Natural Gas — A Complete Market Guide (2026)
Data as of 8 October 2026. Market structure is shown for full-year 2025, the latest complete year, from the Energy Institute (EI) Statistical Review 2026, the U.S. EIA, OPEC, the IEA, the GECF and companies’ 2025 annual filings. Prices are quoted in US dollars as full-year and multi-year averages, not a single day’s snapshot, so this report stays useful over time. Since the end of February 2026 the war in the Gulf has all but closed the Strait of Hormuz to LNG carriers — a live, unresolved disruption that this guide treats only in clearly labelled asides. The guide is refreshed once a year, after EI’s Statistical Review is published each June. Every figure is traced to its source in the register at the end (Section 7.1). This report is for information only and was prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.
Natural gas is the swing fuel of the power grid — it heats homes, fires industry and, in much of the world, sets the price of the marginal megawatt-hour. Unlike oil it has no single world price: the natural gas market is three regional markets, stitched together by a fleet of LNG tankers that now carries more inter-regional gas than pipelines do. This report is the free, big-picture primer on how that market works — where gas comes from, who burns it, how it is priced and stored, and which forces move it. For the company-level data behind the story — every gas producer screened by production, reserves and cost — go to Metal Pilot’s natural gas stock screener.
TL;DR & Key Takeaways
The world produced about 4,196 bcm (billion cubic metres) of natural gas in 2025 and consumed about 4,186 bcm, both up 1.6% on the year. In the same year a unit of gas cost about $3.5/MMBtu at Henry Hub in Louisiana and $11.9 at the Dutch TTF hub — a threefold gap that is the whole economics of the LNG trade.
- What it is: mostly methane, burned for power (about 41% of use), industry and heating, and a feedstock for fertiliser and chemicals. Burned, it emits less than half the CO₂ of coal per kWh; leaked, methane is a potent greenhouse gas — the core of the ESG debate.
- Who supplies it: the United States (≈1,074 bcm, 26%) leads, then Russia (≈609), Iran (≈265), China (≈264) and Canada (≈206); those five pump 58% of the world’s gas.
- Who uses it: the United States (≈913 bcm), Russia (≈480) and China (≈442) top the list; growth is in Asia and the Middle East, while Europe uses about a sixth less than in 2015.
- How it moves: gas is a regional commodity. LNG — gas chilled to a liquid and shipped — carried 578 bcm of exports in 2025 and is now 55% of inter-regional trade; the US, Qatar and Australia each ship more than 100 bcm.
- What drives the price: weather and storage first, regional supply shocks second, the macro cycle a distant third. Henry Hub’s monthly moves are almost uncorrelated with oil, equities or the dollar (Section 4.3).
- The biggest swing factor: a record wave of LNG export capacity due by 2030 — now delayed by the 2026 Gulf war, which cut off the Qatari and Emirati cargoes that supplied about a fifth of world LNG.
Numbers to remember: world production ≈ 4,196 bcm (2025) · Henry Hub ≈ $3.52/MMBtu (2025 avg; $3.72 over 2021–25) · TTF ≈ $11.89 and JKM ≈ $12.16 (2025 avg) · top producer United States ≈ 1,074 bcm · top consumer United States ≈ 913 bcm · LNG exports ≈ 578 bcm · ≈ 20% of LNG transits the Strait of Hormuz · proved reserves ≈ 220 Tcm, about 51 years of output.
Figure 1. Natural gas at a glance, 2025
Notes to Figure 1
- World production (Table 10) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Production in billion cubic metres | “Total World” 4,196.5, 2025 | p.47.
- World consumption (Table 10) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Consumption in billion cubic metres | “Total World” 4,186.0, 2025 | p.49.
- LNG exports (Table 13) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: LNG exports | “Total LNG exports” 578.5, 2025 | p.53. Gross trade including re-exports.
- Top producer, US share (Table 8) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Production in billion cubic metres | “US” 1,073.7 and printed “Share 2025” 25.6% | p.47.
- Top consumer (Table 5) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Consumption in billion cubic metres | “US” 913.4, 2025 | p.49.
- Proved reserves (Table 9) — Filed | OPEC ASB 2026 | Table 9.1 | “Total world” 220,307 bn s cu m, end-2025 | p.76. Years of output = reserves ÷ 2025 marketed production in OPEC’s Table 9.2 (“Total world” 4,341,517 million s cu m, p.77), computed here.
- Henry Hub (Table 3) — Market | U.S. EIA | “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price” (RNGWHHD), annual | 2025.
- TTF (Table 2) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Prices | “Netherlands TTF” 11.89, 2025 | p.51.
- JKM (Table 2) — Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Prices | “Japan Korea Marker (Platts JKM)” 12.16, 2025 | p.51.
Figure data: the tables named in each note — EI’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 for volumes and the TTF and JKM averages, the U.S. EIA Henry Hub spot price series for Henry Hub, and OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin 2026 for reserves. Volumes rounded to whole bcm. EI and OPEC measure gas on different standard bases (Section 7.1), so the reserve life is computed on OPEC’s figures alone.
Why it matters now: gas sits at the centre of the energy-security and energy-transition debates at once — the fuel that balances wind and solar and replaced coal in many power systems, and the import that left Europe exposed in 2022 and Asia exposed in 2026. Historically it has done best in cold winters and supply shocks rather than in any phase of the business cycle (Section 4.3); the company-level screens are linked in Sections 3.1 and 6.
How to read this guide: new to natural gas? Read straight through from Section 1. Here for the investment case? Jump to Section 4 — how to own it (and why gas ETFs decay), how to screen producers, and what moves the price. Every technical term is defined in the Terms list at the end. Crude oil, gas’s geological sibling, has its own guide.
1. Natural gas & the market basics
1.1 What natural gas is — physical basics & quality
Natural gas is a naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbon gases, predominantly methane (CH₄), with varying amounts of ethane, propane, butane and impurities. It is valued for energy delivered with relatively little carbon: in the United States in 2023, gas-fired power emitted 0.96 lb of CO₂ per kWh against 2.31 lb for coal (U.S. EIA, “How much carbon dioxide is produced per kilowatthour of U.S. electricity generation?”, table “CO₂ emissions from U.S. utility-scale electricity generation, 2023”, “pounds per kWh” column). It is burned for power, industrial heat and space heating, and used as the feedstock for ammonia fertiliser and petrochemicals. Its great handicap is physical: gas is bulky, so for most of its history it has been a regional commodity tied to fixed pipelines — a constraint that liquefied natural gas is steadily eroding.
A few terms define gas quality and form, and each recurs throughout this guide:
- Dry vs. wet gas — dry gas is almost pure methane; wet gas carries natural gas liquids (NGLs) — ethane, propane and butane — that are stripped out at a processing plant and sold separately.
- Conventional vs. unconventional — conventional gas flows from porous, permeable reservoirs under its own pressure; unconventional gas — shale gas, tight gas (in low-permeability sandstone) and coalbed methane — is locked in rock that does not flow freely and is released by horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”).
- Associated vs. non-associated — associated gas is produced alongside oil from oil wells; non-associated gas comes from fields drilled for gas. Associated gas responds to the oil price, not the gas price.
- LNG — natural gas cooled to about −162 °C (−260 °F), at which it becomes a liquid about 600 times smaller in volume, so it can be shipped by tanker and warmed back into gas at the destination (U.S. EIA, “Liquefied natural gas explained”).
- Sour gas — gas carrying hydrogen sulphide or CO₂ that must be removed (“sweetened”) before sale.
The value chain. Gas moves along one main path — exploration and production → gathering and processing → transport by pipeline or, across oceans, liquefaction, shipping and regasification → storage → distribution → the end user. LNG is the link that turns regional gas into a globally traded commodity.
Figure 2. The natural gas value chain, wellhead to burner tip
Chart source: this guide — a conceptual diagram of the standard gas chain; it shows stages, not measured quantities, and folds processing into production (described below).
From wellhead to pipeline-quality gas. Raw gas is rarely ready to burn. Gathering lines collect it from the wells — non-associated gas from gas wells, associated gas from oil wells — and feed a processing plant, where it is dehydrated (so it cannot freeze or corrode a pipeline), sweetened (hydrogen sulphide and CO₂ removed) and stripped of its NGLs, which a fractionation unit splits into ethane, propane and butane. What remains is dry gas at pipeline specification. To cross an ocean, that gas is chilled in a liquefaction train (one processing line of an LNG plant), shipped as LNG and warmed back to gas at a regasification terminal. Processing is the quiet step that turns a messy wellhead stream into the clean, tradable molecule the rest of the chain assumes.
1.2 Units & measurement conventions
Gas is measured by volume and by energy, and this guide states both. By volume, the metric world — and the Energy Institute, the source of most country figures here — uses cubic metres, scaling to bcm (billion m³) and Tcm (trillion m³). The US industry uses cubic feet (cf), scaling to Mcf, MMcf, Bcf and Tcf under the oil-and-gas convention in which M = thousand and MM = million (Roman numerals) — so MMcf is million cubic feet, never thousand. By energy, gas is priced per MMBtu (million British thermal units). LNG is also counted in tonnes: plants are rated in Mtpa, million tonnes per year. Companies that produce oil and gas together convert on energy content into barrels of oil equivalent (boe) — 6,000 cf per boe for most US filers, 5,800 for Shell.
Gas figures split into flows and stocks, and the two are never mixed:
- Flow — a quantity per year or per day: production (≈4,196 bcm/yr), consumption, LNG exports, US demand (≈92 Bcf/d in 2025).
- Stock — a level at a point in time: proved reserves (≈220 Tcm at end-2025) and gas in storage (US working gas peaked at 3,950 Bcf in November 2025).
Table 1. Natural gas units and conversions
| Unit | Meaning | Typical magnitude | Conversion | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bcm | Billion cubic metres | Country flows (US 1,074 in 2025) | 1 bcm ≈ 35.3 Bcf ≈ 0.735 Mt LNG | Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Approximate conversion factors | “1 billion m³ NG” | p.83 |
| Tcm | Trillion cubic metres | Reserves (world ≈ 220) | 1 Tcm = 1,000 bcm | Input | SI prefixes |
| Mcf / Bcf / Tcf | Thousand / billion / trillion cubic feet | US demand ≈ 92 Bcf/d | 1 Bcf ≈ 0.028 bcm | Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Approximate conversion factors | “1 billion ft³ NG” | p.83 |
| Bcf/d | Billion cubic feet per day | Basin and LNG flows | 1 Bcf/d ≈ 10.3 bcm a year | Derived | × 365 ÷ 35.315 |
| MMBtu | Million British thermal units | Henry Hub priced per MMBtu | 1 Mcf ≈ 1.036 MMBtu | Filed | U.S. EIA Units and calculators | Examples of converting energy sources | “1.036 million Btu per thousand cubic feet” |
| Mt LNG | Million tonnes of LNG | Plant ratings in Mtpa | 1 Mt LNG ≈ 1.36 bcm ≈ 48 Bcf | Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Approximate conversion factors | “1 million tonnes LNG” | p.83 |
| boe | Barrel of oil equivalent | Mixed oil & gas output | 6,000 cf ≈ 1 boe (Shell: 5,800) | Filed | XOM 10-K FY2025 | Item 2 | “six billion cubic feet per one million barrels” | p.9 Filed | Shell 20-F 2025 | Glossary | “a factor of 5,800 scf per barrel” | p.10 |
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026, “Approximate conversion factors — Natural gas (NG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG)”, rows “1 billion m³ NG” (35.315 billion ft³; 0.735 million tonnes LNG), “1 billion ft³ NG” (0.028 billion m³) and “1 million tonnes LNG” (1.360 billion m³; 48.028 billion ft³) — p.83. Heat content per U.S. EIA, Units and calculators explained. Gas-to-oil conventions as stated in ExxonMobil’s 2025 Form 10-K and Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F. The Bcf/d factor is arithmetic on EI’s 35.315. Magnitudes from Tables 8, 9 and 17.
Intuition anchor: one Henry Hub futures contract is 10,000 MMBtu — roughly the gas in 10 MMcf (NYMEX Rulebook, chapter 220, Rule 220102.B). The United States alone burned about 92 Bcf a day in 2025 — some 9,200 contracts’ worth every day (U.S. EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, sheet 5atab, “Total consumption” NGTCPUS, mean of the twelve 2025 months, 91.96 Bcf/d, computed here).
1.3 Pricing & benchmarks
Gas is the most regional of the major commodities, and three hubs dominate. Henry Hub — a pipeline interconnect in Louisiana and the delivery point of the NYMEX futures contract — is the US benchmark, priced in $/MMBtu. The TTF (Title Transfer Facility), a virtual trading point on the Dutch grid quoted in euros per megawatt-hour, is Europe’s benchmark. The JKM (Japan Korea Marker), a Platts assessment of spot LNG delivered to North Asia, is Asia’s. Much LNG still moves under long-term contracts indexed to crude oil (oil-indexed) rather than to a gas hub (hub-indexed), so the average price Japan pays for imported LNG is a fourth reference.
Two features set gas pricing apart. Storage and weather dominate the short term: a cold winter drains inventories and the price spikes, which is why the U.S. EIA’s weekly storage report, released every Thursday, moves the US market. And the spread between regions is the economics of LNG: in 2025 Henry Hub averaged about $3.5/MMBtu while TTF and JKM averaged about $11.9–12.2 — a gap that pays for liquefaction, shipping and regasification and still leaves a margin.
Table 2. Natural gas pricing benchmarks, 2025 and 2021–25 averages
| Benchmark | What it prices | Pricing point | 2025 average | 2021–25 average |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Henry Hub 1 | US pipeline gas | Erath, Louisiana (NYMEX) | $3.53/MMBtu | $3.70/MMBtu |
| TTF 2 | North-west European gas | Netherlands virtual hub (ICE Endex) | $11.89/MMBtu | $17.68/MMBtu |
| UK NBP | British grid gas | National Balancing Point (virtual) | $11.65/MMBtu | $14.93/MMBtu |
| JKM | Spot LNG into North Asia | Japan / Korea, delivered | $12.16/MMBtu | $18.08/MMBtu |
| Japan LNG (cif) 3 | LNG imported by Japan, mostly term contracts | Japan, delivered | $11.12/MMBtu | $12.56/MMBtu |
Notes to Table 2
- EI’s Henry Hub series is an S&P Global assessment from 2005; the U.S. EIA’s spot series, used in Table 3, gives $3.52 for 2025.
- TTF and NBP trade in their own units (euros per megawatt-hour; pence per therm); EI prints them converted to US dollars per MMBtu.
- The average cost of all LNG landed in Japan, cif (cost, insurance and freight); because most cargoes are on oil-indexed term contracts, it moves more slowly than the spot JKM — in 2022 it averaged $16.86 against JKM’s $33.98.
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026, “Natural gas: Prices”, columns “US Henry Hub”, “Netherlands TTF”, “UK NBP”, “Japan Korea Marker (Platts JKM)” and “Japan” (LNG, cif), rows 2021–2025 — p.51; the same values in the 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas Prices”. EI credits S&P Global Energy and, for earlier years, ICIS Heren and the U.S. EIA. The 2021–25 averages are the means of the five printed annual values, computed here. Pricing points per the NYMEX Rulebook, chapter 220 (Rule 220101, “Sabine Pipe Line LLC near Erath, Louisiana”; not saved — CME blocks scripted downloads) and the ICE Endex Dutch TTF Gas Futures specification (“Title Transfer Facility (TTF) Virtual Trading Point”; “Euros and Euro cents per MWh”).
The long-run US price story is a structural collapse driven by shale. Henry Hub averaged $8.69/MMBtu in 2005 and $8.86 in 2008, when the market feared scarcity; once horizontal drilling and fracking unlocked shale gas it fell and stayed low, averaging $2.75 by 2012 and $3.18 over 2016–2025. The 2022 energy crisis lifted it to $6.45, and the 2024 glut pushed it to $2.19 — in inflation-adjusted terms the lowest annual average in the U.S. EIA’s series, which begins in 1997 — before it recovered to $3.52 in 2025 as US LNG exports rose. Europe and Asia tell a different story: their prices track the cost of imported gas, so they sit far above Henry Hub and spike when supply to their region is cut.
Table 3. Annual average natural gas prices, 2000–2025
| Year | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Henry Hub (U.S. EIA) 1 | $4.31/MMBtu | $3.96/MMBtu | $3.38/MMBtu | $5.47/MMBtu | $5.89/MMBtu | $8.69/MMBtu | $6.73/MMBtu | $6.97/MMBtu | $8.86/MMBtu | $3.94/MMBtu | $4.37/MMBtu | $4.00/MMBtu | $2.75/MMBtu |
| TTF (EI) 2 | — | — | — | — | — | $5.81/MMBtu | $7.26/MMBtu | $5.90/MMBtu | $10.67/MMBtu | $4.91/MMBtu | $6.69/MMBtu | $9.18/MMBtu | $9.37/MMBtu |
| UK NBP (EI) | $2.71/MMBtu | $3.17/MMBtu | $2.37/MMBtu | $3.33/MMBtu | $4.46/MMBtu | $7.11/MMBtu | $7.49/MMBtu | $5.98/MMBtu | $10.66/MMBtu | $4.79/MMBtu | $6.52/MMBtu | $9.00/MMBtu | $9.42/MMBtu |
| Japan LNG, cif (EI) | $4.48/MMBtu | $4.39/MMBtu | $4.09/MMBtu | $4.57/MMBtu | $4.94/MMBtu | $5.79/MMBtu | $6.87/MMBtu | $7.49/MMBtu | $12.21/MMBtu | $8.80/MMBtu | $10.54/MMBtu | $14.37/MMBtu | $16.17/MMBtu |
| Year | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Henry Hub (U.S. EIA) 1 | 3.73 | 4.37 | 2.62 | 2.52 | 2.99 | 3.15 | 2.56 | 2.03 | 3.89 | 6.45 | 2.53 | 2.19 | 3.52 |
| TTF (EI) 2 | 10.52 | 8.11 | 6.45 | 4.53 | 5.71 | 7.88 | 4.46 | 3.13 | 15.67 | 37.09 | 12.87 | 10.89 | 11.89 |
| UK NBP (EI) | 10.60 | 8.22 | 6.52 | 4.65 | 5.78 | 7.97 | 4.46 | 3.17 | 15.45 | 24.55 | 12.30 | 10.69 | 11.65 |
| Japan LNG, cif (EI) | 15.54 | 15.74 | 10.12 | 6.77 | 7.85 | 9.74 | 9.75 | 7.64 | 9.90 | 16.86 | 13.24 | 11.69 | 11.12 |
Notes to Table 3
- The U.S. EIA’s downloadable annual file has no 2013 value; 3.73 is the mean of the daily series for 2013, which matches the annual series in every year from 2012 to 2025. Before 2009 the U.S. EIA’s annual figures differ from a simple mean of its daily prices (2005: 8.69 annual against 8.95 daily), so the annual series is used throughout.
- EI’s TTF series starts in 2005; NBP, the older British hub, covers Europe before then.
Source: Henry Hub from the U.S. EIA, Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, annual (RNGWHHD), every year 2000–2025, US dollars per MMBtu; 2013 from the daily series, mean of 2013’s trading days, computed here. TTF, NBP and Japan LNG from the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheet “Gas Prices”, columns “Netherlands TTF”, “UK NBP” and “Japan”, 2000–2025; the PDF prints the same columns (p.51). Calendar-year averages, not spot quotes. The inflation-adjusted comparison in the text deflates the U.S. EIA annual series by the annual average of FRED CPIAUCSL to 2025 dollars, computed here: 2024 is $2.25, 2020 $2.52.
Figure 3. Regional gas prices diverged after the shale boom, 2000–2025
Figure data: Table 3. Henry Hub is the U.S. EIA series; TTF (from 2005), Japan LNG and NBP (gray) are EI’s. Each coloured line prints its 2025 value.
Live 2026 aside. The Gulf war has reopened the regional gap. TTF averaged $25.42/MMBtu in September 2026, against $11.76 in January, while Henry Hub averaged $2.95 (World Bank, Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), monthly, sheet “Monthly Prices”, columns “Natural gas, Europe” and “Natural gas, US”). The structural picture in this guide describes the market before the disruption.
2. Supply, demand & the market balance
This is the physical market: where gas sits in the ground, who burns it, who produces it, how the two balance region by region, how supply is structured, how it crosses borders, who coordinates it and how it is stored.
2.1 Where gas is produced — basins & fields
Gas production has been transformed by unconventional rock. The single biggest change of the century is the US shale revolution: horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing of the Marcellus and Utica shales in Appalachia and the Haynesville in Louisiana and Texas, plus the associated gas that comes with oil from the Permian, turned the United States into the world’s largest producer. Elsewhere, supply concentrates in giant conventional fields — the North Field, shared by Qatar and Iran (where it is called South Pars) and the largest gas reservoir known; Russia’s West Siberian fields; Norway’s Troll; Australia’s offshore North West Shelf — and in tight-gas plays such as Canada’s Montney.
The contrast is the story of modern gas: fast-declining shale wells that must be re-drilled continuously, against conventional fields that flow for decades. Concentration is high: the three US regions in the table alone produced about 820 bcm in 2025, roughly a fifth of world output.
Table 4. Major gas-producing basins and fields, 2025
| Basin / field | Country | Type | Operator / owner | Output, 2025 | Note | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Appalachia (Marcellus + Utica) | United States | Shale | Many — e.g. EQT, Expand Energy | ~379 bcm/yr | 36.65 Bcf/d; 367 bcm in 2024 | Filed | STEO Oct 2026 | 5atab | “Appalachia region” (NGMPAP) | mean of 12 months |
| Permian | United States | Associated gas (tight oil) | Many | ~285 bcm/yr | 27.55 Bcf/d; 258 bcm in 2024 — moves with oil drilling | Filed | STEO Oct 2026 | 5atab | “Permian region” (NGMPPM) | mean of 12 months |
| North Field 1 | Qatar | Conventional offshore | QatarEnergy | ~184 bcm/yr | National output; LNG capacity to rise to 142 Mtpa “before the end of this decade” | Filed | EI Statistical Review 2026 | Natural gas: Production | “Qatar” | p.47 Filed | QatarEnergy release, 26 Feb 2024 | “142 million tons per annum (MTPA)” |
| Haynesville | United States | Shale | Many — e.g. Expand Energy | ~155 bcm/yr | 15.03 Bcf/d; 150 bcm in 2024 — next to the Gulf Coast LNG plants | Filed | STEO Oct 2026 | 5atab | “Haynesville region” (NGMPHA) | mean of 12 months |
| British Columbia (Montney) 2 | Canada | Tight / shale | Many | ~77 bcm/yr | 7,418 MMcf/d; 73 bcm in 2024 | Filed | CER Marketable Natural Gas Production | “2023-25 - mmcfd Mpi3j” | “British Columbia” | mean of 12 months |
| Troll | Norway | Conventional offshore | Equinor (operator) | ~41 bcm/yr | 41.0 bn Sm³ saleable gas; 43.8 in 2024 | Filed | Sodir FactPages | Field production, yearly | “TROLL” | prfPrdGasNetBillSm3 |
| Shah Deniz | Azerbaijan | Conventional offshore | bp (operator) | ~28 bcm/yr | Gross field output | Filed | Azerbaijan Ministry of Energy, 12 Jan 2026 | “27.9 bcm from Shah Deniz” |
| Gorgon & Wheatstone 3 | Australia | Conventional offshore, for LNG | Chevron (operator) | ~27 bcm/yr | Chevron’s net share: 2,605 MMcf/d | Filed | CVX 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Net Production of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids and Natural Gas | “Total Australia” | p.7 |
| Groningen | Netherlands | Conventional onshore | NAM | ~0 bcm/yr — closed | Closed by law on 19 April 2024 | Filed | Rijksoverheid, 18 Apr 2024 | “Hiermee komt de gaswinning definitief ten einde” |
Notes to Table 4
- National output. The field extends into Iranian waters as South Pars; the guide found no published 2025 figure for the Iranian side.
- A province, not a play: the CER reports British Columbia’s marketable gas as a whole, and the Montney is not reported separately in the documents saved.
- Chevron’s net share — 47.3% of Gorgon and 80.2% of Wheatstone upstream, plus 16.7% of the North West Shelf venture — not gross project output. Gorgon is “a three-train 15.6 million-metric-ton-per-year LNG facility” and Wheatstone “a two-train, 8.9 million-metric-ton-per-year LNG facility” (10-K, Item 2).
Source: US regions from the U.S. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 release, sheet 5atab “U.S. Regional Natural Gas Supply”, marketed production — the mean of each year’s twelve monthly values, computed here; the U.S. EIA’s footnote: regions are “based on geographic regions and not geologic formations”. Qatar from the EI Statistical Review 2026, p.47, and QatarEnergy’s release of 26 Feb 2024 (its own release, carried on Kyodo PR Wire). British Columbia from the Canada Energy Regulator, Marketable Natural Gas Production in Canada. Troll from the Norwegian Offshore Directorate (Sodir) FactPages, field production, yearly, saleable gas on a 100%-field basis. Shah Deniz from the Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan, 12 Jan 2026, gross. Gorgon and Wheatstone from Chevron’s 2025 Form 10-K. Groningen from the Dutch government, 18 Apr 2024. Conversions computed here: Bcf/d × 365 ÷ 35.315 = bcm a year; MMcf/d ÷ 1,000 first; Sodir’s standard cubic metres taken as cubic metres. Bases differ — marketed, saleable, gross, net, national — so the column ranks scale, not like-for-like output; rounded to whole bcm.
Figure 4. Three US regions lead the world’s largest gas sources, 2025
Figure data: Table 4. Bar lengths use the converted values before rounding; Groningen, closed, is left out.
2.2 Demand & consumption
World gas consumption reached a record ≈4,186 bcm in 2025, up 1.6%, and has risen in every year since 2000 except 2009, 2020 and 2022 — the financial crisis, the pandemic and Europe’s energy crisis. The United States is by far the largest user, followed by Russia and China, whose consumption has more than doubled in a decade (8.5% a year since 2015). Japan, for decades the largest buyer of LNG, now uses about a quarter less gas than in 2015.
Table 5. Top natural gas consumers, 2025
| Country | Consumption, 2025 | Share of world | Change vs 2024 | Growth p.a., 2015–25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 913.4 bcm | 21.8% | +1.6% | +2.1% |
| Russia | 480.0 bcm | 11.5% | +0.4% | +1.6% |
| China | 441.9 bcm | 10.6% | +2.3% | +8.5% |
| Iran | 256.3 bcm | 6.1% | +1.3% | +3.4% |
| Saudi Arabia | 133.8 bcm | 3.2% | +8.5% | +3.0% |
| Canada | 132.3 bcm | 3.2% | +3.3% | +1.8% |
| Mexico | 99.7 bcm | 2.4% | −0.4% | +2.1% |
| Japan | 90.4 bcm | 2.2% | −0.3% | −2.7% |
| Germany | 78.5 bcm | 1.9% | +3.9% | +0.2% |
| United Arab Emirates | 70.6 bcm | 1.7% | +5.5% | −0.1% |
| Rest of world | 1,489.1 bcm | 35.6% | — | — |
| World | 4,186.0 bcm | 100% | +1.6% | +1.9% |
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026, “Natural gas: Consumption in billion cubic metres”, rows “US”, “Russian Federation”, “China”, “Iran”, “Saudi Arabia”, “Canada”, “Mexico”, “Japan”, “Germany”, “United Arab Emirates” and “Total World”, column 2025 with the printed “Growth rate per annum” (2025 and 2015–25) and “Share 2025” columns — p.49; the same rows in the 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas Consumption - Bcm”. EI’s growth rates adjust for 2024’s leap year. Rest of world = world total less the ten rows shown, computed here. Consumption excludes gas converted to liquid fuels and is standardised to 40 MJ/m³.
By end use, the largest call on gas is power and heat (≈41%), where gas plants provide flexible, dispatchable electricity; industry (≈20%) uses it for heat and as feedstock; buildings (≈20%) burn it for heating and cooking; and about 11% is consumed by the energy sector itself — in processing, liquefaction and pipeline compressors — or lost.
Table 6. World natural gas use by sector, 2024
| Sector | What it covers | Energy | Share 1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Power & heat | Gas-fired electricity and heat plants | 60 EJ | 40.5% |
| Industry | Process heat; chemicals and fertiliser | 29 EJ | 19.6% |
| Buildings | Residential and commercial heating, cooking | 29 EJ | 19.6% |
| Energy sector own use 2 | Processing, liquefaction, pipeline fuel, losses | 16 EJ | 10.8% |
| Other final uses 2 | Agriculture, non-specified, non-energy outside industry | 9 EJ | 6.1% |
| Transport | Compressed and liquefied gas in vehicles and ships | 5 EJ | 3.4% |
| Total natural gas supply | 148 EJ | 100% |
Notes to Table 6
- Shares of total natural gas supply, energy basis, computed here. The IEA prints whole exajoules, so each share carries up to about half a percentage point of rounding.
- Residuals computed here: other final uses = natural gas in total final consumption (72 EJ) less industry, buildings and transport; energy sector own use = total supply (148) less power and heat (60) and total final consumption (72).
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025 (12 Nov 2025; Annex A licensed CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), Annex A, 2024 column: Table A.1a “World energy supply”, “Natural gas” (148 EJ) and, under “Electricity and heat sectors”, “Unabated natural gas” (60) — p.414; Table A.2a “World total final consumption”, “Natural gas” under “Gaseous fuels” (72) and, under “Industry”, “Unabated natural gas” (29) — p.415; Table A.2a (continued), “Natural gas” under “Transport” (5) and “Buildings” (29) — p.416.
Figure 5. Power generation takes two-fifths of the world’s gas, 2024
Figure data: Table 6. Segments print shares rounded to whole percent, so they sum to 101%.
Geographically, the centre of gravity is moving east and south. North America remains the largest consuming region on cheap shale gas, but Asia Pacific has more than tripled its use since 2000 and the Middle East has risen more than threefold, while Europe uses less gas than in 2000 — a decline that accelerated after the loss of Russian pipeline supply in 2022, before a 4% rebound in 2025.
Table 7. Natural gas consumption by region, 2000–2025, selected years
| Region | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2024 | 2025 | Share 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America | 753.5 bcm | 735.5 bcm | 805.8 bcm | 934.7 bcm | 1,046.5 bcm | 1,130.3 bcm | 1,145.4 bcm | 27.4% |
| Asia Pacific | 298.3 bcm | 408.1 bcm | 575.2 bcm | 717.7 bcm | 871.1 bcm | 975.7 bcm | 976.1 bcm | 23.3% |
| Middle East | 183.3 bcm | 266.4 bcm | 380.5 bcm | 479.3 bcm | 552.5 bcm | 603.5 bcm | 619.4 bcm | 14.8% |
| CIS | 451.8 bcm | 498.5 bcm | 529.0 bcm | 521.4 bcm | 554.9 bcm | 613.3 bcm | 615.3 bcm | 14.7% |
| Europe | 558.5 bcm | 627.6 bcm | 623.3 bcm | 509.2 bcm | 542.1 bcm | 464.0 bcm | 482.1 bcm | 11.5% |
| Africa | 55.7 bcm | 80.8 bcm | 98.2 bcm | 130.3 bcm | 153.7 bcm | 178.3 bcm | 184.2 bcm | 4.4% |
| S. & Cent. America | 98.3 bcm | 127.1 bcm | 147.3 bcm | 177.8 bcm | 148.6 bcm | 166.2 bcm | 163.3 bcm | 3.9% |
| World | 2,399.4 bcm | 2,743.9 bcm | 3,159.3 bcm | 3,470.5 bcm | 3,869.3 bcm | 4,131.2 bcm | 4,186.0 bcm | 100% |
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheet “Gas Consumption - Bcm”, rows “Total North America”, “Total Asia Pacific”, “Total Middle East”, “Total CIS”, “Total Europe”, “Total Africa”, “Total S. & Cent. America” and “Total World”; the PDF prints 2015–2025 and the shares (p.49). The standard EI regions, ordered by 2025 consumption; rounded to 0.1 bcm. EI’s CIS is the former Soviet states less the Baltics, Georgia and Ukraine, which it counts in Europe.
Figure 6. Asia Pacific and the Middle East drove consumption growth, 2000–2025
Figure data: the annual rows of the same EI sheet as Table 7, 2000–2025 (metalpilot_natural_gas_fig_consumption_by_region.csv in the source pack). Each band prints its 2025 value; the top label is the world total.
Live 2026 aside. The IEA expects world gas demand to fall by about 0.5% (≈20 bcm) in 2026 — only the third annual decline this decade — as high LNG prices after the Hormuz closure push Asian power plants back to coal and Middle Eastern industry loses supply (IEA, Gas Market Report, Q3-2026, 7 Jul 2026, executive summary).
2.3 Supply: producing countries
World gas production rose about 75% between 2000 and 2025, from ≈2,401 bcm to ≈4,196 bcm; North America (on the shale boom) and the Middle East each added more than 550 bcm a year of output over the period. The United States has led since 2011 and produced a quarter of the world’s gas in 2025, ahead of Russia, whose output fell after it lost most of its European pipeline market in 2022. Iran’s output has more than quadrupled since 2000 and China’s risen almost tenfold; Qatar — a small producer in 2000 — is the world’s sixth-largest, almost all of it from the North Field.
Ownership splits sharply. North American gas comes from hundreds of private companies responding to price; almost everywhere else production is dominated by state companies — Gazprom, the National Iranian Oil Company, QatarEnergy, PetroChina — whose output answers to national policy as much as to price (Section 3.1).
Table 8. Top natural gas-producing countries, 2025
| Country | Production, 2025 | Share of world | Change vs 2024 | Growth p.a., 2015–25 | Trend 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 1,073.7 bcm | 25.6% | +4.3% | +3.8% | Record high; LNG exports pull growth |
| Russia | 609.4 bcm | 14.5% | −3.0% | +0.4% | Below 2021 peak; pivoting to Asia |
| Iran | 264.8 bcm | 6.3% | +1.3% | +3.7% | Rising; nearly all consumed at home |
| China | 264.1 bcm | 6.3% | +6.6% | +6.9% | Fastest growth among the leaders |
| Canada | 206.2 bcm | 4.9% | +3.7% | +2.5% | Rising |
| Qatar | 183.5 bcm | 4.4% | +2.4% | +0.4% | Flat before the North Field expansion |
| Australia | 148.6 bcm | 3.5% | −2.2% | +7.2% | Doubled in a decade; now plateauing |
| Saudi Arabia | 133.8 bcm | 3.2% | +8.5% | +3.0% | Rising fast; all used at home |
| Norway | 120.6 bcm | 2.9% | −2.7% | +0.5% | Flat; exports almost all of it to Europe |
| Algeria | 98.0 bcm | 2.3% | −1.9% | +1.9% | Flat |
| Rest of world | 1,093.7 bcm | 26.1% | — | — | — |
| World | 4,196.5 bcm | 100% | +1.6% | +1.8% | — |
Notes to Table 8
- Trend is this guide’s reading of the EI series and the sections cited, not a field of the source.
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026, “Natural gas: Production in billion cubic metres”, rows “US”, “Russian Federation”, “Iran”, “China”, “Canada”, “Qatar”, “Australia”, “Saudi Arabia”, “Norway”, “Algeria” and “Total World”, column 2025 with the printed “Growth rate per annum” and “Share 2025” columns — p.47; 2000 values in the text from the 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas Production - Bcm”. EI excludes gas flared or re-injected and standardises volumes to 40 MJ/m³. Rest of world = world less the ten rows shown, computed here; the top-five share (57.6%) is computed from the same rows. The US has led every year since 2011 (sheet “Gas Production - Bcm”: 2011, US 617.4 against Russia 616.8 bcm).
Figure 7. US shale overtook Russia; Iran and China surged, 2000–2025
Figure data: EI 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas Production - Bcm”, 2000–2025 (metalpilot_natural_gas_fig_top_producers.csv in the source pack); 2025 values as in Table 8. Qatar, Australia and Norway in gray.
Reserves tell the longevity story, and here the ranking is dominated by three states: Russia, Iran and Qatar hold 45% of the world’s ≈220 Tcm of proved reserves. At 2025 output that base would last about 51 years — though, as with oil, reserves are an economic estimate that grows with price and technology. The United States holds only about 6% of the world’s reserves while producing a quarter of its gas, a reserve life of about 12 years: shale is produced fast and booked only a few years ahead.
Table 9. Proved natural gas reserves by country, end-2025
| Country | Reserves, end-2025 | Share of world | Reserve life 1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | 42.0 Tcm | 19.1% | 67 years |
| Iran | 34.0 Tcm | 15.4% | 121 years |
| Qatar | 23.8 Tcm | 10.8% | 112 years |
| Turkmenistan | 13.9 Tcm | 6.3% | 145 years |
| United States 2 | 13.9 Tcm | 6.3% | 12 years |
| Saudi Arabia | 9.8 Tcm | 4.4% | 88 years |
| United Arab Emirates | 8.4 Tcm | 3.8% | 140 years |
| Nigeria | 6.1 Tcm | 2.8% | 126 years |
| Canada 2 | 5.6 Tcm | 2.5% | 25 years |
| Venezuela | 5.4 Tcm | 2.5% | 246 years |
| World | 220.3 Tcm | 100% | 51 years |
Notes to Table 9
- Reserves ÷ 2025 marketed production, both from OPEC (Table 9.2), computed here. A guide to scale, not a forecast: production rates change and reserves are revised.
- Canada’s reserves more than doubled in 2025 (from 2.5 to 5.6 Tcm) and US reserves fell by 13% (16.0 to 13.9 Tcm) in OPEC’s table — revisions, not discoveries or depletion in a single year.
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2026, Table 9.1 “World proven natural gas reserves by country”, column 2025, rows “Russia” 41,997, “IR Iran” 33,988, “Qatar” 23,831, “Turkmenistan” 13,900, “United States” 13,894, “Saudi Arabia” 9,786, “United Arab Emirates” 8,410, “Nigeria” 6,111, “Canada” 5,558, “Venezuela” 5,418 and “Total world” 220,307 bn s cu m — p.76; production from Table 9.2 “World marketed production of natural gas by country”, column 2025 — p.77. Billion standard cubic metres ÷ 1,000 = Tcm; shares and reserve lives computed here. OPEC’s figures are at year-end and its standard conditions (15.6 °C), so they are not directly comparable with EI’s production (Section 7.1). EI’s own reserves tables have not been updated since end-2020.
2.4 The supply–demand balance
Gas is consumed as it is produced, so the world balance is mostly a matter of storage and trade. Globally, production and consumption are almost identical every year: the gap in Table 10 is EI’s measure of “variations in stocks at storage facilities and liquefaction plants, together with unavoidable disparities in the definition, measurement, or conversion” of the data (EI 2026, Methodology, p.82) — a statistical residual of 0–2% of the market, not a tradable surplus. The real balance is regional: because gas is costly to move, a glut in the United States can coexist with scarcity in Europe or Asia, and only LNG arbitrages the difference.
Table 10. World natural gas production and consumption, 2000–2025
| Year | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production | 2,401 bcm | 2,458 bcm | 2,515 bcm | 2,605 bcm | 2,694 bcm | 2,758 bcm | 2,852 bcm | 2,928 bcm | 3,033 bcm | 2,941 bcm | 3,129 bcm | 3,257 bcm | 3,345 bcm |
| Consumption | 2,399 bcm | 2,432 bcm | 2,505 bcm | 2,573 bcm | 2,678 bcm | 2,744 bcm | 2,818 bcm | 2,934 bcm | 3,005 bcm | 2,940 bcm | 3,159 bcm | 3,235 bcm | 3,323 bcm |
| Gap 1 | +2 bcm | +26 bcm | +10 bcm | +32 bcm | +16 bcm | +14 bcm | +34 bcm | −6 bcm | +28 bcm | 0 bcm | −31 bcm | +22 bcm | +22 bcm |
| Year | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production | 3,373 bcm | 3,444 bcm | 3,515 bcm | 3,563 bcm | 3,694 bcm | 3,867 bcm | 3,985 bcm | 3,878 bcm | 4,048 bcm | 4,053 bcm | 4,066 bcm | 4,143 bcm | 4,196 bcm |
| Consumption | 3,370 bcm | 3,390 bcm | 3,470 bcm | 3,555 bcm | 3,656 bcm | 3,829 bcm | 3,904 bcm | 3,869 bcm | 4,023 bcm | 4,004 bcm | 4,015 bcm | 4,131 bcm | 4,186 bcm |
| Gap 1 | +3 bcm | +54 bcm | +44 bcm | +7 bcm | +37 bcm | +38 bcm | +81 bcm | +8 bcm | +25 bcm | +49 bcm | +51 bcm | +12 bcm | +10 bcm |
Notes to Table 10
- Production minus consumption, computed here from the unrounded figures. EI attributes the difference to stock changes at storage sites and LNG plants plus definitional and measurement disparities, so it is not a market surplus; no agency publishes an annual global gas surplus/deficit series. Read storage (Section 2.8 and below) as the balance signal.
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheets “Gas Production - Bcm” and “Gas Consumption - Bcm”, row “Total World”, 2000–2025; the PDF prints 2015–2025 (pp.47, 49). Rounded to whole bcm.
The gap that matters lands in storage. In the United States, working gas in underground storage peaked at 3,950 Bcf on 7 November 2025, about 43 days of 2025’s average consumption (91.96 Bcf/d); in the European Union, storage held about 85 bcm on 1 October 2025, 83% full and around a quarter of annual consumption (Table 17). Those two numbers are the cover against a cold winter or a supply cut; Section 2.8 explains how they are managed.
At the country level, a handful of net exporters — the United States, Qatar, Russia, Norway, Australia and Canada — supply the large net importers of East Asia and Europe, which produce little of what they burn.
Table 11. Natural gas net positions, major countries, 2025
| Country | Production | Consumption | Net position 1 | Net position, % of world consumption |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 1,073.7 bcm | 913.4 bcm | Net exporter (+160.3 bcm) | +3.8% |
| Qatar | 183.5 bcm | 43.8 bcm | Net exporter (+139.7 bcm) | +3.3% |
| Russia | 609.4 bcm | 480.0 bcm | Net exporter (+129.3 bcm) | +3.1% |
| Norway | 120.6 bcm | 3.4 bcm | Net exporter (+117.2 bcm) | +2.8% |
| Australia | 148.6 bcm | 38.7 bcm | Net exporter (+109.9 bcm) | +2.6% |
| Canada | 206.2 bcm | 132.3 bcm | Net exporter (+73.9 bcm) | +1.8% |
| South Korea 2 | n/i | 63.0 bcm | Net importer (−63.0 bcm) | −1.5% |
| Mexico | 34.8 bcm | 99.7 bcm | Net importer (−64.9 bcm) | −1.6% |
| Germany | 3.7 bcm | 78.5 bcm | Net importer (−74.8 bcm) | −1.8% |
| Japan 2 | n/i | 90.4 bcm | Net importer (−90.4 bcm) | −2.2% |
| China | 264.1 bcm | 441.9 bcm | Net importer (−177.8 bcm) | −4.2% |
Notes to Table 11
- Production minus consumption, computed here from the unrounded figures; not the same as net trade, which also reflects stock changes.
- n/i — not itemised: EI includes Japanese and Korean production in “Other Asia Pacific”; both are small, so their net imports are close to their consumption (Japan’s LNG imports were 88.5 bcm in 2025, Table 14).
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026: production from “Natural gas: Production in billion cubic metres”, column 2025, rows “US”, “Qatar”, “Russian Federation”, “Norway”, “Australia”, “Canada”, “Mexico”, “Germany” and “China” — p.47; consumption from “Natural gas: Consumption in billion cubic metres”, column 2025, the same rows plus “South Korea” and “Japan” — p.49. Shares are the net position ÷ world consumption (4,186.0 bcm), computed here.
Figure 8. Six exporters supply East Asia and Europe, 2025
Figure data: Table 11. Bar lengths are scaled to China’s −177.8 from the unrounded figures.
2.5 Supply structure: conventional, unconventional & co-products
Gas supply has two structural features. First, gas is not recycled: it is burned or turned into chemicals, so all supply is new production, and a field’s output only declines once drilling stops. (Some gas is re-injected into reservoirs to hold up pressure; EI excludes it from production.) Second, the mix has swung toward unconventional rock. Conventional fields still produced 69% of the world’s gas in 2024, but shale gas rose from 5% of output in 2010 to 21%, almost all of the gain in North America; tight gas and coalbed methane make up most of the rest. In the United States, shale wells supplied 77% of gross withdrawals in 2024, against 10% from oil wells and 12% from conventional gas wells (U.S. EIA, Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, annual: “Gross Withdrawals from Shale Gas” 35,109,495 MMcf of “Gross Withdrawals” 45,867,761; oil wells 4,563,269; gas wells 5,509,405 — shares computed here).
That mix sets how supply responds to price. Shale answers within months and declines fast, so it must be re-drilled continuously. Conventional and LNG-linked projects take years from investment decision to first gas — the CP2 Phase 2 LNG expansion approved in 2026 is due to start in the second half of 2030 (IEA, Gas Market Report, Q3-2026) — and then produce at a plateau whatever the price. Associated gas is the outlier: it follows oil drilling, so Permian gas output rises with the oil price rather than the gas price. Co-products matter too: gas fields yield natural gas liquids — 14.8 MMbbl/d worldwide in 2025, half of it in the United States (EI Statistical Review 2026, “Oil: Natural gas liquids production”, “Total World” 14,830 and “US” 7,479 thousand barrels daily, 2025 — p.34) — whose value supports drilling in “wet” gas areas.
Table 12. World natural gas supply by resource type, 2010 and 2024
| Supply source | Production, 2024 | Share, 2024 | Share, 2010 | Trend 1 | Price elasticity 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conventional gas (incl. most associated gas) | 2,955 bcm | 69.0% | 84.8% | Growing slowly; Middle East-led | Low — long lead times, plateau output |
| Shale gas | 897 bcm | 20.9% | 4.7% | Fastest growth, almost all North America | High — months from rig to gas (associated shale gas excepted) |
| Tight gas | 319 bcm | 7.4% | 8.1% | Stable share | Medium |
| Coalbed methane | 93 bcm | 2.2% | 2.3% | Stable | Low |
| Total | 4,282 bcm | 100% | 100% | ||
| Recycling | — | 0% | 0% | Gas is consumed; nothing to recycle | — |
Notes to Table 12
- Trend and price elasticity are this guide’s reading, not fields of the source. The elasticity column describes how fast each source can respond to a price change.
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025 (12 Nov 2025; Annex A licensed CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), Annex A, Table A.12 “Natural gas production (bcm)”, rows “World”, “Conventional gas”, “Tight gas”, “Shale gas” and “Coalbed methane”, columns 2010 and 2024 — p.435. Shares are row ÷ world, computed here. The IEA’s world total (4,282 bcm in 2024) runs above EI’s (4,143) because the two agencies standardise volumes differently; the shares, not the levels, are used here.
Figure 9. Shale’s share of world gas rose fourfold in fourteen years, 2010–2024
Figure data: Table 12. Segments print shares rounded to whole percent, so the 2024 bar sums to 99%.
2.6 Trade flows & chokepoints
Gas trade runs on two networks. Pipelines carry gas overland on fixed routes — Canada to the United States, the United States to Mexico, Norway and North Africa to Europe, Russia and Central Asia to Europe and China — cheaply but inflexibly. LNG moves by tanker and can change destination with every cargo. Both are concentrated: the United States is now the largest gas exporter overall and the largest LNG exporter, followed by Russia, Qatar, Norway and Australia.
The map was redrawn in 2022. Russia’s pipeline exports fell from 201 bcm in 2021 to 102 bcm in 2025, and Europe replaced them with LNG: its LNG imports rose from 106 bcm to 169 bcm over the same years, while US LNG exports grew 27% in 2025 alone to 147 bcm (EI Statistical Review 2026, “Natural gas: Inter-regional trade”, rows “Pipeline exports” (Russian Federation), “LNG imports” (Europe) and “LNG exports” (US), 2021 and 2025 — p.52). The European Union now takes more LNG than China and Japan.
Table 13. Top natural gas exporters, 2025
| Exporter | LNG | Pipeline 1 | Total | Main markets 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 147.0 bcm | 94.2 bcm | 241.2 bcm | EU (LNG), Mexico and Canada (pipeline) |
| Russia | 42.6 bcm | 101.6 bcm | 144.1 bcm | China, non-EU Europe, CIS; EU (mostly LNG) |
| Qatar | 111.0 bcm | 19.8 bcm | 130.7 bcm | China, India, Taiwan, EU (LNG); UAE (pipeline) |
| Norway | 4.3 bcm | 115.0 bcm | 119.3 bcm | EU and non-EU Europe |
| Australia | 104.8 bcm | — | 104.8 bcm | Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan |
| Canada | — | 87.2 bcm | 87.2 bcm | United States |
| Algeria | 13.1 bcm | 32.3 bcm | 45.4 bcm | EU, Türkiye |
| Turkmenistan | — | 37.8 bcm | 37.8 bcm | China |
| Malaysia | 36.5 bcm | — | 36.5 bcm | Japan, Korea, China |
| World | 578.5 bcm | 567.6 bcm | 1,146.1 bcm |
Notes to Table 13
- EI’s pipeline matrix excludes trade within its aggregated regions (for example between countries inside “Other Europe”), so pipeline totals understate cross-border flows; LNG is gross and includes re-exports.
- Largest destinations in EI’s 2025 LNG and pipeline matrices, read here; the US–EU LNG flow alone was 81.5 bcm.
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheets “Gas trade 2025 - LNG” and “Gas trade 2025 - pipeline”, row “Total exports” by exporter column (“US”, “Russian Federation”, “Qatar”, “Norway”, “Australia”, “Canada”, “Algeria”, “Turkmenistan”, “Malaysia”), and the “Total exports” × “Total imports” cell for the world rows; the PDF prints the same matrices on pp.54–55. Totals = LNG + pipeline, computed here; rounded to 0.1 bcm.
Table 14. Top natural gas importers, 2025
| Importer | LNG | Pipeline 1 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| European Union 2 | 145.1 bcm | 131.4 bcm | 276.5 bcm |
| China | 90.8 bcm | 77.8 bcm | 168.6 bcm |
| Other Europe (UK, Türkiye and others) 2 | 28.9 bcm | 80.0 bcm | 108.9 bcm |
| Japan | 88.5 bcm | — | 88.5 bcm |
| United States | 0.4 bcm | 87.2 bcm | 87.6 bcm |
| Mexico | 0.6 bcm | 66.0 bcm | 66.6 bcm |
| South Korea | 63.1 bcm | — | 63.1 bcm |
| India | 35.4 bcm | — | 35.4 bcm |
| Taiwan | 31.8 bcm | — | 31.8 bcm |
Notes to Table 14
- As Table 13, note 1: intra-regional pipeline trade within EI’s aggregated regions is excluded.
- EI’s pipeline matrix groups importers as “EU” and “Non-EU Europe”; the LNG rows are the sum of “Belgium”, “France”, “Italy”, “Spain” and “Other EU” for the EU, and of “United Kingdom”, “Turkey” and “Rest of Europe” for the rest of Europe.
Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheets “Gas trade 2025 - LNG” and “Gas trade 2025 - pipeline”, column “Total imports” by importer row, summed here as note 2 describes; PDF pp.54–55. Rounded to 0.1 bcm.
LNG has overtaken pipelines as the way gas moves between regions: its share of inter-regional trade has risen from about a fifth in 2000 to more than half.
Figure 10. LNG carries more than half of inter-regional gas trade, 2000–2025
Source: EI Statistical Review 2026, “Natural gas: Inter-regional trade”, World rows “Inter-regional pipeline trade” and “LNG trade” — 2015–2025 on p.52; 2000 and 2010 from the 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas - Trade movements”. Shares computed here: LNG 108.7 of 498.9 bcm in 2000, 267.3 of 706.2 in 2010, 281.9 of 729.6 in 2015, 417.3 of 877.0 in 2020 and 495.2 of 898.7 in 2025. Inter-regional trade excludes flows within a region, such as Australia to Japan, so it is smaller than the gross trade in Tables 13–14.
Figure 11. US LNG to Europe is now the largest single gas flow, 2025
- United States147
- Qatar111
- Australia105
- Russia43
- Malaysia37
- European Union145
- China91
- Japan89
- South Korea63
- India35
- Taiwan32
Figure data: Tables 13–14 (LNG columns) and EI’s 2025 LNG matrix (sheet “Gas trade 2025 - LNG”). Links mark every exporter–importer flow of 10 bcm or more in that matrix; they show which buyer each exporter serves, not volumes. Every bar sits on one scale; values are rounded to whole bcm.
Because LNG is seaborne, gas has inherited a set of maritime chokepoints. The one that matters most is the Strait of Hormuz: Qatar’s LNG and the UAE’s pass through it — about a fifth of world LNG supply in 2024 — and the pipelines that can bypass the strait carry crude oil, not gas. The Strait of Malacca carries a similar volume to China, Japan and Korea but has longer alternatives. The Red Sea route showed the system’s flexibility under stress: when attacks on shipping began in late 2023, LNG through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb fell to almost nothing in 2024 and cargoes went round the Cape of Good Hope instead, at the cost of longer voyages rather than lost supply.
Table 15. LNG transit chokepoints, 2023–1H25
| Chokepoint | 2023 | 2024 | 1H25 | Share of world LNG, 2024 1 | Workaround 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz | 10.6 Bcf/d | 10.5 Bcf/d | 11.4 Bcf/d | 20.0% | None — bypass pipelines carry crude, not LNG |
| Strait of Malacca | 9.4 Bcf/d | 10.1 Bcf/d | 9.2 Bcf/d | 19.2% | Sunda and Lombok straits (longer) |
| Cape of Good Hope (route) | 2.1 Bcf/d | 7.8 Bcf/d | 5.7 Bcf/d | 14.8% | Not a chokepoint — the long way round |
| Danish Straits | 1.4 Bcf/d | 1.4 Bcf/d | 1.6 Bcf/d | 2.7% | Pipeline supply to the Baltic |
| Suez Canal | 4.1 Bcf/d | 0.5 Bcf/d | 0.9 Bcf/d | 1.0% | Cape of Good Hope |
| Bab el-Mandeb | 4.2 Bcf/d | 0.0 Bcf/d | 0.0 Bcf/d | 0.0% | Cape of Good Hope |
| Panama Canal 3 | — | — | <0.3 | — | Cape of Good Hope or Suez |
Notes to Table 15
- 2024 flow ÷ world LNG exports in 2024 (EI, 545.0 bcm = 52.6 Bcf/d), computed here. Shares overlap and do not add up: one cargo can pass Hormuz and then Malacca.
- The Hormuz workaround is from the U.S. EIA report; the others are this guide’s summary.
- US fiscal year 2025 (October 2024 – September 2025), down from about 2.5 Bcf/d in fiscal 2021 after drought restrictions and rerouting.
Source: U.S. EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Tables 2–5 and 7, rows “LNG flows through …” and “LNG flows around the cape” (billion cubic feet per day), columns 2023, 2024 and 1H25; the Strait of Hormuz section, “11.4 Bcf/d, or over 20% of global LNG trade” in 1H25, and “Pipelines in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran provide alternatives” (crude oil pipelines); Panama from the Panama Canal section, “declined to less than 0.3 Bcf/d from around 2.5 Bcf/d in FY 2021”. The U.S. EIA’s figures rest on Vortexa tanker tracking. World LNG exports from the EI 2026 data workbook, sheet “Gas - LNG exports bcm”, “Total LNG exports”, 2024.
Live 2026 aside. The Hormuz risk is no longer hypothetical. After the war began at the end of February 2026, LNG loadings in Qatar and the UAE fell by 35 bcm year on year between March and June; new non-Gulf supply offset about three-quarters of that, and the IEA expects Gulf LNG supply for 2026 as a whole to fall by about 45% (54 bcm). Damage to Qatar’s Ras Laffan site — the world’s largest liquefaction facility — adds an estimated 140 bcm of cumulative LNG supply losses over 2026–2030 (IEA, Gas Market Report, Q3-2026, 7 Jul 2026, executive summary). The IEA’s forecast assumed the strait would reopen in the third quarter; the disruption is unresolved at the data-as-of date.
2.7 Market organisations & coordination
Gas has no effective cartel. The closest body is the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), an intergovernmental forum whose twelve members are Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela, with eight observers (Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru and Senegal). The GECF describes itself as “a platform for the exchange of experience and information among its Member Countries” and says its members hold 70% of proven reserves, 38% of marketed production, 42% of gas exports and 47% of LNG exports (GECF, Overview). Unlike OPEC it sets no output quotas, and the largest producer, the United States, is not a member.
Coordination, where it exists, is state power: Russia’s control of pipeline supply to Europe until 2022, and the concentration of LNG export capacity in a few states, of which Qatar is the largest in the Gulf. The bodies that shape the market day to day are statistical, regulatory and commercial: the IEA and U.S. EIA publish the data and outlooks, the Energy Institute the annual statistics; ICE and CME run the TTF and Henry Hub futures; and governments set the rules that move volumes — US export authorisations, the EU’s storage targets (Section 2.8), and methane regulation.
Table 16. GECF members by natural gas production and reserves, 2025
| Member | Marketed production, 2025 | Share of world production | Proved reserves, end-2025 | Share of world reserves |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | 624.7 bcm | 14.4% | 42.0 Tcm | 19.1% |
| Iran | 280.4 bcm | 6.5% | 34.0 Tcm | 15.4% |
| Qatar | 212.2 bcm | 4.9% | 23.8 Tcm | 10.8% |
| Algeria | 104.7 bcm | 2.4% | 4.5 Tcm | 2.0% |
| United Arab Emirates | 60.1 bcm | 1.4% | 8.4 Tcm | 3.8% |
| Nigeria | 48.7 bcm | 1.1% | 6.1 Tcm | 2.8% |
| Egypt | 42.2 bcm | 1.0% | 2.2 Tcm | 1.0% |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 27.5 bcm | 0.6% | 0.3 Tcm | 0.1% |
| Venezuela | 22.0 bcm | 0.5% | 5.4 Tcm | 2.5% |
| Libya | 12.3 bcm | 0.3% | 0.7 Tcm | 0.3% |
| Bolivia | 10.0 bcm | 0.2% | 0.1 Tcm | 0.1% |
| Equatorial Guinea | 5.7 bcm | 0.1% | 0.04 Tcm | 0.0% |
| GECF members 1 | 1,450.6 bcm | 33.4% | 127.7 Tcm | 58.0% |
Notes to Table 16
- On OPEC’s figures the twelve members hold 58% of world reserves and 33% of production, below the GECF’s own 70% and 38%; the gap is a difference of source and basis (and possibly of the observers counted), which the GECF’s page does not explain.
Source: membership from GECF, Membership; volumes from OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2026, Table 9.2 “World marketed production of natural gas by country”, column 2025 (million standard cubic metres ÷ 1,000) — p.77, and Table 9.1 “World proven natural gas reserves by country”, column 2025 (billion standard cubic metres ÷ 1,000) — p.76; rows as named, “IR Iran” for Iran, “Total world” for the shares. Shares and totals computed here.
2.8 Gas storage & strategic reserves
Gas has no true equivalent of oil’s strategic petroleum reserve. Its buffer is working gas in underground storage — depleted reservoirs, aquifers and salt caverns, filled in summer and drawn down in winter — backed in Europe by government fill targets rather than state-owned stockpiles. Storage clears every seasonal balance, so its level is the most-watched number in the market.
In the United States, storage levels are set by the market. Lower-48 working gas peaked at 3,950 Bcf in early November 2025, above the 2020–2024 average peak of about 3,800 Bcf, and bottomed at 1,698 Bcf in early March — about 43 days of 2025’s average consumption at the peak. The U.S. EIA’s Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report, published on Thursdays at 10:30 ET, compares each week with the five-year average and range: traders read storage below the range as bullish and above it as bearish (U.S. EIA, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report).
In the European Union, storage is policy. After the low storage levels of 2021–22, the Gas Storage Regulation required storage to be 90% full by 1 November; its extension to the end of 2027 (Regulation EU/2025/1733) lets countries meet the 90% target at any point between 1 October and 1 December and deviate from it in difficult market conditions. On 1 October 2025 EU storage held about 85 bcm, 83% full — around a quarter of annual consumption — and storage typically supplies 25–30% of the gas consumed in the EU in winter (European Commission, Gas storage).
Table 17. Gas storage buffers, United States and European Union, 2025
| Buffer | Level | Cover | Rule | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US Lower-48 working gas, 2025 peak | 3,950 Bcf (week ending 7 Nov) | ~43 days of 2025 average use | None — commercial | Market | U.S. EIA | “Weekly Lower 48 States Natural Gas Working Underground Storage” (NW2_EPG0_SWO_R48_BCF) | 2025 Derived | ÷ 91.96 Bcf/d (STEO Oct 2026 | 5atab | NGTCPUS) |
| US working gas, 2025 low | 1,698 Bcf (week ending 7 Mar) | — | — | Market | U.S. EIA | same series | 2025 |
| US working gas, 2020–24 average peak | ~3,800 Bcf | — | — | Derived | mean of each ISO week, 2020–2024 |
| US record high | 4,047 Bcf (11 Nov 2016) | — | — | Market | U.S. EIA | same series | 2010–2026 |
| EU storage, 1 Oct 2025 | ~85 bcm (83% full) | ~25% of annual consumption | 90% between 1 Oct and 1 Dec, to end-2027 | Filed | European Commission, Gas storage | “approximately 85 bcm of gas in stock” |
Source: U.S. EIA, Weekly Lower 48 States Natural Gas Working Underground Storage (Bcf; data to the week ending 25 Sep 2026); average consumption from the U.S. EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, sheet 5atab, “Total consumption” (NGTCPUS), mean of the twelve 2025 months, 91.96 Bcf/d; days of cover = 3,950 ÷ 91.96, computed here. The 2020–24 average peak is the highest weekly value of the five-year average curve in Figure 12 (3,804 Bcf), computed here. EU figures and rules from the European Commission, Gas storage, “The EU gas system reached a storage level of 83% on 1 October 2025, recording approximately 85 bcm of gas in stock … around 25% of the EU’s annual gas consumption”.
Figure 12. US storage ran below average into spring 2025 and ended the injection season above it
Figure data: U.S. EIA series NW2_EPG0_SWO_R48_BCF, weekly; 2025 against the mean, high and low of the same ISO week in 2020–2024, computed here (metalpilot_natural_gas_fig_storage_2025.csv in the source pack). The U.S. EIA’s own report uses the preceding five years and matching report weeks, so its five-year average can differ by a few Bcf.
3. The companies & the value chain
3.1 The largest gas companies
Gas production splits into three corporate worlds, and the durable way to size them up is by production and reserves, not by market value, which moves daily. The state companies hold the largest resource bases: PetroChina, China’s state-controlled oil and gas major, reports more gas reserves than any other listed company in the table, while Russia’s Gazprom and Qatar’s QatarEnergy publish little that can be compared. The integrated majors — Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalEnergies — produce 55–90 bcm a year each from portfolios spread across continents. And the US gas pure-plays — Expand Energy (formed when Chesapeake Energy merged with Southwestern Energy in 2024) and EQT — now produce as much gas as a major, entirely from Appalachia and the Haynesville, and are the listed names most exposed to Henry Hub.
Table 18. Largest natural gas producers by production and reserves, 2025
| Company | Country | Type | Listing | Gas production, 2025 | Proved gas reserves, end-2025 | Reserve life | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PetroChina 1 | China | State-controlled integrated | Public (SSE:601857 / HKEX:857) | 151.9 bcm | 2,089 bcm | 13.8 years | Filed | PetroChina AR 2025 | Key Figures for the Oil, Gas and New Energy Segment | “Marketable natural gas output” 5,363.2 bcf | p.22 Filed | PetroChina AR 2025 | Supplementary Information on Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Activities | “total proved developed and undeveloped reserves of the Group and equity method” 73,784 bcf | p.289 |
| Chevron 2 | United States | Integrated major | Public (NYSE:CVX) | 88.0 bcm | 828 bcm | 9.4 years | Filed | CVX 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Net Production of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids and Natural Gas | “Total Including Affiliates” 8,515 MMCFD | p.7 Filed | CVX 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Reserves | “Total Natural Gas” 29,245 Bcf | p.5 |
| ExxonMobil | United States | Integrated major | Public (NYSE:XOM) | 87.3 bcm | 1,031 bcm | 11.8 years | Filed | XOM 10-K FY2025 | Item 2, 3.A Oil and Gas Production | “Total natural gas production available for sale” 8,442 MMcf/d | p.12 Filed | XOM 10-K FY2025 | Item 2, 1.A Summary of Oil and Gas Reserves | “Total Proved Reserves” 36,408 Bcf | p.9 |
| Shell 3 | United Kingdom | Integrated major | Public (LSE:SHEL / EURONEXT:SHEL / NYSE:SHEL, ADS) | 75.8 bcm | 752 bcm | 9.9 years | Filed | Shell 20-F 2025 | Oil and gas production available for sale | “Natural gas” 2,341,461 + 336,883 MMscf | p.66 Filed | Shell 20-F 2025 | Summary of proved oil and gas reserves | “Total proved developed and undeveloped” 26,541 thousand million scf | p.63 |
| Expand Energy | United States | Gas pure-play | Public (NASDAQ:EXE) | 68.2 bcm | 639 bcm | 9.4 years | Filed | EXE 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Production Volumes, Sales Prices, Production Expenses | “Total Production” 2,409 Bcf | p.14 Filed | EXE 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Proved reserves | “Total proved” 22,575 Bcf | p.15 |
| EQT | United States | Gas pure-play | Public (NYSE:EQT) | 63.4 bcm | 748 bcm | 11.8 years | Filed | EQT 10-K FY2025 | Item 7 | “Sales volume (MMcf)” 2,238,652 Filed | EQT 10-K FY2025 | Item 1 | Reserves | “Total proved reserves” 26,416 Bcf |
| TotalEnergies 2 | France | Integrated major | Public (EURONEXT:TTE / NYSE:TTE) | 55.8 bcm | 778 bcm | 13.9 years | Filed | TTE 20-F 2025 | §2.1 Upstream oil and gas activities | “Gas (Mcf/d)” 5,402 | p.74 Filed | TTE 20-F 2025 | §2.1 Proved reserves | “Gas (Bcf)” 27,481 | p.75 |
| QatarEnergy 4 | Qatar | State company | State-owned (unlisted) | n/p | n/p | — | Estimate | no company filing |
| Gazprom 5 | Russia | State-controlled | Public (MOEX:GAZP); state majority | n/d | n/d | — | Estimate | company reports not retrievable |
Notes to Table 18
- PetroChina’s controlling shareholder is the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation. Reserves include its equity-method share (73,121 bcf for the Group alone).
- Chevron’s 8,515 MMcf/d includes 646 MMcf/d consumed in operations; on an as-sold basis it is 7,869 (81.3 bcm). TotalEnergies’ figure, which includes equity affiliates, also includes fuel gas; its 20-F writes million cubic feet as “M”, so 5,402 Mcf/d is 5,402 million cubic feet a day.
- Shell prints full-year volumes for its subsidiaries and its share of joint ventures and associates; their sum is converted here. Its headline, in oil equivalent, is 1,265 thousand boe/d.
- QatarEnergy publishes no production or reserves figures; Qatar’s national output was 183.5 bcm in 2025 (Table 8) and its reserves 23.8 Tcm (Table 9).
- Gazprom’s websites could not be reached when this guide was refreshed; Russia’s national output was 609.4 bcm (Table 8).
Source: each company’s 2025 annual filing — PetroChina Annual Report 2025 (HKEX, 23 Apr 2026), Chevron 2025 Form 10-K, ExxonMobil 2025 Form 10-K, Shell 2025 Form 20-F, Expand Energy 2025 Form 10-K, EQT 2025 Form 10-K and TotalEnergies 2025 Form 20-F, whose page numbers are those of its Universal Registration Document. Converted here at 35.315 cubic feet per cubic metre (EI 2026, p.83) and 365 days; reserve life = reserves ÷ 2025 production, computed here. Each company’s own basis: production is net, after royalties, and includes equity affiliates where the company reports them; ExxonMobil and Shell report gas available for sale, PetroChina marketable gas, EQT sales volume. Reserves are proved (developed + undeveloped), consolidated plus equity companies, under SEC rules for the US filers, Shell and TotalEnergies. No market-capitalisation figures are shown, by design.
Figure 13. PetroChina leads the listed gas producers; two US pure-plays rival the majors, 2025
Figure data: Table 18. Bases differ by company (Table 18, notes).
To screen every listed gas producer on these durable measures — production, reserves, reserve life and cost — use Metal Pilot’s natural gas stock screener. For the largest US producers compared on one price deck, see the peer comparison, US Natural Gas Producers Compared.
3.2 Company archetypes along the value chain
Gas exposure spans a wide risk spectrum. Upstream pure-plays produce and sell gas, so their profits move most with the price — the highest-beta way to own the commodity. Integrated majors blend gas with oil, refining and LNG trading, which dampens the leverage. LNG developers and exporters sell liquefaction capacity under long-term contracts and earn a fee or a spread, while midstream pipeline and processing companies earn largely fee-based, take-or-pay income (paid whether or not the customer uses the capacity) — more stable, but not immune. Utilities sit at the regulated end, and state companies answer to governments as much as to markets. Among the companies analysed on this blog are the Canadian gas producer Peyto Exploration and the LNG developer NextDecade.
The record bears the ranking out. From February 2020 to August 2022, while Henry Hub’s monthly average rose 361%, the share prices of Range Resources and EQT, two Appalachian pure-plays, rose about 1,090% and 710%, ExxonMobil’s about 86% and Williams, a gas pipeline company, about 79% (month-end closes, CNBC adjusted price data; Henry Hub from the U.S. EIA monthly series, both computed here). Fee-based is not the same as safe, though: from June 2014 to March 2020 Williams fell 76% alongside the gas pure-plays (Section 4.3).
Table 19. Natural gas company archetypes
| Archetype | What they do | Revenue model | Examples | Price sensitivity 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Upstream pure-play | Drill, produce and sell gas | Gas sales less cost | EQT, Expand Energy, Range Resources, Antero Resources | High (operating leverage) |
| Integrated major | Gas, oil, refining, LNG and trading | Diversified | ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, TotalEnergies | Medium (blended) |
| State company | National gas champion | State-directed | PetroChina, Gazprom, QatarEnergy | Medium (+ political) |
| LNG developer / exporter | Build and run liquefaction plants | Long-term tolling or sale contracts | NextDecade, Cheniere Energy | Low–medium (contracted) |
| Midstream | Gathering, processing, pipelines, storage | Fees, often take-or-pay | Williams | Low (fee-based) |
| Utility / distributor | Deliver gas to homes and businesses | Regulated returns | Local distribution utilities | Low |
Notes to Table 19
- Price sensitivity is this guide’s judgement, substantiated by the share-price episodes in the text and in Section 4.3.
Source: this guide’s classification, drawn from the companies’ 2025 filings (Table 18) and the Metal Pilot company-type taxonomy; the share-price episode from CNBC chart data (RRC, EQT, XOM, WMB daily closes) and the U.S. EIA Henry Hub monthly series.
Figure 14. Company archetypes by price sensitivity
Figure data: Table 19, price-sensitivity column. Bar lengths are illustrative ranks set by this guide, not measurements.
3.3 Infrastructure & balance-sheet assets
What a gas company owns determines what its filings are telling you. An upstream producer’s balance sheet rests on its proved reserves — the gas it can show is economically recoverable, split into developed (producible from existing wells) and undeveloped — and on its acreage and wells, measured by production rate and decline rate. Midstream and LNG companies own pipelines, processing plants, storage and liquefaction trains, valued on capacity, utilisation and the length and credit quality of their contracts. LNG trains are large, lumpy assets — Chevron’s Gorgon plant is three trains with 15.6 Mtpa of capacity (Table 4) — usually held in joint ventures, so watch gross vs. net: the attributable share is what reaches shareholders, and only net reserves and production reflect a company’s real exposure.
Table 20. Natural gas company assets and how they are measured
| Asset type | What it does | Key metric | Unit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proved reserves (developed / undeveloped) | The recoverable gas base | Reserves; reserve life; PV-10 | Bcf / bcm; years; $ |
| Acreage & wells | Produce gas | Output; decline rate; drilling inventory | Bcf/d; %/yr; locations |
| Gathering & processing plants | Collect gas; strip NGLs and impurities | Capacity; utilisation | Bcf/d; % |
| Pipelines & storage | Move and buffer gas | Capacity; throughput; working gas | Bcf/d; Bcf |
| LNG trains | Liquefy gas for export | Capacity; contracted share and term | Mtpa; %; years |
| Regasification terminals | Turn LNG back into gas | Send-out capacity | Bcf/d |
Source: this guide’s summary of the metrics companies report under SEC reserve rules (proved, developed and undeveloped reserves; PV-10 as defined in Expand Energy’s 2025 Form 10-K, “Glossary”) and the SPE Petroleum Resources Management System (2018 edition); LNG capacity units as in Chevron’s 2025 Form 10-K, Item 2.
4. Investing in natural gas
4.1 Ways to own it — exposure vehicles
Gas punishes the wrong vehicle harshly, so this decision comes first. You cannot practically hold the commodity. Futures (Henry Hub on NYMEX, TTF on ICE Endex) are the direct instrument — leveraged, margined and rolled monthly. Futures-based ETFs wrap that roll for retail buyers, and here the roll-yield trap bites hardest: a fund that holds the nearest contract must sell it before expiry and buy the next, and when later contracts cost more than nearer ones (contango, normal in an oversupplied market with costly storage) it sells low and buys high every month. The concluded record is stark: from December 2009 to December 2019 the United States Natural Gas Fund (UNG) lost about 95% of its value while Henry Hub’s monthly average fell 59% — the gap is the cost of rolling. In backwardation the roll works the other way. A gas ETF is a short-term trading tool, not a holding.
For a longer horizon the vehicle is equities: pure-play producers for leverage (their hedge books decide how much of a rally they keep), integrated majors for diluted exposure, LNG and midstream companies for contracted income, and utilities at the regulated end.
Table 21. Ways to own natural gas
| Vehicle | What you actually own | Tracks spot? | Key structural cost / risk | Best suited for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Futures (Henry Hub, TTF) | Exchange contracts for delivery | Near-term contract only | Leverage, margin calls, monthly roll | Professionals, hedgers |
| Futures-based ETF | A rolled futures position | No — decays in contango | Roll cost (UNG −95% vs. Henry Hub −59%, 2010–2019) | Days-to-weeks tactical views |
| Pure-play producer equities | Gas-producing businesses | Loosely — through hedges | Operating leverage; bankruptcy in long gluts | Leverage to the price |
| Integrated majors | Diversified energy businesses | Weakly | Gas is a minority of earnings | Core energy exposure |
| LNG and midstream equities | Contracted infrastructure | Barely | Contract and counterparty risk; leverage | Income |
| Utilities | Regulated distribution | No | Rate regulation | Defensive income |
Source: contract structures per the NYMEX Rulebook, chapter 220 and the ICE Endex Dutch TTF specification; the roll episode from CNBC chart data for UNG (split-adjusted daily closes, chart service), month-end $1,290.24 in December 2009 to $67.44 in December 2019, and the U.S. EIA Henry Hub monthly series, $5.35 to $2.22 over the same months; changes computed here. Structural attributes only — no fees or yields, which change.
4.2 How to value & screen gas producers
For an upstream producer, the metrics that matter are the reserve base and reserve life, the breakeven price per MMBtu (who keeps drilling when Henry Hub falls), the decline rate (shale wells deplete fast and must be replaced), the hedge book (how much output is sold forward — protection in a slump, a cap in a spike) and the basis differential, the discount or premium of the local hub to Henry Hub. For LNG and midstream names, contract cover, counterparty credit and utilisation matter more than the gas price. Valuation ratios such as enterprise value per unit of reserves are screening tools for the platform, not figures for an evergreen guide.
The most useful single picture is the cost curve: rank supply from cheapest to most expensive breakeven, draw the price across it, and you can see who earns a margin and who is under water. The curve below is a stylised illustration of the shape, not company data.
Table 22. Natural gas producer screening metrics
| Metric | What it tells you | Good vs. concerning | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proved reserves; reserve life | Scale and longevity | Larger and longer is better | Reserve disclosure (10-K Item 1–2) |
| Breakeven price per MMBtu | Cost competitiveness | Bottom half of the cost curve | Investor presentations |
| Decline rate | How much drilling just holds output flat | Lower is better | Reserve report; type curves |
| Hedge book | Cash-flow protection vs. upside | Some upside left unhedged | Derivatives note |
| Basis differential | Local price vs. Henry Hub | Close to the hub is better | Realised-price disclosures |
| Contract cover (LNG, midstream) | Share of capacity under long-term contract | High, with strong counterparties | MD&A; contract disclosures |
Source: this guide’s screening framework, built on the disclosures named in the last column (for example the realised-price and derivatives sections of EQT’s 2025 Form 10-K). Thresholds are judgement, not a source’s.
Figure 15. Illustrative natural gas cost curve (breakeven vs. cumulative output)
Chart source: this guide — a stylised illustration; the tiers and widths are not company or agency data. Only the reference line is measured: the 2025 average Henry Hub price, $3.52/MMBtu (Table 3).
4.3 Macro regimes, rates & correlations
Gas is the most weather- and storage-driven of the major commodities, and the least tied to the macro cycle. Demand is dominated by power and heating, so temperature, storage levels and regional supply shocks move the price far more than GDP growth or interest rates; and because gas is regional, a shock in one market can leave another untouched. (For how the major commodities compare across macro regimes, see the macro regime guide.)
Table 23. Natural gas across economic and seasonal regimes
| Regime | Typical gas behaviour 1 | Why | Concluded example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cold snap or heat wave | Very strong, short-lived | Heating or cooling demand drains storage | Jan 2026: Henry Hub hit $30.72 on 23 Jan; January averaged $7.72 against $4.26 in December 2025 |
| Regional supply shock | Very strong locally | Pipeline or LNG supply lost | 2022: TTF averaged $37.09, against $6.45 at Henry Hub |
| Inflation surge with tight supply | Strong | Energy prices led the inflation | 2021–22: Henry Hub $3.89 to $6.45; TTF $15.67 to $37.09 |
| LNG export build-out | Tighter in the US, looser for importers | Exports add US demand | 2025: US LNG exports +27% to 147 bcm; Henry Hub $3.52 against $2.19 in 2024 |
| Disinflation with full storage | Weak | Supply outruns demand | 2023–24: Henry Hub $2.53 and $2.19; TTF $12.87 and $10.89 |
| Recession or demand shock | Weak | Industrial and power demand fall | 2009: Henry Hub $3.94 vs. $8.86 in 2008; 2020: $2.03, and TTF $3.13 — the low of its series |
Notes to Table 23
- Behaviour is this guide’s reading of the examples, which are concluded annual or daily records.
Source: annual Henry Hub from the U.S. EIA RNGWHHD annual series and the January 2026 figures from its daily series (monthly means of daily prices computed here); TTF from EI’s “Natural gas: Prices” (Table 3, p.51); US LNG exports from EI’s “Natural gas: Inter-regional trade” (p.52).
Past performance. Gas is a study in volatility. Henry Hub’s annual average ranged from $8.86 (2008) to $2.03 (2020) over 2000–2025; in 2025 dollars, the 2005 average of $14.33 fell to $2.25 by 2024, a real decline of 84%. Day to day it is wilder still — a single day’s price in January 2026 was seven times the previous month’s average — and in Europe TTF’s 2022 average was twelve times its 2020 level. Gas rewards those who read weather and storage and punishes buy-and-hold. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
Rates and the dollar. The usual commodity channels barely register. Gas is not held as a store of value, so the opportunity-cost channel of real interest rates does not apply, and its monthly price changes have shown no measurable correlation with the US dollar over two decades (Table 24).
The equity amplifier — and destroyer. Gas equities do not just amplify the commodity; in the wrong part of the cost curve they do not survive it. From June 2014 to March 2020, as Henry Hub’s monthly average fell 61% (from $4.59 to $1.79/MMBtu), Range Resources’ share price fell 97% — and on 28 June 2020 Chesapeake Energy — now part of Expand Energy (Table 18) — filed for Chapter 11 to eliminate about $7 bn of debt (Chesapeake Energy press release, 28 Jun 2020, “has voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 protection”). The recovery was just as violent: from February 2020 to August 2022 Henry Hub rose 361% ($1.91 → $8.81), Range Resources 1,086% and EQT 714%. But leverage is not symmetric when hedges and forward prices intervene: from August 2022 to February 2024 Henry Hub fell 80% while EQT fell 22% and Range 4%. Cost position decides who survives a glut; the hedge book and the futures curve decide how much of a spike a producer keeps. (Share prices are CNBC month-end closes, split-adjusted; Henry Hub is the U.S. EIA monthly average; changes computed here.)
Correlations. On monthly price changes from 2006 to 2025, Henry Hub’s link to every other asset is weak: +0.18 with LNG delivered to Japan and +0.16 with TTF, +0.12 with Brent crude, +0.10 with coal, +0.04 with the S&P 500 and zero with the US dollar. Even the gas-to-gas links are low, because US gas cannot reach Europe or Asia faster than liquefaction capacity allows. All of these move around a lot: over rolling 24-month windows each has ranged between roughly −0.5 and +0.6.
Table 24. Henry Hub correlations with other assets, monthly 2006–2025
| Asset | Correlation with Henry Hub | 24-month rolling range | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Japan LNG (cif) | +0.18 | −0.36 to +0.46 | Oil-indexed contracts dilute the link |
| TTF (Europe) | +0.16 | −0.34 to +0.62 | Linked only through LNG export capacity |
| Brent crude | +0.12 | −0.34 to +0.64 | Decoupled since the shale boom |
| Coal (Australia) | +0.10 | −0.37 to +0.54 | Competes with gas in power, but in different regions |
| S&P 500 | +0.04 | −0.43 to +0.59 | Gas follows weather, not earnings |
| US dollar (broad index) | 0.00 | −0.46 to +0.49 | No dollar channel |
Source: computed here from monthly percentage changes, January 2006 – December 2025 (240 months; 239 for the dollar): Henry Hub from the U.S. EIA monthly series (RNGWHHD); Brent from the U.S. EIA monthly series (RBRTE); TTF (“Natural gas, Europe”), Japan LNG (“Liquefied natural gas, Japan”) and coal (“Coal, Australian”) from the World Bank Pink Sheet, monthly; the S&P 500 from Robert Shiller’s monthly data (monthly average of daily closes); the dollar from FRED DTWEXBGS (monthly mean of daily values). Pearson correlations; the rolling range is the lowest and highest 24-month correlation in the window. Notes are this guide’s reading. Historical and unstable — not a forecast. The script and merged data are in the source pack (metalpilot_natural_gas_market.py).
Figure 16. Henry Hub moves almost independently of other assets, monthly 2006–2025
Figure data: Table 24, full-period column; coal (+0.10) is in the table only. Tiles are shaded on a fixed scale on which a correlation of 0.75 or more is solid.
4.4 Price drivers & cycles
Stripped of noise, the gas price answers to a short list of forces, and the clearest evidence comes from concluded episodes. On the demand side: weather, coal-to-gas switching in power, industrial activity and LNG export pull. On the supply side: shale productivity, storage levels, outages and pipeline cuts, and geopolitics. The pattern is short, sharp, regional cycles set by storage and weather, layered on a slower capex cycle in LNG.
The settled case studies: the mid-2000s scarcity pushed Henry Hub’s annual average to $8.69 in 2005 and $8.86 in 2008; the shale boom then cut it to $2.75 by 2012; the 2020 pandemic took it to $2.03, the low of the 2000–2025 series; the 2022 European crisis, after Russian pipeline supply collapsed, lifted TTF to $37.09 for the year; and the 2024 US glut — mild weather, storage at 3,972 Bcf in November 2024, near its record — produced $2.19, the lowest annual average in real terms. A cold snap in January 2026 then showed the other side: $30.72 on a single day. The durable lesson: gas spikes when weather or a supply cut drains storage faster than supply can respond, and collapses when mild weather and abundant shale leave storage full.
Table 25. Natural gas price drivers
| Driver | Direction of effect | Why | What to watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weather | Cold or hot, higher | Heating and power-cooling demand | Forecasts; heating and cooling degree days |
| Storage | Below average, higher | The market’s buffer | U.S. EIA weekly storage report; EU fill levels |
| LNG exports | More exports, higher US price | Adds demand for US gas | Terminal start-ups; feedgas flows |
| Coal-to-gas switching | Cheap gas, more gas burned | Power plants swap fuels | Coal–gas price spread |
| Shale productivity | More supply, lower | The structural supply force | Rig counts; well productivity |
| Geopolitics and outages | Supply loss, higher, regionally | Pipeline or shipping route cut | Russia, the Gulf, LNG plant outages |
Source: this guide’s synthesis of the episodes above (Tables 3 and 23, Figure 12); the U.S. EIA’s storage report and the EU fill rules are described in Section 2.8.
The same forces resolve into three illustrative regimes — conditions, not forecasts.
Table 26. Illustrative natural gas price scenarios
| Scenario | Conditions | Likely regime |
|---|---|---|
| Bear | Mild winters, full storage, LNG capacity outrunning demand | Henry Hub near its 2020–2024 lows ($2–2.5); TTF and JKM converge downward |
| Base | Normal weather, storage near the five-year average, LNG growth matched by demand | Henry Hub around its 2021–25 average ($3.7); Europe and Asia at a premium that covers LNG costs |
| Bull | Cold winter or supply shock draining storage; LNG demand outrunning capacity | Sharp regional spikes, as in Europe in 2022, until demand is destroyed |
Source: this guide — illustrative conditions drawn from the 2000–2025 record (Tables 3 and 23); price anchors from Table 3. Explicitly not predictions.
Live 2026 aside. The Gulf war is the live test of the bull case: the loss of most Qatari and Emirati LNG from March 2026 lifted TTF to $25.42 in September, while Henry Hub stayed near $3 (Sections 1.3 and 2.6). It is not yet a concluded episode.
4.5 Risks, controversies & ESG
The financial risk is price volatility itself: a mild winter with full storage can halve the price, as 2023–24 showed, and a long glut can bankrupt high-cost producers, as 2020 did. Geopolitical and infrastructure risk is acute and regional — Europe’s loss of Russian pipeline gas in 2022 and Asia’s loss of Gulf LNG in 2026. LNG overbuild is the structural risk for exporters: the wave of capacity due by 2030 could outrun demand (Section 5). And substitution runs both ways: renewables plus storage compete with gas in power, even as gas displaces coal.
The ESG debate is distinctive. Burned, gas emits less than half the CO₂ of coal per kWh (Section 1.1) — its case as a “bridge” fuel. But methane that escapes from wells, pipelines and plants is a potent greenhouse gas, and leakage can erode that advantage; it is the focus of tightening regulation and satellite monitoring. Hydraulic fracturing raises water-use, induced-seismicity and local-pollution concerns, and large LNG and pipeline projects face permitting fights. Whether gas is a bridge to a low-carbon system or a lock-in of fossil infrastructure is one of the most contested questions in energy, and reasonable analysts weigh it very differently.
Figure 17. Natural gas risk map — likelihood × impact
Chart source: this guide’s qualitative assessment — positions are judgement, not measured; the episodes behind them are in Sections 2.6, 4.3 and 4.4.
5. Future outlook & forecasts
Gas sits between the fuels expected to decline and the materials expected to boom: most outlooks see demand still growing for years, driven by Asia, the Middle East and power generation, even as Europe shrinks. They are scenarios, not measured facts — and they disagree mainly on how fast renewables displace gas in power after 2035.
5.1 Demand
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2025 has world demand rising from 4,254 bcm in 2024 to 4,770 bcm in 2035 in its Stated Policies Scenario and then easing to 4,645 bcm by 2050; in its Current Policies Scenario it keeps rising to 5,596 bcm. The GECF’s Global Gas Outlook 2055 (tenth edition, April 2026) projects 4,589 bcm by 2030, 5,363 bcm by 2050 and 5,417 bcm by 2055, with Asia Pacific supplying 43% of net growth and power more than half of incremental demand (GECF, Global Gas Outlook 2055 — key messages). The gap between the IEA’s two scenarios by 2050 — almost 1,000 bcm, about a quarter of today’s market — is the size of the policy question.
5.2 Supply and the LNG wave
Gas faces no near-term scarcity — proved reserves would last about 51 years at 2025 output (Table 9) — and the structural story is supply, not shortage. Before the Gulf war, the IEA counted an “unprecedented 300 bcm of new LNG export capacity” due between 2025 and 2030, more than half of it in the United States and a further quarter in Qatar, lifting available export capacity from 565 bcm in 2024 to 830 bcm in 2030 — more than its Stated Policies demand growth of about 200 bcm, so the market was set to loosen and prices to fall. The 2026 war changed the timing: the IEA now puts cumulative LNG supply losses at about 140 bcm over 2026–2030, equal to 15% of the new supply planned, and expects markets to stay tighter than expected through 2027 (Section 2.6).
Table 27. Natural gas and LNG outlooks, 2024–2055
| Outlook — source · scenario | 2024 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2050 | 2055 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| World gas demand — IEA · Stated Policies | 4,254 bcm | — | 4,770 bcm | — | 4,645 bcm | — |
| World gas demand — IEA · Current Policies | 4,254 bcm | — | 5,044 bcm | — | 5,596 bcm | — |
| World gas demand — GECF · Reference Case | 4,134 bcm | 4,589 bcm | — | 5,127 bcm | 5,363 bcm | 5,417 bcm |
| Available LNG export capacity — IEA | 565 bcm | 830 bcm | — | — | — | — |
| LNG demand — IEA · Stated Policies 1 | 560 bcm | ~760 bcm | — | — | — | — |
| LNG demand — IEA · Current Policies 1 | 560 bcm | ~820 bcm | — | — | — | — |
Notes to Table 27
- 2024 plus the IEA’s stated increase to 2030 (+200 bcm and +260 bcm), computed here. The IEA’s LNG volumes (560 bcm in 2024) are on its own basis and run above EI’s gross LNG exports (545 bcm), so the two are not mixed.
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025, Annex A, Table A.13 “Natural gas demand (bcm)”, row “World” — p.435; LNG from Chapter 1, “300 bcm of new LNG export capacity” and footnote 2, “LNG demand in 2024 was 560 bcm” — p.68, and Chapter 4, “available LNG export capacity is set to rise from 565 bcm in 2024 to 830 bcm in 2030” — p.216. GECF from Global Gas Outlook 2055, 10th edition, table “Global primary natural gas demand outlook by region, 2024-2055”, row “World” — p.100. Both outlooks were prepared before (IEA) or in the first weeks of (GECF) the 2026 Gulf war. Scenario projections, not measured data.
Figure 18. World gas demand in 2050 — a 950 bcm spread between outlooks
Figure data: Table 27, 2050 column, with the IEA’s 2024 level for scale.
5.3 Catalysts to watch
In the near term, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the repair of Qatar’s Ras Laffan plant decide how fast the 2026 shock unwinds; then the usual triggers return — winter weather and storage, read every Thursday in the U.S. EIA report and in Europe’s fill levels. Over three to ten years, the structural themes are the LNG capacity wave (US, Qatari and African projects, with three large US projects approved since March 2026), power demand from electrification, coal-to-gas switching in Asia, and, on the other side, renewables and methane regulation. What would confirm the bullish case: LNG demand absorbing the new capacity. What would break it: an LNG glut, a run of mild winters, or faster displacement of gas in power.
Table 28. Natural gas catalyst calendar
| Catalyst / theme | Timing | Why it matters | Watch |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Hormuz reopening; Ras Laffan repairs | Live — 2026–27 | Restores about a fifth of LNG supply | LNG loadings in Qatar and the UAE |
| U.S. EIA weekly storage report | Weekly (Thursday, 10:30 ET) | Moves the US price | Storage vs. five-year average |
| Winter and summer weather | Seasonal | Heating and cooling demand | Forecasts; degree days |
| EU storage target window | Annually, 1 Oct – 1 Dec (rule runs to end-2027) | Sets Europe’s summer buying | Fill levels; the 2026 security-framework review |
| New LNG export capacity | 2026–2030 | Supply wave; CP2 Phase 2 and Commonwealth LNG due in 2030 | Start-up dates; final investment decisions |
| EI Statistical Review | Annually (June) | Updates the country data in this guide | energyinst.org |
| IEA Gas Market Report | Quarterly | Market balance and outlook | iea.org |
Source: U.S. EIA, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report (release time); European Commission, Gas storage (target window, 2027 end date and the planned 2026 review of the “broader energy security framework”); IEA, Gas Market Report, Q3-2026 (Hormuz, Ras Laffan, the CP2 Phase 2, Delfin and Commonwealth LNG decisions and start dates). Timing as published; themes are this guide’s selection.
6. Summary
Natural gas is the swing fuel of the modern energy system — cleaner-burning than coal, indispensable to power grids, and increasingly shipped across oceans as LNG. It has no single world price: it clears in three regional markets — Henry Hub (≈$3.5/MMBtu in 2025), TTF and JKM (≈$12) — whose spread pays for the LNG trade. Supply is concentrated: the United States produces a quarter of the world’s gas, and five countries pump almost three-fifths, with US shale and associated gas from the Permian the growth engine and giant conventional fields — Qatar’s North Field above all — the long-life base. Demand of ≈4,186 bcm is led by power generation, then industry and buildings, and is growing in Asia and the Middle East while Europe shrinks. The world balance is a statistical residual; the real balance is regional and shows up in storage — about 43 days of US consumption at the 2025 peak, a quarter of the EU’s annual use. Gas is not recycled, and shale’s share of supply has quadrupled since 2010. LNG now carries more than half of inter-regional trade, so maritime chokepoints matter — above all Hormuz, through which a fifth of world LNG passed before the 2026 war closed it. There is no cartel: the GECF sets no quotas, and state power and EU storage rules do the coordinating. The companies span state champions, majors and US shale pure-plays, best compared on production, reserves and reserve life. Gas’s regime is its own — weather- and storage-driven, regional and violently volatile, barely correlated with oil, equities or the dollar — and its equities amplify it in both directions until a glut bankrupts the high-cost producers. The single most important thing to watch is the LNG export wave against weather, storage and the war’s unwinding.
To go from this big-picture view to the actual companies — screening every gas producer by production, reserves and reserve life — explore Metal Pilot’s natural gas stock screener.
Terms in this post (50)
- Associated / non-associated gas
- Gas produced with oil vs. from a gas field. Associated gas follows the oil price, not the gas price.
- Basis differential
- The gap between a local gas or oil hub price and its benchmark, such as Henry Hub. A wide negative basis means the pipelines out of the region are full.
- bcm / Tcm
- Billion / trillion cubic metres. The metric volume units for flows and reserves.
- boe (barrel of oil equivalent)
- Oil, gas liquids and gas added up in barrels, with gas converted at 6 mcf to one barrel — an energy equivalence, not a value one. kboe/d is thousand barrels a day; mmboe is million barrels.
- Breakeven
- The commodity price at which a measure — usually free cash flow after dividends or after capital — turns zero, at the company’s current costs and spending. Lower is safer. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — The cost curve & breakevens
- Brent
- The North Sea crude benchmark that prices most of the world’s internationally traded oil. In depth: Oil market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
- Chokepoint
- A narrow sea passage a large share of seaborne trade must pass, such as the Strait of Hormuz. A disruption there moves prices worldwide.
- CIF
- Cost, insurance and freight — a delivered price that includes shipping and insurance to the named port, set against FOB, the price at the loading port.
- Coal-to-gas switching
- Power plants choosing gas over coal, or back again, on the relative cost of the two fuels. It ties coal and gas prices together through the power sector.
- Contango / backwardation
- The slope of a futures curve: contango when later-dated contracts cost more than nearer ones, backwardation when they cost less. Backwardation usually signals a tight market.
- Conventional / unconventional
- Gas that flows from permeable rock vs. gas locked in rock that must be fractured. Sets cost, decline rate and how fast supply responds.
- Correlation
- A measure from −1 to +1 of how closely two series move together. A high correlation means little diversification between them.
- Cost curve
- Producers ranked from the lowest to the highest unit cost against their cumulative output. The cost of the marginal producer tends to set the floor for prices over a cycle.
- Decline rate
- The yearly fall in a well’s or field’s output without new investment. A high decline rate forces a producer to keep spending just to hold production flat.
- Dry / wet gas
- Almost pure methane vs. gas carrying natural gas liquids. Wet gas earns a second revenue stream.
- Fill target
- A legal requirement to fill storage to a set level by a deadline. Europe’s substitute for a strategic reserve.
- Five-year average (storage)
- The average storage level for the same week of recent years. The benchmark traders compare storage with.
- Fractionation
- Splitting the mixed stream of natural gas liquids into separate purity products such as ethane, propane and butane.
- Futures / roll
- Exchange contracts for future delivery; replacing an expiring contract with the next. The direct instrument — and the source of ETF decay.
- GECF
- Gas Exporting Countries Forum — an intergovernmental forum of gas exporters. The nearest thing to a gas OPEC, without quotas.
- Hedge
- Contracts — swaps, forwards, options — that fix the price of future sales or set a floor under it, trading some upside for certainty.
- Henry Hub
- The Louisiana pipeline hub whose price is the US natural gas benchmark; NYMEX’s futures deliver there. Quoted in dollars per million British thermal units (MMBtu), roughly a thousand cubic feet of gas. In depth: Natural gas market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
- Henry Hub / TTF / NBP / JKM
- The US, Dutch, British and North Asian LNG price benchmarks. Gas has no single world price.
- Hydraulic fracturing
- Pumping water, sand and chemicals at high pressure to crack tight rock so that oil or gas can flow — the method behind shale production.
- Inter-regional trade / re-export
- Trade between world regions; LNG imported and shipped on again. Why trade totals differ by definition.
- JKM
- Platts’ Japan/Korea Marker: the benchmark price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to North-East Asia, in dollars per MMBtu. In depth: Natural gas market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
- Liquefaction train / Mtpa
- One processing line of an LNG plant; its capacity in million tonnes a year. LNG projects are sized and financed in trains.
- LNG
- Liquefied natural gas — gas cooled to about −162 °C into a liquid so it can be shipped by sea. It links regional gas markets into one global market.
- Marketed / saleable / dry production
- Output after removing re-injected, flared and processed volumes, on each agency’s basis. Why sources differ for the same field.
- Mcf / MMcf / Bcf / Tcf; Bcf/d
- Thousand / million / billion / trillion cubic feet; billion cubic feet per day. The US volume units; M = thousand, MM = million.
- mcf, bcf (gas volumes)
- Natural gas in cubic feet: mcf is a thousand, mmcf a million, bcf a billion and tcf a trillion; 6 mcf count as one barrel of oil equivalent.
- Methane (CH₄)
- The main component of natural gas. What is burned; a potent greenhouse gas if it leaks.
- MMBtu
- One million British thermal units, the energy unit North American gas is priced in; roughly a thousand cubic feet of gas.
- NGLs (natural gas liquids)
- Ethane, propane, butanes and heavier liquids separated from produced gas, sold at a fraction of the oil price. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — The product slate & crude quality
- Oil-indexed vs. hub-indexed contract
- LNG priced by a formula on crude oil vs. on a gas hub price. Explains why Japan’s import price lags spot prices.
- Operating leverage
- Profits that move more than revenue because costs are largely fixed, which makes a producer’s earnings swing harder than the commodity price.
- Production
- The metal, oil or gas the company produced in the period at its own share of each mine or field — ounces, pounds or tonnes, or barrels of oil equivalent a day — before or after royalties as it reports; for a royalty or stream holder, its share of the operators’ output. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Units & reading a production number
- Proved reserves (1P)
- The highest-confidence oil and gas reserve category, the one US-listed producers report under SEC rules: reasonably certain to be produced, about a 90% chance. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Reserves vs resources
- PV-10
- The present value of the future net cash flows from proved reserves, before tax, discounted at 10% a year at the SEC’s prescribed prices — a standardised disclosure, not a valuation, and highly sensitive to that price. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — How to read & screen a producer
- Re-injection
- Pumping produced gas back into a reservoir to hold up pressure. Excluded from production statistics.
- Regasification
- Warming LNG back into gas at an import terminal. The import side of the LNG chain.
- Reserve life
- Years the reserves last at the current or guided production rate: reserves divided by a year’s output, on one reserve category. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — How to read & screen a producer
- Reserves
- What a company can show it will produce at a profit from known deposits or fields, at stated prices and costs, estimated under a disclosure code — NI 43-101, JORC or S-K 1300 for mines; SEC rules or NI 51-101 for oil and gas. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Reserves vs resources
- Shale gas / tight gas / coalbed methane
- Unconventional gas in shale, low-permeability sandstone, or coal seams. Shale drove US growth (Table 12).
- Sour gas / sweetening
- Gas with hydrogen sulphide or CO₂; removing it. Adds processing cost.
- Spot vs. term
- One cargo at today’s price vs. volumes under a long-term contract. Term contracts dampen price swings for buyers and sellers.
- Take-or-pay
- A contract under which a buyer pays for contracted capacity or volume whether or not it uses it.
- TTF
- The Dutch Title Transfer Facility, Europe’s gas benchmark, in euros per megawatt-hour. In depth: Natural gas market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
- Upstream / midstream / downstream
- The three segments of the oil and gas chain: finding and producing, transporting and storing, refining and marketing.
- Working gas
- The gas in storage that can actually be withdrawn and sold, beyond the cushion gas left in place. In depth: Natural gas market guide — Gas storage & strategic reserves
7. Sources, methodology & disclaimer
7.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage
Methodology. Data as of 8 October 2026. Market structure is for full-year 2025, the latest complete year; prices are full-year and multi-year averages of daily or monthly data, not spot quotes. Every table and figure carries a source line naming the document, its edition, the place in it and the basis, and Table 29 lists every document once with each table, figure and passage that draws on it. Conventions: volumes in billion cubic metres follow the Energy Institute, which standardises gas to a gross calorific value of 40 MJ/m³; US volumes in cubic feet are converted at 35.315 cf per m³ and 365 days a year (EI’s own factor); shares, changes not printed by the source, reserve lives, unit conversions, balances and correlations are computed here from the unrounded figures; judgement columns (trend, price sensitivity, scenario conditions) are labelled. Three agencies measure gas on different bases, and the guide never mixes them in one table: EI (40 MJ/m³; world production 4,196 bcm in 2025), OPEC (standard cubic metres at 15.6 °C; 4,342 bcm of marketed production) and the IEA (4,282 bcm in 2024 against EI’s 4,143). Reserves and reserve lives therefore use OPEC’s production; the supply mix uses the IEA’s shares, not its levels. Correlations are Pearson coefficients of monthly percentage changes over January 2006 – December 2025, with 24-month rolling ranges; regime statements are historical, not forecasts. Update cadence: the guide is refreshed once a year after EI’s Statistical Review is published each June, with interim updates when the U.S. EIA or the IEA revise a headline series.
Data gaps & substitutions.
- No global gas balance series. No agency publishes an annual world gas surplus or deficit; EI’s production–consumption gap is a statistical residual (Table 10), so storage (Table 17, Figure 12) stands in as the balance signal and the net-position chart (Figure 8) shows the regional imbalance.
- Reserves. EI has not updated its reserves tables since end-2020 (“The methodology and timing of updating the reserves numbers is currently under review”, data workbook), so Table 9 uses OPEC’s end-2025 figures.
- JKM. Platts JKM is a subscription assessment; its annual averages are taken from EI’s prices table, which prints them.
- Company data. Gazprom’s websites could not be reached on 8 Oct 2026, and QatarEnergy publishes no production or reserves figures; Table 18 carries both as n/d or n/p, with national totals in its notes.
- Fields. No published 2025 figure was found for Iran’s South Pars, Russia’s West Siberian fields or the Montney as a play; Table 4 uses Qatar’s national output for the North Field and British Columbia’s provincial output for the Montney.
- EI PDF report. The 2026 data workbook is saved in the source pack; the PDF report could not be saved (the publisher’s site blocked a second download) and was read in the browser — its printed page numbers are cited.
- NYMEX Rulebook. CME blocks scripted downloads; chapter 220 was read online and is not saved.
- Market value. A single annual value of world gas output is not printed: most gas is sold domestically at regulated or netback prices with no published average, so production × a hub price would overstate it.
- Henry Hub, 2013. Missing from the U.S. EIA’s downloadable annual file; taken from the daily series (Table 3, note 1).
Refresh log.
- 8 Oct 2026 — full refresh to the Commodity Guide Template. Moved every country series to EI’s Statistical Review 2026 (full-year 2025) and reserves to OPEC’s 2026 Statistical Bulletin; corrected the Henry Hub history to the U.S. EIA annual series (2005 is $8.69, not $8.79; 2022 $6.45; 2024 $2.19); replaced unsourced correlation estimates with computed ones (Table 24); added the top-consumers, balance, supply-mix, exporters, importers, GECF and storage tables, Source columns, numbered notes and this register; rebuilt the field and company tables from 2025 filings and agency data; updated the EU storage rule to Regulation EU/2025/1733; rebuilt every chart as a live component (Figures 3, 6, 7, 11, 12 replace exported images); and added labelled asides on the 2026 Gulf war.
- 19 Jul 2026 — first published (data as of 26 June 2026).
The register below is the guide’s reference list: one band per document, in order of first use, each linked to the edition cited.
Table 29. Source register — the document behind every table and figure
| Table / figure | What it takes | Locator | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — PDF report and data workbook | |||
| TL;DR; Figure 1 (notes 1–5, 8–9) | World production, consumption, LNG exports, US production share and consumption, TTF and JKM | Natural gas: Production, p.47; Consumption, p.49; LNG exports, p.53; Prices, p.51 | 2025 |
| Table 1; Table 18 | Gas and LNG conversion factors | Approximate conversion factors, natural gas and LNG, p.83 | — |
| Table 2 | Benchmark prices: Henry Hub, TTF, NBP, JKM, Japan LNG | Natural gas: Prices, p.51; workbook sheet “Gas Prices” | 2021–2025 |
| Table 3; Figure 3 | TTF, NBP and Japan LNG annual prices | Workbook sheet “Gas Prices”; p.51 | 2000–2025 |
| Table 4 | Qatar’s national production | Natural gas: Production, row “Qatar”, p.47 | 2025 |
| Table 5 | Consumption by country, printed growth and shares | Natural gas: Consumption in billion cubic metres, p.49 | 2015–2025 |
| Table 7; Figure 6 | Consumption by region | Workbook sheet “Gas Consumption - Bcm”, regional Total rows; p.49 | 2000–2025 |
| Table 8; Figure 7; Section 2.3 | Production by country, printed growth and shares | Natural gas: Production in billion cubic metres, p.47; workbook sheet “Gas Production - Bcm” | 2000–2025 |
| Table 10; Section 2.4 | World production and consumption; definition of the gap | Workbook sheets “Gas Production - Bcm” and “Gas Consumption - Bcm”, “Total World”; Methodology, p.82 | 2000–2025 |
| Table 11; Figure 8 | Production and consumption by country | pp.47 and 49 | 2025 |
| Section 2.5 | NGL production, world and US | Oil: Natural gas liquids production, p.34 | 2025 |
| Section 2.6; Figure 10; Table 23 | Inter-regional pipeline and LNG trade; Russia, Europe and US trade rows | Natural gas: Inter-regional trade, p.52; workbook sheet “Gas - Trade movements” | 2000–2025 |
| Tables 13, 14; Figure 11 | Exports and imports by country and mode; LNG flows | Workbook sheets “Gas trade 2025 - LNG” and “Gas trade 2025 - pipeline”; pp.54–55 | 2025 |
| Table 15; Table 27 (note) | World LNG exports | Workbook sheet “Gas - LNG exports bcm”, “Total LNG exports” | 2024 |
| U.S. EIA, Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (RNGWHHD) — annual, monthly and daily series; data to 6 Oct 2026 | |||
| Figure 1, note 7; Table 3; Figure 3; Figure 15 | Annual averages; 2013 from the daily series | RNGWHHD, annual; daily | 2000–2025 |
| Section 1.3 text | Real-terms comparison (with CPI) | RNGWHHD, annual | 1997–2025 |
| Table 19; Table 21; Section 4.3; Table 24 | Monthly averages for episodes and correlations | RNGWHHD, monthly | 2005–2025 |
| Table 23; Section 4.4 | January 2026 spike and monthly means | RNGWHHD, daily | Dec 2025 – Jan 2026 |
| OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2026 | |||
| Figure 1, note 6; Table 9; Section 2.3 | Proved reserves by country; reserve lives | Table 9.1, p.76; Table 9.2, p.77 | end-2025; 2025 |
| Table 16 | GECF members’ marketed production and reserves | Tables 9.1 and 9.2, pp.76–77 | 2025 |
| U.S. EIA, “How much carbon dioxide is produced per kilowatthour of U.S. electricity generation?” | |||
| Section 1.1; Section 4.5 | CO₂ per kWh, gas vs. coal | Table, “pounds per kWh” | 2023 |
| U.S. EIA, Liquefied natural gas explained | |||
| Section 1.1 | LNG temperature and volume ratio | “about 600 times smaller” | — |
| U.S. EIA, Units and calculators explained | |||
| Table 1 | Heat content of natural gas | “1.036 million Btu per thousand cubic feet” | — |
| ExxonMobil, 2025 Form 10-K | |||
| Table 1 | Gas-to-oil conversion convention | Item 2, 1.A, p.9 | — |
| Table 18 | Gas production available for sale; proved gas reserves | Item 2, 3.A, p.12; Item 2, 1.A, p.9 | 2025; end-2025 |
| Shell, 2025 Form 20-F | |||
| Table 1 | Gas-to-oil conversion factor | Glossary, p.10 | — |
| Table 18 | Gas production available for sale; proved gas reserves | Production available for sale, p.66; summary of proved reserves, p.63 | 2025; end-2025 |
| CME Group, NYMEX Rulebook chapter 220 — Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures — not saved (CME blocks scripted downloads) | |||
| Section 1.2; Table 2; Table 21 | Contract unit, delivery point and quotation | Rules 220101, 220102.B–C | — |
| U.S. EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook — October 2026 release — archived workbook | |||
| Section 1.2; Section 2.4; Table 17 | US natural gas consumption | Sheet 5atab, NGTCPUS | 2025 (mean of 12 months) |
| Table 4; Figure 4 | Appalachia, Permian and Haynesville marketed production | Sheet 5atab, NGMPAP, NGMPPM, NGMPHA | 2024–2025 |
| ICE, Dutch TTF Gas Futures — contract specification | |||
| Table 2; Table 21 | Delivery point and price quotation | Market Specifications | — |
| FRED, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPIAUCSL) | |||
| Table 3 (source line); Section 1.3; Section 4.3 | Deflator for real Henry Hub prices | Annual mean of monthly values | 1997–2025 |
| World Bank, Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), monthly | |||
| Section 1.3 aside; Section 4.4 aside | 2026 monthly TTF and US gas prices | Sheet “Monthly Prices”, “Natural gas, Europe”, “Natural gas, US” | Jan–Sep 2026 |
| Table 24; Figure 16 | TTF, Japan LNG and Australian coal for correlations | Same sheet, three columns | 2005–2025 |
| QatarEnergy, North Field West release (via Kyodo PR Wire) | |||
| Table 4 | LNG capacity target | “142 million tons per annum (MTPA)” | — |
| Canada Energy Regulator, Marketable Natural Gas Production in Canada | |||
| Table 4; Figure 4 | British Columbia marketable gas | Sheet “2023-25 - mmcfd Mpi3j”, “British Columbia” | 2024–2025 |
| Norwegian Offshore Directorate (Sodir), FactPages — field production, yearly | |||
| Table 4; Figure 4 | Troll saleable gas | “TROLL”, prfPrdGasNetBillSm3 | 2024–2025 |
| Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan, 2025 oil and gas production | |||
| Table 4; Figure 4 | Shah Deniz gas output | “27.9 bcm from Shah Deniz” | 2025 |
| Chevron, 2025 Form 10-K | |||
| Table 4; Figure 4 | Australia net gas production; Gorgon and Wheatstone capacity and interests | Item 1, net production table, p.7; Item 2, Australia | 2025 |
| Table 18; Figure 13 | Gas production; proved gas reserves | Item 1, p.7; Item 1, Reserves, p.5 | 2025; end-2025 |
| Table 20 | LNG capacity units | Item 2 | — |
| Government of the Netherlands, “Wet sluiting Groningenveld gaat per 19 april 2024 in” | |||
| Table 4 | Closure of the Groningen field | News release text | 19 Apr 2024 |
| IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025 | |||
| Table 6; Figure 5 | Gas use by sector | Table A.1a, p.414; Table A.2a, pp.415–416 | 2024 |
| Table 12; Figure 9; Section 7.1 | Production by resource type | Table A.12, p.435 | 2010, 2024 |
| Table 27; Figure 18; Section 5 | Demand scenarios; LNG capacity and demand | Table A.13, p.435; p.68; p.216 | 2024–2050 |
| IEA, Gas Market Report, Q3-2026 — executive summary | |||
| Section 2.2 aside | 2026 demand forecast | Executive summary | 2026 |
| Section 2.5 | CP2 Phase 2 timing | Executive summary | 2026–2030 |
| Section 2.6 aside; Section 5.2; Table 28 | Gulf LNG losses; Ras Laffan damage; new US projects | Executive summary | 2026–2030 |
| U.S. EIA, Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production — annual | |||
| Section 2.5 | US gross withdrawals by well type | “Gross Withdrawals”, shale, oil wells, gas wells | 2024 |
| U.S. EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints | |||
| Table 15; Section 2.6 | LNG flows through chokepoints; Hormuz bypass; Panama | Tables 2–5 and 7; Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal sections | 2023–1H25 |
| Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Overview and Membership | |||
| Section 2.7; Table 16 | Members, observers, stated shares and purpose | Overview; Membership | 2026 |
| U.S. EIA, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report | |||
| Section 2.8; Table 28 | Release time and five-year comparison | Report header | — |
| European Commission, Gas storage | |||
| Section 2.4; Section 2.8; Table 17 | EU storage level, share of consumption and the fill rules | Page text and “Gas storage rules 2025-2027” | 1 Oct 2025; 2025–2027 |
| Table 28 | Target window and the 2026 review | Same page | 2026–2027 |
| U.S. EIA, Weekly Lower 48 States Natural Gas Working Underground Storage (NW2_EPG0_SWO_R48_BCF) — data to the week ending 25 Sep 2026 | |||
| Table 17; Figure 12; Section 2.4 | 2025 peak, low and weekly path; 2020–2024 range; record | Weekly series | 2010–2025 |
| Section 4.4 | November 2024 storage level | Weekly series | 2024 |
| PetroChina, Annual Report 2025 — HKEX | |||
| Table 18; Figure 13 | Marketable gas output; proved gas reserves | Key Figures, p.22; Supplementary Information, p.289 | 2025; end-2025 |
| Expand Energy, 2025 Form 10-K | |||
| Table 18; Figure 13 | Gas production; proved gas reserves | Item 1, p.14; Item 1, p.15 | 2025; end-2025 |
| Table 20; Table 29 | Definition of PV-10 | Glossary | — |
| EQT, 2025 Form 10-K | |||
| Table 18; Figure 13 | Gas sales volume; proved gas reserves | Item 7; Item 1, Reserves | 2025; end-2025 |
| Table 22 | Example of realised-price and derivatives disclosure | Item 7; derivatives note | 2025 |
| TotalEnergies, 2025 Form 20-F (Universal Registration Document) | |||
| Table 18; Figure 13 | Gas production; proved gas reserves | §2.1, URD pp.74–75 | 2025; end-2025 |
| CNBC chart data — RRC, EQT, XOM, WMB and UNG daily closes — split-adjusted | |||
| Section 3.2; Table 19 | Share-price changes by archetype | Month-end closes | Jun 2014 – Aug 2022 |
| Section 4.1; Table 21 | UNG roll decay | Month-end closes | Dec 2009 – Dec 2019 |
| Section 4.3 | Equity amplifier episodes | Month-end closes | Jun 2014 – Feb 2024 |
| SPE, Petroleum Resources Management System — 2018 edition | |||
| Table 20; Table 29 | Reserves definitions | PRMS 2018 | — |
| Chesapeake Energy, press release “Chesapeake Energy Corporation commences voluntary Chapter 11 process” — Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1 | |||
| Section 4.3 | Chapter 11 filing and debt to be eliminated | Release text | 28 Jun 2020 |
| U.S. EIA, Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (RBRTE), monthly | |||
| Table 24; Figure 16 | Brent for correlations | RBRTE, monthly | 2005–2025 |
| Robert Shiller, U.S. stock market data (ie_data.xls) | |||
| Table 24; Figure 16 | S&P 500 monthly average | Sheet “Data”, column P | 2005–2025 |
| FRED, Nominal Broad U.S. Dollar Index (DTWEXBGS) | |||
| Table 24; Figure 16 | US dollar for correlations | Monthly mean of daily values | 2006–2025 |
| GECF, Global Gas Outlook 2055 — 10th edition, with the key-messages page | |||
| Table 27; Figure 18 | World demand, Reference Case | “Global primary natural gas demand outlook by region, 2024-2055”, p.100 | 2024–2055 |
| Section 5.1 | Asia Pacific and power shares of growth | Key messages | 2024–2055 |
| U.S. EIA, Glossary | |||
| This guide — derived, estimated or illustrative | |||
| Figure 2 | Value-chain stages | Conceptual diagram | — |
| Figure 1; Tables 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18; Figures 4, 8, 13 | Shares, unit conversions, totals, reserve lives and gaps | Computed from the documents above; scripts in the source pack | — |
| Table 8; Table 12 | Trend and price-elasticity columns | Judgement | — |
| Table 15 (workaround column); Table 19; Figure 14 | Workarounds, archetype classification and price sensitivity | Judgement; Metal Pilot company-type taxonomy | — |
| Table 17; Figure 12 | 2020–2024 storage average, high and low | Computed from the U.S. EIA weekly series | 2020–2024 |
| Tables 20, 22, 25 | Asset metrics, screening framework, price drivers | Synthesis | — |
| Table 23; Table 24; Figure 16 | Regime behaviour; correlations and rolling ranges | Computed (metalpilot_natural_gas_market.py); behaviour is judgement | 2006–2025 |
| Figure 15 | Cost-curve tiers | Illustrative — not data | — |
| Table 26 | Scenario conditions | Illustrative | — |
| Figure 17 | Risk positions | Judgement | — |
| Table 28 | Catalyst selection | Judgement | — |
Source: compiled from the source lines under each table and figure in this guide; each band links the edition cited. Files are kept in the guide’s source pack.
7.2 Disclaimer & disclosure
This report is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security or commodity. Natural gas prices are highly volatile, and the figures here are estimates as of the stated date that will change; reserves, correlations and regime descriptions are estimates and historical observations that may not persist. Do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser before acting. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI; its figures were sourced from the documents in the register above and reviewed, but readers should verify any number before relying on it. The author holds no position disclosed as a conflict in respect of the companies named.