Alamos Gold (AGI) — Stock Analysis 2026 [4.1]

Analysis as of 12 August 2026. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Alamos Gold’s 2025 Annual Information Form (year ended 31 December 2025, filed March 2026), the Island Gold District Expansion Study (3 February 2026) and its technical report (20 March 2026), and the Q2 2026 results released 29 July 2026. Market data is as of the NYSE close on 11 August 2026. Rating: ★★★★, Solid — Fairly valued (wide band) → quality compounder, now priced close to a conservative fair value after a 20% rally. Price deck (Table 3b gold rungs): bear US$3,500/oz, base US$4,000/oz, bull US$4,500/oz; spot ~US$4,370/oz as the run-rate cross-check; 5% real post-tax discount rate (7% bear, 4% bull), the precious-metals convention. All figures are US dollars unless marked C$. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Alamos Gold has 15.9 million ounces of reserves booked at an $1,800 gold price, four funded growth projects with published economics, no meaningful debt — and, after a 20% rally off its July lows, a share price back near $33.45 while gold trades at a record ~$4,370/oz. The thesis in one line: an intermediate producer with the best-documented organic growth pipeline in its peer group, priced at ~0.8× a conservative net asset value — cheap on the assets it is building, roughly fair on the cash flow it earns today. Why the swing: a June seismic event at the group’s oldest mine forced a 12% cut to 2026 production guidance in July and the market marked the shares down to $27.83; since then gold has climbed 7% and the shares have re-rated ~20%, while the assets that actually drive the value — Island Gold and Lynn Lake — never changed. To screen Alamos against every listed gold producer on grade, cost, reserve life and stage, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Alamos Gold Inc. (TSX: AGI; NYSE: AGI) is an intermediate gold producer headquartered in Toronto with about 1,918 employees, three operating mines — the Island Gold District and Young-Davidson in Ontario and the Mulatos District in Sonora, Mexico — and three funded growth projects behind them: the Phase 3+ Shaft Expansion and IGD Expansion at Island Gold, Puerto Del Aire (PDA) at Mulatos, and Lynn Lake in Manitoba. By archetype it is a producer/operator with a large, funded and permitted development pipeline, so the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). (AISC = all-in sustaining cost, cash costs plus royalties, corporate overhead and sustaining capital but not growth capital; koz = thousand ounces, Moz = million ounces; 2P = proven and probable mineral reserves; tpd = tonnes per day.)

Figure 1. Alamos Gold in numbers

Figure data: Alamos Gold Q2 2026 results release , 29 July 2026 (guidance, cash) and the 2025 Annual Information Form (reserves and resources); market data per stockanalysis.com as of the NYSE close on 11 August 2026. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.

Table 1. Alamos Gold in numbers

Source: Alamos Gold Q2 2026 results release , 29 July 2026, for guidance, quarterly operating figures and the balance sheet; 2025 Annual Information Form for reserves and resources, prepared under NI 43-101 and CIM definitions; market data, share count, 52-week range and consensus per stockanalysis.com , 11 Aug 2026. Cash margin = (realised price − AISC) ÷ realised price. Alamos reports measured and indicated resources exclusive of reserves, so the 5.5 Moz is additional to the 15.9 Moz, not inclusive of it. Net cash is cash and short-term investments of ~$676.7 m less ~$216.3 m of total debt at 30 June 2026, the latter chiefly lease liabilities and the gold prepayment obligation; the Q2 release discloses no drawn revolving credit. Listed: Public (TSX: AGI / NYSE: AGI).

Thesis in brief. Bull: 15.9 Moz of reserves booked at an $1,800/oz gold price against a ~$4,370 spot; a flagship in Island Gold whose reserve grades 10.61 g/t and whose own expansion study puts it at 534 koz a year from 2028 at a mine-site AISC of $1,025/oz; Lynn Lake behind it at 186 koz a year and $829/oz; a path from ~535 koz today toward ~1 Moz by 2030; no meaningful debt and a capital programme funded entirely from cash flow. Bear: the company just cut 2026 production guidance 12% and raised cost guidance 18% after a seismic event at Young-Davidson; Lynn Lake’s capital estimate has already risen 48% from the 2023 feasibility study; the growth is all in front of it and none of it is in the current cash flow; three separate law-firm investigations were announced in July; and after a 20% rally the shares now trade at ~0.8× a conservative NAV rather than the ~0.6× they touched in July. What tips it: whether Island Gold’s underground mining rate reaches the guided 2,000 tpd by year-end and the shaft commissions in Q1 2027. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Alamos is selling into the strongest gold market on record — spot near $4,370/oz in mid-August 2026 — and realised $4,504/oz in the second quarter, effectively at the London PM fix. Unlike many peers it carries almost no hedge drag: 279,000 of the 329,000 ounces of forward sales inherited with Argonaut Gold have been retired, leaving 50,000 ounces maturing in 2027. For how gold is priced and why miners are a geared expression of the metal, see the Gold — A Complete Market Guide . This section spends its words on the company.

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

Three producing mines, three growth projects, two countries, and a reserve base that grew 32% in 2025.

Table 2. Asset base

Source: Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form , Mineral Reserve and Mineral Resource tables effective 31 December 2025, prepared under NI 43-101 and CIM definitions; 2026 production guidance per the Q2 2026 results release , 29 July 2026 (revised from the 4 February 2026 guidance). Alamos reports measured and indicated resources exclusive of mineral reserves; a further 2.04 Moz of inferred resources sits outside both. Mineral resources are not mineral reserves and do not have demonstrated economic viability. Reserves were estimated at an assumed gold price of $1,800/oz and resources at $2,000/oz. The Mulatos M&I figure includes the Golden Arrow, Cerro Pelon and Carricito satellite deposits. Listed: Public (TSX: AGI / NYSE: AGI).

Two facts about that table matter more than the rest. Reserves rose 32% in 2025, from 12.0 Moz to 15.9 Moz net of divestitures, with mining depletion at the operating mines more than offset by exploration at those same mines. And they are booked at $1,800/oz against a ~$4,370 spot price — a 59% discount to the market, which is unusually conservative even by industry standards and means the reserve base is more likely to grow on price revision than shrink.

2.2 Where the revenue and the value sit

Alamos produces one metal — silver is a minor by-product — so revenue by segment is the asset split, and the picture it gives is already the story: one asset has been growing while the other two have not.

Figure 2. Revenue by segment, 2025

Figure data: segment revenue per stockanalysis.com drawing on Alamos Gold’s 2025 financial statements; corporate and other contributed −$45.0 m and is excluded from the ranking. Island Gold District revenue rose 88% in 2025 as the Magino mill was integrated; Young-Davidson rose 29% and Mulatos was flat.

Figure 3. Risked net asset value by asset

Figure data: the Section 7 net-asset-value build (Table 11, base case: $4,000/oz gold, 5% real post-tax discount rate, Lynn Lake risked at 0.85). Shares are of gross asset value before net cash and the hedge book — the bridge to equity is Figure 6. The Lynn Lake risk factor and the in-situ multiple behind “Other” are the author’s estimates, not disclosed figures.

The two figures together say the thing worth knowing: the Island Gold District is 46% of revenue today and 59% of value, and Lynn Lake is 0% of revenue and 16% of value. Young-Davidson — the mine that caused July’s guidance cut — is 30% of revenue and only 14% of value, because it is the shortest-lived and highest-cost of the three producers. The market spent July repricing the company on the asset that matters least to its net asset value.

2.3 Island Gold District — the flagship

The Island Gold District is the combination of the high-grade Island Gold underground mine with the Magino open pit and mill, acquired through the Argonaut Gold takeover in July 2024 and integrated into a single operation. That integration is the single best capital-allocation decision in the company’s recent history: two adjacent orebodies, one mill, and a district reserve of 8.28 Moz.

The grade is what sets it apart. Island Gold’s underground reserve grades 10.61 g/t Au — roughly five times the group average and among the highest-grade reserves of any operating mine in the peer set — against Magino’s 0.86 g/t open-pit ore that fills the mill. In the second quarter of 2026 the district produced a record 67,500 oz on record underground mining of 1,550 tpd (+25% year on year) and record Magino milling of 8,862 tpd, reaching about 10,000 tpd in July. Mine-site AISC of $1,715/oz rose 22% on Northern Ontario contractor and labour inflation, and the district’s production guidance was the only one Alamos did not cut in July.

Two expansions run through it. The Phase 3+ Shaft Expansion lifts underground mining from 1,200 tpd to 2,400 tpd with a shaft, paste plant and accelerated development; 91% of its capital was spent or committed at the end of 2025 and commissioning is guided to the first quarter of 2027, after which ore and waste skip to surface instead of being trucked up the ramp. The IGD Expansion Study, announced 3 February 2026 with a technical report filed 20 March, then expands the Magino mill to 20,000 tpd to support 3,000 tpd underground and 17,000 tpd open-pit mining.

The asset-level risk is narrow and dated: underground mining rates must reach 2,000 tpd by the end of 2026 for the shaft commissioning to deliver what the study assumes. It is currently the one operational metric in the portfolio running ahead of plan rather than behind it.

2.4 Young-Davidson — the mature mine that broke

Young-Davidson, near Matachewan in Ontario, is a mature underground mine with 2.98 Moz of reserves at 2.20 g/t and roughly a 14-year reserve life. It has been the group’s steady contributor for a decade, and in June 2026 it stopped being steady.

A seismic event at an active mining front damaged infrastructure and cut access to the 9410 level and two higher-grade stopes supplying roughly 2,500 tpd. No injuries were sustained. Mining rates of 7,132 tpd in the second quarter will fall to approximately 5,000 tpd for the rest of 2026; production guidance was cut from 155–175 koz to 100–115 koz, a 35% reduction at the midpoint, and mine-site AISC guidance rose from $1,730–1,830 to $2,500–2,600/oz. Second-half mine-site AISC is guided to about $3,300/oz with roughly $10 million of rehabilitation and ground support still to come.

Even so, the mine generated $67.4 million of mine-site free cash flow in the quarter at a $4,504/oz gold price — which is the useful lesson about a high-cost asset in a high-price market. The asset-level risk is that the durable post-event mining rate is unknown, and will not be established until the three-year guidance due early in 2027.

2.5 Mulatos District and Puerto Del Aire

The Mulatos District in Sonora is the group’s low-cost operation and its shortest-lived in current form. Q2 production of 30,100 oz — 25,100 from La Yaqui Grande and 5,000 from residual leaching of the original Mulatos pad — fell 12%, at a mine-site AISC of $1,132/oz, the lowest in the portfolio. The shortfall is a timing problem rather than a loss: recovery expectations are unchanged, but a longer leach cycle and rising pad height are stretching the time to recover ounces already stacked, and a $10.8 million pre-tax leach-pad write-down followed the quarter-end gold price fall.

What replaces it is Puerto Del Aire (PDA), an underground development on the same district infrastructure carrying 1.06 Moz of reserves at 5.45 g/t — four times La Yaqui Grande’s grade. Total initial capital is $165 million, unchanged, and first production is on track for mid-2027. PDA converts Mulatos from a declining heap-leach operation into a higher-grade underground mine using a mill the district is already building.

The asset-level risk here is jurisdictional rather than technical: Mexico has tightened mining concession and permitting rules since 2023, and Mulatos is the group’s only non-Canadian asset.

2.6 Lynn Lake — the second build

Lynn Lake in northern Manitoba took a positive construction decision on 13 January 2025 after the closure plan was approved, and Impact Benefit Agreements are now in place with both proximal First Nations, including one signed with Mathias Colomb Cree Nation in the first quarter of 2025. It holds 3.44 Moz of reserves at 1.25 g/t across four deposits — MacLellan, Gordon, Burnt Timber and Linkwood.

Table 3. Growth-project economics as published

Source: Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form — the IGD Expansion Study announced 3 February 2026 with a technical report filed 20 March 2026, the PDA capital estimate, and the updated Lynn Lake development plan. These are study estimates, not achieved results. Lynn Lake’s initial capital rose from $632 m in the 2023 Feasibility Study (2022 costing) to $937 m, reflecting a 13% mill-capacity increase to 9,000 tpd, three years of inflation, and a longer construction timeline after the 2025 northern Manitoba wildfires; incorporating the Burnt Timber and Linkwood satellite deposits extended the combined mine life from 17 to 27 years. Lynn Lake capital spending in 2026 is guided at $140–160 m, with the majority of initial capital falling in 2027 and 2028.

That table is the investment case and its main caveat in one place. An $829/oz mine-site AISC over the first ten years, in Manitoba, at a ~$4,370 gold price, is an exceptional asset — and the capital estimate to build it has already risen 48%. The wildfire delay and the scope increase are documented and defensible reasons; they are also exactly how mine capital budgets usually grow.

2.7 Other assets & the exploration pipeline

Beyond the reserves, Alamos carries 5.48 Moz of measured and indicated resources exclusive of reserves and a further 2.04 Moz inferred — including 1.06 Moz of inferred at Island Gold at 11.51 g/t, which is the highest-value conversion target in the portfolio. Satellite deposits at Golden Arrow, Cerro Pelon and Carricito sit around Mulatos. Through the April 2024 Orford Mining acquisition the company holds the Qiqavik gold project in Quebec, with $7.4 million budgeted for exploration and 8,000 m of heli-supported drilling planned for the 2026 season, plus interests in West Raglan, the Joutel-area properties and Nunavik Lithium. The Manitou Gold acquisition in May 2023 added ground around the Island Gold District.

The portfolio has also been pruned. In October 2025 Alamos sold its Turkish subsidiary Dogu Biga Madencilik for $470 million and sold its option on the Quartz Mountain project — two disposals that removed the group’s only politically exposed jurisdiction and funded the current build programme.

2.8 Group production, reserves & costs

Table 4. 2026 guidance — original, revised and half-year delivery

Source: Alamos Gold Q2 2026 results release , 29 July 2026. Guidance figures are management’s forward-looking estimates, not measured results. The production cut is almost entirely Young-Davidson (155–175 koz to 100–115 koz), with a smaller trim at Mulatos (125–145 koz to 120–135 koz); the Island Gold District’s guidance of 290–310 koz was unchanged. Growth capital was not raised.

Costs. Revised 2026 AISC of $1,775–1,875/oz sits above Agnico Eagle’s $1,400–1,550 and Kinross’s $1,380–1,480, roughly in line with Eldorado Gold’s $1,670–1,870, and well below B2Gold’s $2,400–2,580. Alamos is mid-pack, in a year damaged by one event — and its own studies put the two assets that will dominate production from 2028 at $1,025/oz and $829/oz mine-site AISC. For how cost-curve position decides who survives a downturn, see the macro regime guide .

Reserves and replacement. This is the strongest single fact in the analysis. Proven and probable reserves rose 32% to 15.9 Moz in 2025, net of divestitures and after mining depletion, with the additions coming from exploration at the existing mines rather than from acquisition. At 2026 guidance rates the reserve life is roughly 30 years — and because reserves are struck at $1,800/oz against a ~$4,370 spot, the conversion optionality behind them is unusually large.

Figure 4. Production growth profile, 2026 to 2030

Figure data: 2026 guidance midpoint per Table 4; the ~1 Moz 2030 target per company disclosure. The near-doubling is bridged by Puerto Del Aire (first production mid-2027), the IGD Expansion (study basis from 2028) and Lynn Lake (H1 2029); the per-asset stacked detail is carried in Table 3 rather than overlaid as multiple series (rule A13).

2.9 Peer positioning

The peer set used throughout this analysis — for every scorecard star in Section 9 and the relative valuation in Section 7 — is five listed gold producers of intermediate-to-senior scale with published 2026 guidance, spanning the low-cost seniors Alamos is measured against and the intermediates it competes with for capital.

Table 5. Peer positioning — quality metrics

Source: each company’s 2026 guidance as published — Agnico Eagle , Kinross , B2Gold and Eldorado Gold 2026 outlook releases; Northern Star FY2026 actuals per its June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report , converted at A$1 = US$0.68; Alamos per the Q2 2026 results release . AISC definitions differ between issuers — B2Gold’s is stated per ounce sold and Northern Star’s is a full-year actual rather than guidance — so the comparison is indicative. Screen the full gold peer set on grade, cost, reserve life and stage at Metal Pilot.

Alamos sits at the small end of that set on production and in the middle on cost — but it is the only name whose growth is fully permitted, fully funded from existing cash flow, and published with per-project economics. Eldorado’s Skouries is comparable in ambition but carries Greek and Turkish jurisdiction risk; B2Gold’s cost base is in a different league; Agnico and Kinross are three to five times the size with correspondingly less percentage growth available. The distinguishing feature of Alamos in this group is not scale or current cost — it is that a reader can look up exactly what each of its next three assets is supposed to earn.

3. Financials & balance sheet

Table 6. Five-year financial summary (US$m unless stated, years ended 31 December)

Source: Alamos Gold’s audited annual financial statements as compiled by stockanalysis.com from Fiscal.ai data. Trailing twelve months to 30 June 2026: revenue $2,230 m, net income $1,170 m, EBITDA $1,550 m, operating cash flow $990.5 m, free cash flow $319.5 m, cash and investments $676.7 m, total debt $216.3 m. Total debt arose with the July 2024 Argonaut Gold acquisition and is chiefly lease liabilities and the gold prepayment obligation, not drawn revolving credit. The dividend was raised 60% to $0.04 per quarter in Q1 2026, taking the annualised rate to $0.16. 2026 figures are not shown because the year is incomplete; H1 2026 delivery is in Table 4.

The five-year record is a company that grew revenue 120% and net income from a loss to $886 million while raising capital expenditure only 50% — and then, in 2026, stepped its capital spending up to $945–1,035 million, roughly double the 2025 level, to build three things at once. That is the single most important thing to understand about the current financials: 2026 free cash flow will be thin by design, and it is not a sign of deterioration. Q2 free cash flow of $143.5 million was up 70% year on year even so, because a $4,504/oz realised price against a $1,728/oz AISC produces a $2,776/oz margin.

Balance sheet and liquidity. At 30 June 2026 Alamos held $676.7 million of cash and short-term investments and about $1.2 billion of total liquidity, with no drawn revolving credit disclosed and total debt of roughly $216 million — chiefly lease liabilities and the gold prepayment obligation, not bank borrowing — for a net cash position of about $460 million. Management states the full $945–1,035 million 2026 capital programme is internally funded. The $470 million received for the Turkish subsidiary in October 2025 is a meaningful part of why that is possible.

Hedging. Alamos runs no strategic gold hedge. What exists is legacy: 329,000 ounces of forward sales inherited with Argonaut Gold, of which 279,000 ounces (85%) have been retired, including the remaining 2026 tranche of 35,000 oz at $1,821/oz bought out in Q2 2026 for $92.3 million. 50,000 ounces maturing in 2027 remain outstanding. A separate gold prepayment facility takes deliveries at $4,166/oz — above the base-case deck used in Section 7, so it is currently a favourable contract rather than a drag. The company also hedges Canadian dollar and Mexican peso exposure, the currencies in which most operating costs are incurred.

Capital returns. Alamos held its dividend at $0.10 a share for five years and then raised it 60% to $0.04 per quarter in Q1 2026, an annualised $0.16. It also began buying stock back: 1,401,100 shares for $50 million at an average $35.70 in Q2 2026, taking year-to-date returns to $83.6 million. Against a $1 billion capital programme those are modest sums — but they are the first evidence in five years that the company intends to return cash while it builds, and the buyback was executed at prices well above the current share price.

4. Management, strategy & corporate structure

4.1 Management & governance

John A. McCluskey has been President and Chief Executive Officer since founding the company in 2003 and is a director of the World Gold Council — one of the longest tenures of any chief executive in the peer set, and a marked contrast to the leadership churn elsewhere in the sector. J. Robert S. Prichard was appointed Chair of the Board on 8 January 2025; he is President Emeritus of the University of Toronto and a former Chair of BMO Financial Group. Greg Fisher was promoted from Senior Vice President of Finance to Chief Financial Officer effective 1 May 2023. Chris Bostwick, FAusIMM, serves as Senior Vice President, Technical Services and is the qualified person for the Young-Davidson and PDA disclosures; Scott K. Parsons is Senior Vice President, Corporate Development and Investor Relations.

The board runs to ten directors overseeing five standing committees — Audit, Human Resources, Corporate Governance and Nominating, Technical and Sustainability, and Public Affairs — with all five members of the Audit Committee independent and financially literate. Named directors include Alexander Christopher (a former Senior Vice President of Teck Resources, now a director of BMC Minerals and a past president of the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada), Elaine Ellingham (P.Geo., principal of Ellingham Consulting and Executive Chairman, President and CEO of Omai Gold Mining), David Fleck (principal at First Avenue Investment Counsel), Serafino Tony Giardini (President and CEO of Trilogy Metals and formerly President of Ivanhoe Mines) and Claire Kennedy. Conflict-of-interest policy requires directors and officers to disclose material conflicts and abstain from the related vote.

One governance item belongs in the record. Following the July guidance revision, three separate law-firm investigations were announced in July 2026 — Pomerantz LLP publicised investigations on 9, 14 and 16 July on behalf of Alamos investors. No claim has been filed or certified at this analysis date and the company has not disclosed a provision; the item is carried in the risk register at low impact, but it is a fact about the period and is named here rather than omitted.

4.2 Strategy & capital allocation

The stated strategy is to blend cash flow from operating mines with growth from expansions, exploration and development, and to add to the mineral base continually through all three. The published target is a 46% production increase by 2028, driven by the Magino–Island Gold integration and the development projects, at significantly lower costs — moving toward roughly 1 Moz a year by 2030.

The capital-allocation record supports it. The Argonaut Gold acquisition (July 2024) brought Magino, whose mill is now the processing hub of the flagship district and the reason Island Gold District revenue rose 88% in 2025. Orford Mining (April 2024) brought Qiqavik; Manitou Gold (May 2023) brought ground around Island Gold. On the other side, the October 2025 sale of the Turkish subsidiary for $470 million removed the group’s only politically exposed jurisdiction near a cyclical high and funded the build. Exploration has meanwhile grown reserves 32% in a single year from the existing mines.

The counter-evidence is Lynn Lake’s capital estimate, up from $632 million to $937 million, and the 2026 guidance cut. Named forward targets are unusually specific for this sector: Phase 3+ shaft commissioning Q1 2027, PDA first production mid-2027, Magino mill expansion Q1 2028, Lynn Lake first production H1 2029.

4.3 Ownership & corporate structure

Table 7. Capital structure and corporate events

Source: Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form for the acquisitions, divestments and subsidiary; share count, buyback and debt per the Q2 2026 results release and stockanalysis.com , 11 Aug 2026. There are no strategic or cornerstone shareholders disclosed, no warrants and no convertible notes; Alamos owns 100% of all six assets in Table 2 with no joint-venture partner, royalty encumbrance beyond statutory regimes, or streaming obligation.

The structural simplicity matters: 100% ownership of every mine and every growth project, no partners, no streams, no equity issued since the Argonaut scrip in 2024. The growth from here does not dilute anyone.

5. ESG & sustainability

Table 8. ESG snapshot

Source: Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form sustainability disclosures and the Q2 2026 results release . The company’s full ESG report is published separately and annually. Quantified safety-frequency rates are not disclosed in the sources used for this analysis — a gap noted in Section 10.1.

The distinguishing feature is that the environmental and Indigenous commitments are structural rather than declaratory: a transmission line built with a First Nation partner is a capital project that permanently lowers emissions at the flagship, and Impact Benefit Agreements signed before construction are what makes Lynn Lake’s schedule credible. The honest caveats are that Alamos does not publish injury-frequency rates in the filings used here, that a 30% absolute reduction by 2030 is a mid-pack ambition without a net-zero date attached, and that the company is being sued by a Burge Lake cottage owner and seven Lynn Lake residents over a May 2025 fire — a live matter that sits alongside the wildfire relief donation.

6. Risks

Table 9. Risk register

Source: risk categories drawn from the Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form risk factors and the operational disclosures in the Q2 2026 results release ; the law-firm investigations per PRNewswire , July 2026. Likelihood and impact ratings are the author’s assessment on a 1–5 scale, not disclosed figures.

Figure 5. Risk matrix — likelihood against impact

Figure data: Table 9. Each point prints its likelihood × impact score; the shaded region is the high-likelihood, high-impact quadrant (likelihood ≥ 3.5 and impact ≥ 3.5). Ratings are the author’s assessment, not disclosed figures.

The register’s shape is the mirror image of the market’s July reaction. The highest-likelihood risk — Young-Davidson’s mining rate — sits on 14% of net asset value, while the highest-impact risk sits on 59% and is currently running ahead of plan. That is not an argument that Young-Davidson does not matter; it is an argument that the ~40% peak-to-July drawdown was a large response to a problem at the smallest of three producing assets — and the market has since taken back about half of it, re-rating the shares ~20% off the lows.

7. Valuation

Valuation as of 12 August 2026, in US dollars. Horizon: spot fair value. Price deck (Table 3b gold rungs): bear $3,500/oz, base $4,000/oz, bull $4,500/oz; spot ~$4,370/oz and consensus as cross-checks. Discount rate 5% real post-tax base (7% bear, 4% bull) — the precious-metals convention. Share price $33.45 (11 Aug 2026), 418.6 m shares outstanding, ~424 m fully diluted.

Alamos is a producer/operator with a large, permitted and funded development pipeline, so the anchor is a sum-of-the-parts NAV/DCF — a life-of-mine discounted cash flow on each producing asset, a risked build on Lynn Lake, and an in-situ credit for resources outside reserves, bridged to equity and taken to a value per share at a target P/NAV. Two cash-flow multiples (EV/EBITDA and P/CF) each convert to their own value per share and complete the blend. The conclusion: a blended base-case fair value of $36.58 per share against a $33.45 share price — about +9% implied, inside a bear-to-bull range of $24.75 to $47.66 — and a value read of Fairly valued (wide band). The anchor NAV alone is $42.26 (a 0.79× P/NAV); the cash-flow multiples sit below it because ~40% of the value is pre-production and earns no current EBITDA — which is exactly the spread the blend is meant to show.

7.1 Method selection

Alamos is a producer with a material development pipeline — a two-archetype name — so the producer default set (NAV 50% / EV·EBITDA 30% / FCF·P/CF 20%) is tilted toward the intrinsic anchor: the SOTP already values the pre-production assets on their own risked economics, which the cash-flow multiples cannot see. The deviation is stated (rule V13) and stays inside the input-family caps (rule V18: intrinsic 55% single-method ceiling; the two cash-flow methods 45% together, under the 50% collinear cap).

Table 10. Valuation method selection and weights

Source: method-to-archetype mapping per the Metal Pilot valuation framework (producer/operator row); the archetype is stated in Section 1 and the peer set in Section 2.9. The tilt from the 50/30/20 default to 55/30/15 is the stated V13 deviation. Typical P/NAV and EV/EBITDA bands are conventions from sell-side mining primers, re-sourced against the current gold peer set, not fixed facts.

7.2 Net asset value

Each asset is modelled on its own published economics where they exist and on current unit costs where they do not, taxed at 27% in Canada and 30% in Mexico, and discounted at 5% real on the $4,000/oz base deck. Island Gold District runs at the IGD Expansion Study’s 534 koz a year and $1,025/oz mine-site AISC over its 8.28 Moz reserve, starting 1.5 years out, less about $600 million of remaining growth capital. Young-Davidson is modelled at a normalised 180 koz a year — below the pre-event rate and above the damaged 2026 guidance — at $1,900/oz. Mulatos including PDA runs 135 koz a year over its 1.20 Moz reserve at $1,400/oz, less $110 million of remaining PDA capital. Lynn Lake takes the published 186 koz a year at $829/oz over its 3.44 Moz reserve, starting three years out, less $800 million of remaining capital and risked at 0.85. Every asset carries a $120/oz corporate-overhead charge and a residual growth-capital charge.

Table 11. Net asset value build-up, base case ($4,000/oz gold, 5% real, US$m)

Source: author’s model on the $4,000/oz base deck. Reserve inputs per Table 2; project economics per Table 3; current unit costs and the balance sheet per the Q2 2026 results release ; market data per stockanalysis.com , 11 Aug 2026. Canadian tax at 27% and Mexican at 30%. Every asset NPV scales with the $4,000 deck versus the $1,800/oz reserve price, which is why the gross value rose from the $3,400-deck build. Closure and rehabilitation provisions are embedded in the AISC-based operating assumption rather than bridged separately, because they are not separately disclosed in the quarterly reporting — a known gap in this build. The Lynn Lake risk factor, the Young-Davidson normalised rate, the in-situ multiple and the fully diluted share count are the author’s estimates. This is a model output, not a disclosed figure.

Figure 6. Net asset value build-up

Figure data: Table 11. Equity net asset value of $17,918 m equates to $42.26 per fully diluted share on the $4,000/oz base deck.

Figure 7. NAV per share sensitivity — gold price × discount rate

Figure data: this analysis’ net-asset-value model, Table 11, holding the Lynn Lake risk factor at 0.85 and all operating assumptions constant. Price columns: the fixed gold grid ($3,000–$5,000 by $500; Table 3b of the valuation playbook). Base deck: $4,000/oz gold at a 5% real post-tax discount rate ($42.26/share), sitting exactly on the $4,000 grid column, which carries the base outline. A ±10% move in the gold price shifts net asset value per share by roughly ±16%; the $33.45 share price sits below the $4,000 base-case NAV ($42.26), between the $3,500 and $4,000 rungs at the 5% base rate.

7.3 Relative valuation

The two cash-flow multiples each convert to a value per share (rule V11), applying a justified target multiple to Alamos’s own forward metric. To respect rule V17, the target multiples are held flat across the bear/base/bull scenarios and only the underlying EBITDA and cash flow are flexed with the deck — because Alamos’s current cash flow already sits well above its five-year average, so moving the multiple and the deck together would manufacture a range the business cannot support.

Table 12. Relative valuation — implied value per share (base case)

Source: author’s calculations. Forward EBITDA and operating cash flow are estimated from guidance-level production at the $4,000/oz base deck and current unit costs (OCF taken at ~0.64× EBITDA, Alamos’s trailing ratio) — estimates, not guidance. Net cash and shares per Table 1. Target multiples: the 8.5× EV/EBITDA is the gold-producer peer median (the industry trades ~9.5× trailing and quality intermediates ~7–9× forward; Alamos itself trades 8.7× trailing per stockanalysis.com , 11 Aug 2026); the 12× P/CF is a premium to the 5–8× historical producer band, reflecting the sector’s re-rating at record gold and Alamos’s growth, but a discount to Alamos’s own stretched 14× current P/OCF. Bands are conventions re-sourced against the current peer set, not fixed facts.

The two relative methods land at $30.96 and $27.00 — below the $42.26 NAV anchor and below the $33.45 price. That is not a contradiction: EV/EBITDA and P/CF see only the cash the producing mines throw off today, and roughly 40% of Alamos’s value (Lynn Lake, the IGD expansion tranche, PDA, resource conversion) is pre-production and generates no current EBITDA. The gap between the intrinsic anchor and the cash-flow multiples is the growth pipeline, priced two ways — which is why the blend carries the anchor at 55% and the two multiples at 30% and 15%.

7.4 Cross-checks

These carry no weight in the blend (rule V12); they test whether the model or the market is wrong.

The market-implied read (rule V19). Holding the model’s structure fixed, the current $33.45 price is what the NAV returns when the flat long-term gold price is about $3,475/oz (at a 1.0× P/NAV and the 5% discount) — roughly 20% below the ~$4,370 spot and 13% below the $4,000 base deck. Put the other way, the shares trade at 0.79× the $4,000-deck NAV. So the price is not betting on a collapse; it is capitalising gold a fifth below where it trades and applying a normal producer multiple — a defensible caution, not obvious mispricing. Sell-side consensus does the opposite: at $46.25 (Strong Buy, 13 analysts) it sits above even this model’s bull blend, implying the street capitalises gold at or above spot and assigns Lynn Lake little execution risk.

Diagnostic multiples (unweighted). On $13.5 bn of enterprise value: a trailing P/E of 11.9× and EV/EBITDA of 8.7× — mid-band for a producer at a record gold price; $852 per ore-reserve ounce and $633 per reserve-plus-M&I ounce, against reserves booked at an $1,800/oz gold price; ~$25,300 per annual ounce on the damaged 2026 guidance, falling to ~$13,500 per annual ounce on the ~1 Moz 2030 pro-forma if the three growth projects deliver; and a −40% drawdown from the 52-week high even after the recent rally. These are cross-checks, not valuations — they need no risk factor, and every one of them frames the same tension the blend resolves: cheap on the assets and the 2030 profile, full on today’s cash flow.

Optionality not in the base case. Three exclusions are worth naming. Reserve conversion at ~$4,370 gold is the largest: reserves struck at $1,800/oz and resources at $2,000/oz leave an unusual amount of pit-shell and cut-off-grade optionality that no model here captures. Island Gold’s 1.06 Moz of inferred resource at 11.51 g/t sits immediately below a mine whose reserve already grades 10.61 g/t and is the single most likely source of future reserve additions. And the Burnt Timber and Linkwood satellites already extend Lynn Lake’s combined mine life from 17 to 27 years, of which only the first 18.5 years are modelled here. None belongs in a base case; all three are real.

7.5 Scenario analysis

Every weighted method is recomputed in three coherent worlds — each on a rung of the fixed gold grid (rule V26) — so the blend can be struck per scenario (rule V14). The target multiples are held flat (V17, 7.3); the decks, discount rates and operating assumptions move.

Table 13. Scenario assumptions and per-method value per share

Source: author’s model, per the methods in 7.2–7.3 with the stated assumption changes. These are illustrative scenarios, not forecasts. The three decks are the $3,500 / $4,000 / $4,500 rungs of the fixed gold grid (Table 3b of the valuation playbook). The bear case is the one Section 6’s register describes: gold easing toward the incentive price while Young-Davidson’s post-seismic rate settles low and Lynn Lake’s capital rises again. Method 1 holds the target P/NAV at 1.0× and lets the deck, discount rate and Lynn Lake risk factor drive the NAV; Methods 2–3 hold their multiples and flex EBITDA and cash flow with the deck (V17).

7.6 Fair value & conclusion

Each weighted method’s value per share is multiplied by its weight and summed to a blended fair value — once per scenario. The blend reproduces on a calculator from the values and weights below.

Table 14. Fair-value blend

Source: this analysis; weights per Section 4, Table 2 with the stated V13 deviation to 55/30/15. All figures in US dollars; horizon: spot fair value. Cross-checks carried at 0% weight and discussed in 7.4: the market-implied read (V19), EV per reserve/annual ounce, P/E and analyst consensus. Base blend = 0.55 × $42.26 + 0.30 × $30.96 + 0.15 × $27.00 = $36.58. Adding the ~0.5% forward dividend yield, the implied total return is about +9.9% — reported, not rated.

Figure 8. Value per share by method and scenario

Figure data: Table 14. Shading ranks every cell within this figure’s own $20.66–$56.70 range; the base-case blend carries the outline. Current share price $33.45 (11 Aug 2026). The spread down each column is the finding: the intrinsic anchor sits well above the two cash-flow multiples in every world, because ~40% of the value is pre-production.

Conclusion. The blended fair value is $36.58 in the base case, inside a $24.75–$47.66 bear-to-bull range, against a $33.45 share price — an implied +9.4%. The value read is Fairly valued (wide band): the base is inside the ±10% band, and the bear case sits 26% below the current price, wider than the 25% threshold, so the qualifier travels with the read everywhere it appears. The anchor is the SOTP NAV/DCF, which the archetype puts first and which alone implies $42.26 (+26%); the two cash-flow multiples sit ~25–35% below the anchor because they cannot see the pre-production pipeline, and that spread — not an averaging-away — is why the blend lands at fair value rather than cheap. The market-implied read (7.4) says the price is capitalising gold ~20% below spot; sell-side consensus of $46.25 sits above even this model’s bull blend. This analysis is deliberately more conservative than the street on both the deck and the Lynn Lake risk factor. The honest summary: the 20% rally off the July lows has closed most of the discount the July guidance cut opened — the stock is no longer obviously cheap on the blend, though it remains cheap on the anchor NAV and on the 2030 production profile.

Assumptions box. Valuation date 12 August 2026; balance sheet as of 30 June 2026; horizon spot fair value. Trading currency US dollars. Price decks (Table 3b gold rungs): bear $3,500/oz, base $4,000/oz, bull $4,500/oz; spot ~$4,370/oz as run-rate cross-check. Discount rate 5% real post-tax base, 7% bear, 4% bull; sensitised at 4–7%. Share basis: ~424 million fully diluted (418.6 million outstanding plus estimated equity awards). Method weights 55/30/15 (SOTP NAV / EV·EBITDA / P/CF) — a stated V13 deviation from the 50/30/20 producer default, inside the V18 family caps; target P/NAV 1.0×, EV/EBITDA 8.5×, P/CF 12× held flat across scenarios (V17, cash flow above mid-cycle). Mine plans from the 31 December 2025 NI 43-101 reserves, the IGD Expansion Study and the updated Lynn Lake development plan; current unit costs from Q2 2026; forward EBITDA and cash flow are author estimates from guidance-level production. Canadian corporate tax 27%, Mexican 30%. Corporate overhead charged at $120/oz across all assets. Legacy Argonaut hedges marked against the base deck and taxed at 27%; the gold prepayment facility at $4,166/oz is above the base deck and is not modelled as a liability. Closure costs embedded in AISC, not separately bridged. Cross-checks (0% weight): market-implied read, EV/reserve oz, EV/annual oz, P/E, analyst consensus.

8. Near-term catalysts (1–3 years)

Table 15. Near-term catalysts

Source: Alamos Gold Q2 2026 results release and the 2025 Annual Information Form for all project timing. All timing is company guidance, not a guarantee. The reserve-restatement and free-cash-flow inferences are the author’s.

The sequence is unusually dense for a company this size: a gating operational metric at the end of 2026, a shaft in Q1 2027, a re-set guidance in early 2027 and a new mine by mid-2027. There is a dated, checkable event roughly every two quarters between now and 2029.

9. Rating & verdict

Alamos is scored on the same nine dimensions every Metal Pilot company analysis uses, against the peer set declared in Section 2.9. As a producer/operator it takes the reference weighting: asset quality, cost position, reserves and life, balance sheet and capital allocation carry 15% each; growth, management, jurisdiction and ESG carry 6.25% each. No dimension is marked not-applicable.

Table 16. Scorecard rationale

Source: each row cites its evidence in this analysis; peer references are the set declared in Section 2.9.

Weighted average: 0.75 + 0.60 + 0.60 + 0.60 + 0.45 + 0.3125 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 = 4.06/5 → ★★★★, Solid.

The two-axis verdict. Composite quality ★★★★ (Solid); value read Fairly valued (wide band) as of 12 August 2026; verdict: Quality compounder, now fairly priced — the re-rating has largely happened, and the upside from here is the pipeline, not the discount. Alamos is a well-run intermediate with a deep, conservatively-booked reserve base and the clearest growth pipeline in its peer group; after a 20% rally off the July lows the shares now trade close to a conservative blended fair value rather than at the distressed discount the guidance cut opened.

The bull case is arithmetic plus a calendar. At a $4,000/oz base deck — below spot — the sum of the parts is $42.26 against a $33.45 share price, a 0.79× P/NAV, and the biggest single component is an asset whose guidance was not cut and whose mining rates are running ahead of plan. Behind it are three projects with published economics, no funding gap and no dilution, arriving on dates management has repeated through the guidance cut. The bear case is that this is a company that has just demonstrated it can lose 12% of a year’s production to one seismic event, whose second build has already run 48% over its feasibility estimate, and whose growth is entirely in the future while today’s cash flow — which the market is now paying close to full value for — sits on a gold price that could mean-revert. That is why the blend, which weights the cash-flow multiples alongside the NAV, reads fair rather than cheap.

The specific thing that tips it is Island Gold’s underground mining rate. If it reaches 2,000 tpd by year-end and the shaft commissions in Q1 2027, the largest component of this valuation is de-risked, the 0.79× P/NAV can migrate toward 1.0×, and the gap between the $33.45 price and the $42.26 NAV closes. If it does not, then two of three producing assets are behind plan at once, and the discount to NAV stops looking like conservatism and starts looking like a judgement about execution.

A note on the companion memo: this analysis rates the company at 4.1/5 while the Metal Pilot earnings memo rates the second quarter of 2026 at 2.8/5. Both are correct — the memo scores one period against the company’s own guidance; this scores the durable business against its peers.

To rank Alamos against every listed gold producer on the same nine dimensions — grade, AISC, reserve life, growth stage and P/NAV — screen the sector on Metal Pilot.

10. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

10.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Company filings. Alamos Gold 2025 Annual Information Form (year ended 31 December 2025) — the spine of this analysis: mineral reserves and resources at 31 December 2025, the mineral-property descriptions, the growth-project parameters, the board and executive detail, corporate transactions and the sustainability disclosures. Alamos Gold Reports Second Quarter 2026 Results (29 July 2026) — Q2 operating and financial results, revised 2026 guidance, the Young-Davidson seismic event, the hedge buyout, cash and capital returns; also filed as a PDF .

Technical reports. The IGD Expansion Study announced 3 February 2026 with an NI 43-101 technical report filed 20 March 2026; the Lynn Lake 2023 Feasibility Study as updated by the February 2025 Burnt Timber and Linkwood economic study and the re-based development plan; the PDA capital estimate — all as summarised in the 2025 Annual Information Form and available on SEDAR+ .

Exchange and market data. stockanalysis.com for share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, share count, P/E, EV/EBITDA, cash flow, dividend, 52-week range, employee count and the 13-analyst consensus target of $46.25, all as of the NYSE close on 11 August 2026; the financials overview (Fiscal.ai data) for the five-year statements, trailing-twelve-month EBITDA and cash flow, and segment revenue.

Gold prices. Spot gold of ~$4,370/oz on 11 August 2026 per Trading Economics ; long-run context in the Gold — A Complete Market Guide .

Peer and legal material. 2026 guidance from Agnico Eagle , Kinross , B2Gold and Eldorado Gold ; Northern Star FY2026 actuals from its June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report ; the law-firm investigations per PRNewswire ; the Lynn Lake fire litigation per CBC News ; the Metal Pilot gold dataset for the peer-screening basis.

Methodology. Durable structure (reserves, resources, grade, mine life, ownership, jurisdiction) is kept separate from the dated market layer (share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples, valuation) throughout. The data-as-of date is 12 August 2026; market data is as of the NYSE close on 11 August 2026; reserves and resources are effective 31 December 2025; operating figures are effective 30 June 2026. Alamos reports on a calendar fiscal year in US dollars under IFRS, and reports measured and indicated resources exclusive of reserves — both differ from the Australian-domiciled companies elsewhere in this series and are stated at every table where it matters. Scorecard weights follow the producer/operator reference case, sum to 100%, and no dimension is not-applicable. The valuation blends three methods that each emit a value per share — a sum-of-the-parts NAV/DCF at target P/NAV (55%), EV/EBITDA at peer median (30%) and P/CF support (15%) — reproducible from Tables 11–14 and the assumptions box; the weights are a stated deviation from the producer default, and the Lynn Lake risk factor, the Young-Davidson normalised production rate, the in-situ resource multiple, the target multiples, forward EBITDA and cash flow, the corporate-overhead charge and the fully diluted share count are author estimates, not company figures. Two disclosure gaps are noted rather than filled: injury-frequency rates are not published in the filings used here, and closure and rehabilitation provisions are not separately disclosed in the quarterly reporting. A Metal Pilot Q2 2026 earnings memo covers the same quarter on the period-rating basis and is consistent with this analysis. Update cadence: refreshed on each annual report and on material events — the next scheduled refresh is the 2026 Annual Information Form in Q1 2027, with the Young-Davidson three-year guidance expected in the same window. Figures: every figure is an inline HTML/CSS component; the asset-footprint map is omitted (a proportional-symbol map of the six assets is drawn geometry the component library does not express, and this post type generates no SVG — rule A13), so Table 2 and the §2 prose carry the footprint, and the production growth profile is a single series of group production (2026 guidance vs the ~1 Moz 2030 target) with the per-asset split held in Table 3 (rule A13).

Provenance: Alamos Gold Inc. — Annual Information Form — 2025.

10.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This analysis is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. It is a point-in-time snapshot as of 12 August 2026: the share price, market capitalisation, enterprise value, multiples and valuation read all move. Reserve, resource, study and forecast figures are estimates, prepared on the codes and bases stated beside each table, and study economics are not achieved results. The Quality × Value verdict is an analytical read, never an instruction to the reader. This report was prepared with AI assistance; figures were sourced from primary filings and reviewed, but readers should verify every number against the original documents before acting on it. The author holds no position in Alamos Gold Inc. or in any company named here. Please do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser.