Uranium — A Complete Market Guide (2026)

Uranium Energy Metals Guide Commodity Guide
Uranium — A Complete Market Guide (2026) Uranium — A Complete Market Guide (2026)

Data as of 10 October 2026. Uranium market structure is shown for 2024, the latest year every agency has counted, from the OECD-NEA/IAEA Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand (the “Red Book”), with the Red Book’s expected 2025 output, the World Nuclear Association (WNA), the IAEA’s Nuclear Power Reactors in the World (2026 edition) and the producers’ 2025 filings.

Uranium is the fuel of nuclear power, and almost nothing else: in 2024 the world’s 441 commercial reactors needed 64,584 tonnes of uranium, and mines supplied 61,924 tonnes — 96% of it, with stockpiles and recycled material covering the rest. Three countries, Kazakhstan, Canada and Namibia, mined almost three-quarters of that, and one, Russia, owns 43% of the world’s capacity to enrich it into reactor fuel. The spot price averaged $85.14 a pound in 2024 and $85.34 over the 12 months to September 2026, ten times its level of 2000. This report is the free, big-picture primer on how the uranium market works: where uranium is mined, how the fuel cycle turns it into reactor fuel, how its price is set and which forces drive it. For the company-level data behind the story — every producer screened by production and resources — go to Metal Pilot’s uranium mining stock screener.

TL;DR & Key Takeaways

  • What it is: a weakly radioactive metal valued for one isotope, uranium-235, whose fission heats a reactor’s water. Demand comes from the reactor fleet, which must be fuelled whatever the price.
  • Who supplies it: mines produced 61,924 tU in 2024 (Red Book count); Kazakhstan alone mined 38%, and with Canada and Namibia 73%. Government-owned companies own 72% of output.
  • Who uses it: the United States needs a third of the world’s uranium (21,500 tU) but mines almost none; China, at 16%, builds half the world’s new reactors.
  • The balance: a structural primary gap — mines have covered 74–98% of reactor needs since 2015 (WNA count); inventories, ex-weapons material and underfeeding fill the rest. The choke point is downstream: Russia holds 43% of enrichment capacity.
  • How it is priced: the uranium market trades privately, under long-term contracts; thin spot trades are assessed by two price-reporting agencies, UxC and TradeTech. Spot averaged $73.54/lb in 2025 and $85.34/lb over the 12 months to September 2026.
  • The regime that favours it: none — uranium ignores the business cycle (correlation with the S&P 500 on monthly changes, 2000–2025: +0.10). It rises when reactor build-out meets producer discipline or fuel-cycle stress and collapses after accidents; miners amplify both.

Numbers to remember: mine production 61,924 tU (2024) · market size about $13.7 bn (2024) · spot $85.3/lb (12 months to Sep 2026); $73.54/lb (2025 average) · top producer Kazakhstan 23,270 tU · top consumer the United States 21,500 tU · mine output = 96% of reactor needs · Russia 43% of enrichment capacity · resource life ≈ 95 years.

Figure 1. Uranium at a glance, 2024 (price: 12 months to Sep 2026)

61.9 k tU
Mine production, 2024
$13.7 bn
Market size, 2024
$85.3/lb
Spot price, 12 months to Sep 2026
23.3 k tU
Top producer — Kazakhstan
21.5 k tU
Top consumer — United States
96%
Mine output ÷ reactor needs, 2024
43%
Russia's share of enrichment
95 yrs
Resource life

Notes to Figure 1

  1. Mine production — Table 4 · Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.18 | “Historical uranium production”, row “Total”, column 2024 | 61,924 tU | p.78. The WNA counts 60,213 tU for the same year (Table 8).
  2. Market size — Derived | 61,924 tU × 2,599.8 lb U₃O₈ per tU × $85.14/lb (Table 3, 2024 average spot) = $13.7 bn; the value of one year’s mine output, not of any company. At the 2025 average and the Red Book’s expected 2025 output it is $12.6 bn.
  3. Spot price, 12 months to Sep 2026 — Market | Cameco | “Uranium Spot Price”, month-end industry average | Oct 2025–Sep 2026; the mean of the twelve month-end prices, computed here. For reference only: the 2025 calendar-year average was $73.54/lb (Table 3).
  4. Top producer — Table 4 · Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.18 | “Kazakhstan”, 2024 | 23,270 tU | p.78.
  5. Top consumer — Table 6 · Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 2.1 | “2024 uranium requirements (tU)", “United States” | 21,500 | p.106.
  6. Mine output ÷ reactor needs — Table 10 · Filed | Red Book 2026 | Primary sources of uranium supply | “world uranium production (61 924 tU) represented around 96% of 2024 world reactor requirements (64 584 tU)" | p.127. On the WNA’s count the 2024 figure is 90%; uranium is barely recycled, so this coverage ratio stands in for the “share of supply from recycling” a metal guide would show.
  7. Russia’s share of enrichment — Table 15 · Derived | Rosatom 29,133 ÷ world 68,076 thousand SWU/yr, 2025 | WNA, Uranium Enrichment, “World enrichment capacity” = 42.8%.
  8. Resource life — Table 9 · Derived | identified recoverable resources below $130/kgU, 5,864,500 tU (Red Book 2026, Table 1.2a, p.25) ÷ 2024 production 61,924 tU = 94.7 years, shown as 95. Resources are an estimate, not a reserve.

Figure data: Tables 3, 4, 6, 9, 10 and 15 — the OECD-NEA/IAEA Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand (printed page numbers), Cameco’s industry-average uranium prices and the WNA’s Uranium Enrichment page; each tile’s citation is in the notes above.

How to read this guide: new to uranium? Read straight through from Section 1 — the fuel cycle is the key that unlocks everything else. Here for the investment case? Jump to Section 5 — how to own it, how to screen the miners and what actually drives this idiosyncratic market. Every technical term is defined in the Terms list at the end.

1. Uranium & the market basics

1.1 What uranium is — physical basics & quality

Uranium (chemical symbol U) is a dense, weakly radioactive metal whose economic value rests on one property: its isotope uranium-235 (U-235) can sustain a nuclear chain reaction, splitting atoms and releasing heat that boils water to spin a turbine. Natural uranium is only 0.7% U-235; the rest is U-238, which does not readily split. Most reactors therefore need the U-235 share raised to 3–5%, the step called enrichment. Almost all uranium demand is fuel for power reactors; research reactors, naval propulsion and medical isotopes take a small remainder. There is no monetary, jewellery or broad industrial pillar: uranium is a pure energy fuel.

A few terms define uranium’s quality and form, and they recur throughout this report:

  • Grade (% U₃O₈) — the concentration of uranium oxide in the ore. The range is extreme: Cameco’s Cigar Lake reserves grade 16.33% U₃O₈, McArthur River 6.48%, while the Inkai in-situ leach deposits in Kazakhstan grade about 0.03%. Grade, more than the price, decides what is economic.
  • Conventional vs. in-situ leach (ISL) — the two mining routes. Conventional mining digs ore from an open pit or underground and processes it in a mill. In-situ leach (also called in-situ recovery, ISR) pumps a leaching solution through a permeable sandstone orebody and recovers the dissolved uranium at surface; nothing is dug. ISL supplied 55% of world output in 2024, up from 16% in 2000.
  • Yellowcake (U₃O₈) — the uranium oxide concentrate a mill or ISL plant produces, the form in which uranium is bought, sold and priced.
  • Enrichment and SWU — the effort of raising the U-235 share, measured in separative work units (SWU) and priced separately.
  • Primary vs. by-product — uranium mined for its own sake versus uranium recovered alongside another metal, as at BHP’s Olympic Dam copper mine in Australia.

The value chain — from ore to reactor. Uranium follows a longer path than any metal: mining and milling (yellowcake) → conversion (to uranium hexafluoride, UF₆, a gas) → enrichment (to 3–5% U-235) → fuel fabrication (uranium dioxide pellets in fuel assemblies) → the reactor → spent fuel (stored or reprocessed). A mine’s job ends at U₃O₈; each later step is a separate industry with its own, far smaller, set of suppliers. The strategic choke point is enrichment (Section 2.6).

Figure 2. The nuclear fuel cycle, ore to reactor

Mining & milling
Yellowcake, U₃O₈
Conversion
UF₆ gas
Enrichment
3–5% U-235, in SWU
Fuel fabrication
UO₂ pellets, assemblies
Reactor
Heat, then power
Spent fuel
Stored or reprocessed

Source: this guide’s summary of the WNA’s Conversion and Deconversion and Uranium Enrichment pages; a conceptual diagram with no values.

From orebody to yellowcake. On the conventional route, ore is crushed and ground in a mill, and the uranium is dissolved out with acid or an alkaline solution, purified by ion exchange and precipitated as U₃O₈. ISL runs the same chemistry underground and needs no pit, waste rock or mill tailings, which is why low-grade sandstone deposits in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United States are mined that way.

1.2 Units & measurement conventions

This report uses the nuclear-industry convention, stated here so every later number is unambiguous. Quantities of uranium appear in two units the reader must convert between: tonnes of uranium metal (tU), used by the Red Book, the WNA and the IAEA for production, resources and reactor needs; and pounds of U₃O₈ (lb U₃O₈), the yellowcake unit in which the metal is priced. U₃O₈ is 84.8% uranium by mass, so 1 tU = 1.1792 t U₃O₈ = 2,599.8 lb U₃O₈, and a price of $1/lb U₃O₈ equals $2.60/kgU. Prices are in US dollars per pound of U₃O₈ ($/lb); enrichment is priced per SWU. Large quantities use M = million (Mlb, Mt).

Uranium figures split into flow and stock, and the two must not be confused:

  • Flow — quantities per year: mine production (61,924 tU in 2024), reactor requirements (64,584 tU), the shortfall met by secondary supply.
  • Stock — a level at a point in time: identified resources in the ground (5.86 m tU below $130/kgU at 1 January 2025), company reserves, and the inventories of natural and enriched uranium that utilities and governments hold.

Table 1. Uranium units and conversions

Unit Meaning Typical magnitude in uranium Conversion
tU Tonne of uranium metal World mine output ~62,000 tU/yr = 2,599.8 lb U₃O₈
lb U₃O₈ Pound of yellowcake The price-quote unit = 0.000385 tU
Mlb U₃O₈ Million pounds of yellowcake A large mine: 15–20 Mlb/yr = 384.6 tU
$/lb U₃O₈ Price per pound 2025 spot average $73.54 × 2.6 = $/kgU
SWU Separative work unit US utilities bought 12.7 m SWU in 2025 Priced separately ($/SWU)
% U₃O₈ Ore grade Cigar Lake 16.33%; Inkai 0.03% 1% U₃O₈ = 0.848% U
Mt U Million tonnes of uranium Identified resources: 5.86 Mt U below $130/kgU = 1,000,000 tU

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand, Appendix 3 “Units” — “1% U₃O₈ = 0.848% U” and “1 USD/lb U₃O₈ = USD 2.6/kg U”, p.539; the tU-to-pound factor is derived here from the 0.848 ratio and 2,204.62 lb per tonne. Magnitudes from Tables 3, 4 and 9, Cameco’s 2025 annual report (Cigar Lake output and grades, Table 5) and the US EIA’s 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 16 (SWU), p.45.

Numbers intuition: the world’s biggest uranium mine, Cigar Lake, produced 19.1 Mlb (about 7,350 tU) in 2025; one large reactor of 1,000 MWe needs about 160 tU a year (the world fleet averages 162 tU per GWe of capacity). A year’s mine output is worth about $13 bn at recent prices — tiny next to copper or gold, yet it fuels the reactors that generated 2,845 TWh of electricity in 2025.

1.3 Pricing & benchmarks

Uranium has the most unusual pricing of any commodity in this series. There is no liquid exchange: buyers and sellers negotiate privately, and two price-reporting agencies, UxC and TradeTech, publish the reference prices. Two of them matter. The spot price covers one-off deliveries within a year; the Red Book puts spot at 15–25% of annual transactions, so it is thin, volatile and headline-grabbing. The long-term price is the reference for multi-year contracts, where most uranium changes hands: a utility running a reactor for decades values secure supply over a cheap cargo. The two can diverge widely, and long-term contracts often carry formulas that reference spot at delivery. Conversion and enrichment are bought separately, so the delivered cost of fuel blends several prices.

Agencies publish what buyers actually paid, and those averages lag the market. US reactor operators paid a weighted average of $58.46/lb for deliveries in 2025, and the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) put EU utilities’ average spot purchase at $70.33/lb — against an industry spot average of $73.54. Since 2021 a physical trust has bought pounds outright on the spot market (Section 5.1), and CME lists a cash-settled futures contract on UxC’s spot price, but uranium remains a contract market at heart.

Table 2. Key uranium price benchmarks

Benchmark What it prices Who sets it Role Source
Spot U₃O₈ Delivery within a year UxC, TradeTech (Cameco averages the two) Headline price; thin, volatile Market | Cameco | “Uranium Spot Price”, month-end
Long-term U₃O₈ Multi-year contracts UxC, TradeTech Where most volume is priced Market | Cameco | “Long-term Uranium Price”, month-end
UxC U₃O₈ futures 250 lb, cash-settled on UxC spot CME Group Hedging tool; thin Filed | CME contract specs | “Contract Unit” 250 pounds; “Financially Settled”
ESA spot and MAC-3 Prices EU utilities paid Euratom Supply Agency Lagging, what was actually paid Filed | ESA AR 2025 | Average prices | “ESA spot U₃O₈ price” | p.11
US weighted-average price Prices US operators paid US EIA Lagging; covers all contract types Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 3 | “Total Purchases” | p.21
Enrichment (SWU) Separative work Enrichers, by contract Largest fuel-cycle cost after U₃O₈ Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 16 | “Average price (US$ per SWU)" 108.70 | p.45

Source: Cameco, Uranium Price (month-end prices published by UxC and TradeTech, averaged by Cameco); CME Group, UxC Uranium U₃O₈ Futures Contract Specs; Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2025; US EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report. The Role column is this guide’s summary.

The long-run price story is one of two great cycles. A 2003–2007 boom carried the annual spot average from $11.55 to $99.33/lb, with a month-end peak of $136 in June 2007. The bust that followed was compounded by the March 2011 Fukushima accident: spot ground down to $18.00 at the end of November 2016, and the annual average bottomed at $21.66 in 2017. Producer cuts, financial buying and the move away from Russian fuel then drove a recovery to $85.14 in 2024 — the long-term price followed more slowly and, at $81.96, stood above spot in 2025. Adjusted for US inflation, the 2007 average was worth $154 in 2025 dollars, double today’s level. Over 2016–2025 spot averaged $43.38 and the long-term price $47.32; over 2021–2025, $61.26 and $61.12.

Table 3. Average annual uranium price per pound of U₃O₈, 2000–2025

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Spot $8.18/lb $8.82/lb $9.88/lb $11.55/lb $18.60/lb $28.67/lb $49.61/lb $99.33/lb $61.71/lb $46.06/lb $46.84/lb $56.37/lb $48.40/lb
Long-term $9.45/lb $10.12/lb $10.62/lb $12.10/lb $20.35/lb $30.66/lb $49.90/lb $90.83/lb $82.50/lb $65.50/lb $60.92/lb $66.79/lb $60.12/lb
Spot, in 2025 dollars $15.29/lb $16.04/lb $17.69/lb $20.22/lb $31.71/lb $47.27/lb $79.24/lb $154.24/lb $92.30/lb $69.12/lb $69.15/lb $80.69/lb $67.88/lb
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Spot $38.17/lb $33.21/lb $36.55/lb $25.64/lb $21.66/lb $24.59/lb $25.64/lb $29.96/lb $35.28/lb $49.81/lb $62.51/lb $85.14/lb $73.54/lb
Long-term $54.12/lb $46.46/lb $46.29/lb $39.00/lb $31.89/lb $30.38/lb $31.75/lb $34.62/lb $36.81/lb $49.75/lb $58.20/lb $78.88/lb $81.96/lb
Spot, in 2025 dollars $52.75/lb $45.17/lb $49.65/lb $34.40/lb $28.45/lb $31.53/lb $32.29/lb $37.27/lb $41.92/lb $54.81/lb $66.05/lb $87.38/lb $73.54/lb

Notes to Table 3

  1. Cameco’s own 2025 annual report prints the same 2025 and 2024 averages — “Average spot price (US$/lb)" 73.54 and 85.14; “Average long-term price (US$/lb)" 81.96 and 78.88 (p.57). Long-term prices before May 2004 are TradeTech’s alone, per Cameco’s page.
  2. The month-end extremes quoted in the text are from the same series: $7.10 (December 2000), $136.00 (June 2007), $18.00 (November 2016) and $100.25 (January 2024); $69.63 (February 2011) is the last month-end before the Fukushima accident.

Source: Cameco, Uranium Price, series “Uranium Spot Price” and “Long-term Uranium Price” — month-end industry averages Cameco computes from UxC and TradeTech, 2000–2025; each annual value is the mean of the year’s twelve month-end prices, computed here. The real row is nominal spot × (US CPI-U 2025 ÷ CPI-U of the year), from FRED series CPIAUCSL (annual mean of monthly values; 2025 uses 11 months, October 2025 being unpublished). Multi-year averages in the text are computed here from the nominal rows.

Figure 3. Uranium’s two great cycles, 2000–2025: spot and long-term price

Uranium price ($/lb U₃O₈)
100
80
60
40
20
0
Long-term 81.96 Spot 73.54
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025

Figure data: Table 3, nominal rows. The long-term price swings less than spot and leads it at turning points, because contracts are signed ahead of need.

Current situation (2026, unresolved — for reference only): spot has averaged $87.41/lb from January to September 2026 and the long-term price $93.33, above any calendar-year average in the series; the September month-end figures were $89.63 and $96.50 — the long-term one the highest month-end in the series, above the $95.00 plateau of 2007–08 (Cameco series, Figure 1, note 3). These are prices of a year still in progress and anchor none of the analysis below.

2. Supply, demand & the market balance

2.1 Where uranium is mined — deposits & geology

Uranium supply is geographically concentrated, and the deposit type dictates the mining method and the cost. The richest deposits on Earth are the unconformity orebodies of Canada’s Athabasca Basin in Saskatchewan — McArthur River and Cigar Lake — mined underground at reserve grades of 6–16% U₃O₈ (Table 5, note 4). The largest volume comes from sandstone deposits leached in place: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and parts of the United States and Australia. Namibia’s Husab and Rössing are large, low-grade open pits; Australia’s Olympic Dam yields uranium as a by-product of a giant copper mine; Niger’s sandstone mines at Arlit were a steady source until the 2023 coup and the 2025 nationalisation of the Somaïr mine; the Red Book expects no Nigerien output in 2025.

In 2024 Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Uzbekistan and Australia produced 88.5% of the world’s uranium — Kazakhstan alone 37.6%. Eleven of the 18 producing countries mine only through government-owned companies, and government-owned companies owned 72% of all 2024 output.

Table 4. Leading uranium-mining countries, 2022–2025

Rank Country 2022 2023 2024 Share of world, 2024 2025e
1 Kazakhstan 21,279 tU 21,112 tU 23,270 tU 37.6% 25,789 tU
2 Canada 7,380 tU 10,986 tU 14,327 tU 23.1% 14,251 tU
3 Namibia 1 5,612 tU 6,986 tU 7,332 tU 11.8% 8,720 tU
4 Uzbekistan 3,561 tU 4,050 tU 5,200 tU 8.4% 6,000 tU
5 Australia 4,555 tU 4,686 tU 4,656 tU 7.5% 5,395 tU
6 Russia 2,508 tU 2,710 tU 2,738 tU 4.4% 2,620 tU
7 China 1,550 tU 1,728 tU 1,956 tU 3.2% 2,160 tU
8 Niger 1, 2 2,020 tU 1,130 tU 959 tU 1.5% 0 tU
9 India 1 488 tU 485 tU 485 tU 0.8% 485 tU
10 Ukraine 120 tU 350 tU 329 tU 0.5% 300 tU
— Rest of world 417 tU 340 tU 672 tU 1.1% 354 tU
— World total 49,490 tU 54,563 tU 61,924 tU 100% 66,074 tU

Notes to Table 4

  1. Secretariat estimates in the Red Book.
  2. Niger’s 2025 figure is the Red Book’s expected zero: in July 2025 the government announced the nationalisation of the Orano-majority Somaïr (Arlit) mine (Table 1.17, p.77).
  3. “Rest of world” is the world total less the ten rows; in 2024 it is mainly the United States (260 tU) and South Africa (235 tU). The Red Book gives no expected 2025 value for the United States (“NA”), so the 2025 world total excludes it.

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand, Table 1.18 “Historical uranium production”, columns 2022, 2023, 2024 and “2025 (expected)", pp.77–78; the government-owned share from Table 1.19 “Ownership of uranium production” (44,575 tU, 72.0%), p.89. Shares and the rest-of-world row are computed here. The Red Book’s count is a little above the WNA’s (61,924 against 60,213 tU in 2024), mainly on Uzbekistan and China; this guide keeps the two apart (Section 8.1).

Figure 4. Leading uranium-mining countries, 2024 (tU)

Kazakhstan
Canada
Namibia
Uzbekistan
Australia
Russia
China
Niger
India
Ukraine
Rest of world
23,270
14,327
7,332
5,200
4,656
2,738
1,956
959
485
329
672
Mine production, 2024 (tU)

Figure data: Table 4, column 2024.

At the asset level uranium is the most concentrated market in this series. The two Athabasca mines produced about 13,150 tU in 2025 between them — roughly a fifth of world output — and the eight mines in Table 5 about 31,450 tU — close to half of the Red Book’s expected 2025 world output. The grade spread is the industry’s defining contrast: Cigar Lake ore is about five hundred times richer than Inkai’s, yet the Kazakh ISL wellfields are among the cheapest producers on the cost curve (Section 5.2).

Table 5. Largest uranium mines, 2025

Mine Country Operator and owners Output, 2025 Method Source
Cigar Lake Canada Cameco 54.547% (operator), Orano 40.453%, others 5.0% 7,347 tU Underground; 16.33% U₃O₈ reserves Filed | CCJ AR 2025 | Cigar Lake | “2025 production 10.4 million pounds (19.1 million pounds on 100% basis)" | p.82
Derived | ÷ 2,599.8
McArthur River / Key Lake Canada Cameco 69.805% (operator), Orano 30.195% 5,808 tU Underground mine, separate mill Filed | CCJ AR 2025 | McArthur River/Key Lake | “2025 production 10.5 million pounds (15.1 million pounds on 100% basis)" | p.78
Derived | ÷ 2,599.8
KATCO (Moinkum, Tortkuduk) Kazakhstan Orano (operator), Kazatomprom 49% 1 3,714 tU ISL Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | Uranium segment production by operation | “JV KATCO LLP” 3,714 | p.36
Karatau (Budenovskoye 2) Kazakhstan Kazatomprom 50%, Uranium One 50% 3,622 tU ISL Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | production by operation | “Karatau LLP” 3,622 | p.36
Inkai Kazakhstan Kazatomprom 60%, Cameco 40% 3,215 tU ISL; 0.03% U₃O₈ reserves Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | production by operation | “JV Inkai LLP” 3,215 | p.36
South Mining Chemical Co. (Akdala, Inkai 4) Kazakhstan Kazatomprom 30%, Uranium One 2,845 tU ISL Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | production by operation | “JV South Mining Chemical Company LLP” 2,845 | p.36
Olympic Dam Australia BHP 100% 2,675 tU 2 By-product of copper; underground Filed | BHP AR 2025 | Production | “Payable metal in concentrate (t)" uranium, 3,154 | p.201
Derived | × 0.848
Akbastau (Budenovskoye 1, 3, 4) Kazakhstan Kazatomprom 50%, Uranium One 2,227 tU ISL Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | production by operation | “JV Akbastau JSC” 2,227 | p.36

Notes to Table 5

Output is each mine’s whole output, at 100%, whatever the owners’ shares.

  1. Kazatomprom gives its KATCO stake as 49%; Orano’s 2025 report prints both 51%/49% and 49%/51% for the same joint venture (pp.34 and 234), so only Kazatomprom’s figure is shown.
  2. BHP’s year ends on 30 June: the figure is the year to June 2025, reported as uranium oxide concentrate and converted here at 0.848 tU per tonne of U₃O₈.
  3. Namibia’s Husab, run by CGN’s Swakop Uranium, produced 4,437 tU in 2024 (Red Book 2026, Table 1.17, p.77) and would rank third, but its 2025 output is not in the documents checked, so it is not ranked; nor is Rössing.
  4. Grades are those of Cameco’s reserve statement at 31 December 2025: “Cigar Lake UG” 16.33% and “Inkai ISR” 0.03% U₃O₈ (Cameco AR 2025, Mineral reserves, p.110); McArthur River’s is 6.48%.

Source: the operators’ filings, row by row as cited — Cameco 2025 Annual Report, Kazatomprom 2025 Integrated Annual Report (annual reports → 2025), BHP Annual Report 2025 and, for KATCO’s operator, Orano’s Annual Activity Report 2025. Pounds of U₃O₈ are converted at 2,599.8 lb per tU (Table 1). Output is the whole mine (100%), not the owners’ shares. Screen every producing asset on Metal Pilot’s uranium mining project screener.

2.2 Demand & consumption

Uranium demand is the reactor fleet. At 1 January 2025 the Red Book counted 441 commercial reactors in 31 countries (including 23 in suspended operation, mostly in Japan) with 398 GWe of capacity, and put their 2024 needs at 64,584 tU — about 146 tU per reactor, or 162 tU per GWe. That demand is highly price-inelastic: fuel is a small part of what it costs to run a reactor, a reactor must be refuelled whatever the uranium price, and utilities buy years ahead under contract.

The fleet is concentrated. The United States, with 94 reactors, needed 21,500 tU in 2024 — a third of the world total — followed by China (10,500 tU), France (7,200), South Korea (4,097) and Russia (4,000). The trend is set by China: of the 72 reactors under construction at the end of 2025, 36 were Chinese.

Table 6. Uranium requirements by country, 2024

Country Reactors operational Uranium required, 2024 Share of world
United States 94 21,500 tU 33.3%
China 1 58 10,500 tU 16.3%
France 57 7,200 tU 11.1%
South Korea 26 4,097 tU 6.3%
Russia 36 4,000 tU 6.2%
Japan 2 33 2,021 tU 3.1%
India 24 1,650 tU 2.6%
Canada 17 1,512 tU 2.3%
Ukraine 15 1,500 tU 2.3%
Spain 7 1,208 tU 1.9%
Sweden 6 1,121 tU 1.7%
Rest of world 68 8,275 tU 12.8%
World total 441 64,584 tU 100%

Notes to Table 6

Reactors are counted at 1 January 2025.

  1. Excludes Chinese Taipei (one reactor, 150 tU), which the Red Book counts in the world total only.
  2. Japan’s 33 reactors include those in suspended operation; at the end of 2025 the IAEA counted 14 operating and 19 suspended.

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand, Table 2.1 “Nuclear power plant data summary”, columns “Operational reactors” and “2024 uranium requirements (tU)", p.106; reactors under construction from the IAEA’s Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition, Table 1, pp.8–9. Shares and the rest-of-world row are computed here. Requirements exclude MOX fuel.

Figure 5. Uranium requirements by country, 2024

33.3%
26.8%
16.3%
11.1%
6.3%
6.2%
United States Rest of world China France South Korea Russia
% of world uranium requirements, 2024

Figure data: Table 6 — the five largest consumers, with every smaller fleet (Japan, India, Canada and the rest) grouped as “Rest of world”.

No agency publishes an annual series of uranium requirements by country back to 2000, but reactor output is the same story told in electricity: requirements track generation, at roughly 24 tU per TWh. World nuclear generation fell 10.7% between 2010 and 2012 as Japan idled its fleet after Fukushima and Germany began its exit, then recovered to a record 2,845 TWh in 2025. Under that flat total sits a geographic shift: China’s output grew 29-fold after 2000, to 17% of the world in 2025, while Europe’s fell 28%.

Table 7. Nuclear electricity generation by region, 2000–2025

Region 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024 2025
North America 874 TWh 925 TWh 946 TWh 952 TWh 940 TWh 920 TWh 921 TWh
Europe 1 1,049 TWh 1,110 TWh 1,032 TWh 968 TWh 833 TWh 766 TWh 759 TWh
China 17 TWh 53 TWh 75 TWh 171 TWh 366 TWh 451 TWh 485 TWh
Asia Pacific excl. China 483 TWh 500 TWh 508 TWh 248 TWh 289 TWh 363 TWh 359 TWh
CIS 133 TWh 152 TWh 173 TWh 198 TWh 219 TWh 234 TWh 239 TWh
Middle East 0 TWh 0 TWh 0 TWh 4 TWh 8 TWh 46 TWh 44 TWh
South & Central America 12 TWh 17 TWh 22 TWh 22 TWh 24 TWh 26 TWh 27 TWh
Africa 13 TWh 11 TWh 14 TWh 12 TWh 12 TWh 8 TWh 11 TWh
World 2,581 TWh 2,769 TWh 2,769 TWh 2,576 TWh 2,691 TWh 2,815 TWh 2,845 TWh

Notes to Table 7

  1. EI counts Ukraine in Europe, not in the CIS.

Source: Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheet “Nuclear Generation - TWh”, rows “Total North America”, “Total Europe”, “China”, “Total Asia Pacific”, “Total CIS”, “Total Middle East”, “Total S. & Cent. America”, “Total Africa” and “Total World”, 2000–2025 in five-year steps plus 2024; the full annual series feeds Figure 6. China is split out from Asia Pacific given its build-out (Asia Pacific excl. China = the regional total less China, computed here); the other regions follow the EI grouping. Rounded to the nearest TWh. The ratio of about 24 tU per TWh is this guide’s division of 2024 requirements (64,584 tU, Table 6) by the Red Book’s 2024 generation (2,727 TWh, Table 2.2, p.107).

Figure 6. Nuclear generation by region, 2000–2025 (TWh)

Nuclear generation (TWh)
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
World2,845 Other82 CIS239 Asia Pacific ex China359 China485 Europe759 North America921
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025

Figure data: Table 7, annual values; the gray band is South & Central America, the Middle East and Africa together.

2.3 Supply: producing countries

Mine output has been volatile. On the WNA’s count it peaked at 63,207 tU in 2016, fell to 47,731 tU in 2020 as producers idled mines into a glut and then a pandemic, and recovered to 60,213 tU in 2024 as McArthur River restarted and Kazakhstan lifted output. The Red Book expects 66,074 tU for 2025 on its own, slightly higher, count. Supply is also concentrated by ownership: Kazatomprom, Rosatom’s Uranium One, Orano, CGN, CNNC and Navoi Mining are all state-controlled (Table 21).

Table 8. World uranium mine production, 2015–2025

Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
WNA count 60,342 tU 63,207 tU 60,462 tU 54,154 tU 54,742 tU 47,731 tU 47,805 tU 49,614 tU 54,433 tU 60,213 tU n/p
Red Book count n/p n/p n/p n/p n/p n/p n/p 49,490 tU 54,563 tU 61,924 tU 66,074 tU e

Notes to Table 8

  1. The 2025 Red Book value is the expected figure (“e”); the WNA has not yet published 2025. “n/p” = not published in the edition cited.

Source: WNA, World Uranium Mining Production, table “Production from mines (tonnes U)”, row “World total tU”, 2015–2024; OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, Table 1.18, row “Total”, 2022–2025 expected, p.78. The two counts differ by up to 2.8%, mostly on Uzbekistan and China; the WNA row is the 2015–2024 series used for the balance (Table 10).

Figure 7. World uranium mine production, 2015–2024 (tU)

Mine production (tU)
80 k
60 k
40 k
20 k
0
60.3 k
63.2 k
60.5 k
54.2 k
54.7 k
47.7 k
47.8 k
49.6 k
54.4 k
60.2 k
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Year

Figure data: Table 8, WNA row.

Uranium is not scarce in the ground. The Red Book’s identified recoverable resources — deposits delineated well enough to estimate, at a cost below $130 per kgU — were 5.86 m tU at 1 January 2025, about 95 years of 2024 output; below $260/kgU they reach 8.1 m tU. Australia holds 29%, mostly at Olympic Dam, followed by Kazakhstan, Canada and Russia. Resources are estimates on each country’s own basis, and much of Australia’s sits in a by-product orebody that will be mined only as fast as its copper.

Table 9. Identified recoverable uranium resources by country, below $130/kgU, 2025

Rank Country Resources Share of world
1 Australia 1,701,600 tU 29.0%
2 Kazakhstan 827,500 tU 14.1%
3 Canada 551,700 tU 9.4%
4 Russia 471,700 tU 8.0%
5 Namibia 1 392,800 tU 6.7%
6 Niger 1 351,100 tU 6.0%
7 China 325,400 tU 5.5%
8 South Africa 1 320,900 tU 5.5%
9 Brazil 167,800 tU 2.9%
10 Ukraine 161,300 tU 2.8%
— Rest of world 592,700 tU 10.1%
— World total 5,864,500 tU 100%

Notes to Table 9

  1. Secretariat estimates in the Red Book.
  2. The WNA’s World Uranium Mining Production page prints a “to $130/kg U” world total of 7,824,600 tU, which does not match the Red Book it cites; this table uses the Red Book directly.

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, Table 1.2a “Identified recoverable uranium resources”, column "<USD 130/kgU”, as of 1 January 2025, pp.24–25; the total below $260/kgU is 8,104,500 tU. Resources are reasonably assured plus inferred, recoverable, rounded to the nearest 100 tU. Shares, the rest-of-world row and the resource life are computed here.

2.4 The supply–demand balance

Uranium’s balance has one defining feature: mines have not covered reactor needs in any year since about 1990, when the Red Book dates the end of mine overproduction. The gap is filled by secondary supply — utility, producer and government inventories, re-enriched depleted uranium, recycled material and, until 2013, Russian weapons uranium (Section 2.5). On the WNA’s count, mine output covered 98% of requirements in 2015, fell to 74% in 2020 after a decade of low prices and the pandemic shut mines, and recovered to 90% in 2024. The Red Book, counting both sides differently, puts 2024 coverage at 96%. Either way, the structural question is whether new mines arrive before the inventories that have bridged the gap run down — the outlook in Section 6.

Table 10. Mine production against reactor requirements, 2015–2024

Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Mine production 60,342 tU 63,207 tU 60,462 tU 54,154 tU 54,742 tU 47,731 tU 47,805 tU 49,614 tU 54,433 tU 60,213 tU
Mine output ÷ requirements 98% 96% 93% 80% 81% 74% 76% 76% 83% 90%
Requirements, implied ~61,600 tU ~65,800 tU ~65,000 tU ~67,700 tU ~67,600 tU ~64,500 tU ~62,900 tU ~65,300 tU ~65,600 tU ~66,900 tU
Shortfall met by secondary supply ~1,300 tU ~2,600 tU ~4,500 tU ~13,500 tU ~12,900 tU ~16,800 tU ~15,100 tU ~15,700 tU ~11,200 tU ~6,700 tU

Notes to Table 10

  1. The WNA prints production and the coverage ratio (its row ”% of world demand”), not requirements. The implied requirement is production ÷ coverage, rounded to the nearest 100 tU; because the coverage ratio is printed as a whole percentage, each implied value is uncertain by about ±400 tU, and the shortfall by the same.
  2. The Red Book’s own 2024 pair is 61,924 tU of production against 64,584 tU of requirements — a shortfall of 2,660 tU and coverage of 95.9% (p.127).

Source: WNA, World Uranium Mining Production, table “Production from mines (tonnes U)”, rows “World total tU” and ”% of world demand”, 2015–2024. The implied-requirement and shortfall rows are computed here, as note 1 explains. The Red Book comparison is OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, “Primary sources of uranium supply”, p.127.

Figure 8. Mine output as a share of reactor requirements, 2015–2024 (%)

Mine output ÷ requirements (%)
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0
98%
96%
93%
80%
81%
74%
76%
76%
83%
90%
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Year

Figure data: Table 10, row “Mine output ÷ requirements”; the dashed line marks 100%, the level at which mines alone would fuel the fleet.

At the country level the market splits into a handful of net suppliers that mine far more than they burn — Kazakhstan, Namibia, Uzbekistan and Australia run no power reactors at all — and the large net importers. The United States is the extreme case: it needs 21,500 tU a year and mined 260 tU in 2024. China, France, South Korea and Japan also depend on imports; Russia, despite its mines, consumes more than it produces.

Table 11. Uranium net positions, major countries, 2024

Country Mine production Reactor requirements Net position Role
Kazakhstan 23,270 tU 0 tU +23,270 tU Net supplier
Canada 14,327 tU 1,512 tU +12,815 tU Net supplier
Namibia 7,332 tU 0 tU +7,332 tU Net supplier
Uzbekistan 5,200 tU 0 tU +5,200 tU Net supplier
Australia 4,656 tU 0 tU +4,656 tU Net supplier
India 485 tU 1,650 tU −1,165 tU Net importer
Ukraine 329 tU 1,500 tU −1,171 tU Net importer
Russia 2,738 tU 4,000 tU −1,262 tU Net importer
Japan 0 tU 2,021 tU −2,021 tU Net importer
South Korea 0 tU 4,097 tU −4,097 tU Net importer
France 0 tU 7,200 tU −7,200 tU Net importer
China 1,956 tU 10,500 tU −8,544 tU Net importer
United States 260 tU 21,500 tU −21,240 tU Net importer

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026 — production from Table 1.18, column 2024, pp.77–78; requirements from Table 2.1, column “2024 uranium requirements (tU)", p.106 (a country absent from Table 2.1 has no power reactor and is entered as 0). Net position = production − requirements, computed here; it is a physical balance, not a trade statistic, and ignores inventories and re-exports. The Role column is this guide’s label.

Figure 9. Uranium net positions, major countries, 2024 (tU)

Kazakhstan+23,270
Canada+12,815
Namibia+7,332
Uzbekistan+5,200
Australia+4,656
South Korea−4,097
France−7,200
China−8,544
United States−21,240
net importer (−)net supplier (+)
Mine production minus reactor requirements, 2024 (tU)

Figure data: Table 11 — the five net suppliers and the four largest net importers; India, Ukraine, Russia and Japan, each with net imports below 2,100 tU, are left out.

Inventories are the cover. Uranium has no exchange stocks to watch; its shock absorber is the inventory utilities hold. At the end of 2025 EU utilities owned 42,522 tU of natural-uranium equivalent — 3.6 years of their average annual needs — and US reactor operators about 45,500 tU, roughly 2.1 years of US requirements. US brokers and traders held another 17,000 tU; the Red Book notes their holdings at the end of 2024 were more than six times the end-2015 level. These are working stocks spread across the fuel cycle, not idle metal; when utilities decide they hold too little, their restocking lands on a thin spot market, as it did after 2022, when EU utilities began stockpiling.

Table 12. Utility uranium inventories and the cover they represent

Holder Inventory, end-year Year Annual requirement Cover Source
EU utilities 42,522 tU 2025 11,835 tU 3.6 years Filed | ESA AR 2025 | Inventories | “inventories owned by EU utilities totalled 42 522 tU” | p.16; requirement "(11 835 tU per year)" | p.17
EU utilities 51,892 tU 2015 — — Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 2.5 | “Inventories held by EU utilities” | p.131
US reactor owners and operators 45,487 tU 2025 1 21,500 tU 2.1 years Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 23 | “Owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors” 118,256 thousand lb U₃O₈e | p.59
Derived | ÷ 2,599.8
US brokers and traders 17,154 tU 2025 1 — — Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 23 | “U.S. brokers and traders” 44,597 thousand lb | p.59
Derived | ÷ 2,599.8
All US commercial holders 65,384 tU 2025 1 — — Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 23 | “Total commercial inventories” 169,986 thousand lb | p.59
Derived | ÷ 2,599.8

Notes to Table 12

  1. Preliminary 2025 data in the EIA report.
  2. The US requirement is the Red Book’s 2024 figure for the United States (Table 6). Cover = inventory ÷ annual requirement, computed here. EU inventories exclude the UK from 2021; the Red Book’s 2015 figure includes it.
  3. The Red Book notes that US traders and brokers held about 13,430 tU at the end of 2024, more than six times their end-2015 level (p.131).

Source: Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2025, section 1.5 “Inventories” (and, on stockpiling since 2022, “EU utilities have been stockpiling nuclear materials and fuel”, p.10); US EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 23 “Inventories of uranium by owner as of end of year”; OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, Table 2.5. US pounds of U₃O₈ equivalent converted at 2,599.8 lb per tU (Table 1). China publishes no inventory series; the Red Book cites a WNA estimate from import statistics of about 147,000 tU at 1 January 2025 (Uranium 2026, p.130), and nothing comparable exists for Russia.

2.5 Supply structure

Primary supply is all mined, and the mining method has shifted decisively. In-situ leach supplied 55.2% of 2024 production, underground mining 26.1% — boosted by McArthur River’s restart — open pits 13.8% and co-product and by-product recovery 4.7%, almost all of it Olympic Dam, where uranium rides with copper and responds to the copper price rather than its own. ISL lowers the industry’s cost base and needs no tailings dam, but its wellfields deplete within a few years, so Kazakh output depends on continual new drilling — and on sulfuric acid, whose shortages the Red Book lists among Kazakhstan’s recent supply disruptions.

The rest of supply is secondary: material mined years ago or made from something else. The Red Book lists stocks and inventories of natural and enriched uranium, civil and military; fuel from reprocessing spent fuel and surplus plutonium; underfeeding, where enrichers run extra separative work to use less natural uranium; and the re-enrichment of depleted uranium (“tails”). The largest historical source, the Megatons to Megawatts agreement, converted 500 tonnes of Russian warhead uranium into reactor fuel for the United States between 1993 and 2013. Recycling is small: mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel saved EU utilities an estimated 605 tU in 2024, and reprocessed uranium is under 1% of world requirements.

Table 13. Uranium supply structure, 2024

Supply source Share, 2024 Trend Price response Source
Mine — in-situ leach 55.2% of mine output 59.8% in 2022; 57.7% in 2025 (prelim.) Medium: low cost, but needs constant drilling Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.22 | “ISL” | p.92
Mine — underground 26.1% 18.0% in 2022, after McArthur River’s restart Low: long lead times Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.22 | “Underground mining” | p.92
Mine — open pit 13.8% 15.9% in 2022 Low Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.22 | “Open-pit mining” | p.92
Mine — co-product and by-product 4.7% 6.1% in 2022 Very low: follows copper Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.22 | “Co-product/by-product” | p.92
Mine — heap leach and other 0.2% — — Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.22 | “Heap leaching”, “Other” | p.92
Secondary supply (gap to requirements) ~4% of requirements (2,660 tU) Down from ~26% in 2020 (WNA count) Finite; falls as stocks are drawn Derived | Table 10: requirements − production
MOX fuel in EU reactors 605 tU saved — Policy-driven Filed | Red Book 2026 | MOX | “reduced natural uranium requirements in the EU by an estimated 605 tU in 2024” | p.133
Reprocessed uranium < 1% of requirements — Policy-driven Filed | Red Book 2026 | RepU | “less than 1% of projected annual world requirements” | p.133

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, Table 1.22 “World uranium production by production method (2022-2025)", p.92, and “Secondary sources of uranium supply”, pp.128–133; the ISL share of 16% in 2000 quoted in Section 1.1 is from the WNA’s In Situ Leach Mining of Uranium page. Mining-method shares are of mine output; secondary supply is a share of requirements, on the Red Book’s count (≈ 10% on the WNA’s, Table 10). The Price response column is this guide’s judgement.

Figure 10. Uranium production by mining method, 2024 (% of mine output)

55.2%
26.1%
13.8%
4.7%
0.2%
In-situ leach Underground Open pit Co-/by-product Heap leach & other
% of world uranium production, 2024

Figure data: Table 13, mine rows.

2.6 Trade flows & the fuel-cycle choke point

Uranium’s trade map is really a map of the fuel cycle. It is compact and valuable — a year of world mine output weighs about 73,000 tonnes of U₃O₈ — so there are no bulk-shipping choke points of the oil or copper kind. Yellowcake moves from a few mining countries to conversion plants in Canada, France, the United States, Russia and China, then to enrichment, then to fuel fabricators near the reactors. Trade statistics for uranium are patchy — several producers report nothing to UN Comtrade — so the clearest picture comes from the buyers. In 2025 Canada and Kazakhstan supplied more than half of what both EU and US utilities bought; Russia supplied 16% of the EU’s natural uranium, while the US figure for Russian origin is withheld.

Table 14. Where EU and US utilities bought natural uranium, 2025

Origin EU utilities Share of EU US operators Share of US
Canada 5,384 tU 36.7% 15,207 klb U₃O₈e 32.4%
Kazakhstan 2,981 tU 20.3% 13,331 klb U₃O₈e 28.4%
Russia 2,346 tU 16.0% withheld withheld
Australia 1,379 tU 9.4% 7,077 klb U₃O₈e 15.1%
Uzbekistan 1,522 tU 10.4% 3,258 klb U₃O₈e 7.0%
Namibia 842 tU 5.7% 1,652 klb U₃O₈e 3.5%
United States not listed 2 — 3,376 klb U₃O₈e 7.2%
Other and withheld 1 224 tU 1.5% 2,970 klb U₃O₈e 6.3%
Total 14,678 tU 100% 46,871 klb U₃O₈e 100%

Notes to Table 14

  1. EU: Niger 33, Malawi 28, South Africa 26, Kyrgyzstan 22 and 115 tU of underfeeding, mixed and unknown origin. US: Ukraine 1,056, Niger 213, Malawi 73 and every cell the EIA withholds to protect company data, Russia’s included; computed as the total less the rows shown.
  2. The ESA’s origin table has no United States row; any US-origin material delivered to EU utilities sits in “Other”.

Source: Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2025, Table 3 “Origin of uranium delivered to EU utilities in 2025 (tU)", columns “Quantity” and “Share (%)", p.12; US EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 3 “Uranium purchased by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors by origin country and delivery year”, column “Deliveries in 2025”, p.21. US shares are computed here. The two blocs report in different units, so the shares, not the quantities, are comparable; the US total equals about 18,000 tU.

Figure 11. Where EU and US utilities bought their uranium, 2025 (% of purchases)

Canada
Kazakhstan
Russia
Australia
Uzbekistan
Namibia
36.7%
32.4%
20.3%
28.4%
16.0%
withheld
9.4%
15.1%
10.4%
7.0%
5.7%
3.5%
EU utilities US reactor operators
Share of 2025 natural uranium purchases, by origin (%)

Figure data: Table 14, share columns; the US Russia figure is withheld by the EIA, so its bar is empty.

The choke point is enrichment. Four operators hold almost all of the world’s 68 m SWU of enrichment capacity, and Rosatom alone has 43% — more than Urenco and Orano, the two Western enrichers, combined at 36%. Conversion is less concentrated but tight in the West. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western utilities began cutting Russian fuel services, and in August 2024 the United States banned imports of Russian low-enriched uranium, with Department of Energy waivers allowed until the start of 2028 and the ban itself running to the end of 2040. Russia still supplied 26% of the enrichment US operators bought in 2025 and 23% of the EU’s. Urenco and Orano are adding capacity — 700,000 SWU a year in New Mexico by 2027 and 2.5 m SWU at France’s Georges Besse II by 2030 — but the West will lean on Russian enrichment for years.

Table 15. The fuel-cycle choke points: conversion and enrichment capacity

Stage Operator Country Capacity Share of world Source
Enrichment, 2025 Rosatom Russia 29,133 thousand SWU/yr 42.8% Filed | WNA enrichment page | “World enrichment capacity” | “Rosatom”, 2025
Enrichment, 2025 Urenco UK, Germany, Netherlands, US 17,300 thousand SWU/yr 25.4% Filed | WNA enrichment page | “Urenco”, 2025
Enrichment, 2025 CNNC 1 China 13,789 thousand SWU/yr 20.3% Filed | WNA enrichment page | “CNNC*", 2025
Enrichment, 2025 Orano France 7,500 thousand SWU/yr 11.0% Filed | WNA enrichment page | “Orano”, 2025
Enrichment, 2025 Others (INB, JNFL) Brazil, Japan 355 thousand SWU/yr 0.5% Filed | WNA enrichment page | “Other (INB, JNFL)", 2025
Conversion, 2022 CNNC 1 China 15,000 tU/yr 24.2% Filed | WNA conversion page | “Estimated world primary conversion capacity” | “CNNC (est.)*"
Conversion, 2022 Orano France 15,000 tU/yr 24.2% Filed | WNA conversion page | “Orano”
Conversion, 2022 Cameco Canada 12,500 tU/yr 20.2% Filed | WNA conversion page | “Cameco”
Conversion, 2022 Rosatom Russia 12,500 tU/yr 20.2% Filed | WNA conversion page | “Rosatom (est.)"
Conversion, 2022 ConverDyn United States 7,000 tU/yr 11.3% Filed | WNA conversion page | “ConverDyn”
Russian share of SWU bought, 2025 — United States 3,284 of 12,710 thousand SWU 25.8% Filed | EIA UMAR 2025 | Table 16 | “Russia”, “Total” | p.45
Russian share of SWU bought, 2025 — EU 2,735 of 12,130 tSW 22.6% Filed | ESA AR 2025 | Table 5 | “Russia” 22.55 | p.15

Notes to Table 15

  1. The WNA estimates China’s enrichment and conversion capacity on the assumption that China builds enough to supply its own fleet.
  2. Conversion figures are licensed capacity in 2022, the latest year the WNA publishes; world capacity was 62,000 tU against 42,000 tU of production, and ConverDyn’s Metropolis plant produced nothing that year.

Source: WNA, Uranium Enrichment, table “World enrichment capacity” (from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2025), columns 2025 and 2030; WNA, Conversion and Deconversion, table “Estimated world primary conversion capacity and UF₆ production 2022” (from the Nuclear Fuel Report 2023); US EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Table 16; Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2025, Table 5. Shares are computed here. The US import ban, its waivers and the Urenco and Orano expansions are described on the same WNA enrichment page.

Figure 12. World uranium enrichment capacity by operator, 2025 (thousand SWU/yr)

Rosatom (Russia)
Urenco (Europe)
CNNC (China)
Orano (France)
Others (INB, JNFL)
29,133
17,300
13,789
7,500
355
Enrichment capacity, 2025 (thousand SWU/yr)

Figure data: Table 15, enrichment rows. By 2030, on the WNA’s projection, Rosatom’s share falls to 38% as CNNC, Urenco and Orano expand.

2.7 Market organisations & supply coordination

Uranium has no OPEC and no quota system, but it is among the most state-dominated markets in this series, and coordination shows up in three places. First, state producers’ output decisions: Kazakhstan’s state holds 75% of Kazatomprom, the largest producer, whose production guidance is among the market’s most watched announcements. Second, Russia’s position in the fuel cycle (Section 2.6) — leverage no miner has. Third, Western policy: the US ban on Russian enriched uranium and the Euratom Supply Agency’s role in co-signing every EU utility’s purchase contract, which it uses to push diversification. The bodies that publish the market’s data — the OECD-NEA and IAEA, and the WNA — set no prices.

Table 16. Who shapes the uranium market

Body or actor Role Leverage Source
Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan) Largest producer: 25,839 tU on a 100% basis in 2025 Output guidance; 75% state-owned Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | production by operation | “Total tU as U₃O₈” 25,839 | p.36; ownership | “62.99336549% belong to Samruk-Kazyna, 12.00663451% – to the Ministry of Finance” | p.45
Rosatom (Russia) Mining (Uranium One, ARMZ), conversion, 43% of enrichment Fuel-cycle supply; the US ban’s target Filed | WNA enrichment page | “Rosatom” 29,133, 2025
Orano (France) Mining, conversion, enrichment 90.33% owned by the French state Filed | Orano AAR 2025 | Shareholders | “90.33% of share capital held by the French State” | p.14
CNNC and CGN (China) Domestic and overseas mining; enrichment for China’s fleet State-directed buying for the fastest-growing fleet Filed | Red Book 2026 | Table 1.19 | “China” 100% government-owned | p.89
Euratom Supply Agency Co-signs EU utilities’ supply contracts Diversification policy Filed | Red Book 2026 | Policy measures in the EU | “all uranium purchase contracts by EU end users … must be concurred by the ESA” | p.137
US Department of Energy Waivers to the ban on Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU); surplus HEU Policy and government stocks Filed | WNA enrichment page | “waivers which the Department of Energy may grant”
OECD-NEA and IAEA The Red Book: resources, production, demand Data and projections; no price role Filed | Red Book 2026 | title page | “Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand” | p.1
World Nuclear Association Industry data and the Nuclear Fuel Report Data; no price role Filed | WNA fuel report page | “biennial report on the outlook for nuclear power and nuclear fuels”

Source: as cited row by row — Kazatomprom’s 2025 Integrated Annual Report, Orano’s Annual Activity Report 2025, the WNA’s Uranium Enrichment and World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025 pages and OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026. The Leverage column is this guide’s judgement.

2.8 Strategic reserves & inventories

Uranium has no strategic petroleum reserve, but it has stockpiles that have shaped the market for thirty years. The largest disclosed stocks are commercial: the EU and US utility inventories of Table 12, which together hold about 88,000 tU — well over a year of world requirements. Government stocks are larger and less visible: the Red Book notes that the US and Russian governments still hold significant natural and highly enriched uranium (HEU) from military programmes, though no official figures exist, and the US National Nuclear Security Administration has run an HEU down-blending programme whose contract was extended through 2027. The great past release was Megatons to Megawatts, whose 500 tonnes of Russian weapons HEU fed US reactors until 2013. Two fuel banks add an emergency backstop: a 120-tonne low-enriched uranium reserve at Angarsk in Russia and the IAEA’s 90-tonne LEU Bank in Kazakhstan, operational since 2019. China, the fastest-growing consumer, publishes no inventory figures, but the Red Book cites a WNA estimate, built from import statistics, of about 147,000 tU at 1 January 2025 — more than the EU and US together — and about 15,000 tU for India. The through-line: the stocks that bridged two decades of mine shortfalls are finite, and the Red Book expects secondary supply to keep declining.

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, “Natural and enriched uranium stocks and inventories”, “HEU from Russia”, “HEU from the United States” and “Fuel banks”, pp.128–132, and “Supply and demand to 2050”, p.139; the WNA’s Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel page. Inventories from Table 12.

3. Nuclear reactors & the fleet

Uranium demand begins and ends with the machines that burn it. Section 2.2 counted the fleet; this section opens the box — what the reactors are, how long they run and what the next generation will need — because reactor design decides how much uranium a plant uses, at what enrichment and for how many decades, the three variables behind the demand curve.

3.1 Reactor types & how they work

A reactor controls the chain reaction of Section 1.1. A moderator slows the neutrons released by splitting U-235 so they split more atoms; a coolant carries the heat away to raise steam. The choice of moderator and coolant defines a reactor’s type. The workhorse is the pressurised water reactor (PWR), 74% of the 413 reactors operating at the end of 2025: ordinary (“light”) water is both moderator and coolant, held at about 150 times atmospheric pressure so it reaches some 325 °C without boiling, and it burns uranium enriched to 3–5%. The boiling water reactor (BWR), 10%, lets the water boil in the core and drives the turbine directly. The pressurised heavy-water reactor (PHWR, or CANDU), 11%, uses heavy water, a moderator efficient enough to run on natural, unenriched uranium — no enrichment at all. The rest are Britain’s gas-cooled reactors and Russia’s graphite-moderated RBMKs, both being retired, plus two fast reactors and one high-temperature gas reactor.

Type matters to the market because it sets the fuel specification. Light-water reactors — 84.5% of the fleet — are what make enrichment the strategic choke point; CANDUs buy natural uranium only. Most advanced designs need fuel enriched beyond 5% (Section 3.4).

Table 17. World reactor fleet by type, end-2025

Reactor type Moderator / coolant Operational reactors Share of fleet Fuel Main countries
Pressurised water (PWR) Light water / light water 306 74.1% Enriched, 3–5% U-235 United States, France, China, Russia, South Korea
Pressurised heavy water (PHWR) Heavy water / heavy water 46 11.1% Natural uranium India, Canada
Boiling water (BWR) Light water / light water 43 10.4% Enriched, 3–5% U-235 United States, Sweden
Gas-cooled (GCR) Graphite / CO₂ 8 1.9% Enriched United Kingdom
Light-water graphite (LWGR, RBMK) Graphite / light water 7 1.7% Enriched Russia
Fast breeder (FBR) None / sodium 2 0.5% Enriched; MOX Russia
High-temperature gas (HTGR) Graphite / helium 1 0.2% Enriched TRISO China
Total 413 100%

Notes to Table 17

  1. The count excludes 23 reactors in suspended operation (17 BWRs, 4 PWRs and 2 PHWRs — 19 of them in Japan); the Red Book’s 441 includes them.

Source: IAEA, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition, Table 2 “Type and net electrical power of operational reactors, 31 Dec. 2025”, row “TOTAL”, p.11, and Table 23 “Reactor types: abbreviations and summary”, p.77. Shares are computed here. Moderator, coolant and fuel descriptions follow the WNA’s Nuclear Power Reactors page (“Water in the reactor core reaches about 325°C”; PHWRs “generally use natural uranium”); the Main countries column is this guide’s summary of Table 2.

Figure 13. World reactor fleet by type, end-2025 (% of operational reactors)

74.1%
11.1%
10.4%
4.4%
PWR PHWR (CANDU) BWR Other
% of operational reactors, 31 Dec 2025

Figure data: Table 17; “Other” is the GCR, LWGR, FBR and HTGR rows together.

3.2 Reactor generations, Gen I to Gen IV

Reactors are grouped into generations. Generation I were the 1950s–60s prototypes, now retired. Generation II — the PWRs, BWRs, CANDUs and RBMKs built from the 1970s to the 1990s — are the bulk of today’s fleet, designed for a nominal 40-year life. Generation III and III+ are the evolutionary designs built since the 1990s and being built now, with standardised designs and, in III+, passive safety that cools the core without power or operator action; most of the PWRs under construction, including China’s Hualong One (HPR1000) and Korea’s APR-1400 in the IAEA’s list, belong here. Generation IV is the research frontier: an international forum is developing six designs, four of them fast-neutron reactors, cooled by sodium, lead, gas or molten salt, all running hotter than today’s plants. Fast reactors can breed new fuel from U-238 and burn long-lived waste, wringing far more energy from each tonne of uranium.

Table 18. Nuclear reactor generations

Generation Era Defining feature Examples
Gen I 1950s–1960s First prototypes Shippingport, early Magnox (retired)
Gen II 1970s–1990s Today’s operating fleet; 40-year design life PWR, BWR, CANDU, RBMK
Gen III / III+ 1990s–today Evolutionary; passive safety in III+ AP1000, EPR, APR-1400, VVER-1200, Hualong One
Gen IV 2030s onward Fast or high-temperature; closed fuel cycle Sodium-, lead- and gas-cooled fast reactors, molten-salt, very-high-temperature reactors

Source: WNA, Generation IV Nuclear Reactors — “six generation IV nuclear reactor technologies. Four are fast neutron reactors”; models under construction from the IAEA’s Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition, Table 13, pp.28–30. The Era and Defining feature columns are this guide’s summary.

Figure 14. The four reactor generations

Gen I
1950s–60s prototypes
Gen II
1970s–90s: today’s fleet
Gen III / III+
1990s on: passive safety
Gen IV
2030s on: fast, high-temperature

Source: Table 18; a conceptual sequence with no values.

3.3 Plant life & licence renewal

A reactor’s lifetime uranium appetite depends on how long it runs, and here the story has shifted in nuclear’s favour. Plants were licensed for 40 years, a regulatory and financing convention rather than a physical limit. In the United States the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) renews licences in 20-year steps: it has completed 64 initial renewals, to 60 years, and 13 plants (25 reactors) have received a subsequent licence renewal to 80 years, from Turkey Point in 2019 to Hatch in 2026, with more under review. Life extension is the cheapest “new” nuclear capacity there is, and every extended reactor keeps buying uranium for decades longer than older demand models assumed.

The counter-pressure is age. At the end of 2025 the world’s operating reactors had been connected to the grid for 33 years on average, and 45% of them for 40 years or more. Extensions and restarts support demand now; from the 2030s, a wave of retirements will cut it unless new build replaces them — the fleet turnover behind the outlook in Section 6.

Table 19. Reactor operating life & licence renewal (US framework)

Milestone Operating life Status Source
Original operating licence 40 years Set by the Atomic Energy Act Filed | NRC licence-renewal backgrounder | “to operate for up to 40 years”
Initial licence renewal 40 to 60 years 64 plant applications completed Filed | NRC backgrounder | “renewed for an additional 20 years at a time”; NRC initial renewal page | “Completed Applications”, 64 rows
Subsequent licence renewal 60 to 80 years 13 plants, 25 reactors renewed; 3 under review Filed | NRC SLR page | “subsequent license renewal (SLR) to be the period of extended operation from 60 years to 80 years”; “Completed Applications” (Turkey Point … Edwin I. Hatch); “Applications Currently Under Review”

Source: US NRC, Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal, Status of Subsequent License Renewal Applications and Status of Initial License Renewal Applications and Industry Initiatives; counts of plants and reactors computed here from the completed-applications tables. Other regulators run comparable periodic safety reviews.

Figure 15. Operating reactors by years since grid connection, end-2025

Operational reactors (number)
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
59
40
37
91
146
40
0–9
10–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50+
Years since grid connection, 31 Dec 2025

Source: IAEA, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition, Table 14 “Operational reactors, 31 Dec. 2025”, column “Grid Connection”, pp.31–49 — each of the 413 reactors’ age at 31 December 2025, binned here into ten-year bands; the mean, 32.9 years, is computed from the same dates. Reactors in suspended operation are excluded.

3.4 Small modular reactors & advanced designs

The most talked-about forward theme is the small modular reactor (SMR) — a design of up to about 300 MWe per module, against 1,000 MWe or more for a conventional plant, with microreactors below about 20 MWe. The pitch is to replace giant, bespoke, over-budget projects with factory-built modules shipped to site and added one at a time, sited beside industry, remote grids or data centres. More than 100 designs are in development.

Reality is earlier-stage than the headlines. At the end of 2025 the IAEA listed one SMR-class power reactor in commercial operation, China’s HTR-PM at Shidao Bay, and three under construction: China’s ACP100 (Linglong One), Russia’s lead-cooled BREST-OD-300 and Argentina’s CAREM25. The Western leaders were still listed as planned: GE Vernova Hitachi’s BWRX-300 at Darlington in Canada (four units, construction start expected in 2026) and Clinch River in Tennessee, TerraPower’s Natrium at Kemmerer, Wyoming, and Kairos Power’s Hermes 2 demonstration. The fuel-cycle catch: more than half of SMR designs in development need HALEU — high-assay low-enriched uranium, enriched to between 5% and 20% U-235 — and only Russia and China can make it at scale; commercial supply comes only from Russia’s Tenex. Scaling SMRs would deepen the very dependency Section 2.6 describes. For the uranium market, SMRs are a real but gradual upside on top of the existing fleet.

Table 20. Small modular and advanced reactors in the IAEA’s lists, end-2025

Design Developer Type MWe net per unit Status Source
HTR-PM (Shidao Bay 1) Tsinghua University (design) High-temperature gas 150 Operating; grid 2021, commercial 2023 Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 14 | “SHIDAO BAY-1” HTGR | p.34
ACP100 (Linglong One) CNNC PWR 100 Under construction since July 2021 Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 13 | “LINGLONG-1” | p.28
BREST-OD-300 Rosatom Lead-cooled fast 300 Under construction since June 2021 Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 13 | “BREST-OD-300” | p.30
CAREM25 CNEA (Argentina) PWR 25 Under construction since August 2015 Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 13 | “CAREM25” | p.28
BWRX-300 GE Vernova Hitachi BWR 300 Planned: Darlington SMR1–4 (construction expected 2026), Clinch River Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 12 | “DARLINGTON SMR1”, “CLINCH RIVER SMR-1” | pp.26–27
Natrium TerraPower Sodium fast 342 Planned: Kemmerer Unit 1 Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 12 | “KEMMERER UNIT 1” | p.27
KP-FHR (Hermes 2) Kairos Power Fluoride-salt high-temperature 25 Planned: two demonstration units Filed | IAEA RDS-2 2026 | Table 12 | “HERMES 2 UNIT 1” | p.27

Source: IAEA, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition, Tables 12 (planned), 13 (under construction) and 14 (operational); the SMR definition, design count and HALEU supply from the WNA’s Small Nuclear Power Reactors and High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium pages (“Commercial supply of HALEU is only available from Russian company Tenex”). Status changes quickly; the IAEA’s list is the one pinned here.

4. The companies & the value chain

4.1 The largest uranium companies

Uranium production is dominated by state-owned producers, and the way to size them up in an evergreen guide is by durable fundamentals — production, reserves and cost — not market capitalisation, which moves daily. By 2024 output the leaders are Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan, mostly ISL), Cameco (Canada, the Athabasca mines and a 40% stake in Inkai), France’s Orano, Rosatom’s Uranium One, China’s CGN and CNNC, Uzbekistan’s Navoi Mining and BHP, whose Olympic Dam yields uranium as a by-product. Of the top ten, only Cameco, Kazatomprom and BHP trade on major exchanges as companies in their own right, which is why listed developers and the physical trust (Sections 4.2 and 5.1) loom so large in uranium portfolios.

Table 21. Largest uranium producers by output and reserves

Company Country Type Listing Production, 2024 Reserves Reserve life Source
Kazatomprom Kazakhstan ISL, state-controlled Public (LSE and AIX: KAP) 1 12,463 tU 282.9 thousand tU, attributable (JORC) 20.9 years Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | Ore Reserves | “282.9 thousand tU attributable to the Company” | p.41
Cameco Canada Conventional, high grade Public (NYSE: CCJ; TSX: CCO) 10,193 tU 433.0 Mlb U₃O₈, its share (NI 43-101) 16.0 years 2 Filed | CCJ AR 2025 | Mineral reserves | “Total” 760.8 (100%), 433.0 (our share) | p.110
Orano France Diversified fuel cycle State-owned (unlisted) 3 6,815 tU 101,341 tU, its share n/d Filed | Orano AAR 2025 | “Mineral reserves of Orano deposits comprise 101,341 metric tons of uranium” | p.35
Uranium One Russia ISL (Kazakhstan), state State-owned (Rosatom) 5,829 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published
CGN China State State-owned (CGN) 5,761 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published
Navoi Mining Uzbekistan ISL, state State-owned 4,000 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published
CNNC China State State-owned 3,286 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published
Rosatom (ARMZ) Russia State State-owned 2,738 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published
BHP Australia By-product of copper Public (ASX, LSE, NYSE: BHP) 2,693 tU Olympic Dam: 591 Mt at 0.57 kg/t U₃O₈ (JORC) 4 n/d Filed | BHP AR 2025 | Ore Reserves | “Olympic Dam” UG Sulphide 591 Mt, 0.57 kg/t U₃O₈ | p.210
General Atomics / Quasar United States / Australia ISL (Beverley, Four Mile) Privately held 1,808 tU n/p n/d Filed | WNA mining production page | “Uranium production by company 2024”; reserves not published

Notes to Table 21

Reserves are as each company filed them at the end of 2025.

  1. Kazakhstan’s state owns 75% (Samruk-Kazyna 62.99%, the Ministry of Finance 12.01%); 25% trades as shares and global depositary receipts on the Astana International Exchange and the London Stock Exchange (KAP IAR 2025, pp.45–46).
  2. Cameco’s reserve life excludes Inkai on both sides, because Cameco books its Inkai share as purchases, not production: (433.0 − 96.5 Mlb of Inkai) ÷ 21.0 Mlb produced in 2025 = 16.0 years (CCJ AR 2025, pp.57, 110). Kazatomprom’s is attributable reserves ÷ 13,519 tU of attributable 2025 production (p.35).
  3. 90.33% owned by the French state (Orano AAR 2025, p.14).
  4. BHP prints ore tonnage and grade, not contained uranium; a further 43 Mt of low-grade ore grades 0.28 kg/t. Uranium is recovered at about 65%, so a reserve life is not comparable and is not computed.

Source: production — WNA, World Uranium Mining Production, table “Uranium production by company 2024”, one basis for every row; reserves — the companies’ filings as cited: Kazatomprom 2025 Integrated Annual Report, Cameco 2025 Annual Report, Orano Annual Activity Report 2025, BHP Annual Report 2025. “n/p” = not published in the documents checked; “n/d” = not derivable on a matching basis. Reserve lives are computed here. No market-capitalisation figures are shown by design.

Figure 16. Largest uranium producers, 2024 (tU)

Kazatomprom
Cameco
Orano
Uranium One
CGN
Navoi Mining
CNNC
Rosatom (ARMZ)
BHP
GA / Quasar
All others
12,463
10,193
6,815
5,829
5,761
4,000
3,286
2,738
2,693
1,808
4,627
Uranium production, 2024 (tU)

Figure data: Table 21, production column; “All others” is the WNA’s “Other” row, 4,627 tU.

4.2 Company archetypes along the value chain

Uranium exposure spans a wide risk spectrum, and an investor should match the archetype to the goal. Explorers offer option value and no cash flow. Developers and restarts are permitting or building mines — in the Athabasca Basin, Denison’s Phoenix ISL project (56.7 Mlb of reserves at 11.7% U₃O₈) received its construction licence in February 2026 and targets first production by mid-2028, while NexGen’s Arrow (239.6 Mlb at 2.37%) awaits its regulator’s decision; value is unlocked at first production, with high leverage to price. Producers sell uranium with direct exposure, shaped by cost-curve position and contract book. Physical holders own pounds of U₃O₈ and track spot. Fuel-cycle companies — converters and enrichers — earn service margins tied to policy as much as to the uranium price. Royalty companies hold a share of others’ output. Among the companies analysed on this blog are the explorer IsoEnergy, the producer Boss Energy, the enricher Centrus Energy and the royalty company Uranium Royalty Corp.

Table 22. Uranium company archetypes

Archetype What they do Revenue model Examples Price sensitivity
Explorer Search for deposits None (raise and spend) Early-stage Athabasca juniors Very high
Developer / restart Build or re-open mines None until production Denison (Phoenix), NexGen (Arrow) High
Producer Mine and sell uranium Uranium sales less cost Kazatomprom, Cameco, Paladin High
Physical holder Hold pounds of U₃O₈ None; tracks spot via NAV Sprott Physical Uranium Trust One-to-one with spot
Royalty Finance mines for a share of output Royalty income Uranium Royalty Corp. Medium
Fuel cycle (convert, enrich) Process uranium Service fees per kgU or SWU Urenco, Orano, Centrus Low; policy-driven

Source: developer reserves and status from Denison’s 2025 Annual Information Form (“Total Proven and Probable”, p.38; “Phoenix remains on track for first production by mid- 2028”, p.8) and NexGen’s 2025 Annual Information Form (“Probable Mineral Reserves were estimated at 240 Mlb U₃O₈ contained in 4.6Mt grading 2.37% U₃O₈”, p.3; the CNSC decision “remains pending as of March 3, 2026”, p.7), each also filed on SEDAR+. The archetypes, revenue models and sensitivity ratings are this guide’s judgement, following the Metal Pilot project-type taxonomy.

4.3 Infrastructure & balance-sheet assets

What a uranium company owns decides what its filings tell you. A producer’s balance sheet rests on reserves and resources (in tU or Mlb U₃O₈ at a % U₃O₈ grade, reported under JORC, NI 43-101 or S-K 1300), its mines — ISL wellfields, or pits and underground workings feeding a mill — and, for integrated companies such as Cameco and Orano, conversion and enrichment plants. A uranium-specific asset is the contract book: the long-term sales contracts and the prices or formulas locked into them, which set near-term revenue more than spot does. Cameco’s realised price in 2025 was $62.11/lb against a spot average of $73.54. And watch gross versus net: Cigar Lake, McArthur River, Inkai and most Kazakh mines are joint ventures, so only the attributable share reaches shareholders — Kazatomprom’s attributable output was 13,519 tU of the 25,839 tU its mines produced in 2025.

Table 23. Uranium-company asset types and metrics

Asset type What it does Key metric Unit
Reserves and resources The in-ground uranium base Tonnage, grade, contained uranium Mt; % U₃O₈; Mlb or tU
Mines (ISL or conventional) Extract uranium Annual output; recovery tU/yr or Mlb/yr; %
Mill or processing plant Produce yellowcake Throughput, licensed capacity Mlb U₃O₈/yr
Conversion and enrichment Fuel-cycle services Capacity tU/yr; thousand SWU/yr
Contract book Locked-in sales Committed volume; realised price Mlb; $/lb
Joint-venture interests Shares of others’ mines Ownership %; attributable output %; tU

Source: this guide’s summary; the examples in the text are from Cameco’s 2025 Annual Report (“Average realized price (US$/lb)" 62.11, p.57) and Kazatomprom’s 2025 Integrated Annual Report (“Production volume of U₃O₈ (attributable basis)" 13,519 tU and (100% basis) 25,839 tU, p.35).

5. Investing in uranium

5.1 Ways to own it — exposure vehicles

Uranium’s menu of vehicles is unlike any other commodity’s, because a private investor cannot store yellowcake: only licensed facilities may hold it. The market’s answer is the physical trust. The Sprott Physical Uranium Trust, listed in Toronto since July 2021, is a closed-end trust that holds substantially all its assets in U₃O₈ stored at the converters of Cameco, ConverDyn and Orano — the uranium equivalent of a bullion fund, and since 2021 a buyer of physical pounds on the spot market. Read the structural catch first: a closed-end trust’s units trade at a premium or discount to the net asset value of the uranium it holds, so a buyer who pays a premium can lose money as it narrows even while uranium rises. The trust publishes the gap daily; check it before buying.

Futures exist — CME’s UxC U₃O₈ contract, 250 lb, cash-settled — but are thin, and no futures-based fund is offered to retail investors, so the contango roll cost that erodes oil and gas ETFs does not arise; the trust’s premium or discount is uranium’s equivalent trap. Mining equities are the leveraged route, from Cameco and Kazatomprom through developers to explorers, and sector equity ETFs bundle them. Fuel-cycle companies — converters and enrichers — give fee-based exposure to the move away from Russian supply rather than to the uranium price.

Table 24. Ways to own uranium

Vehicle What you actually own Tracks spot? Key structural cost or risk Best suited for
Physical trust Pounds of U₃O₈ in licensed storage Yes, through NAV Premium or discount to NAV Direct exposure, patient capital
Futures (CME UxC U₃O₈) Cash-settled contracts on UxC spot Near-term Thin liquidity; margin calls Professionals hedging
Producer equities Mining businesses and their contract books No — amplifies Contract books delay the benefit of a rally Leverage to the price
Developer and explorer equities Projects awaiting finance or licences No — amplifies more Financing, permitting, execution High-conviction leverage
Sector equity ETFs A basket of uranium-related shares No — blended Concentration in a few large names Diversified equity exposure
Fuel-cycle equities Conversion and enrichment margins Weakly Policy and plant-build risk The de-Russification theme

Source: Sprott, Sprott Physical Uranium Trust fund page — “Closed-End Trust”; “invests and holds substantially all of its assets in uranium in the form of U₃O₈”; storage at “Cameco (Canada); ConverDyn (U.S.); Orano (France)"; inception “July 19, 2021”; and CME Group, UxC Uranium U₃O₈ Futures Contract Specs. Structural attributes only — no fees, premiums or prices, which change daily; the ratings are this guide’s judgement.

5.2 How to value & screen uranium miners

The facts above turn into a repeatable checklist. For a producer: the reserve base — how many pounds, at what grade (Athabasca’s 6–16% U₃O₈ and Kazakh ISL’s 0.03% are the two ends of the quality spectrum); the cash cost and all-in sustaining cost (AISC) per pound — who keeps mining through a downturn; and, uniquely for uranium, the contract book — how much output is sold forward and on what terms, since a producer fully committed at old prices captures little of a rally. For developers: the project’s net present value and internal rate of return at a conservative price, the capital cost, and the incentive price that would justify building it. For explorers: grade, drill results and jurisdiction.

The most useful single tool is the cost curve: rank producers from cheapest to dearest, draw the price across it, and see who earns a margin and who needs a higher price to exist. Few uranium producers publish comparable unit costs; the three that do, for 2025, sit far below the spot price — Kazatomprom’s attributable C1 cash cost was $18.06/lb, Cameco’s cash cost of produced pounds about $17, and Paladin’s restarted Langer Heinrich $40.20. To run the same screen — resources, cost and contract cover — across every listed uranium company, use the Metal Pilot uranium dataset.

Table 25. Uranium-miner screening metrics

Metric What it tells you Good vs. concerning Where to find it
Reserves and grade Scale and ore quality Larger and higher-grade is better Reserve statement (JORC, NI 43-101, S-K 1300)
Cash cost / AISC ($/lb) Cost competitiveness Well below the long-term price Annual report, MD&A
Contract book Exposure to a rising or falling price Some uncommitted volume is upside MD&A, contract-portfolio notes
Realised vs. spot price How fast price moves reach revenue A small lag means more torque MD&A
Incentive price Price needed to build new supply Below the long-term price = buildable Feasibility study, company guidance
Jurisdiction and permitting Political and licensing risk Established regimes are safer Country profile, regulator

Source: this guide’s judgement, using the cost and price lines reported in the producers’ filings (Table 26) and the reporting codes in Table 21.

Table 26. Cash cost of three uranium producers per pound of U₃O₈, 2025

Producer Operation Cost measure Cost Output Source
Cameco McArthur River / Key Lake, Cigar Lake Cash cost of produced pounds, its share $16.98/lb 1 21.0 Mlb Filed | CCJ AR 2025 | Uranium average unit cost of sales | “Cash cost” 23.74 ($/lb) | p.58
Derived | ÷ 1.3978
Kazatomprom All Kazakh assets C1 cash cost, attributable $18.06/lb 35.15 Mlb Filed | KAP IAR 2025 | Uranium segment C1 cash cost | “C1 Cash cost (attributable basis) USD/lb” 18.06 | p.37
Paladin Langer Heinrich (100%), year to June 2025 Average cost of production $40.20/lb 3.0 Mlb Filed | PDN AR 2025 | Highlights | “US$40.2/lb Average cost of production” | p.10

Notes to Table 26

  1. Cameco reports in Canadian dollars; converted here at the Bank of Canada’s 2025 average of 1.3978 Canadian dollars per US dollar (FXUSDCAD). Its share of output excludes Inkai, which it books as purchases.
  2. The three measures are not identical: Kazatomprom’s C1 excludes sustaining capital (its AISC was $29.53/lb), Cameco’s excludes non-cash costs (its total production cost was C$35.06/lb), and Paladin’s figure covers a mine in its first full year after restart, against a target of $28.50–31/lb (PDN AR 2025, p.63).

Source: the producers’ filings as cited — Cameco 2025 Annual Report, Kazatomprom 2025 Integrated Annual Report, Paladin 2025 Annual Report (ASX announcements → Annual Report 2025); FX from the Bank of Canada’s daily exchange rates, series FXUSDCAD, 2025 mean computed here. Orano, CGN, CNNC, Navoi and Rosatom publish no unit cost, so the curve covers about 34% of the Red Book’s expected 2025 output.

Figure 17. Uranium cost curve of three producers, 2025 ($/lb U₃O₈)

Cash cost ($/lb U₃O₈)
80
60
40
20
0
$16.98
$18.06
$40.20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Cumulative 2025 output of the three (%)

Figure data: Table 26 — bars left to right Cameco, Kazatomprom and Paladin; each bar’s width is its share of the three’s 59.2 Mlb, its height its cash cost. The dashed line is the 2025 average spot price, $73.54/lb (Table 3).

5.3 Macro regimes, rates & correlations

Uranium’s behaviour is the most idiosyncratic of any commodity in this series, and that is its defining investment feature. Demand is set by a fleet that changes over decades and must be fuelled whatever the economy does, so uranium does not trade like “Dr. Copper” or like an inflation hedge; its price answers to reactor policy, producer discipline, the drawdown of stocks, financial buying and fuel-cycle geopolitics. (For how the major commodities compare across macro regimes — a framework uranium largely sits outside — see the macro regime guide.) Interest rates and the dollar matter only at the margin: uranium is priced in dollars, and high rates raise the cost of carrying inventory, but neither has driven a uranium cycle.

Table 27. Uranium across economic regimes

Regime Typical behaviour Why Historical example
Nuclear-build optimism Strong Demand outlook lifts; utilities contract ahead 2003–2007: annual spot +760% ($11.55 to $99.33)
Accident or policy reversal Very weak Reactors shut; a glut builds 2011–2016: annual spot −55%; February 2011 – November 2016 month-end −74%
Producer supply discipline Strong Mines idled; producers buy spot to cover contracts June 2018 – May 2020: spot +50%, S&P 500 +6%
Financial buying Strong Physical buyers absorb thin spot supply June to September 2021, the trust’s first months: spot +32%, S&P 500 +5%
Recession, risk-off Largely independent Reactor fuel demand is inelastic June to December 2008: spot −11%, S&P 500 −35%; February to May 2020: spot +37%, S&P 500 −11%
Fuel-cycle supply shock Strong Buyers turn away from Russian fuel February 2022 – January 2024: spot +106%, S&P 500 +9%

Source: uranium spot — Cameco, Uranium Price (annual averages, Table 3, and month-end prices); S&P 500 — Robert Shiller, ie_data, sheet “Data”, column “P” (monthly average of daily closes). Moves computed here. The Typical behaviour and Why columns are this guide’s judgement; regime descriptions are historical, not predictive.

Past performance. Uranium is a study in extremes. On month-end prices the spot rose 19-fold from $7.10 at the end of 2000 to $136 in June 2007, fell 87% to $18.00 by November 2016, then rose more than fivefold to $100.25 by January 2024. Monthly price changes over 2000–2025 had an annualised volatility of 23.6%, above copper’s 21.1% and nearly double gold’s 12.7%. Adjusted for inflation, the 2025 average price was still less than half the 2007 average. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Correlations. Over January 2000 to December 2025, monthly changes in the uranium price were almost uncorrelated with mainstream assets — between 0.00 and +0.10 with the S&P 500, copper, Brent and gold. Even in the financial crisis the link was weak (+0.07, September 2008–March 2009). The strongest relationships are with the companies that mine it — +0.33 with Cameco and +0.38 with the Global X Uranium ETF — and those have strengthened since 2013.

Table 28. Uranium correlations, monthly, 2000–2025

Asset Correlation, full window Window 2000–⁠2012 2013–⁠2025 Note
Global X Uranium ETF (URA) +0.38 Dec 2010–Dec 2025 n/a 1 +0.41 The equity proxy; amplifies
Cameco (CCJ) +0.33 Feb 2000–Dec 2025 +0.25 +0.41 The largest listed producer
S&P 500 +0.10 Jan 2000–Dec 2025 +0.22 −0.02 Largely independent
Copper +0.05 Jan 2000–Dec 2025 +0.09 0.00 Not a growth-cycle metal
Brent crude +0.02 Jan 2000–Dec 2025 +0.04 −0.01 Different drivers
Gold 0.00 Jan 2000–Dec 2025 −0.08 +0.08 No safe-haven link

Notes to Table 28

  1. URA began trading in November 2010, so its 2000–2012 sub-window would hold only 24 monthly changes (+0.20 on Dec 2010–Dec 2012) — too short to set beside the other rows.

Source: computed here from monthly percentage changes — uranium from Cameco’s month-end spot price; gold, Brent and copper from the World Bank’s Pink Sheet, monthly, sheet “Monthly Prices”, columns “Gold”, “Crude oil, Brent” and “Copper”; the S&P 500 from Robert Shiller’s ie_data; Cameco and URA month-end closes from CNBC’s chart data (split-adjusted closes, used for percentage moves only, because no primary price history can be downloaded free). Uranium and the equities are month-end values, the others monthly averages. Correlations are time-varying and can break down around shocks; the Note column is this guide’s judgement.

Figure 18. Uranium’s correlations with major assets, monthly, 2000–2025

Uranium ETF (URA)
+0.38
Cameco (CCJ)
+0.33
S&P 500
+0.10
Copper
+0.05
Gold
0.00

Figure data: Table 28, full-window column; Brent crude (+0.02) is in the table only. Shading is on a fixed scale where 0.75 or more is solid.

The equity amplifier. A low monthly correlation hides how much the miners amplify the big moves. In the post-Fukushima bear market the annual average spot price fell 55% from 2011 to 2016; Cameco’s shares fell 61% and the Global X Uranium ETF 83%, its junior-heavy basket hit hardest. In the recovery, annual-average spot rose 184% from 2020 to 2024 while Cameco rose 385% — though URA, which also holds non-producers, rose a smaller 163%. Miners are the geared expression of the uranium price, in both directions; for the juniors, gearing includes the risk of not surviving the downturn.

Source: annual averages of Cameco’s month-end spot price (Table 3) against annual averages of daily closes for Cameco (NYSE:CCJ) and the Global X Uranium ETF (URA), CNBC chart data, 2011–2024 — concluded episodes, computed here.

5.4 Price drivers & cycles

Stripped of noise, the uranium price answers to a short list of forces, and the clearest evidence comes from concluded episodes. On the demand side: the reactor pipeline of new builds, restarts and retirements, nuclear policy, and financial buying of physical pounds. On the supply side: producer discipline, the drawdown of secondary supply, and fuel-cycle geopolitics. The recurring pattern is a long lag between price and supply — a new mine takes a decade — which turns modest imbalances into violent cycles.

Figure 19. Nine episodes that shaped the uranium market, 2003–2024

  1. 2003
    The 2003–07 boomAnnual average spot climbs from $11.55 to $99.33/lb; the month-end price peaks at $136 in June 2007.
  2. 2008
    BustBy December 2008 spot is $52.50/lb, 61% below the peak, while the long-term price holds at $70.
  3. 2011
    FukushimaThe March accident idles Japan's fleet; spot drops from $69.63 in February to $52.88 by June.
  4. 2013
    Megatons to Megawatts endsDeliveries of down-blended Russian warhead uranium to the United States are completed.
  5. 2016
    The troughSpot hits $18.00/lb in November, 74% below February 2011, amid a supply glut.
  6. 2018
    Producers cutCameco idles McArthur River until November 2022; producers buy spot to cover their contracts.
  7. 2020
    Pandemic curtailmentsMine suspensions lift spot from $24.80 in February to $33.93/lb in May.
  8. 2021
    Sprott trust launchedFrom July 2021 a listed trust buys physical U₃O₈, turning investor money into spot demand.
  9. 2024
    Away from Russian fuelAfter the 2022 invasion, spot reaches $100.25/lb in January 2024; the US bans Russian LEU from August.

Source: prices from Cameco’s month-end and annual industry averages (Table 3); events from OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, “Uranium prices”, pp.135–137 (Fukushima, the 2018–2019 production cuts, the 2020 curtailments, the 2022 war and the May 2024 Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act) and p.131 (Megatons to Megawatts, completed at the end of 2013); McArthur River’s idling to November 2022 from p.139; the trust’s launch from Sprott’s fund page; the August 2024 start of the US ban from the WNA’s Uranium Enrichment page.

The settled case studies show each driver at work. The 2003–2007 boom — a nuclear-renaissance narrative, speculation and supply problems at a few critical facilities — carried the annual spot average from $11.55 to $99.33, before buyers balked and the 2008 crisis forced distressed sellers out. The Fukushima accident of March 2011 idled Japan’s fleet and set off a six-year glut that took spot to $18.00 in November 2016. Supply discipline came next: Cameco idled McArthur River from 2018 and producers bought spot to cover their contracts, and the 2020 pandemic shut more mines. The Sprott trust, launched in July 2021, turned investor money into physical demand on a thin spot market. Finally, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine sent Western buyers looking for non-Russian fuel; spot reached $100.25 in January 2024, and the US ban on Russian low-enriched uranium followed in August. The durable lesson: uranium rallies when a growing reactor fleet meets a supply base producers have spent years shrinking, and collapses when an accident or a glut destroys confidence.

Table 29. Uranium price drivers

Driver Direction of effect Why What to watch
Reactor build and retirement More reactors, higher Sets long-run demand Construction starts, restarts, licence renewals
Nuclear policy and sentiment Pro-nuclear, higher Drives contracting by utilities National targets; the COP28 pledge
Producer discipline Cuts, higher Idled mines tighten a thin market Kazatomprom and Cameco guidance
Secondary supply Drawdown, higher The buffer behind the primary gap is finite Utility inventories (Table 12); underfeeding
Financial buying Inflows, higher Physical buyers absorb spot supply The physical trust’s holdings and premium
Fuel-cycle geopolitics Disruption, higher Russia holds 43% of enrichment US waivers; Western capacity additions

Source: this guide’s synthesis of the episodes above and Tables 10, 12 and 15; directions are historical tendencies, not forecasts.

Those drivers resolve into a simple forward frame. It is not a forecast — uranium’s history warns against those — but a set of conditions and the price regime each would produce.

Table 30. Uranium price scenarios (illustrative, not forecasts)

Scenario Key conditions Likely price regime
Bull Requirements track the Red Book’s high case; life extensions and restarts continue; secondary supply runs down; new mines and Western enrichment lag Sustained strength; long-term contract prices lead spot higher
Base Requirements between the Red Book’s low and high cases; restarts and committed mines roughly keep pace until the mid-2030s Firm long-term prices; spot volatile around them
Bear A serious accident or policy reversal; faster-than-expected new supply; financial holders sell A sharp, multi-year de-rating, as after 2011

Source: this guide’s illustrative frame, conditioned on the drivers in Table 29 and the OECD-NEA/IAEA Uranium 2026 scenarios in Table 31; the rows describe conditions, not forecasts.

5.5 Risks, controversies & ESG

The bull case has real counterweights, and uranium’s are unusually binary. The dominant risk is a nuclear accident: Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) each triggered policy reversals that cut demand for years. Policy reversal more broadly — Germany’s completed exit, from 169.6 TWh of nuclear output in 2000 to none in 2024 — can remove demand at a stroke. Resource nationalism bites in a market this concentrated: Niger’s 2023 coup ended in the 2025 nationalisation of Orano’s Somaïr mine and the loss of its Imouraren permit. And the deepest structural risk is dependence on Russian enrichment, which the West is replacing slowly and expensively.

Uranium mining also carries distinctive ESG exposure: the radioactivity of ore, waste rock and mill tailings; groundwater protection at ISL wellfields; the unresolved question of long-term spent-fuel disposal; and weapons proliferation, policed by IAEA safeguards. Against that, nuclear’s defenders point to an energy source that is low-carbon, always on and compact. Substitution is real at the margin — renewables and storage compete for new generation — but for an existing reactor uranium is irreplaceable, which is what keeps demand inelastic. These are contested questions, and reasonable analysts weigh them differently.

Figure 20. Uranium risk map — likelihood vs. impact

Impact
High
Low
Russian enrichment
Nuclear accident
Resource nationalism
Policy reversal
Waste / proliferation
Substitution
Low
High
Likelihood

Source: this guide’s qualitative assessment of the risks above; positions are judgement, not data. Germany’s generation is from the Energy Institute’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook, sheet “Nuclear Generation - TWh”, row “Germany”; Niger from the Red Book, Table 1.17, p.77, and “Supply and demand to 2050”, p.139, and Orano’s Annual Activity Report 2025, p.36.

6. Future outlook & forecasts

Uranium demand is unusually forecastable — it is set by a fleet that changes slowly and visibly — and both the agency and the industry project growth. Forecasts remain scenarios: the near-term ones rest on reactors already operating or under construction; the long-term ones on policy.

6.1 Demand

The Red Book projects world reactor requirements rising from 64,584 tU in 2024 to between 84,765 tU (low case) and 143,857 tU (high case) by 2050 — up 31% at the low end and more than doubling at the high end — as nuclear capacity grows from 398 GWe to between 565 and 916 GWe, led by East Asia. The WNA’s World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025 is more aggressive in the near term: from 68,920 tU in 2025 its Reference scenario reaches just over 150,000 tU by 2040, with 746 GWe of capacity, and its Upper scenario more than 204,000 tU. The two bodies count requirements differently, so their levels should not be mixed; what they agree on is the direction.

6.2 Supply and the gap

The catch is supply. On the Red Book’s figures, existing and committed mines could produce 74,209 tU a year in 2030, enough for the low case but not the high; their capability then falls to 37,755 tU by 2040 and 15,525 tU by 2050 as orebodies deplete. Adding every planned and prospective project lifts 2030 capability to 98,589 tU, but even that falls to 57,455 tU by 2050 — below both demand cases from 2040. Closing the gap needs new mines, with long lead times, and a rebuilt Western conversion and enrichment industry, while the secondary stocks that bridged past gaps keep shrinking. Capability is not output — the Red Book notes that actual production “seldom, if ever” matches it (p.92).

Table 31. Uranium requirements and mine production capability to 2050

Red Book 2026 case 2024 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Requirements, low case 64,584 tU/yr 66,835 tU/yr 78,034 tU/yr 83,001 tU/yr 84,857 tU/yr 84,765 tU/yr
Requirements, high case 64,584 tU/yr 81,768 tU/yr 92,474 tU/yr 110,738 tU/yr 127,884 tU/yr 143,857 tU/yr
Capability, existing and committed mines (A-II) n/p 74,209 tU/yr 57,335 tU/yr 37,755 tU/yr 32,695 tU/yr 15,525 tU/yr
Capability incl. planned and prospective (B-II) n/p 98,589 tU/yr 94,075 tU/yr 76,485 tU/yr 69,510 tU/yr 57,455 tU/yr
Gap, high case vs. A-II — 7,559 tU/yr 35,139 tU/yr 72,983 tU/yr 95,189 tU/yr 128,332 tU/yr
Gap, high case vs. B-II — −16,821 tU/yr −1,601 tU/yr 34,253 tU/yr 58,374 tU/yr 86,402 tU/yr

Source: OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026, Table 2.4 “Annual reactor-related uranium requirements to 2050”, row “World Total”, low and high columns, p.125, and Table 1.23 “World uranium production capability to 2050”, row “Total”, columns A-II and B-II, p.93 (capability from identified resources below $130/kgU); capacity from Table 2.3, p.124. The 2024 requirement is the actual figure. Gaps = requirements − capability, computed here; a negative gap means capability exceeds requirements. Scenario projections, not measured data. The WNA figures in the text are from its World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025 summary page (the full report is sold).

Figure 21. Uranium requirements vs. mine production capability to 2050 (tU/yr)

Uranium (tU/yr)
150,000
125,000
100,000
75,000
50,000
25,000
0
Requirements (high) 143,857 Requirements (low) 84,765 Mines incl. planned 57,455 Existing + committed mines 15,525
2024
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

Figure data: Table 31, the four projection rows; the requirement lines start from the actual 2024 figure.

6.3 Catalysts to watch

The forward watch-list is concrete. Near term: Kazatomprom’s and Cameco’s production guidance (the swing supply), restarts and life extensions in Japan and the United States, flows into the physical trust, and the build-out of Western enrichment before US waivers for Russian supply end at the start of 2028. Over three to ten years: whether the fleet grows along the Red Book’s high case — China’s 36 reactors under construction, the COP28 pledge to triple nuclear capacity by 2050, SMRs and data-centre demand — and whether new mines such as Denison’s Phoenix and NexGen’s Arrow arrive in time. What would confirm the bull thesis: continued build-out and a still-thin supply pipeline. What would break it: a serious accident, a major policy reversal, or new supply arriving faster than expected.

Table 32. Uranium catalyst calendar

Catalyst Timing Why it matters Watch
Kazatomprom and Cameco guidance Quarterly Swing supply Production and sales guidance
Euratom Supply Agency annual report Annual, mid-year EU purchases, prices, inventories Russian share; inventory cover
US EIA Uranium Marketing Annual Report Annual, mid-year US purchases, prices, inventories Origins; contracted volumes
US waiver authority for Russian LEU ends Start of 2028 Forces substitution of Russian SWU Urenco and Orano additions
Denison Phoenix first production Targeted mid-2028 First new Athabasca ISL mine Construction progress
NexGen Arrow licence decision Pending The largest undeveloped high-grade deposit Regulator’s decision; financing
OECD-NEA/IAEA Red Book Biennial; next 2028 Resources, production, demand Coverage ratio; capability

Source: the timings are those stated in the documents behind Tables 12, 14, 15 and 22 and in OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026 (the Red Book’s 2026 edition followed the 2024 edition); this guide’s selection.

7. Summary

Uranium is the fuel of nuclear power and almost nothing else: its value rests on U-235, its demand on a fleet of 441 reactors that must be fuelled whatever the price. It is priced privately, under long-term contracts and a thin spot market, and best read as an average — spot ran from $8.18 in 2000 to $99.33 in 2007, down to $21.66 in 2017 and back to $85.14 in 2024, $73.54 in 2025 and $85.34 over the 12 months to September 2026. It is mined in a few places — Kazakhstan 38%, Canada 23%, Namibia 12% — mostly by state companies, increasingly by in-situ leach, at grades from 0.03% to 16% U₃O₈. Demand comes from the United States (a third), China (the growth) and France, and has run ahead of mine supply every year since the 1990s; inventories, recycled material and ex-weapons uranium have filled a gap that was 26% of needs in 2020 and 4–10% in 2024. The choke point is downstream: Russia holds 43% of enrichment capacity, and the West is only now rebuilding its own. The companies — Kazatomprom, Cameco, Orano and a group of state miners — are best compared on production, reserves and cost; the three that publish comparable costs produce far below the spot price. Uranium’s regime is its own: almost uncorrelated with stocks, oil, copper or gold, it rewards reactor build-out, producer discipline and fuel-cycle stress and collapses after accidents, and the miners amplify both. The single variable to watch is the gap between a growing fleet and a mine pipeline that, on the Red Book’s figures, shrinks after 2030.

To go from this big-picture view to the actual companies — every uranium producer and developer screened by resources, cost and contract cover — explore Metal Pilot’s uranium mining stock screener.

Terms in this post (44)
AISC (all-in sustaining cost)
The cost to produce an ounce or pound and keep the mine running: operating costs, royalties, sustaining capital and corporate overhead, net of by-product credits, on the World Gold Council’s non-GAAP definition. Lower is better. In depth: Gold market guide — How to value & screen gold miners
Attributable
A company’s ownership share of a jointly or partly owned asset’s output or reserves, after every layer of the structure — the part that belongs to its shareholders.
Brent
The North Sea crude benchmark that prices most of the world’s internationally traded oil. In depth: Oil market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
By-product
A metal recovered incidentally while mining another. Its supply follows the host metal’s output, not its own price.
C1 / cash cost
The direct cost of producing a pound or ounce — mining, processing, site overhead and freight, net of by-product credits — before depreciation, royalties and sustaining capital. Lower is better. In depth: Copper market guide — How to value & screen copper miners
C1 cash cost / AISC
Cash cost per pound / cash cost plus sustaining capital. Who survives a downturn.
CME UxC U₃O₈ futures
Cash-settled uranium futures on CME, settled against UxC’s month-end spot price for U₃O₈ — uranium oxide concentrate, or yellowcake — in dollars a pound. In depth: Uranium market guide — Pricing & benchmarks
Contango roll cost
The loss a futures fund takes when it sells an expiring contract to buy a dearer later one. Absent in uranium: no futures fund.
Contract book
A producer’s long-term sales contracts. Delays or caps the benefit of a rally.
Conventional mining
Open-pit or underground mining with a mill. One of two main supply routes.
Conversion (UF₆)
Turning yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas. A separate, concentrated fuel-cycle step.
Enrichment
Raising U-235 to 3–5% (or more). The choke point: Russia holds 43%.
Fuel fabrication
Making pellets and fuel assemblies. The last step before the reactor.
Grade
The concentration of metal in the ore — grams a tonne for gold and silver, per cent for base metals and uranium. A higher grade means more metal per tonne mined and usually a lower unit cost. In depth: Gold market guide — What gold is — physical basics & quality
HALEU
High-assay low-enriched uranium, 5–20% U-235. Needed by most advanced reactors; Russian-supplied.
HEU downblending
Diluting weapons-grade uranium into reactor fuel. The Megatons to Megawatts legacy.
Identified resources (RAR + inferred)
Delineated uranium recoverable below a cost threshold. Uranium’s endowment measure.
In-situ leach (ISL / ISR)
Dissolving uranium underground and pumping it to surface. 55% of supply; low cost; needs constant drilling.
Incentive price
The price needed to justify a new mine. Where new supply comes from.
Licence renewal (initial / subsequent)
A regulator’s extension of an operating licence: 40 — 60, then 60 — 80 years in the US. Keeps old reactors buying fuel.
Low-enriched uranium (LEU)
Uranium enriched to less than 20% U-235; reactor fuel is typically 3–5%. The fuel of today’s reactors.
Mlb (million pounds)
Million pounds — the unit uranium, as U₃O₈, and North American copper output and reserves are reported in.
Moderator / coolant
Material that slows neutrons / fluid that removes heat. Defines a reactor type and its fuel.
MOX / reprocessed uranium
Fuel recycled from spent fuel. Small; under 1% of requirements.
Net position
Mine production minus reactor requirements. Who exports and who imports.
Physical trust / NAV
A listed vehicle holding U₃O₈ / the value of its holdings per unit. Trades at a premium or discount to NAV.
Price-reporting agency
A firm, such as Platts or Argus, that assesses and publishes physical commodity prices from reported trades.
Production
The metal, oil or gas the company produced in the period at its own share of each mine or field — ounces, pounds or tonnes, or barrels of oil equivalent a day — before or after royalties as it reports; for a royalty or stream holder, its share of the operators’ output. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Units & reading a production number
Production capability (A-II / B-II)
The Red Book’s estimate of what existing and committed (A-II), or also planned and prospective (B-II), mines can produce. The supply side of the outlook.
PWR / BWR / PHWR
Pressurised water, boiling water and heavy-water reactors. Light-water types need enriched fuel; PHWRs do not.
Reactor generations (II, III, IV)
The fleet built since the 1970s, today’s evolved designs, and the research frontier. Sets fuel type and build risk.
Reactor requirements
Uranium a fleet needs in a year. The core demand number.
Reserve life
Years the reserves last at the current or guided production rate: reserves divided by a year’s output, on one reserve category. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — How to read & screen a producer
Reserves
What a company can show it will produce at a profit from known deposits or fields, at stated prices and costs, estimated under a disclosure code — NI 43-101, JORC or S-K 1300 for mines; SEC rules or NI 51-101 for oil and gas. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Reserves vs resources
Royalty
A share of a mine’s or well’s revenue or profit paid to a government or a royalty holder, ahead of the operator’s own margin. In depth: The Oil & Gas Value Chain: Upstream — Fiscal regimes
Secondary supply
Supply from sources other than mines — recycling, inventories and stockpiles.
SMR
A small modular reactor — a nuclear reactor of up to about 300 MWe designed to be built in factories.
Spot vs. long-term price
One-off delivery vs. multi-year contract reference. Most volume is priced long-term.
SWU
Separative work unit: the measure of enrichment effort. Enrichment is priced per SWU.
tU / lb U₃O₈
Tonne of uranium metal / pound of uranium oxide; 1 tU = 2,599.8 lb U₃O₈. Agencies count in tU, the market prices in lb.
tU, kgU (uranium metal)
Tonnes or kilograms of uranium as metal, the unit fuel services and Kazakh producers report in; one tonne of uranium equals 2,599.79 pounds of U₃O₈.
U-235 / U-238
The fissile (0.7%) and the non-fissile (99.3%) isotopes of natural uranium. Why most reactors need enriched fuel.
Underfeeding / tails
Using extra enrichment to need less uranium / depleted uranium left after enrichment. Turns spare enrichment into uranium supply.
U₃O₈ (yellowcake)
Uranium oxide concentrate, the form mined uranium is sold and priced in, quoted in dollars a pound.

8. Sources, methodology & disclaimer

8.1 Sources, methodology & data vintage

Methodology. Data as of 10 October 2026; the guide is refreshed annually, after the Euratom Supply Agency and US EIA annual reports (mid-year) and each biennial Red Book (the next is expected in 2028). Market structure is for 2024, the latest year both the Red Book and the WNA have counted, with the Red Book’s expected 2025 output alongside. Prices are calendar-year, multi-year and trailing-12-month averages of Cameco’s month-end industry averages of the UxC and TradeTech spot and long-term prices, never single quotes; an annual value is the mean of twelve month-end prices, and real prices deflate by US CPI-U to 2025 dollars. Two mine-production counts are kept apart: the Red Book (61,924 tU in 2024) for countries, ownership, mining methods, resources, requirements by country and the outlook, and the WNA (60,213 tU) for the 2015–2024 world series, the coverage ratio, mines and companies. Correlations use monthly percentage changes, January 2000–December 2025 (the uranium ETF from December 2010); uranium and the equities are month-end values, the other assets monthly averages. Equity episodes use annual averages of daily closes. Every derived figure is computed in scripts kept with this guide’s evidence. Pounds of U₃O₈ convert at 2,599.8 lb per tU and Canadian dollars at the Bank of Canada’s 2025 average. Judgement columns are labelled. Resources, reserves and forecasts are estimates, not measured facts.

Data gaps & substitutions.

  • The price. No agency publishes a free monthly series of the trade-press spot price; this guide uses the industry averages Cameco publishes, which match the averages in Cameco’s audited annual report. The IMF’s “Global price of Uranium” (FRED series PURANUSDM) tracks the same spot price until about 2020 but runs well below it since — $69.7 against $85.1 for the 2024 average — so it is not used.
  • Requirements by country over time. No agency publishes an annual series of uranium requirements by country back to 2000, so Table 7 shows nuclear generation by region (Energy Institute) as the demand series, and Table 10 implies world requirements from the WNA’s coverage ratio. The Red Book and the WNA count requirements differently (64,584 tU for 2024 against the WNA’s 68,920 tU for 2025).
  • Trade. Several producers report no uranium trade to UN Comtrade, so Section 2.6 shows the origins of what EU and US utilities bought (ESA, EIA) in place of exporter and importer tables, and the chokepoint table covers conversion and enrichment, not shipping lanes. The EIA withholds the Russian-origin share of US purchases. The WNA’s latest conversion data are for 2022.
  • Companies and mines. Production is the WNA’s 2024 company ranking, one basis for every row. State producers — Uranium One, CGN, Navoi, CNNC, Rosatom — publish no reserves in the documents checked; Orano publishes no group production total; BHP prints no contained uranium. Husab’s and Rössing’s 2025 output are not in the documents checked. Only three producers publish a comparable unit cost, so the cost curve covers about a third of world output, on three definitions.
  • Inventories. Only EU and US inventories are published; China’s, Russia’s and India’s are not, and the figures for China and India in Section 2.8 are the WNA estimates the Red Book cites.
  • Resources. The WNA’s resource table prints a world total that does not match the Red Book it cites; the Red Book is used directly.
  • Exchange and web pages. CME and NRC pages refused scripted downloads and were read in a browser; the WNA, Cameco and Sprott pages are live pages, saved on the date this guide was refreshed.
  • Equity prices. No primary daily price history for Cameco or the Global X Uranium ETF can be downloaded free, so the correlations and the equity amplifier (Section 5.3) use CNBC’s chart data — split-adjusted closes, used for percentage moves only.

Refresh log.

  • 10 Oct 2026 — full refresh. Moved market structure and the outlook to the Red Book 2026, reactors to the IAEA’s 2026 reactor list, purchases and inventories to the 2025 ESA and EIA reports, and companies and costs to the producers’ 2025 filings. Rebuilt prices on Cameco’s month-end averages and the correlations and equity amplifier on computed monthly data (Cameco’s correlation with uranium is +0.33, not ≈ +0.8; its 2011–2016 fall −61%, not −75%). Corrected the enrichment, reactor-type, ISL and resource figures, removed claims no source supports, and pinned every figure to its document.
  • 5 Jul 2026 — first published; revised 18 Jul 2026 (data as of 2 July 2026).

The register below is the guide’s reference list: one band per document, in order of first use, each linked to the edition cited.

Table 33. Source register — the document behind every table and figure

Table / figure What it takes Locator Period
OECD-NEA/IAEA, Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand (“Red Book”) — printed page numbers
Figure 1; Tables 4, 8, 11; Figures 4, 9 Mine production by country and world Table 1.18 “Historical uranium production”, pp.77–78 2022–2025e
Table 4; Section 2.1 Ownership; changes by country; Niger Tables 1.17, 1.19, pp.77, 89 2022–2024
Figure 1; Tables 6, 11; Figures 5, 9 Reactors and 2024 requirements by country Table 2.1 “Nuclear power plant data summary”, p.106 2024
Figure 1; Table 10 Production against requirements, 96% “Primary sources of uranium supply”, p.127 2024
Figure 1; Table 9 Identified recoverable resources by country Table 1.2a, column "<USD 130/kgU”, pp.24–25 1 Jan 2025
Tables 1, 33 Unit conversions; glossary definitions Appendix 3, p.539 —
Table 7 note Nuclear generation, world Table 2.2, p.107 2024
Tables 12, 13; Sections 1.3, 2.5, 2.8 EU and US utility inventories; China and India inventory estimates; secondary supply, HEU, MOX, RepU, fuel banks; spot share of transactions Table 2.5, p.131; pp.128–133; p.136 2015–2024
Table 13; Figure 10 Production by mining method Table 1.22, p.92 2022–2025p
Tables 16, 31; Figures 19, 21; Sections 2.4, 5.4, 6 Market developments; ESA role; requirements and capability to 2050; capacity pp.135–139; Tables 2.3, 2.4, p.124–125; Table 1.23, p.93 2024–2050
Cameco, Uranium Price — month-end industry averages of UxC and TradeTech prices
Figure 1; Tables 2, 3, 27, 28; Figures 3, 18, 19 Spot and long-term prices; trailing 12 months; episodes; correlations “Uranium Spot Price”, “Long-term Uranium Price”, month-end 2000–Sep 2026
WNA, Uranium Enrichment (capacity from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2025)
Figure 1; Tables 15, 16; Figure 12; Sections 1.1, 2.6 Enrichment capacity by operator; US ban and waivers; capacity additions; isotopes Table “World enrichment capacity”; text 2022, 2025, 2030
WNA, Conversion and Deconversion (from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2023)
Figure 2; Table 15 Conversion capacity and production by company Table “Estimated world primary conversion capacity and UF₆ production 2022” 2022
US EIA, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report
Tables 1, 2, 12, 14, 15; Figure 11 Purchases by origin and price; SWU purchases and price; inventories by owner Tables 3, 16, 23, pp.21, 45, 59 2021–2025
FRED, CPIAUCSL (US CPI-U)
Table 3 Deflator for the real price row Monthly series, annual means 2000–2025
CME Group, UxC Uranium U₃O₈ Futures Contract Specs
Tables 2, 24 Contract unit and settlement “Contract Unit”, “Settlement Method” —
Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2025
Tables 2, 12, 14, 15; Figure 11 EU prices; purchases by origin; enrichment origin; inventories and requirements p.11; Table 3, p.12; Table 5, p.15; pp.10, 16–17 2025
Cameco, 2025 Annual Report
Table 3 note; Tables 5, 21, 23, 26; Figures 16, 17 Price averages; mine output and grades; reserves; realised price; cash cost pp.57–58, 78, 82, 110 2024–2025
Kazatomprom, 2025 Integrated Annual Report (annual reports → 2025)
Tables 5, 16, 21, 23, 26; Figure 17 Output by asset; attributable output; reserves; shareholders; C1 and AISC pp.35–37, 41, 45–46 2024–2025
BHP, Annual Report 2025
Tables 5, 21 Olympic Dam uranium output; ore reserves pp.201, 210 Year to Jun 2025
Orano, Annual Activity Report 2025
Tables 5, 16, 21; Section 5.5 KATCO operator; state ownership; reserves; Niger pp.14, 34–36 2025
IAEA, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 2026 edition (RDS-2)
Tables 6, 17, 18, 20; Figures 13, 15; Section 3 Reactors under construction; fleet by type; planned, under construction and operating SMRs; grid-connection dates Tables 1, 2, 12–14, 23, pp.8–11, 26–49, 77 31 Dec 2025
Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2026 — data workbook
Table 7; Figure 6; Section 5.5 Nuclear generation by region and Germany Sheet “Nuclear Generation - TWh” 2000–2025
WNA, World Uranium Mining Production
Tables 8, 10, 21; Figures 7, 8, 16 World production and coverage ratio; production by company Tables “Production from mines (tonnes U)”, “Uranium production by company 2024” 2015–2024
WNA, In Situ Leach Mining of Uranium
Table 13; Section 1.1 ISL share in 2000 Text, “has risen significantly from 16% in 2000” 2000
WNA, Military Warheads as a Source of Nuclear Fuel
Section 2.8 Megatons to Megawatts “Megatons to Megawatts, the Russian HEU deal” 1993–2013
WNA, World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025 (summary page)
Table 16; Section 6.1 Reference and Upper scenarios; 2025 requirements Summary text 2025–2040
WNA, Nuclear Power Reactors
Table 17; Section 3.1 Moderators, coolants and fuels by type Text —
WNA, Generation IV Nuclear Reactors
Table 18; Figure 14 Six Generation IV designs Text —
US NRC, Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal; US NRC, Status of Subsequent License Renewal Applications; Status of Initial License Renewal Applications
Table 19; Section 3.3 Original 40-year licence and 20-year renewals; completed renewals Backgrounder text; “Completed Applications” tables 2000–2026
WNA, Small Nuclear Power Reactors; High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium
Table 20; Section 3.4 SMR definition and design count; HALEU supply Text —
Denison Mines and NexGen Energy, 2025 Annual Information Forms
Tables 22, 32; Section 4.2 Phoenix and Arrow reserves; licensing status Denison pp.8, 38; NexGen pp.3, 7 2025–2026
Sprott, Sprott Physical Uranium Trust
Table 24; Figure 19; Section 5.1 Structure, holdings, storage, inception Fund page —
Paladin Energy, Annual Report 2025 (ASX announcements → Annual Report 2025)
Table 26; Figure 17 Langer Heinrich output and cost pp.4, 10, 63 Year to Jun 2025
Bank of Canada, daily exchange rates
Table 26 US dollar to Canadian dollar Series FXUSDCAD, 2025 mean 2025
Robert Shiller, ie_data
Tables 27, 28; Figure 18 S&P 500 monthly Sheet “Data”, column “P” 2000–2025
World Bank, Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), monthly
Table 28; Figure 18 Gold, Brent and copper monthly Sheet “Monthly Prices” 2000–2025
CNBC chart data — Cameco (NYSE:CCJ) and Global X Uranium ETF (URA) daily closes
Table 28; Figure 18; Section 5.3 Monthly and annual equity prices Split-adjusted closes 2000–2025
FRED, PURANUSDM — IMF “Global price of Uranium”
Section 8.1 (data gaps) 2024 average, as the series not used Monthly series, annual mean 2024
This guide — derived, estimated or illustrative
Figure 1 (notes 2, 7, 8); Figure 9; Tables 3, 4, 6, 9–12, 14, 15, 21, 26, 31 Market size, real prices, shares, implied requirements and shortfalls, net positions, cover, reserve lives, gaps Operations stated in each source line 2000–2050
Tables 27, 28; Figures 15, 18; Section 5.3 Episode moves, correlations, volatility, amplifier returns, reactor age bands Computed from the series above 2000–2025
Figures 2, 14, 20; Tables 16, 18, 22–25, 29, 30, 32; the Terms list Fuel cycle, generations, risk map, bodies, archetypes, assets, vehicles, screening, drivers, scenarios, catalysts, the Terms list’s wording This guide’s summaries and judgements —
Tables 2, 11, 13, 16, 17, 22, 24, 27, 28 The role, leverage, price-response, sensitivity, regime and note columns Judgement columns, labelled in each source line —

Source: compiled from the source lines under each table and figure in this guide; each band links the edition cited, and the closing band lists the figures that are this guide’s own computation or judgement.

8.2 Disclaimer & disclosure

This report is for informational purposes only and is not investment advice, a recommendation, or an offer to buy or sell any security or commodity. Uranium prices are volatile, and the figures here are estimates as of the stated date that will change; resources, reserves, forecasts, correlations and regime descriptions are estimates and historical observations that may not persist. Do your own research and consult a licensed financial adviser before acting. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI; its figures were sourced from the documents in the register above and reviewed, but readers should verify any number before relying on it. The author holds no position disclosed as a conflict in respect of the companies named.