-Q, and the remaining count of US$22.00 warrants at 30 June 2026 is the one derived share-count input. Two documents would close the open gaps: the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q, and an investor presentation carrying a US drilling-location count and type curve, which is what the model needs to price the inventory beyond proved reserves. Every gap is registered in §7.6’s assumptions box with its direction and bound. The asset map is omitted deliberately — a multi-region footprint plus a single DAC site does not render as a legible proportional-symbol map, so the segment split in §2.2 carries the geography — and §2.9’s peer table carries approximate mid-2026 figures for the four comparators, flagged as such. Data as of 7 September 2026; refreshed on each annual report and on material events.

Re-run log. 7 September 2026 — full refresh against the FY2025 Form 10-K and the Q2 2026 results. The market layer moved to the 4 September close (US$60.04) and the balance sheet to 30 June 2026 (net principal debt US$7.6 bn, from US$10.5 bn at the prior read). Section 7 was rebuilt on the current valuation module: the net asset value runs on the audited standardized measure apportioned by reserve tranche, the midstream business enters as its own tranche, the preferred is charged at face in every bridge, and the base deck is the twelve-month WTI trailing average snapped to the fixed grid. Net effect: NAV/share US$27.95, base blend US$26.16, read Overvalued (wide band). The preferred’s redemption terms were corrected to the Form 10-K’s own wording. 9 September 2026 — re-weight against version 51 of the valuation module: the unbooked-inventory n/d row was scored load-bearing (bound 36% of NAV/share, above the 15% threshold), so the EV-per-proved-boe leg was dropped to a 0% set-aside cross-check and its weight redistributed to a price-to-cash-flow leg at the 4.4× target and to the net asset value (NAV 50% / EV-EBITDA 30% / P/CF 20%), per the module’s load-bearing-gap re-weight. Net effect: base blend US$26.16 → US$31.33, market-implied deck ~US$114.75 → ~US$99.45/bbl, read unchanged at Overvalued (wide band). The rate sentence’s “standardized-measure” clause (flagged by the prelaunch check) was struck, the development tier corrected to US$4.33, the net-working-capital sign moved to the operator column, and NGL co-product and Q2 10-Q gaps were flagged. Provenance: Occidental Petroleum Corporation — Form 10-K — fiscal year 2025.

10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice; do your own research or consult a licensed advisor. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 7 September 2026 — share prices, multiples, analyst targets and the valuation read move, and figures are estimates as of the stated date. The two-axis verdict is an analytical read of quality and price, not a personal buy or sell instruction. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from Occidental’s filings and market data and reviewed, but readers should verify before acting. The author holds no position in Occidental Petroleum as of the date of writing.