Endeavour Mining (EDV) — Stock Analysis 2026 [3.3]

Analysis as of 8 August 2026. A point-in-time snapshot, not an evergreen guide. Fundamentals come from Endeavour Mining’s FY2025 Annual Report (year ended 31 December 2025) and its H1/Q2 2026 results released 30 July 2026. Market data is as of the TSX close in early August 2026, expressed as a US$47.40 equivalent (≈C$66 / ≈£35). Rating: ★★★½, Solid — Modestly undervalued → re-rating candidate: cheap for a reason (West Africa). Price deck: gold spot ~US$4,350/oz, base US$3,500/oz, conservative US$2,900/oz; 5% real post-tax discount rate. All figures are US dollars (Endeavour’s reporting currency) unless marked otherwise. Refreshed on each annual report and on material events. For information only, prepared with AI assistance — see the disclaimer at the end.

Endeavour Mining is the largest gold producer focused entirely on West Africa — about 1.2 million ounces a year from Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mali — and it is one of the cheapest gold stocks anywhere: roughly 8× forward earnings, 4.6× EV/EBITDA, and 0.88× a net asset value that already discounts its geography hard. It has the best exploration record in the industry (over 20 million ounces discovered since 2016 at under $25 an ounce), it just crossed into net cash, and it is about to build a genuinely tier-1 mine in Assafou. The thesis in one line: a high-margin, net-cash, exploration-rich producer trading at a deep discount for one reason — it operates only in West Africa — with the analyst community rating it a Strong Buy and this analysis rating it modestly undervalued. Why look now: the shares are ~30% below their 2026 high while gold is near a record, Assafou’s feasibility study confirmed elite economics, and the balance sheet is now net cash. To screen Endeavour against every listed gold producer on grade, cost, reserve life and stage, go to Metal Pilot.

1. Snapshot & thesis

Endeavour Mining plc (LSE: EDV; TSX: EDV; OTCQX: EDVMF) is a senior gold producer headquartered in London and focused entirely on West Africa, with five operating mines — Ity and Lafigué in Côte d’Ivoire, Sabodala-Massawa in Senegal, and Houndé and Mana in Burkina Faso — behind the Assafou development project (Côte d’Ivoire) and Kalana (Mali). By archetype it is a diversified single-region gold producer/operator, so the full nine-dimension rubric applies (Section 9) and the valuation runs sum-of-the-parts (Section 7). (AISC = all-in sustaining cost; koz = thousand ounces, Moz = million ounces; 2P = proven and probable reserves; M&I = measured and indicated resources; DFS = definitive feasibility study.)

Figure 1. Endeavour Mining in numbers

Figure data: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report and H1 2026 results (30 July 2026); market data per stockanalysis.com in early August 2026, converted to USD at ~0.71 CAD/USD. Rating per Section 9, valuation read per Section 7.

Table 1. Endeavour Mining in numbers

Source: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report for reserves, resources, production and financial detail, prepared under NI 43-101 / JORC; H1/Q2 2026 figures per the H1 2026 results , 30 July 2026; market data, share count and consensus per stockanalysis.com , Aug 2026. Endeavour reports in US dollars but trades on the LSE (GBP), TSX (CAD) and OTCQX (USD); the share price shown is a US$ equivalent at ~0.71 CAD/USD. Listed: Public (LSE/TSX: EDV).

Thesis in brief. Bull: one of the cheapest gold producers anywhere — ~8× forward earnings, ~4.6× EV/EBITDA and 0.88× a jurisdiction-discounted net asset value — with a ~55% EBITDA margin, net cash, a 3.1% dividend, the best exploration record in the industry (>20 Moz discovered since 2016), and a genuinely tier-1 growth project in Assafou (320 koz at ~$1,026/oz); the analyst consensus is Strong Buy with ~50% upside. Bear: the discount is earned — 100% of production is in West Africa, including Burkina Faso and Mali, where military governments, jihadist insurgency and mining-code changes are live risks; costs are rising (2026 AISC guided to $1,600–1,800/oz, Q2 at $1,907); a 2024 governance failure saw the previous CEO dismissed for misconduct; and a fatal accident occurred at Lafigué in mid-2026. What tips it: whether the jurisdictions hold and Assafou is built on time and budget. The full rating and its rationale are in Section 9.

How to read this analysis: here for the verdict? The statcards above and the rating in Section 9 are the whole story. Want the evidence? Read Section 2 (the assets) through Section 7 (the valuation).

2. Assets & operations

Endeavour sells into the strongest gold market on record — spot near US$4,350/oz — and, like most West African producers, it captures the move with only a modest legacy hedge drag. For how gold is priced and why miners are a geared expression of the metal, see the Gold — A Complete Market Guide . This section spends its words on the company — and, unavoidably, on where it operates.

2.1 Portfolio overview & map

Five mines in three countries, one development project, and a single overriding characteristic: it is all in West Africa.

Table 2. Asset base (attributable)

Source: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report , production and cost tables for the year ended 31 December 2025, prepared under NI 43-101 / JORC; all figures attributable. Endeavour sold its Boungou and Wahgnion mines (both Burkina Faso) in 2023, reducing its Burkina exposure; Kalana (Mali) is stranded by the same Malian government dispute affecting other operators. Assafou’s figures are study estimates from the April 2026 DFS. Listed: Public (LSE/TSX: EDV).

Two facts about that table matter most. Côte d’Ivoire is the core — Ity, Lafigué and the Assafou project make it the largest and lowest-risk part of the portfolio — while Burkina Faso (Houndé, Mana) is the risk, a country under a military junta facing a serious security situation. And the group AISC of $1,433/oz in 2025 is rising fast, guided to $1,600–1,800/oz in 2026 and already $1,907 in Q2 — the cost pressure that partly justifies the discount.

Geographic concentration. This is the whole story: 100% of production and value is in West Africa — roughly 62% Côte d’Ivoire, 19% Senegal, 16% Burkina Faso, with Mali (Kalana) stranded. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal are relatively stable mining jurisdictions; Burkina Faso and Mali are not. There is no tier-1-jurisdiction ballast at all, which is why the jurisdiction score in Section 9 is the lowest in this series and why the market applies a deep discount. A proportional-symbol asset map is not rendered here — this analysis publishes no drawn geometry, and a symbol map is one of the graphics the component library does not express (see Section 10.1); the portfolio table and the value-by-country split below carry what it would have shown.

2.2 Where the revenue and the value sit

Endeavour is a near-pure gold producer (a small silver by-product), so the meaningful splits are by mine and — because geography is the thesis — by country.

Figure 2. Gold production by mine, 2025

Figure data: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report . Gold is roughly 99% of revenue with a minor silver by-product, so a by-metal split is trivial; the meaningful concentration is by mine and by country.

Figure 3. Net asset value by country, base case

Figure data: the Section 7 net-asset-value build (Table 6, base case: $3,500/oz gold, 5% real post-tax discount rate). Shares are of the positive asset components before the corporate charge; Assafou (development) is included within Côte d’Ivoire. Country groupings and the jurisdiction risk factors are the author’s estimates, not disclosed figures.

The two figures make the thesis concrete: Côte d’Ivoire — the good jurisdiction — is 62% of value, Senegal another 19%, and Burkina Faso 16%. The market discounts the whole company for that Burkina (and stranded Mali) exposure, even though nearly two-thirds of the value sits in a more stable country and even though the growth (Assafou) is in Côte d’Ivoire. That mismatch — between where the value is and where the fear is — is the heart of the undervaluation case in Section 7.

The next subsections take the four assets and the project that carry the value in Figure 3 — each contributes more than a tenth of production or net asset value — and then step back to group costs, reserves and peer positioning.

2.3 Ity (Côte d’Ivoire) — the flagship

Ity is the single most valuable asset and the anchor of the low-risk core: 85%-owned, in the best West African jurisdiction, producing 319 koz in 2025 at an AISC of $1,197/oz — comfortably below the group average. It is a long-life, low-cost heap-leach and CIL operation that has been steadily expanded, and it carries a large reserve and resource base with continued near-mine exploration upside. In the base-case valuation Ity is worth about $3.5 billion, roughly a quarter of gross asset value (Table 6), and it is the asset that most clearly does not deserve a deep discount — Côte d’Ivoire has been a stable, investment-friendly mining jurisdiction. If you want to understand why Endeavour’s NAV holds up even after hard country risk factors, start here: the biggest single piece sits in the safest country.

2.4 Sabodala-Massawa (Senegal)

Sabodala-Massawa is Endeavour’s Senegalese flagship — 90%-owned, 274 koz in 2025 at $1,248/oz — and the second-largest value contributor at roughly $2.7 billion, about 19% of gross asset value. A major expansion (a BIOX plant to treat the higher-grade Massawa refractory ore) lifted the asset into a larger, longer-life producer, and Senegal, like Côte d’Ivoire, has been a comparatively stable and constructive jurisdiction. Together, Ity and Sabodala-Massawa mean that the two biggest mines — over 80% of value between the low-risk pair — sit in the two most stable countries. That is the structural point the headline “100% West Africa” label obscures.

2.5 Houndé & Mana (Burkina Faso) — the risk

Here is the part the market fears. Houndé (85%, 257 koz at $1,354/oz) and Mana (85%, 173 koz at a high $2,160/oz) are both in Burkina Faso, a country run by a military junta since successive coups, facing a severe jihadist insurgency across large parts of its territory, and one that has moved to increase state participation and royalties in mining. Houndé is a solid, mid-cost mine; Mana is older, higher-cost and shorter-life. Together they are about 16% of value (~$2.2 billion), and in the model they carry the hardest jurisdiction discount (a risk factor of ~0.55) — the single biggest reason the group NAV sits below where the assets’ cash flows alone would put it. Endeavour has already reduced its Burkina exposure by selling the Boungou and Wahgnion mines in 2023; Houndé and Mana are what remains. If the security or fiscal situation in Burkina deteriorates, this is where the damage lands — and it is why the jurisdiction score in Section 9 is the lowest in this series.

2.6 Lafigué (Côte d’Ivoire) — the new mine

Lafigué is Endeavour’s newest mine, in Côte d’Ivoire (80%-owned), which came into production in 2024 and delivered 187 koz at $1,251/oz in 2025 in its first full year. It is a modern, long-life, lower-cost operation with a substantial reserve base and exploration upside, and it adds to the Côte d’Ivoire weighting that makes the portfolio less risky than the label suggests. In the base case it is worth about $2.2 billion (~16% of value). Lafigué matters as evidence for the growth thesis: Endeavour built it on schedule and it is performing — the same execution track record it is now betting on Assafou to repeat.

2.7 Assafou & the exploration machine

Assafou is the growth story and, on the numbers, a genuinely tier-1 project: 100%-owned, in Côte d’Ivoire, with an April 2026 DFS confirming 320+ koz per year over the first eight years at an AISC of about $1,026/oz across a 16-year mine life — production that is bigger, longer and cheaper than any mine Endeavour currently runs. A final investment decision is targeted for the end of 2026 with 24–30 months of construction, so first gold lands around 2028–2029. In the base case Assafou is worth about $3.1 billion risked, second only to Ity, even after discounting for country risk and time.

Behind Assafou sits the real differentiator: exploration. Endeavour has discovered more than 20 million ounces of resources since 2016 at a discovery cost under $25 an ounce — among the cheapest and most prolific track records in the industry — and targets 12–15 Moz of reserves by 2030. For a producer, organic ounces found this cheaply are worth far more than ounces bought through M&A, and this is the capability that most justifies a quality score above what the jurisdiction alone would imply. It is also the reason the reserve life keeps replenishing despite ~1.2 Moz a year of depletion.

2.8 Group production, reserves & costs

Step back to the group. Endeavour produces about 1.2 Moz a year, holds 16.6 Moz of proven and probable reserves (a ~14-year reserve life) plus a large M&I resource, and — after divesting Boungou and Wahgnion in 2023 — has a smaller but higher-quality, more Côte d’Ivoire-weighted footprint than it did five years ago.

Figure 4. Group gold production, 2021–2026E (koz)

Figure data: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report and prior-year reports; 2026E is the midpoint of guidance issued 30 July 2026. Pre-2023 figures include mines since divested and are approximate.

The story in the bars: production stepped down in 2023 — deliberately — as Endeavour sold two Burkina Faso mines, then rebuilt through Lafigué’s ramp-up. Two things stand out on cost, though. AISC is rising — $1,433/oz in 2025, guided to $1,600–1,800/oz in 2026, and $1,907 in Q2 — driven by waste stripping and sustaining capital, which compresses the margin even as gold rises. And Assafou is the fix: a 320 koz mine at ~$1,026/oz would pull the group cost curve down materially when it starts. The reserve base (16.6 Moz) plus the exploration engine keep the mine lives long; the near-term question is cost, and the answer is a few years out.

2.9 Peer positioning

Against its natural peers, Endeavour occupies a clear niche: the largest, most liquid, best-capitalised West African gold producer — bigger and more diversified than single-country West African names like Perseus or Resolute, but without the tier-1-jurisdiction ballast of the seniors it is otherwise sized against.

Table 3. Endeavour vs. selected gold-producer peers

Source: latest company filings for each; Endeavour figures per its FY2025 Annual Report . Production and AISC are approximate and on differing bases; for a like-for-like screen across every listed producer see Metal Pilot. Peer links are to Metal Pilot analyses.

The comparison that matters most is Barrick, whose Malian mine was effectively seized by the same government that leaves Endeavour’s Kalana stranded — a live reminder of what the tail risk looks like. Against the tier-1 seniors like Agnico, Endeavour trades at roughly half the EV/EBITDA multiple; the entire gap is jurisdiction. The investment question is whether that gap is too wide given that 80%+ of Endeavour’s value sits in the more stable countries — the subject of Sections 7 and 9.

3. Financial performance & balance sheet

Endeavour’s financial trajectory has two chapters. Through 2022–2024 the reported numbers were messy — depressed by impairments and the losses on exiting the Boungou and Wahgnion mines — and net earnings attributable to shareholders were negative in three straight years. Then 2025 arrived: record gold prices met a de-risked, more Côte d’Ivoire-weighted portfolio, and the result was a $4.2 billion revenue year, a ~55% adjusted EBITDA margin, over $1.1 billion of free cash flow, and a swing to net cash.

Figure 5. Revenue, 2021–2025 (US$ m)

Table 4. Five-year financial summary (US$ m unless stated)

Source: Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report and prior-year reports; standardized figures cross-checked against stockanalysis.com . ¹ Statutory net earnings/(loss) attributable to shareholders — the 2022–2024 losses reflect impairments and the losses on divesting the Boungou and Wahgnion mines. ² Adjusted net earnings (Endeavour’s preferred measure, stripping out one-offs); 2025 was $781.9 m ($3.23/share). Earlier-year adjusted and EBITDA figures are approximate. Net debt for 2021–2023 is estimated.

Three things carry the balance-sheet read. The deleveraging is real — net debt fell from ~$684 m at the end of 2024 to $158 m at the end of 2025 (a ~$527 m repayment), and by mid-2026 Endeavour was net cash (roughly $0.4 billion at the end of Q1, with H1 free cash flow of $761 m on top). The margin is high — ~55% adjusted EBITDA — and cash-generative even with rising AISC. And the return of capital has stepped up: a $1.45 dividend (3.1% yield) plus buybacks, with management guiding to $1 billion or more of shareholder returns over 2026–2028. For a company this cheap, that combination — net cash, high margin, growing dividend, buybacks — is the reason the analyst consensus is a Strong Buy despite the geography.

The one caution the table flags is cost: with AISC guided up to $1,600–1,800/oz in 2026, the margin will compress from the 2025 peak unless gold keeps rising — which is exactly why Assafou’s ~$1,026/oz economics matter to the medium-term picture.

4. Management, strategy & structure

Endeavour’s strategy is coherent and, on execution, well-proven: build and explore in West Africa, keep the balance sheet strong, and return the cash. It has delivered on the operational half — Lafigué built on time, Sabodala-Massawa expanded, Assafou advanced to a positive DFS, and the industry’s best per-ounce discovery record — while deleveraging to net cash and lifting the dividend. The organic-growth-plus-returns model is genuinely differentiated from peers who lean on acquisitions.

The blemish is governance, and it is a real one. In January 2024 the board dismissed then-CEO Sébastien de Montessus — the executive who had built modern Endeavour through the SEMAFO and Teranga mergers — for “serious misconduct” relating to an irregular ~$5.9 million payment instruction. It was an abrupt, reputational shock at the top of the company. Ian Cockerill, a veteran mining executive, stepped in as CEO and has since steadied the ship, but the episode is recent enough to temper the management and capital-allocation scores in Section 9: a company whose growth was tied so closely to one leader carries key-person and culture questions until the new team has a longer track record. A separate, sobering note: Endeavour reported a fatal contractor accident at Lafigué in June 2026 — a reminder that operating in this environment carries human as well as financial risk.

On structure, Endeavour is a UK-domiciled plc listed on the LSE, TSX and OTCQX, with a broad institutional register (BlackRock among the large holders) and no controlling shareholder — a clean, liquid, widely-held senior. It reports in US dollars, which is why this analysis is denominated in USD even though the shares quote in GBP and CAD.

5. Sustainability & ESG

Endeavour’s ESG profile is inseparable from where it operates, and it cuts both ways. On the positive side, the company is a major economic force in its host countries — it reports well over $900 million a year in taxes, royalties, salaries and local procurement to West African governments and communities, and frames itself as a development partner, which is both genuine and strategically necessary for its social licence in fragile states. Its exploration success also means it replaces the ounces it mines, extending mine lives and the associated local employment.

On the risk side, the same fragile-state context that discounts the equity weighs on ESG: security and community risk in Burkina Faso and Mali, exposure to jurisdictions with weaker governance and human-rights environments, and the June 2026 fatality at Lafigué, which is the most serious kind of safety event and will draw scrutiny of the company’s contractor-safety systems. The governance failure at the CEO level in 2024 also sits in the “G” of ESG. Net, this is a company doing meaningful development work in hard places, but one whose ESG risk is structurally higher than a tier-1-jurisdiction senior’s — reflected in a middling ESG score in Section 9.

6. Risk assessment

Endeavour’s risks are unusually concentrated in one dimension — geography — which is precisely why the stock is cheap. The matrix places each risk by likelihood and severity.

Figure 6. Endeavour Mining risk matrix

Author’s assessment. The shaded corner marks the high-likelihood, high-severity quadrant.

Table 5. Principal risks

The single risk that dominates is the top row. Endeavour has no tier-1-jurisdiction ballast, so a serious deterioration in Burkina Faso — a fiscal grab, a security incident forcing a shutdown, or a Mali-style seizure spreading — would hit ~16% of value directly and re-rate the whole company. That is a genuine, non-trivial tail, and it is why even a cheap valuation and a Strong Buy consensus deserve the sober framing this analysis gives. The mitigants are real too: the value is 80%+ in more stable Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, the balance sheet is net cash, and management has already trimmed Burkina exposure once. The stock is a bet that the market over-discounts a concentrated but partly-diversifiable risk.

7. Valuation

Endeavour is a diversified single-region gold producer, so the valuation is built sum-of-the-parts: a risked net asset value across the five mines plus Assafou and the resource base, cross-checked against P/NAV, an EV/EBITDA multiple and the analyst consensus. The crucial modelling choice is explicit country risk: each mine’s after-tax cash flows are discounted at a 5% real rate and multiplied by a jurisdiction risk factor — roughly 0.80 for Côte d’Ivoire, 0.75 for Senegal, and 0.55 for Burkina Faso — so the “100% West Africa” reality is baked into the number, not hand-waved. Assafou is risked further for development and timing. (Method weights follow the producer archetype: 55% NAV, 25% P/NAV, 20% EV/EBITDA. The consensus target and dividend yield are cross-checks that carry no weight.)

7.1 Net asset value (sum-of-the-parts)

Table 6. Base-case NAV build (US$ m, 5% real discount, $3,500/oz gold, risked for jurisdiction)

Author’s model. Attributable production and AISC per the FY2025 Annual Report ; Assafou per the April 2026 DFS. Jurisdiction risk factors (~0.80 Côte d’Ivoire, ~0.75 Senegal, ~0.55 Burkina Faso; Assafou risked further) are the author’s estimates and are the single largest judgement in the model. Per-share on ~242 m shares.

At $53.94 per share, base-case NAV sits about 14% above the ~$47.40 share price — a P/NAV of 0.88×. That is the headline: even after discounting Burkina Faso hard and haircutting Assafou for development risk, Endeavour trades below its risked net asset value. The waterfall shows where the value is built and, just as importantly, how the corporate charge and reclamation pull it back.

Figure 7. Net asset value build-up (US$ m)

Côte d’Ivoire producing = Ity + Lafigué; Burkina Faso = Houndé + Mana; resources & corporate nets resource value against the capitalised corporate charge.

7.2 Sensitivity

Gold price and discount rate move the number a lot — this is a high-operating-leverage producer — so the grid matters as much as the point estimate.

Figure 8. NAV per share (US$) by gold price and discount rate

The grid makes the undervaluation tangible: at the base gold deck ($3,500), NAV is $53.94 at a 5% discount — and even at a punitive 7% discount it is $47.74, still at the share price. Read the other way, the market is paying for Endeavour as if gold were around $3,200–3,500 — well below the ~$4,350 spot — giving the stock no credit for the current price, let alone for Assafou or exploration. That is the definition of a discounted producer.

7.3 Scenarios & the value read

Table 7. Scenario summary

Author’s model. Blended = 55% NAV + 25% P/NAV + 20% EV/EBITDA, per the producer archetype. The Strong Buy analyst consensus (~C$100 target, ~+50%) and the 3.1% dividend yield are cross-checks and carry no weight.

Table 8. Valuation cross-checks (base case)

The five-point value read: Modestly undervalued. Every measure points the same way — 0.88× risked NAV, ~4.6× EV/EBITDA, ~8× forward earnings, and a base-case blended fair value of ~$57 that is ~20% above the price (a modestly-undervalued read on the US$3,500 base deck; the analyst consensus at ~+50% is more bullish, and at spot gold near US$4,350 the upside is far larger still). This is not a case where you have to believe a heroic gold price to make the stock work; the base deck alone gets you there, and the model already discounts the jurisdictions hard. The reason it is cheap is legible and singular — West Africa — and the reason it could re-rate is equally legible: the jurisdictions holding, Assafou getting built, and $1 billion-plus of cash coming back to shareholders. The bear case (−33% at $2,900 gold) is real and would be led by a Burkina/Mali shock, not by the business under-performing. On balance, this is the cheapest, highest-upside name in this series — modestly undervalued on the conservative base deck (and materially cheaper at spot), for a reason you can name and monitor.

8. Near-term catalysts

The next 12–18 months carry a clear, dated slate — with Assafou’s investment decision the one that matters most.

Table 9. Catalysts to watch

Author’s compilation from Endeavour disclosures and the H1 2026 results.

Two of these are upside catalysts (Assafou FID, exploration, capital returns) and one is a two-sided risk (Burkina/Mali). The asymmetry the bull case relies on is that the market is already pricing the downside — so stability in West Africa, not improvement, is enough to let the growth and cash-return catalysts pull the multiple up. No takeover subsection is included: at ~$11.5 billion Endeavour is a large, widely-held senior, and a bid is not part of the investment case.

9. Rating & verdict

Endeavour scores on a nine-dimension framework. Five core dimensions carry a 15% weight each; four secondary dimensions carry 6.25% each. The composite is the weighted average, expressed to one decimal.

Table 10. Nine-dimension scorecard

Author’s assessment. Weighted average = (0.15×3)+(0.15×3)+(0.15×4)+(0.15×4)+(0.15×3)+(0.0625×4)+(0.0625×3)+(0.0625×2)+(0.0625×3) = 3.30.

Composite: 3.3 / 5 → ★★★½ (Solid). The scorecard captures the split personality precisely: genuinely strong on reserves, exploration, balance sheet and growth (the ★★★★ dimensions), held back by rising costs and — decisively — the industry’s weakest jurisdiction mix and a recent governance stumble. A company this good on the operating and exploration axes would rate a half-star higher in a tier-1 jurisdiction; the geography is exactly what the market is discounting, and exactly what caps the quality score.

Table 11. Two-axis verdict

The verdict. Endeavour is a Solid, modestly undervalued producer — the deep-value corner of the precious-metals spectrum. On quality it is a clear cut below tier-1 seniors like Agnico Eagle , not because it mines or explores poorly (it does both well) but because every ounce is in West Africa. On value it is the cheapest name in this series: 0.88× risked NAV, ~4.6× EV/EBITDA, ~8× forward earnings, net cash, a 3.1% dividend, and ~20% base-case upside before the analyst consensus’s more bullish ~50%. The two-axis cell is “re-rating candidate — cheap for a reason”: the reason is legible (Burkina Faso and Mali), and so is the catalyst path (jurisdiction stability, Assafou delivery, $1 bn+ of returns). This is a stock for investors who can hold a real, nameable tail risk in exchange for a discount the market has arguably overdone — the mirror image of paying up for Agnico’s safety, and a close cousin of the deep-value cases in Barrick and Gold Fields . Whether it belongs in a portfolio depends entirely on your tolerance for West African jurisdiction risk — but the price already assumes a lot goes wrong.

10. Sources & methodology

10.1 Notes on the figures

The statcards, rank-bars, cost/production columns, risk matrix, NAV waterfall and sensitivity grid are authored in HTML/CSS to the Metal Pilot component standard; this analysis publishes no SVG and no drawn geometry. A proportional-symbol asset map (Section 2.1) is deliberately omitted — a geographic symbol map is one of the graphic types the component library does not express — with the portfolio table and the value-by-country split (Figure 3) carrying that information instead. All figures are the author’s models and estimates unless a primary source is cited; the jurisdiction risk factors in the valuation are the single largest judgement in the model and are explicitly the author’s own.

10.2 Primary & market sources

• Endeavour Mining FY2025 Annual Report — production, reserves, resources, costs and financial statements (year ended 31 December 2025).
• Endeavour Reports Strong H1-2026 Results — Q2/H1 2026 production, AISC, free cash flow and net-cash position (30 July 2026).
• Endeavour announces positive DFS results for the Assafou project — Assafou definitive feasibility study (April 2026).
• stockanalysis.com — Endeavour Mining (TSX:EDV) and financials — share price, market data, consensus and five-year financials (USD), early August 2026.
• Metal Pilot gold stock screener — cross-company production, cost, reserve and stage comparison.
• Related Metal Pilot analyses: Agnico Eagle , Barrick Mining , Gold Fields , Kinross Gold ; context in the Gold — A Complete Market Guide .

10.3 Disclaimer

This analysis is for information and education only. It is not investment advice, not a recommendation, and not an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security. Commodity equities — and West African gold producers in particular — are volatile and can lose value rapidly; jurisdiction, security and gold-price risks are material and can crystallise without warning. Figures are as of the dates stated and will go stale; valuation models rest on assumptions (notably the gold price deck, discount rate and jurisdiction risk factors) that reasonable analysts will dispute. The author holds no position in Endeavour Mining. Always do your own research and consider consulting a licensed financial adviser before investing.

Prepared with AI assistance (Claude Opus 4.8). The financial models, structure and judgements follow the Metal Pilot company-analysis methodology; all data is drawn from the primary and market sources cited above and was checked against them, but errors are possible — verify against original filings before relying on any figure.